瓦托夫斯基的历史认识论与科学的理性

美国波士顿大学教授M·W·瓦托夫斯基提出了一种称为“历史认识论”的认识论观点。历史认识论认为,不仅是我们认识的对象是历史地变化的,而且认识模式本身也是历史地变化的。也就是说,我们的认识模式的变化与我们的社会实践和历史实践的形式有关;这些认识模式是:(1)在实践本身的形式内发展,作为这种实践本身的结构成分和调节成分,作为自觉的、有认识的人类活动而发展;(2)在法则、方法和理论的形式中,作为这     

论生死观演变的哲学意义

人类生死观的演变反映了人类认识能力和水平的历史进步 :(1)对人的生命本源认识的演变 ,揭示了生命起源的真谛 ;(2 )对死亡标准认识的演变 ,体现了对人的本质认识的飞跃 ;(3)对死亡态度的演变 ,标志着人类理性的觉醒。     

着力揭示科学历史观形成和发展的内在逻辑——评《走向历史的深处》

陈先达教授的学术专著《走向历史的深处——马克思历史观研究》(以下简称《历史》)以马克思历史观的形成和发展为主线,对人类社会历史发展的客观规律、人们对历史的认识以及许多现实问题进行了认真的思考,取得了可喜的成绩。     

变态心理学历史发展的四次变更

变态心理学历史的研究曾经过数次变化。在本世纪初,人们把变态心理学历史分为二个阶段,即皮内尔(Pinel)前和后的阶段;在弗洛伊德(Freud)学说全盛时代,心理学家把变态心理学历史分为精神分析前时期和精神分析时期;近代也有人把这一研究分为三次发展变化过程。这种不一致的看法是由于人们对变态心理的性质与意义认识不同所致,是人们对客观现实和社会历史变革的观点的反映。     

文化的社会功能

(1)文化的记录功能。作为文化创造和文化载体,语言符号有如言语、文字、绘画、音乐等等,和非语言符号有如陶片、石器、服饰、建筑等等,无不自觉或不自觉地记录并留下了人类特定社会形态和特定历史阶段的原貌。(2)文化的认识功能。借助于符号系统的记录,人们得以了解和认识不     

自由与实践认识

一、自由是在认识与实践过程中主观与客观的统一 自由根源于实践认识。自由是符合必然和主观目的之实践认识及其主体感受的统一体。或者说,自由是在实践认识过程中主观和客观的统一。实践认识是具体的、历史的,决定了主观与客观统一的具体性、历史性。它们一起决定了自由的具体性、历史性。 实践认识是主客观统一的表现形式。它具体地表现在四个方面: 第一,在认识过程中,主客观统一表现为符合目的的认知目的性活动,是认知目的性活动(主观)与认知必然过程(客观)的统一。认知目的性活动是有目的之认知活动,是一种特殊的实践活动,认知必然过程是一种特殊的实践过程。     

发生认识论简介

一、什么是发生认识论发生认识论是国际知名的瑞士学者让保罗·皮亚杰根据以他自己为代表的日内瓦学派对儿童心理发展的长期研究和对其他学科认识论的研究而提出来的一种关于认识论的独特理论。它用发生学的方法,即发展观点,来研究认识论。用皮氏自己的话来说,“发生认识论试图根据认识的历史,认识的社会根源,认识所依据的概念和“运算”的心理起源来解释认识,特别是解释科学认识。”[2]发生认识论有两个明显的特点:(一)用发生学的观点和方法来研究人类的认识,强调认识的个体心理起源和历史发展。皮氏认为传统的认识论只注意认识的高级水平,认识的最后结果。近代现代的认识论则专门从事认识的逻辑分析或语     

我国民族有哪些优秀的道德传统

我国是世界文明摇篮之一,有将近四千年文字可考的历史记载。在漫长的文明历史发展过程中,中华民族在认识自然、改造自然的同时,也不断认识、改造自身,认识和调节人与人之间、个人与社会之间的各种关系。在浩瀚的文化典籍中,在大量生动的民间故事和传说中,记载和描写了我国古代人民的理想、追求、感情、情操,生活观念和价值观念。透过历史上各种文化载体和民族道德——心理意识的积淀,可以看到我国民族具有特色的优秀道德遗产。它们大致有以下几个方面。 (一)廉洁奉公。我国传统道德意识特别强调     

