自我感神经心理模型与人格同一性

如何解释“自我”是认知神经科学要面对的一个难题。临床研究发现,人脑右半球的联想区可将源自身体的感知和心智的理知整合成统一体验,即“自我感”,这是理解主观经验“我性”的一种新模型。这种新模型将神经层次的自我感与临床上对自我障碍症状研究相结合,为自我感的神经心理过程提供了一个统一解释框架,以说明人的自我认知特征和感知经验的神经心理过程。这种自我感的神经心理过程可被视为适应性表征过程,这为哲学上的人格同一性问题提供了临床经验解释,表明了神经心理过程可整合到统一经验中,从而形成一个统一的自我主观经验。

     

Broadening the Study of the Self: Integrating the Study of Personal Identity and Cultural Identity

This article reviews what is known and what remains to be studied, regarding the association between personal identity and cultural identity. Although these two conceptions of identity have inspired separate literatures and have developed independently of one another, globalization and mass immigration have increased the need to study these two conceptions of identity together. The article puts forth recommendations for integrating the literatures on personal identity and cultural identity. These recommendations include using multidimensional constructs to represent both personal identity and cultural identity, refining the measurement of personal identity and of cultural identity, and of studying these conceptions of identity across various ethnic, cultural, and national groups.     

Functionalism,the Brain,and Personal Identity

Philosophical Studies -     

Personal Identity, Autonomy and Advance Statements

abstract    Recent legal rulings concerning the status of advance statements have raised interest in the topic but failed to provide any definitive general guidelines for their enforcement. I examine arguments used to justify the moral authority of such statements. The fundamental ethical issue I am concerned with is how accounts of personal identity underpin our account of moral authority through the connection between personal identity and autonomy. I focus on how recent Animalist accounts of personal identity initially appear to provide a sound basis for extending the moral autonomy of an individual — and hence their autonomous wishes expressed through an advance statement — past the point of severe psychological decline. I argue that neither the traditional psychological account nor the more recent Animalist account of personal identity manage to provide a sufficient basis for extending our moral autonomy past the point of incapacity or incompetence. I briefly explore how analogies to similar areas in law designed to facilitate autonomous decision, such as wills and trusts, provide at best only very limited scope for an alternative justification for granting advance statements any legal or moral authority. I conclude that whilst advance statements play a useful role in formulating what treatment is in a patient's best interests, such statements do not ultimately have sufficient moral force to take precedence over paternalistic best interests judgements concerning an individual's care or treatment.     

The Integration of Personal Identity,Religious Identity,and Moral Identity in Emerging Adulthood

The present study investigated the relative roles of identity structure (i.e., personal identity) and identity contents (i.e., religious identity and moral identity) in predicting emerging adults’ prosocial and antisocial behaviors. The sample included 9,495 college students. A variable-centered analysis (path analysis) used personal identity, religious identity, and moral identity as predictors of prosocial and antisocial behavior and tested interactions of personal identity with religious identity and moral identity. Moral identity was the strongest predictor of both behaviors, and religious identity and moral identity both interacted with personal identity in predicting antisocial behavior. A person-centered analysis (latent profile analysis) found three classes: integrated, moral identity–focused, and religious identity–focused, with integrated being most adaptive on both outcomes.     

Personal Identity, Fission and Time Travel

One problem that has formed the focus of much recent discussion on personal identity is the Fission Problem. The aim of this paper is to offer a novel solution to this problem.

Locke,Kierkegaard and the Phenomenology of Personal Identity

Abstract

Personal Identity theorists as diverse as Derek Parfit, Marya Schechtman and Galen Strawson have noted that the experiencing subject (the locus of present psychological experience) and the person (a human being with a career/narrative extended across time) are not necessarily coextensive. Accordingly, we can become psychologically alienated from, and fail to experience a sense of identity with, the person we once were or will be. This presents serious problems for Locke’s original account of “sameness of consciousness” constituting personal identity, given the distinctly normative (and indeed eschatological) focus of his discussion. To succeed, the Lockean project needs to identify some phenomenal property of experience that can constitute a sense of identity with the self figured in all moments to which consciousness can be extended. I draw upon key themes in Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of moral imagination to show that Kierkegaard describes a phenomenal quality of experience that unites the experiencing subject with its past and future, regardless of facts about psychological change across time. Yet Kierkegaard’s account is fully normative, recasting affective identification with past/future selves as a moral task rather than something merely psychologically desirable (Schechtman) or utterly contingent (Parfit, Strawson).     

