恋人概念威胁启动削弱自我和恋人面孔优势效应:来自眼动研究的证据

采用眼动记录技术和恋人概念威胁启动范式探讨自我和恋人面孔优势效应的产生和维持过程。结果发现:与概念非威胁启动条件下相比,概念威胁启动条件下,被试搜索恋人面孔时的兴趣区个数和搜索自我面孔时的平均眼跳次数与搜索陌生人面孔时比差异变得不显著;恋人面孔与陌生人面孔在兴趣区内总注视时间上的差异变得不显著。结果表明,自我与恋人面孔存在注意的优先捕获和维持优势,恋人概念的威胁启动会减少对恋人的关注,证明了建立恋人的积极概念是恋人面孔优势效应产生和维持的重要原因。     

The problem with moralism

Moralism is often described as a vice. But what exactly is wrong with moralism that makes it aptly described as a character flaw? This paper will argue that the problem with moralism is that it downgrades the force of legitimate moral criticism. First, I will argue that moralism involves an inflated sense of the extent to which moral criticism is appropriate. Next, I will examine the value of legitimate moral criticism, arguing that its value stems from enabling us to take a stand against immoral behavior. Finally, I will argue that unwarranted moral criticism downgrades the force of legitimate moral criticism and that this is why moralism should be seen as a vice.     

The real problem with equipoise

The equipoise requirement in clinical research demands that, if patients are to be randomly assigned to one of two interventions in a clinical trial, there must be genuine doubt about which is better. This reflects the traditional view that physicians must never knowingly compromise the care of their patients, even for the sake of future patients. Equipoise has proven to be deeply problematic, especially in the Third World. Some recent critics have argued against equipoise on the grounds that clinical research is fundamentally distinct from clinical care, and thus should be governed by different norms. I argue against this "difference position," and instead take issue with the traditional, exclusively patient-centered account of physicians' obligations that equipoise presupposes. In place of this traditional view, I propose a Kantian test for the reasonable partiality that physicians should show their patients, focusing on its application in clinical research and medical education.     

The problem with descriptive correctness

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the normativity of meaning was thought to be more-or-less ‘incontestable.’ But in the last 25 years, many philosophers of mind and language have contested it in several seemingly different ways. This, however, is somewhat illusory. There is an unappreciated commonality among most anti-normativist arguments, and this commonality, I argue, poses a problem for anti-normativism. The result, however, is not a wholesale rejection of anti-normativism. Rather, an insight from the anti-normativist position can be harnessed to reveal an unappreciated position in the normativity of meaning debate.     

The feature-binding problem is an ill-posed problem

The binding problem arises when visual features (colour, orientation), said to be coded in independent brain modules, are to be integrated into unitary percepts. I argue that binding is an ill-posed problem, because those modules are now known to code jointly for multiple features, rendering the feature-binding issue moot. A hierarchical reentrant system explains the emergence of coherent visual objects from primitive features. An initial feed-forward sweep activates many high-level perceptual hypotheses, which descend to lower levels, where they correlate themselves with the ongoing activity. Low correlations are discarded, whereas the hypothesis that yields the highest correlation is confirmed and leads to conscious awareness. In this system, there is no separate binding process that actively assigns features to objects.     

The matching problem

Tables of the exact distributions of number of matches are given for small decks having the same number of cards in each suit. Several approximate distributions are considered for use with larger decks, and some indication of the goodness of the approximations is given.The calculations for this paper were done while the writer was working on a project sponsored by funds from the Ford Foundation. The writer wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Frederick Mosteller for his constant help and encouragement during the writing of this paper.     

The preemption problem

Philosophical Studies - According to the standard version of the counterfactual comparative account of harm, an event is overall harmful for an individual if and only if she would have been on...     

The dedifferentiation problem

This article demonstrates that our more sophisticated theories of law lead us to a point where we are no longer able to distinguish law from culture, or society, or the market, or politics or anything of the sort. Not only are the various terms inextricably intertwined (something that other thinkers have observed) but we are no longer in a position to articulate any relations between these various terms at all. It is with this latter realization that the dedifferentiation problem kicks in. Because the various terms cannot be disentangled, we find ourselves in the odd position where there is nothing of any positive character to be said about their relations. Each is already the other and, thus, they can have no relation. This is rather bad news for the ways in which we have traditionally conceived theories of law—indeed any theory that gets off the ground by distinguishing law from a discrete something else (which, on first glance, would seem to include all legal theory).

The many-property problem is your problem,too

Philosophical Studies - The many-property problem has traditionally been taken to show that the adverbial theory of perception is untenable. This paper first shows that several widely accepted...     

The reference class problem is your problem too

The reference class problem arises when we want to assign a probability to a proposition (or sentence, or event) X, which may be classified in various ways, yet its probability can change depending on how it is classified. The problem is usually regarded as one specifically for the frequentist interpretation of probability and is often considered fatal to it. I argue that versions of the classical, logical, propensity and subjectivist interpretations also fall prey to their own variants of the reference class problem. Other versions of these interpretations apparently evade the problem. But I contend that they are all “no-theory” theories of probability - accounts that leave quite obscure why probability should function as a guide to life, a suitable basis for rational inference and action. The reference class problem besets those theories that are genuinely informative and that plausibly constrain our inductive reasonings and decisions. I distinguish a “metaphysical” and an “epistemological” reference class problem. I submit that we can dissolve the former problem by recognizing that probability is fundamentally a two-place notion: conditional probability is the proper primitive of probability theory. However, I concede that the epistemological problem remains.