《毛泽东哲学思想教程》简述

《毛泽东哲学思想教程》(以下简称《教程》)全书共分五大部分:总论篇(总论和结束语),论述了毛泽东哲学思想的精髓及其历史地位。历史篇(第1章),简介了毛泽东哲学的形成和发展。原理篇(第2至第7章,第9章),对毛泽东哲学的基本原理,如主观和客观相结合、认识和实践相统一、矛盾理论、唯物辩证的范畴论,自然观以及社会基本矛盾     

刘禹锡和柳宗元无神论思想研究

刘禹锡(纪元772至842年)和柳宗元(纪元773至819年)的无神论思想,不仅在唐代最为杰出,在整个中国无神论史上也有其创造性的特殊建树、有其独立的科学的历史地位。这就是说,从中国无神论史上来看,刘柳的无神论思想,有如下三个历史特点:第一,刘柳在认识自然现象、解释自然现象的场合,不仅坚持了一般的无神论原则,并且把这一原则放在唯物主义基础上做出了创造性的阐述,在阐述过程中,对于当时及历史上     

Teaching and Truthfulness

Some tendencies in modern education—the stress on ‘performativity’, for instance, and ‘celebration of difference’—threaten the value traditionally placed on truthful teaching. In this paper, truthfulness is mainly understood, following Bernard Williams, as a disposition to ‘Accuracy’ and ‘Sincerity’—hence as a virtue. It is to be distinguished from truth (a property of beliefs), and current debates about the nature of truth are not relevant to the issue of the value of truthfulness. This issue devolves into the question of whether truthfulness is a distinctive virtue of teachers, which they have a special obligation to exercise in the face of competing aims. This paper defends the idea of distinctive professional duties and considers two conceptions of teaching which ascribe a central place to truthfulness. The first conceives of teaching as a personal relationship within which trust, and hence, it is claimed, truthfulness, are paramount. This claim is challenged, and the paper concludes by sympathetically considering a second conception of teaching, articulated by Oakeshott and Heidegger. In this conception, teaching is a ‘releasement’ from ‘the daily flux’ of pupils’ lives through a truthful initiation into the alternatives to this ‘daily flux’ found within ‘the civilized inheritance of mankind’.     

"RATIONALITY" IN SCIENCE AND MORALS

Abstract. Martin Eger's comparison of controversies in science and morals is extended to a consideration of the nature of "rationality" in each. Both theoretical science and moral philosophy are held to be relativist in social and historical terms, but science also has definitive non-relativist pragmatic criteria of truth. The problem for moral philosophy is to delineate its own appropriate types of social criteria of validity.     

Habermas and validity claims

At the heart of Jürgen Habermas’s explication of communicative rationality is the contention that all speech acts oriented to understanding raise three different kinds of validity claims simultaneously: claims to truth, truthfulness, and normative rightness. This paper argues that Habermas presents exactly three distinct, logically independent arguments for his simultaneity thesis: an argument from structure; an argument from criticizability/rejectability; and an argument from understanding/reaching understanding. It is further maintained that the simultaneity thesis receives cogent support only from the Argument from understanding/reaching understanding, and only if the notion of ‘understanding’ is expanded to that of ‘agreement’.     

Aiming at Truth: Doxastic vs. Epistemic Goals

Belief is generally thought to be the primary cognitive state representing the world as being a certain way, regulating our behavior and guiding us around the world. It is thus regarded as being constitutively linked with the truth of its content. This feature of belief has been famously captured in the thesis that believing is a purposive state aiming at truth. It has however proved to be notoriously difficult to explain what the thesis really involves. In this paper, I begin by critically examining a number of recent attempts to unpack the metaphor. I shall then proceed to highlight an error that seems to cripple most of these attempts. This involves the confusion between, what I call, doxastic and epistemic goals. Finally, having offered my own positive account of the aim-of-belief thesis, I shall underline its deflationary nature by distinguishing between aiming at truth and hitting that target (truth). I end by comparing the account with certain prominent inflationary theories of the nature of belief. I am grateful to Muhammed Legenhausen, David Velleman and an anonymous referee of this journal for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Anchoring,Familiarity, and Confidence in the Detection of Deception

