Self-consciousness, self-awareness, and self-attribution

Self-awareness was either manipulated by a mirror (experimental) or not (control). Subjects were selected for being high or low in private self-consciousness (disposition to attend to one's thoughts, feelings, motives). Private self-consciousness had a stronger effect on self-attributions than did self-awareness. These findings have implications for attribution, self-consciousness, and the relationship between manipulations and dispositions.     

Toward understanding sex differences in pay allocation: Agency,communion, and reward distribution behavior

This research examined the extent to which the personality characteristics of agency and communion are sex linked, and the extent to which differences in these orientations can account for sex differences in reward distribution behavior. In two studies, the agency and communion level of large samples of male and female undergraduates were assessed. As expected, males were more agentic and females were more communal. Moreover, when subjects who scored high or low on agency and high or low on communion were asked to allocate rewards between themselves and a co-worker, these personality differences were related to their allocation decisions. These results were used as the basis for discussing the role that sex-linked personality differences might play in distributive justice judgments.This article is an adaptation of a colloquium presentation at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Los Angeles, August 1981. The research reported here was supported by NIMH grant MH29987-1, Goals, Motives, and Norms of Reward Distribution, and by NIMH Biomedical Research Support Grant from the College of Social Science, Michigan State University. The authors wish to thank Andrea Doughty for her valuable advice, and to gratefully acknowledge the help of Mark Teicher, Julie B. Klein, Sue Schnelbach, Pat Loepp, Barb Allen, Gavin Goodrich, Bob O'Hara, Kelly Bowen, Rod Hollenstein, Steve Schultz, and Mary Hurst.     

Self-consciousness, self-agency, and schizophrenia

Empirical approaches on topics such as consciousness, self-awareness, or introspective perspective, need a conceptual framework so that the emerging, still unconnected findings can be integrated and put into perspective. We introduce a model of self-consciousness derived from phenomenology, philosophy, the cognitive, and neurosciences. We will then give an overview of research data on one particular aspect of our model, self-agency, trying to link findings from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Finally, we will expand on pathological aspects of self-agency, and in particular on psychosis in schizophrenia. We show, that a deficient self-monitoring system underlies, in part, hallucinations and formal thought (language) disorder in schizophrenia. We argue, that self-consciousness is a valid construct and can be studied with the instruments of cognitive and neuroscience.     

Self-consciousness,self-determination,and imagination in Kant

I argue for a basically Sartrean approach to the idea that one's self-concept, and any form of knowledge of oneself as an individual subject, presupposes concepts and knowledge about other things. The necessity stems from a pre-conceptual structure which assures that original self-consciousness is identical with one's consciousness of objects themselves. It is not a distinct accomplishment merely dependent on the latter. The analysis extends the matter/form distinction to concepts. It also requires a distinction between two notions of consciousness: one relates to the employment of already formed concepts, the other to the structures of imaginative apprehension that help to constitute (empirical) concepts from the start. We need to see that (1) so far as objects are only conceptualized appearances, the material through which we apprehend them must be reflected in that apprehension itself; (2) the corresponding material consists of a manifold of pre-conceptually active anticipations and retentions concerning the course of one's own experience. The resultant structure imposes an orientation on the world of appearances that does not derive from a concept of oneself as an individual in it, but that nevertheless provides the only possible basis for such a concept. One's self-concept, at least as empirical subject, is simply that ofwhatever subject is indicated, in an appropriate way, by that orientation.     

Evaluation,self-awareness,and task performance

Two contradictory hypotheses regarding the effect of self-attention or self-awareness on task performance are considered. Recent research on test anxiety indicates that self-awareness interferes with task performance by decreasing the proportion of attention paid to the task. Wicklund and Duval's (1971) theory of objective self-awareness predicts the opposite: that self-awareness will induce a person to try harder and to perform at a higher level. Experimental evidence indicates that both hypotheses are correct, each at a different level of evaluation. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for a unified social-psychological theory of evaluative self-awareness which could account for findings now classed under separate headings such as test anxiety, self-awareness, and social facilitation.     

Self-consciousness, outcome expectancy, and persistence

A study investigated persistence as a function of two variables: the disposition to be self-attentive (called private self-consciousness) and outcome feedback on a prior task that was described as closely related to the target task. More specifically, subjects first completed a concealed-figures test and were told that their performances were either very good or very poor. The second test, which ostensibly measured the same abilities, was an insolvable design problem that is commonly used to measure persistence. Feedback concerning prior outcomes had a direct influence on expectancies for the second task, but persistence on that task was a joint function of feedback and self-consciousness. That is, favorable feedback led to greater persistence than did unfavorable feedback, but only among subjects high in self-consciousness. This finding replicates and extends the results of several previous studies. Discussion centers on the relationship between the present research and an earlier experiment which yielded apparently different results.     

