Keeping the “cognitive” in cognitive neuroscience, the “affective” in affective neuroscience, and the “behavioral” in behavioral neuroscience: The CABN mission for the next five years

The fields of cognitive, affective, and behavioral neuroscience have been with us for many years now, and have served to spawn an ever growing body of research that has helped to clarify the mechanisms by which the brain gives rise to the diverse processes that govern our thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. These fields of research have grown exponentially as more and more tools have become available for invasive and noninvasive measures of brain function in both humans and animals, and as information about the human and animal genomes has increased. These advances in neurosciencebased tools have clearly advanced our knowledge and understanding of brain—behavior relationships. However, there is also a danger that lurks in the shadows of these methodological and empirical advances. This danger is that the enticement of understanding neural processes sometimes leads us to forget about the exact phenomena that we ultimately wish to understand and explain—namely, cognitive, affective, and behavioral processes. What do I mean by danger? I mean the concern that we often seem to prioritize the sophistication of our neural and genetic tools and theorizing over our psychological tools and theorizing, and that we may overlook the absence of linkage between neural (e.g., imaging results at a range of levels) or genetic findings and well—grounded psychological theories about specific cognitive, affective, or behavioral mechanisms. In other words, we can be seduced by the “call of the brain mechanism,” without a reminder of the phenomena we wish to explain.     

The triple response approach to assessment: a conceptual and methodological reappraisal

Despite its positive effects on the increased use of multiple assessments and improved assessment validity, the triple-response concept has led to some conceptual and practical confusion. This is mainly due to two problems: (1) a confounding of the content and method of assessment; and (2) an imprecise and vague use of the 'verbal-subjective mode' which has been expanded to include cognitive elements since the introduction of cognitive-behavioural theories and treatments. A new matrix is proposed that clearly distinguishes content and method of assessment. It also defines a separate cognitive/information-processing content area and introduces affect as an additional content area. Thus, four content areas are suggested: behavioural, physiological, cognitive, and affective, which can be measured in three different ways: by means of self-report, observation, and instruments or technical equipment. We point out the implications of these changes for (1) a more appropriate selection of assessment procedures and outcome measures in clinical research; (2) a more adequate individualization of treatment through matching individual response profiles to specific treatments; and (3) an improved understanding of the interrelationship between behavioural, physiological, cognitive, and affective processes in anxiety and depression. Finally, we suggest that the lack of agreement between measures of physiological, cognitive, behavioural and affective changes in some studies may be as much a reflection of the lack of agreement arising from spurious sources of variance within content areas as it is a reflection of the operation of different processes and systems.     

The Place of Emotion in Stories Told by Children: An Exploratory Study

This study explored the relationship between developmental changes in children's understanding of emotions and their use of affective content (Wilkinson, Barnsley, Hanna, & Swan, 1980) and affective structure (Brewer & Lichtenstein, 1982) in the production of stories. We hypothesized that children with an advanced understanding of emotions would make more use of both affective content and affective structure. This relationship was found only for affective content, which was more advanced in girls than boys. Affective structure did not relate to affective understanding or sex but, rather, to verbal intelligence. The implications of these results for the part played by psychological processes in children's story telling are discussed.     

Leading Military Teams to Think and Feel: Exploring the Relations Between Leadership,Soldiers' Cognitive and Affective Processes,and Team Effectiveness

The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between leadership and military teams' affective and cognitive processes and the subsequent links between these processes and team effectiveness. Soldiers (N = 148) from 32 teams completed questionnaires assessing these variables. Hierarchical linear modeling was used to analyze the data. Transformational leadership was positively associated with cognitive and affective processes, but only active management-by-exception leadership was related to negative affect. Neither form of management-by-exception leadership related to cognitive processes. Positive affect, negative affect, and cognitive processes were all related to team viability. Finally, some mediation effects were observed. Implications of the results for developing leadership in military teams are drawn.     

Rostro‐caudal and dorso‐ventral gradients in medial and lateral prefrontal cortex during cognitive control of affective and cognitive interference

Characterizing the anatomical substrates of major brain functions such as cognition and emotion is of utmost importance to the ongoing efforts of understanding the nature of psychiatric ailments and their potential treatment. The aim of our study was to investigate how the brain handles affective and cognitive interferences on cognitive processes. Functional magnetic resonance imaging investigation was performed on healthy individuals, comparing the brain oxygenation level dependent activation patterns during affective and cognitive counting Stroop tasks. The affective Stroop task activated rostral parts of medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) and rostral and ventral parts of lateral PFC, while cognitive Stroop activated caudal parts of medial PFC and caudal and dorsal parts of lateral PFC. Our findings suggest that the brain may handle affective and cognitive interference on cognitive processes differentially, with affective interference preferentially activating rostral and ventral PFC networks and cognitive interference activating caudal and dorsal PFC networks.     

