Event structure in perception and conception

Events can be understood in terms of their temporal structure. The authors first draw on several bodies of research to construct an analysis of how people use event structure in perception, understanding, planning, and action. Philosophy provides a grounding for the basic units of events and actions. Perceptual psychology provides an analogy to object perception: Like objects, events belong to categories, and, like objects, events have parts. These relationships generate 2 hierarchical organizations for events: taxonomies and partonomies. Event partonomies have been studied by looking at how people segment activity as it happens. Structured representations of events can relate partonomy to goal relationships and causal structure; such representations have been shown to drive narrative comprehension, memory, and planning. Computational models provide insight into how mental representations might be organized and transformed. These different approaches to event structure converge on an explanation of how multiple sources of information interact in event perception and conception.     

Objects, parts, and categories

Concepts may be organized into taxonomies varying in inclusiveness or abstraction, such as furniture, table, card table or animal, bird, robin. For taxonomies of common objects and organisms, the basic level, the level of table and bird, has been determined to be most informative (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Psychology, linguistics, and anthropology have produced a variety of measures of perception, behavior, and communication that converge on the basic level. Here, we present data showing that the basic level differs qualitatively from other levels in taxonomies of objects and of living things and present an explanation for why so many measures converge at that level. We have found that part terms proliferate in subjects' listings of attributes characterizing category members at the basic level, but are rarely listed at a general level. At a more specific level, fewer parts are listed, though more are judged to be true. Basic level objects are distinguished from one another by parts, but members of subordinate categories share parts and differ from one another on other attributes. Informants agree on the parts of objects, and also on relative "goodness" of the various parts. Perceptual salience and functional significance both appear to contribute to perceived part goodness. Names of parts frequently enjoy a duality not evident in names of other attributes; they refer at once to a particular appearance and to a particular function. We propose that part configuration underlies the various empirical operations of perception, behavior, and communication that converge at the basic level. Part configuration underlies the perceptual measures because it determines the shapes of objects to a large degree. Parts underlie the behavioral tasks because most of our behaviors is indirect toward parts of objects. Labeling appears to follow the natural breaks of perception and behavior; consequently, part configuration also underlies communication measures. Because elements of more abstract taxonomies, such as scenes and events, can also be decomposed into parts, this analysis provides a bridge to organization in other domains of knowledge. Knowledge organization by parts (partonomy) is contrasted to organization by kinds (taxonomy). Taxonomies serve to organize numerous classes of entities and to allow inference from larger sets to sets included in them. Partonomies serve to separate entities into their structural components and to organize knowledge of function by components of structure. The informativeness of the basic level may originate from the availability of inference from structure to function at that level.     

Knowledge of natural kinds in semantic dementia and Alzheimer's disease

We examined the semantic impairment for natural kinds in patients with probable Alzheimer's disease (AD) and semantic dementia (SD) using an inductive reasoning paradigm. To learn about the relationships between natural kind exemplars and how these are distinguished from manufactured artifacts, subjects judged the strength of arguments such as "Humans have a chemical called sebum. Therefore, frogs have a chemical called sebum." These judgments depend on subjects' perception of the similarity between the familiar objects named in the premise and the conclusion. Controls rated arguments generalizing from a natural kind to an artifact as significantly weaker than arguments generalizing from one natural kind to another natural kind. SD patients demonstrated a graded profile of generalization without evidence of a categorical distinction between natural kinds and artifacts. AD patients' judgments also suggested more difficulty than controls at distinguishing between natural kinds and artifacts. Both SD patients and AD patients resembled controls in their judgments of arguments where both objects are from the natural kinds category. Semantic knowledge thus appears to be sufficiently preserved in both AD and SD to support within-category similarity judgments. We suggest that SD patients may be impaired in part at identifying the features critical to diagnosing membership in a semantic category, while AD patients' performance is consistent with their semantic categorization deficit.     