Personal Identity, Reductionism and the Necessity of Origins

A thought that we all entertain at some time or other is that the course of our lives might have been very different from the way they in fact have been, with the consequence that we might have been rather different sorts of persons than we actually are. A less common, but prima facie intelligible thought is that we might never have existed at all, though someone rather like us did. Arguably, any plausible theory of personal identity should be able to accommodate both possibilities. Certain currently popular Reductionist theories of personal identity, however, seem to be deficient in precisely this respect. This paper explores some Reductionist responses to that challenge. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Privacy and Personal Identity

What marks the traditional privacy torts of disclosure, intrusion, false light, and appropriation is that they require an invasion, an intrinsic harm caused by someone doing something to us without our consent. But we are now voluntarily giving up information about ourselves--to our physicians, for instance--that is being gathered into databases that are brought and sold and that can be appropriated by those who wish to assume our identities. The way in which our privacy is put at risk is different, and this leads to a new understanding of the concept of privacy. Others appropriate our identities, treating us as objects; by doing so, our standing as autonomous moral agents, controlling how we present ourselves to the world, is thus denied.     

Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments

Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit's 'fission argument' for the unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parfit's argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parfit claims, namely, that identity is not what matters. I argue that Parfit's conclusion can be blocked without denying that he has presented an imaginary case where prudential concern would be rational in the absence of identity. My analysis depends on the recognition that the features that explain or justify a relation may be distinct from the features that underpin it as necessary conditions.     

Personal Value,Biographical Identity,and Retrospective Attitudes

We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. What, if anything, accounts for such conservative retrospective attitudes? I argue that the right answer involves the significance of our personal attachments and our biographical identity. I also examine other options, such as the absence of self-to-self connections across possible worlds and a general conservatism about value.     

Self and Identity in Later Life: Protecting and Enhancing the Self

Self and identity are central concepts in the social and behavioral sciences for multiple reasons. At least three major research traditions focus on the self. First, sociologists view the self as a primary bridge between social structures and individual attitudes and behaviors, as a mechanism by which social structures and individuals affect and are affected by each other. Second, self and identity are viewed as cornerstones of well-being. Thus, social and behavioral scientists have documented important links between the self and physical and mental health, role performance, the quality of interpersonal relationships, and subjective well-being. Third, the self is conceptualized as a central motivating force in human behavior. Issues as diverse as self-selection into specific environments, defense mechanisms, and the desire and ability to break addictive behaviors have been informed by attention to the motivational force of the self. This latter tradition serves as the conceptual bedrock of this paper. This paper examines three components of the self: self-efficacy, self-esteem, and a sense of authenticity. The first two have received substantial theoretical and empirical attention; the latter, much less. I argue that this unequal distribution of scientific inquiry is a result of too much emphasis on the motivation to protect the self, to the neglect of motivation to enhance the self. I make a case for the particular importance of examining self-enhancement in late life.     

World Citizenship, Identity and the Notion of an Integrated Self

In light of the complex notions ofidentity, this paper attempts to consider howto perceive the notion of world citizenship.The paper looks to discussions on the self andidentity; focusing on the writing of CharlesTaylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, with particularattention given to the notion of an integratedself. While philosophers, sociologists andeducationalist discuss particular and universalaspects to the self, Danesh in his book`Psychology of Spirituality,' presents a modelfor the integrated self that seems to allow fora systematic process of development to helprealise a unity of character of individualidentity with an extended community. What issuggested in this paper is to consider thepossibility of an education for worldcitizenship where one can have a notion of anintegrated self and be a citizen engaged atmany levels, from local to national andinternational.