Tracing Attitude Expressions: An Eye‐Tracking Study

Attitudes represent object evaluations, comprising complex underlying cognitive and affective knowledge structures. When people are asked to judge an object, they can use their primary response (i.e., the immediate object‐evaluation linkage) or underlying affective and cognitive knowledge structures. In many situations, a primary response satisfices, but if not, more elaboration is required. Both processes are fundamentally different but may lead to the same attitude. For monitoring underlying processes during attitude expression, we developed an innovative eye‐tracking procedure using eye‐gaze on response scale options. This procedure was applied in three studies to identify the extent to which elaboration differs for attitude objects with weak or strong, univalent or mixed object evaluations (i.e., univalent, neutral and ambivalent). In Study 1, the overall judgment preceded processing of more specific affective and cognitive linkage evaluations. In Studies 2 and 3, the order was reversed, and affective and cognitive bases were assessed prior to overall attitude outcomes. For attitude objects with strong univalent or strong mixed object evaluations, we found similar outcomes on underlying processes. For weak object evaluations, cognition was found to be more predictive and easily accessible if an overall judgment was required first; affect for these objects was more predictive if people had to elaborate on affect and cognition first. We concluded that both affective and cognitive attitudes may require substantial elaboration, albeit in different situations. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotion Regulation Across the Life Span: An Integrative Perspective Emphasizing Self-Regulation,Positive Affect,and Dyadic Processes

In this commentary, we build upon the papers featured in this 2-part special issue to advance an integrative perspective on emotion regulation that emphasizes the developmentally specific goal-contexts of emotional phenomena. We highlight the importance of (1) multilevel longitudinal investigations of interactions among biological, affective, cognitive, and behavioral processes with respect to emotion regulation; (2) the integration of emotion-regulation processes with self-regulatory processes across the life course; (3) the dynamic relationship between positive and negative affect and their respective influence on regulatory processes; and (4) greater consideration of the dyadic context of emotion-regulation processes. From this perspective, the optimal developmental outcome with respect to emotion regulation is not affective homeostasis, but rather a dynamic flexibility in emotional experience, the ability to pursue and prioritize different goals, and the capacity to selectively and proactively mobilize emotions and cognitions in the service of context-specific and developmentally specific goals.     

Individual differences in reappraisal ability: Links to reappraisal frequency, well-being, and cognitive control

Reappraisal is generally viewed as an adaptive emotion regulation strategy. Reappraisal frequency has been associated with greater well-being, and reappraisal ability is thought to be composed of several crucial cognitive control processes. However, the relationships among reappraisal ability, reappraisal frequency, well-being, and various cognitive control processes have not yet been determined. In this study, we experimentally examined individual differences in reappraisal ability (RA), and also assessed reappraisal frequency, well-being, and several cognitive control processes. We observed a positive relationship between RA, reappraisal frequency, and well-being. RA was also related positively to working memory capacity and set-shifting costs, and marginally related to abstract reasoning. These findings have important implications for understanding the cognitive components and affective outcomes of RA.     

积极情感和消极情感适应的不对称性及其机制探讨

情感适应是指对重复或连续刺激的情感反应慢慢变弱的现象。近年来有关实证研究发现, 积极情感与消极情感适应在速度和程度上具有不对称性, 对适应不对称性的解释可以从进化心理学、认知心理学以及积极心理学三个视角进行。未来的研究应该进一步关注：(1)区分主观幸福感不同成分的情感适应; (2)探讨人格因素在情感适应中的调节效应; (3)完善情感适应的干预方法; (4)提高情感适应研究在时间上的精确性。     

Affect of the unconscious: Visually suppressed angry faces modulate our decisions

Emotional and affective processing imposes itself over cognitive processes and modulates our perception of the surrounding environment. In two experiments, we addressed the issue of whether nonconscious processing of affect can take place even under deep states of unawareness, such as those induced by interocular suppression techniques, and can elicit an affective response that can influence our understanding of the surrounding environment. In Experiment 1, participants judged the likeability of an unfamiliar item—a Chinese character—that was preceded by a face expressing a particular emotion (either happy or angry). The face was rendered invisible through an interocular suppression technique (continuous flash suppression; CFS). In Experiment 2, backward masking (BM), a less robust masking technique, was used to render the facial expressions invisible. We found that despite equivalent phenomenological suppression of the visual primes under CFS and BM, different patterns of affective processing were obtained with the two masking techniques. Under BM, nonconscious affective priming was obtained for both happy and angry invisible facial expressions. However, under CFS, nonconscious affective priming was obtained only for angry facial expressions. We discuss an interpretation of this dissociation between affective processing and visual masking techniques in terms of distinct routes from the retina to the amygdala.     