Parts of activities: reply to Fellbaum and Miller (1990)

If people believe that one activity is a kind of another, they also tend to believe that the second activity is a part of the first. For example, they assert that deciding is a kind of thinking and that thinking is a part of deciding. Fellbaum and Miller's (1990) explanation for this phenomenon is based on the idea that people interpret part of in the domain of verbs as a type of logical entailment. Their explanation, however, suffers from at least 2 deficiencies. First, it fails to account for parallel effects with nouns (e.g., a contest is a kind of an activity, and an activity is a part of a contest). Second, it contains a flaw that incorrectly predicts many activities to be parts of each other (e.g., coming is part of going and going part of coming). However, a hypothesis Rips and Conrad (1989) originally proposed for the kind-part reciprocal effect avoids both of these difficulties.     

The role of mental rotation in TetrisTM gameplay: An ACT-R computational cognitive model

The mental rotation ability is an essential spatial reasoning skill in human cognition and has proven to be an essential predictor of mathematical and STEM skills, critical and computational thinking. Despite its importance, little is known about when and how mental rotation processes are activated in games explicitly targeting spatial reasoning tasks. In particular, the relationship between spatial abilities and Tetris^TM has been analysed several times in the literature. However, these analyses have shown contrasting results between the effectiveness of Tetris-based training activities to improve mental rotation skills. In this work, we studied whether, and under what conditions, such ability is used in the Tetris^TM game by explicitly modelling mental rotation via an ACT-R based cognitive model controlling a virtual agent. The obtained results show meaningful insights into the activation of mental rotation during game dynamics. The study suggests the necessity to adapt game dynamics in order to force the activation of this process and, therefore, can be of inspiration to design learning activities based on Tetris^TM or re-design the game itself to improve its educational effectiveness.     

Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements

Implicit attitudes are mental states that appear sometimes to cause agents to act in ways that conflict with their considered beliefs. Implicit attitudes are usually held to be mere associations between representations. Recently, however, some philosophers have suggested that they are, or are very like, ordinary beliefs: they are apt to feature in properly inferential processing. This claim is important, in part because there is good reason to think that the vocabulary in which we make moral assessments of ourselves and of others is keyed to folk psychological concepts, like ‘belief’, and not to concepts that feature only in scientific psychology: if implicit attitudes are beliefs there is a prima facie case for thinking that they can serve as the basis for particular kinds of moral assessment. In this paper I argue that while implicit attitudes have propositional structure, their sensitivity and responsiveness to other mental representations is too patchy and fragmented for them to properly be considered beliefs. Instead, they are a sui generis kind of mental state, a state I dub patchy endorsements.     

Perceiving expressions of emotion: What evidence could bear on questions about perceptual experience of mental states?

What evidence could bear on questions about whether humans ever perceptually experience any of another’s mental states, and how might those questions be made precise enough to test experimentally? This paper focusses on emotions and their expression. It is proposed that research on perceptual experiences of physical properties provides one model for thinking about what evidence concerning expressions of emotion might reveal about perceptual experiences of others’ mental states. This proposal motivates consideration of the hypothesis that categorical perception of expressions of emotion occurs, can be facilitated by information about agents’ emotions, and gives rise to phenomenal expectations. It is argued that the truth of this hypothesis would support a modest version of the claim that humans sometimes perceptually experience some of another’s mental states. Much available evidence is consistent with, but insufficient to establish, the truth of the hypothesis. We are probably not yet in a position to know whether humans ever perceptually experience others’ mental states.     

Spatial Proportional Reasoning Is Associated With Formal Knowledge About Fractions

Proportional reasoning involves thinking about parts and wholes (i.e., about fractional quantities). Yet, research on proportional reasoning and fraction learning has proceeded separately. This study assessed proportional reasoning and formal fraction knowledge in 8- to 10-year-olds. Participants (N = 52) saw combinations of cherry juice and water in displays that highlighted either part–whole or part–part relations. Their task was to indicate on a continuous rating scale how much each mixture would taste of cherries. Ratings suggested the use of a proportional integration rule for both kinds of displays, although more robustly and accurately for part–whole displays. The findings indicate that children may be more likely to scale proportional components when being presented with part–whole as compared with part–part displays. Crucially, ratings for part–whole problems correlated with fraction knowledge, even after controlling for age, suggesting that a sense of spatial proportions is associated with an understanding of fractional quantities.     

