Mirrors and Misleading Appearances

Although philosophers have often insisted that specular perception is illusory or erroneous in nature, few have stressed the reliability and indispensability of mirrors as optical instruments. The main goal of this paper is to explain how mirrors can contribute to knowledge and at the same time be a source of systematic errors and misleading appearances. To resolve this apparent paradox, I argue that mirrors do not generate perceptual illusions or misperceptions, by defending a view of mirrors as transparent and invisible visual media. I then consider the reasons for which mirrors are said to be misleading. Contrary to the illusory account, I defend a nonperceptual approach to the errors attributable to mirrors, which analyses the kind of errors generated by the use of mirrors in terms of false judgments. I further show that a nonperceptual view of errors extends to all of the cases in which a sensorimotor adaptation is required, such as perception through magnifying or inversing lenses.     

Appearances can be deceiving

Conclusion I began by claiming that I simply wanted to undermine the plausibility of the appeal to appearances in matters of perceptual belief. Most of the arguments I have offered, however, have been more strongly stated, viz., I have apparently tried to eliminate them rather than simply render them less credible. But the notion of appearances is deeply entrenched, so much so that simply undermining their credibility may require overstating the case somewhat. The central theme of the above arguments is that appealing to appearances misleads us. The appeal misleads us into giving the wrong sorts of explanation, both with respect to the psychology of perceptual belief formation and the justification of perceptual beliefs. In short, appearances can be deceiving. And they probably are.A distant (if now unrecognizable) ancestor of this paper was first read at the 12th Annual Louisiana Philosophy Convention in October, 1988. Steve Fuller also offered comments on an intermediate version. I am especially grateful to Norton Nelkin who has read and commented on several versions. He should not be held complicit, however.     

Appearances,antirealism, and Aristotle

Summary Nussbaum misconstrues the difference between Plato and Aristotle over what is real for a debate over a conception of truth. She seems to mistake Aristotle's arguments against Plato' version of realism as an argument against realism per se, though the texts do not permit such a reading. She claims Aristotle is convinced that realism involves a fatal failure of reference, yet she produces not a single text where Aristotle is even remotely concerned about such a failure of reference given the commitments of realism. And nowhere is the crucial question of the relationship between Aristotle's antirealism and his method of appearances explicitly addressed or resolved.Nussbaum offers us a fashionable Aristotle. I have argued that, far from being attractive and obviously right on a deep and recent metaphysuical debate, Nussbaum's Aristotle is confused and inconsistent and thus that it is a good thing the texts do not support such a characterization.     

Shuffling arrays: Appearances may be deceiving

Random permutations of arrays are widely used in experimentation and simulation, and most arrays are shuffled by means of a computer-based algorithm. In this paper, I show that despite theappearance of a random process, a shuffling procedure must be carefully scrutinized to determine whether it actually does produce random shuffles. A general sequence-transformation procedure is developed for evaluating permutation and shuffling schemes. Applying the transformation procedure and using the criteria that all possible sequences must be equally likely and that each object in a shuffled array must be equally likely to occupy each possible position in the shuffled array, we see that one algorithm meets the criteria, while another seemingly adequate algorithm fails to meet the criteria and, in addition, exhibits systematic deviations from randomness.     

Similarity and Numerical Equivalence: Appearances Count

The present study investigated whether preschool children recognize numerical equivalence between sets that vary in similarity. The relation between emergence of accurate numerical equivalence judgments and acquisition of the conventional counting system was also explored. The results of this investigation provide evidence for two main conclusions. First, the ability to recognize numerical equivalence for different sets emerges gradually during the period from 3 to 4 years of age depending on the degree of overall similarity between the sets. Second, conventional counting ability is linked to success on some but not all comparisons, suggesting that acquisition of the labels for various set sizes might aid in abstraction of numerical relations.     

Appearances,Rationality, and Justified Belief

One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have it seem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferential justification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated as ‘sound’ or ‘unsound.’ Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even an unsound appearance can ‘rationally require’ the subject to form the belief. Some of our intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the belief’s being justified. The resulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appearances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one must see that p.     

Beyond Appearances: Citizenship Tests in Canada and the UK

Citizenship tests are increasingly used by national governments as part of their naturalization procedures. Several analysts suggest that citizenship tests are indicative of a converging trend toward civic integration, especially in Europe. The reform of the Canadian citizenship test in 2009?C2010 represents an opportunity to examine the mobilization of tests in different national context. Are citizenship tests necessary the central tools of civic integration policies? In order to answer this question, this article first argues that it is crucial to understand citizenship tests as public policy instruments. Using the approach developed by Pierre Lascoumes and Patrick LeGalès, the article compares the emergence and characteristics of the citizenship tests implemented by Canada and the United Kingdom. Stemming from this analysis, this article demonstrates that the two citizenship tests are different instruments despite their similar appearances. The Canadian test remains, despite the reform, an instrument to promote naturalization and integration. In contrast, in addition to promoting civic integration, the British test is also an instrument of immigration control.     