Effects of interactional justice on egocentric bias in resource allocation decisions

Three studies demonstrated that interactional justice was able to attenuate egocentric bias, i.e., the tendency to regard a larger share for oneself as fair. Study 1, an experimental study of negotiation, showed that fair interpersonal treatment led to a smaller egocentric bias, quicker settlements, and fewer stalemates. Study 2 showed that fair treatment was related to a smaller egocentric bias in a real-life context. University students were more willing to accept a higher tuition fee and less willing to cut the salary of their teachers if the interpersonal treatment received from the teachers was more positive. Study 3 showed experimentally that in support of fairness heuristic theory, when the fair interpersonal treatment received could be attributed externally, its attenuating effect on the egocentric bias disappeared.     

Self-consciousness,self-report of aggressiveness,and aggression

Private self-consciousness consists of attending to one's thoughts, feelings, and motives. Public self-consciousness consists of attending to oneself as a social object. The effect of dispositional self-consciousness on the accuracy of self-reports was studied in research on aggression. High- and low-private self-conscious subjects rated their own aggressiveness. Several weeks later their aggressive behavior was objectively measured. The correlation between self-report of aggressiveness and aggressive behavior was significantly higher for high-than for low-private self-conscious subjects. The correlation between self-report and behavior was unaffected by public self-consciousness. The implications of these findings for self-consciousness theory and personality dispositions are discussed.     

The effect of anticipated future interaction on reward allocation in same- and opposite-sex dyads

Hypotheses were tested concerning the relationship of anticipated future interaction and sex of allocator vs. sex of recipient on reward allocation norm choice. Male and female college students worked on a sex-neutral, attributionally ambiguous task. Subjects participated in same- and mixed-sex dyads, but were kept isolated from one another. All received feedback that they had contributed higher input than their partner and had been randomly chosen to apportion a group reward. The primary dependent variable was amount of reward allocated to self. As predicted, there was a significant difference in allocation norm choice in the no future interaction condition (with males favoring equity and females employing equality), while both sexes divided the reward equally between themselves and the coworker in the future interaction condition. A model was proposed to explain these findings in terms of a continuum of social interaction levels. Rather than being viewed as independent causal entities, sex of allocator and sex of recipient were demonstrated to play roles of differing importance as a function of the level of interaction experienced or anticipated.     

Self-consciousness and reactance

Two studies examined the effects of dispositional self-consciousness on reactance. In Experiment 1, men who were high in private self-consciousness displayed greater reactance responses to a coercive communication attempt (as reflected by attitude reversal) than did men lower in private self-consciousness. In contrast, the effect of public self-consciousness in this context was to inhibit the expression of reactance. In Experiment 2, women high in private self-consciousness exhibited greater reactance responses to a self-imposed threat to their freedom of choice (as reflected by equivocation over two choice alternatives) than did women lower in private self-consciousness. The effect of public self-consciousness in this context was negligible. These findings replicate and extend a previous self-awareness and reactance finding; they provide additional evidence that manipulated self-awareness and dispositional self-consciousness converge on the same psychological entity; and they provide additional evidence that there are important differences between the dimensions of private and public self-consciousness.     

Self-consciousness,role discrepancy,and depressive affect

Abstract

Two studies were conducted to test the hypothesis that depressive affect is a joint function of private self-consciousness and the extent to which an individual's self-concept is discrepant from the requirements of a significant role. In the first study, the role of college student was empirically defined using a technique developed by Burke and Tully (1977). As predicted, the discrepancy between this role definition and subjects' self-ratings was a more significant predictor of depressive affect among high than low private self-conscious individuals. In the second study, measurements were taken at two time periods that were spaced six weeks apart. In a replication of the results of Study 1, the discrepancy between the role definition and subjects' self-ratings was a more significant predictor of depressive affect at Time 1 among high than low self-conscious individuals. In addition, discrepancy at Time 1 was a significant predictor of depression at Time 2 among high but not low self-conscious individuals. On the other hand, depression at Time 1 was unrelated to discrepancy at Time 2 among high self-conscious subjects. On the basis of these results, it is concluded that high private self-consciousness combined with role-identity discrepancy is associated with increased risk of depression. Finally, additional analyses suggested that depression may itself function to increase subsequent self-consciousness.     