Children's Use of Social Categories in Thinking About People and Social Relationships

A series of studies investigated White U.S. 3- and 4-year-old children's use of gender and race information to reason about their own and others’ relationships and attributes. Three-year-old children used gender- but not race-based similarity between themselves and others to decide with whom they wanted to be friends, as well as to determine which children shared their own preferences for various social activities. Four-year-old (but not younger) children attended to gender and racial category membership to guide inferences about others’ relationships but did not use these categories to reason about others’ shared activity preferences. Taken together, the findings provide evidence for three suggestions about these children's social category-based reasoning. First, gender is a more potent category than race. Second, social categories are initially recruited for first-person reasoning but later become broad enough to support third-person inferences. Finally, at least for third-person reasoning, thinking about social categories is more attuned to social relationships than to shared attributes.     

On the cognitive effects of learning computer programming

This paper critically examines current thinking about whether learning computer programming promotes the development of general higher mental functions. We show how the available evidence, and the underlying assumptions about the process of learning to program, fail to address this issue adequately. Our analysis is based on a developmental cognitive science perspective on learning to program, incorporating developmental and cognitive science considerations of the mental activities involved in programming. It highlights the importance for future research of investigating students' interactions with instructional and programming contexts, developmental transformations of their programming skills, and their background knowledge and reasoning abilities.     

Dual-process theories of reasoning: The test of development

Dual-process theories have become increasingly influential in the psychology of reasoning. Though the distinction they introduced between intuitive and reflective thinking should have strong developmental implications, the developmental approach has rarely been used to refine or test these theories. In this article, I review several contemporary dual-process accounts of conditional reasoning that theorize the distinction between the two systems of reasoning as a contrast between heuristic and analytic processes, probabilistic and mental model reasoning, or emphasize the role of metacognitive processes in reflective reasoning. These theories are evaluated in the light of the main developmental findings. It is argued that a proper account of developmental phenomena requires the integration of the main strengths of these three approaches. I propose such an integrative theory of conditional understanding and argue that the modern dual-process framework could benefit from earlier contributions that made the same distinction between intuition and reflective thinking, such as Piaget’s theory.     

Abuse History, World Assumptions, and Religious Problem Solving

At a Christian university, 167 subjects completed questionnaires measuring worldview assumptions, religious problem solving, physical and emotional abuse, and subjects' beliefs about whether they had been "abused." Results indicated that worldview assumptions were not related to actual abuse histories. Instead, such assumptions were related to the subjects' beliefs that they had been abused. Subjects who believed that they had been abused had more negative views of the impersonal world, people, and themselves; they were also more likely to see events as random. Both actual abuse history and subjects' beliefs that they had been abused were related to religious problem-solving styles. Finally, problem-solving styles were related to various worldview assumptions. Results are discussed in terms of previous research on abuse and in the psychology of religion.     

归纳推理和演绎推理的关系理论及其模型

推理是人类高级认知过程的一种,相关的心理学研究一般将其分为归纳推理和演绎推理两个方面。归纳推理是从特殊到一般的推理过程,与之相对的演绎推理则是从一般到特殊的过程。归纳推理和演绎推理的关系问题是当前心理推理研究领域的一个重点问题。这一问题主要有两种理论解释：一种是单过程理论,该理论认为归纳推理和演绎推理本质上是同一个认知过程,以单过程理论为基础构建的推理模型称为单维模型;另一种是双过程理论,认为归纳推理和演绎推理是两个不同的认知过程,并不同程度地受到启发和分析过程的影响。未来研究可多关注推理的时间进程,以及采用不同的研究方法对各自理论提供数据支持。     

Pleasure and Illusion in Plato

Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but ignores reasoning about what is really good. Hence the new moral psychology of the Republic , not all desires are rational, and thus virtue depends on bringing one's non-rational desires under the control of reason.     

The plurality of concepts

Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the empirical data for which concepts are responsible. I argue that the assumption that concepts are uniformly the same kind of mental structure is responsible for these theories’ shortcomings, and outline a pluralist theory of concepts that rejects this assumption. On pluralism, concepts should be thought of as being constituted by multiple representational kinds, with the particular kind of concept used on an occasion being determined by the context. I argue that endorsing pluralism does not lead to eliminativism about concepts as an object of scientific interest.     