Anchoring in judgments is the tendency for the final judgment to be biased toward the initial estimate through insufficient adjustment. In the context of the detection of deception, it has been used to explain phenomena such as negative absolute leakage and the truthfulness bias. We examined the influence of order of judgment type on attitude ratings, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias. Receivers of communications should tend to anchor their judgments on the sender's attitudinal position if asked to make attitude judgments first and on the sender's behavior if asked to make truthfulness judgments first. The results partly support these predictions. Negative absolute leakage, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias were not significantly different for those who made attitude judgments before truthfulness judgments. However, results show that accuracy decreased as the session continued and there was no difference in the confidence with which truth and deception judgments were made, but there was a positive relation between confidence and truthfulness bias.     

The Ethics of Democratic Deceit

Deception presents a distinctive ethical problem for democratic politicians. This is because there seem in certain situations to be compelling democratic reasons for politicians both to deceive and not to deceive the public. Some philosophers have sought to negotiate this tension by appeal to moral principle, but such efforts may misrepresent the felt ambivalence surrounding dilemmas of public office. A different approach appeals to the moral character of politicians, and to the variety of forms of manipulative communication at their disposal. The public is usually more indulgent of politicians who ‘spin’ the truth than of those who tell bare‐faced lies, but this could be a mistake. Spin expresses disdain for the democratic value of truthfulness, and so democratic ‘spin‐doctors’ ought to trouble us more than they typically do. The cause of confusion here may reside in the failure to appreciate the distinctiveness of public morality, and in the misguided application of private standards of behaviour to a public context in which they are out of place.     

Varieties of Objectivity: Reply to De Mesel

In a previous paper, I argued that the later Wittgenstein did not endorse a realist account of ethics, where a realist account is understood to involve a claim to truth as well as objectivity. In this paper, I respond to a number of critical questions that Benjamin De Mesel raises about that interpretation. I agree with him that just as there are uses for expressions such as “truth”, “fact” and “reality” in ethics, there are uses for expressions such as “objectivity” that do not involve a deeper realist commitment. But I uphold and reinforce my claim that objectivity in ethics as the realist conceives it is ruled out by Wittgenstein, who describes the correspondence between ethical expressions and reality in an entirely different way.     

“技术认识”解析

要阐明技术认识论的性质、内容和理论系统,必须从技术认识开始,这是研究技术认识论的基点。明确技术认识的一个前提是准确把握什么是技术,澄清技术认识与非技术认识的界限,以此为基础才能明确什么是技术认识。一、技术与技术认识     

Pragmatism, Relativism, and the Critique of Philosophy

The relativist strain in Rorty's work should be distinguished from the Davidsonian strain. The latter may be exploited in support of Rorty's critique of philosophy but it is at odds with his use of "solidarity" and "ethnocentrism"as explanatory concepts. Once this is recognized, there remains in Rorty's work a consistent challenge to the search for general philosophical theories of truth, objectivity, and rationality (of which relativism itself is an example). On this reading, however, Rorty's pragmatism is not a theory that offers answers to questions about the authority of beliefs and practices but rather a critical tool used to open detailed, concrete, and critical investigation into particular questions about the establishment and viability of the beliefs and practices we have.     

Historical objectivity and value neutrality

To resolve the impasse between skeptic, idealist and positivist as to whether or not historical inquiry can be objective, an affirmative answer is argued by exposing, clarifying and challenging the common presupposition: the thesis of scientific value neutrality. The argument applies a more explicit version of the Braithwaite— Churchman‐Rudner position to history and thus challenges the prevalent claim that history, unlike the law, has but one goal, the establishment of truth about the past. The important yet neglected residual issue concerns what ‘objectivity’ means when inquiry (historical or scientific) is construed as a goal‐directed activity controlled by epistemic and pragmatic utilities.