The effects of alternatives on the salience of reward allocation norms

In a dyadic bargaining situation there is considerable evidence that the alternative outcomes of the bargainers (if they cannot reach agreement) have important effects on bargaining outcomes. Under the assumption that situational factors affect the nature of the relation between the alternatives of the bargainers and bargaining outcomes, the effects of two factors were assessed: the relative size of the reward to be negotiated (excess of prize minus alternatives) and the magnitude of the difference in the alternatives of the two bargainers. Using college students as subjects, the predictions of two models were also contrasted: the equal excess model and Shapley-w. The relative size of the prize did not have a significant effect on the accuracy of the two models, but the magnitude of the difference in alternatives had marked effects. The results also suggest that the Shapley-w model may be more accurate when the bargainers are relatively inexperienced and cooperatively oriented, whereas the equal excess model may be more accurate when the bargainers are relatively sophisticated and competitively oriented.     

The effects of frequency of social interaction and relationship closeness on reward allocation

In this study of how the frequency of interaction affects decisions on reward allocation, 320 Chinese adults were randomly assigned to 8 conditions and instructed to read a scenario describing 2 co-workers completing a task and obtaining a bonus. The 8 conditions differed in the type of relationships, the frequency of past interaction between co-workers, and the possibility of future interaction. Each participant was instructed to act as the allocator and to hypothetically allocate a monetary reward to the co-worker. The results indicated that both past interaction and future interaction between the co-workers significantly influenced the allocation decision. These results also suggested that the frequency of 2 individuals' past interaction can be predictive of the closeness of their relationship.     

Objective self-awareness,standards of evaluation,and moral behavior

In a performance setting, subjects were given an opportunity to cheat without fear of detection on puzzle problems. Subjects were led to believe that successful performance was due to ability in some conditions, but to luck in other conditions. In fact, most of the problems were insolvable, so that success was impossible without cheating. Self-awareness was induced in half the subjects by having them sit in front of a mirror and listen to a tape recording of their own voice as they worked on the puzzle problems; the remaining subjects were not exposed to a mirror and listened to a tape of someone else's voice as they worked on the problems. It was predicted that cheating frequency would be higher under ability attribution conditions than under luck attribution conditions, and that this effect of performance attribution would be greater among self-aware subjects than among non-self-aware subjects. Results confirmed these hypotheses. Discussion centered on the differential use of morality and competence standards for behavior when in a state of self-awareness.     

Representation and self-awareness in intentional agents

Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for conditional and counterfactual thinking. Contextual or indexical representations are necessary in order that the inner world relates to the actual external world and thus can be used as a basis for action. To have full-blown intentionality, the agent should also have a detached self-awareness, that is, be able to entertain self-representations that are independent of the context.     

Dissociation and self-awareness in directed daydreaming

Self-awareness, as the ability to be the observer of one's own cognitive. affective, and volitional states, was explored in directed daydreaming. Self-awareness of varying complexity and depth was found in the dissociated ego states, which were experienced as relatively discontinuous with each other in space and time, and discontinuous with the subjects' usual experience of a cohesive self. An extreme expression of shallow self-awareness was found for a few subjects who reported a fantasy with no experience of a self. The most elaborate form of self-awareness, coconsciousness , was found for the majority of subjects in the two-ego state group, where both of their ego states were associated with an identity feeling, and where one ego state evidenced full awareness of the thoughts and feelings of the other state. Coconsciousness was found to be a prerequisite for deep self-awareness in directed daydreaming.     

Self-consciousness and nonconceptual content

Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think ‘I’-thoughts. Recently, it has been suggested that self-consciousness in this sense can (and should) be accounted for in terms of nonconceptual forms of self-representation. Here, I will argue that while theories of nonconceptual self-consciousness do provide us with important insights regarding the essential genetic and epistemic features of self-conscious thought, they can only deliver part of the full story that is required to understand the phenomenon of self-consciousness. I will provide two arguments to this effect, drawing on insights from the philosophy of language and on structural differences between conceptual and nonconceptual forms of representation. Both arguments rest on the intuition that while self-consciousness requires explicit self-representation, nonconceptual content can at best provide implicit self-related information. I will conclude that in order to explain the emergence of self-conscious thought out of more basic forms of representation one has to explain the transition between implicit self-related information and explicit self-representation.