Spatial associations in relational reasoning: evidence for a SNARC-like effect

Relational reasoning (A > B, B > C, therefore A > C) shares a number of similarities with numerical cognition, including a common behavioural signature, the symbolic distance effect. Just as reaction times for evaluating relational conclusions decrease as the distance between two ordered objects increases, people need less time to compare two numbers when they are distant (e.g., 2 and 8) than when they are close (e.g., 3 and 4). Given that some remain doubtful about such analogical representations in relational reasoning, we determine whether numerical cognition and relational reasoning have other overlapping behavioural effects. Here, using relational reasoning problems that require the alignment of six items, we provide evidence showing that the subjects' linear mental representation affects motor performance when evaluating conclusions. Items accessible from the left part of a linear representation are evaluated faster when the response is made by the left, rather than the right, hand and the reverse is observed for items accessible from the right part of the linear representation. This effect, observed with the prepositions to the left of and to the right of as well as with above and below, is analogous to the SNARC (Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes) effect, which is characterized by an interaction between magnitude of numbers and side of response.     

Know yourself and you shall know the other... to a certain extent: multiple paths of influence of self-reflection on mindreading

Social and neurocognitive research suggests that thinking about one's own thinking and thinking about the thinking of others-termed 'mindreading', 'metacognition', 'social cognition' or 'mentalizing' are not identical activities. The ability though to think about thinking in the first person is nevertheless related to the ability to think about other's thoughts in the third person. Unclear is how these phenomena influence one another. In this review, we explore how self-reflection and autobiographical memory influence the capacity to think about the thoughts and emotions of others. We review studies suggesting that the more individuals are able to reflect on and retrieve episodes from their life narratives, the more they are likely to grasp others' thoughts and emotions. We discuss evidence supporting this possibility including studies of the neurocognitive bases of empathy and self-awareness and how different aspects of self-reflection may impact on mindreading. We also draw from clinical reports how improved self-reflection may result in a more nuanced mindreading, namely persons suffering from schizophrenia and narcissistic personality disorder. We finally discuss the implications for research and practice and consider whether there are conditions in which the reverse is true, where self-reflection might impair mindreading or in which mindreading may facilitate self-reflection.     

Content-blind norms, no norms, or good norms? A reply to Vranas

In the psychology of thinking, little thought is given to what constitutes good thinking. Instead, normative solutions to problems have been accepted at face value, thereby determining what counts as a reasoning fallacy. I applaud Vranas (Cognition 76 (2000) 179) for thinking seriously about norms. I do, however, disagree with his attempt to provide post hoc justifications for supposed reasoning fallacies in terms of 'content-neutral' norms. Norms need to be constructed for a specific situation, not imposed upon it in a content-blind way. The reason is that content-blind norms disregard relevant structural properties of the given situation, including polysemy, reference classes, and sampling. I also show that content-blind norms can, unwittingly, lead to double standards: the norm in one problem is the fallacy in the next. The alternative to content-blind norms is not no norms, but rather carefully designed norms.     

Implication and reasoning in mental state attribution: Comments on Jane Heal's theory of co-cognition

Simulation theory explains third-person mental state attribution in terms of an attributor's ability to imaginatively mimic other people's mental processes. Jane Heal's version of simulation theory, which she calls a theory of “co-cognition,” maintains that one can know and can predict others’ beliefs primarily by thinking about what their antecedent beliefs imply. I argue that Heal's account of belief attribution elides crucial differences between reasoning and merely discovering relations among propositions.     

Mental model construction in linear reasoning: Evidence for the construction of initial annotated models

According to the mental model theory, reasoners build an initial model representing the information given in the premises. In the context of relational reasoning, the question arises as to which kind of representation is used to cope with indeterminate or multimodel problems. The present article presents an array of possible answers arising from the initial construction of complete explicit models, partial explicit models, partial implicit models, a single "isomeric" model, or a single annotated model. Predictions generated from these views are tested in two experiments that vary the problem structure and the number of models consistent with the premises. Analyses of the premise processing times, answering times and accuracy show that the annotated model yields the best fit of the data. Implications of these findings for the mental model theory as developed for relational reasoning are discussed.