Facilitating Ethical Reflection Among Scientists Using the Ethical Matrix

Several studies have indicated that scientists are likely to have an outlook on both facts and values that are different to that of lay people in important ways. This is one significant reason it is currently believed that in order for scientists to exercise a reliable ethical reflection about their research it is necessary for them to engage in dialogue with other stakeholders. This paper reports on an exercise to encourage a group of scientists to reflect on ethical issues without the presence of external stakeholders. It reports on the use of a reflection process with scientists working in the area of animal disease genomics (mainly drawn from the EADGENE EC Network of Excellence). This reflection process was facilitated by using an ethical engagement framework, a modified version of the Ethical Matrix. As judged by two criteria, a qualitative assessment of the outcomes and the participants’ own assessment of the process, this independent reflective exercise was deemed to be successful. The discussions demonstrated a high level of complexity and depth, with participants demonstrating a clear perception of uncertainties and the context in which their research operates. Reflection on stakeholder views and values appeared to be embedded within the discussions. The finding from this exercise seems to indicate that even without the involvement of the wider stakeholder community, valuable reflection and worthwhile discourse can be generated from ethical reflection processes involving only scienitific project partners. Hence, the previous assumption that direct stakeholder engagement is necessary for ethical reflection does not appear to hold true in all cases; however, other reasons for involving a broad group of stakeholders relating to governance and social accountability of science remain.     

Answering the Ethical Question

Many philosophers have attempted to answer the ‘ethical question’: can the ethical value of an artwork ever contribute to its aesthetic value, and if so, how? In this paper, I consider a methodological question that arises out of this discussion: should attempts to address the ethical question use analytic tools found in contemporary philosophical literature, art criticism, or some combination of the two? I concur with arguments proposed elsewhere, which suggest that art criticism has an important role to play in addressing the ethical question. However, I argue that any fruitful attempt to answer the question must defend some particular way of understanding the ethical value of artworks, which suggests that we should address what I label the ‘art question’: what is the role and importance of art? This question, I suggest, is one with which philosophers can usefully engage. This division of labour offers a way forward in addressing this important issue.     

伦理相对主义辨析

伦理相对主义的基本特征是否认道德普遍性、绝对性、客观性。它的论据主要是文化相对主义所描述的不同民族或同一民族在不同时代所奉行的不同的乃至相反的道德风习。然而 ,这些道德规范的差异 ,只能说明道德具有特殊性、相对性、主观性 ;却不能否认道德具有普遍性、绝对性、客观性。因为一方面 ,这些不同的乃至相反的道德规范所由以推出而为其前提的更高的、最终的道德标准必是完全相同的、绝对的 :保障社会存在发展、增进人的利益 ;另一方面 ,道德的规范虽然都是主观约定、制定的 ,但是 ,这些道德规范的正确性或优良性却是客观的、不依人的意志而转移的。因此 ,道德是特殊性与普遍性、相对性与绝对性、主观性与客观性的统一 :伦理相对主义犯了以偏概全的错误     

The Ethical Dangers of Ethical Sensitivity

ABSTRACT All ethical systems seem to call for more ethical sensitivity. The dangers to personal life of too much ethical sensitivity have received much attention lately, in attempts to limit the demands of morality. But the ethical dangers of ethical sensitivity have hardly been noticed. I argue that, in a number of different ways, too much ethical sensitivity can be ethically harmful. The normative, the psychological and the pragmatic pictures are for more complex than is commonly realised.     

不同道德评价取向对企业道德决策的预测作用

本研究基于Hunt和Vitell（1986）所提出的市场营销领域的道德通用理论模型,随机选取129名MBA学生为被试,采用Reidenbach和Robin的多维道德量表和情景研究法,旨在考察个体在应对企业决策中的道德问题时,不同道德评价取向对道德决策（整体性道德判断和道德意图阶段）的预测作用。结果表明：1）与对道德判断的单项目测量相比,多维道德量表对道德意图具有高的预测效度;2）道德公平、功利主义和契约主义对整体道德判断具有显著的预测作用;3）道德公平和相对主义对自我和他人道德意图具有显著预测作用。     

The New Color Complex: Appearances and Biracial Identity

Ethnic identity research has largely focused on the identity choices of White ethnics (Alba, 1990; Ignatiev, 1995; Waters, 1990). One key factor in these choices is bodily appearance. We extend this research to Black and White Biracial individuals and examine the role that physical appearance plays in their "choices" of racial identity. We test Rockquemore's (1999) taxonomy of Biracial identity using survey data from a sample of 177 Biracial respondents. The results indicate that Biracial individuals do make choices within circumscribed cultural contexts and these understandings are influenced not by skin color, but by an actor's assumption of how others perceive his or her appearance.     

An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances

A familiar slogan in the literature on temporal experience is that ‘a succession of appearances, in and of itself, does not amount to an experience of succession’. I show that we can distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of this slogan. I diagnose the strong interpretation of the slogan as requiring the support of an assumption I call the ‘Seems→Seemed’ claim. I then show that commitment to this assumption comes at a price: if we accept it, we either have to reject the extremely plausible idea that experience is as it seems, or we are forced to provide an account of temporal experience that isn’t compatible with the phenomenology. I conclude by noting that the only plausible interpretation of the slogan is the weak interpretation, and outline a positive account of temporal experience, according to which an appearance of succession requires a succession of appearances.