Taste perceptual circuit for the generation of autonomous responses in virtual creatures

BraLearning is one of the most complex cognitive processes that living beings have. This process is distributed within the brain and each independent cognitive function contributes to a small or large extent to it. Particularly, affective learning is a process that allows us to identify stimuli in the environment and discriminate them based on our tastes or preferences. Within this work we will address a type of affective evaluation generated by the perceptual circuit of taste that allows us to determine flavors from the environment and how this information becomes part of the perceptual affective evaluation. We will start this work by identifying other computational works that address affective processes oriented to taste or that involve some other affective evaluation. Subsequently, we analyze of neuroscientific information that allows us to build an informal model of the perceptual circuit of taste. Finally, we propose a cognitive architecture for the generation of autonomous responses oriented to taste in virtual creatures and we will demonstrate its functionality through an implementation of this model in some case studies through distributed modules and discuss the results obtained.     

Moral cognition,affect, and psychopathy

Few theorists would challenge the idea that affect and emotion directly influence decision-making and moral judgment. There is good reason to think that they also significantly assist in decision-making and judgment, and in fact are necessary for fully effective moral cognition. However, they are not sufficient. Deliberation and more reflective thought processes likewise play a crucial role, and in fact are inseparable from affective processes. I will argue that while the dual-process account of moral judgment set forth by Craigie (2011) has great merit, it fails to appreciate fully the extent to which affective and reflective processes are not only integrated, but also mutually interdependent. Evidence from psychopathy indicates that when reflective processes are not assisted adequately by what I will call ‘affective framing’, and moral cognition is of the “cooler,” less emotionally-informed variety, what results is not effective cognitive functioning, but rather psychopathology. My proposed account of affective framing aims to make sense of the way in which affect plays a strictly necessary and integral role not just in intuitive moral responses, but also in reflective moral judgments, so that moral cognition is accomplished by the joint operation of affective processes and reflective reasoning processes.     

The Moderating Role of Anxiety in the Associations of Callous-Unemotional Traits with Self-Report and Laboratory Measures of Affective and Cognitive Empathy

In a sample of detained male adolescents (n = 107; Mean age = 15.50; SD = 1.30), we tested whether anxiety moderated the association of CU traits with self-report and computerized measures of affective (emotional reactivity) and cognitive (affective facial recognition and Theory of Mind [ToM]) empathy. Hierarchical regression analyses revealed that CU traits were negatively associated with self-reports of affective empathy and this association was not moderated by level of anxiety. Significant interactions revealed that CU traits were negatively associated with cognitive empathy (self-report) only at high levels of anxiety, whereas CU traits were positively associated with cognitive empathy on the ToM task only at low levels of anxiety. CU traits were also associated with greater fear recognition accuracy at low levels of anxiety. Implications for understanding and treating different variants of CU traits (i.e., primary and secondary) are discussed.     

Differential relationships between intergroup contact and affective and cognitive dimensions of prejudice

Research on affective dimensions of intergroup relationships suggests that positive effects of intergroup contact can generalize through establishing affective ties with outgroup members. However, research on cognitive dimensions emphasizes that it is often difficult to generalize positive contact outcomes. In this research, the authors examine whether affective and cognitive dimensions of prejudice bear different relationships to intergroup contact. Using data from a larger meta-analysis of contact effects, Study 1 demonstrates that affective indicators of prejudice typically yield stronger, inverse contact-prejudice relationships than such cognitive indicators as stereotypes. Study 2 replicates these trends in a survey study using multiple indicators of affective and cognitive dimensions of prejudice. Study 2 also shows significant, inverse relationships between contact and affective prejudice when contact is assessed either as number of outgroup friends or intergroup closeness. Together, these results suggest that affective dimensions of intergroup relationships are especially critical for understanding the nature of contact-prejudice effects.     

Off‐Target? Changing Cognitive‐Based Attitudes

Researchers argue that the effectiveness of cognitive versus affective persuasive appeals depends in part on whether the appeal is congruent or incongruent with a primarily cognitive or affective attitude base. However, considerable research suggests that these persuasion effects may hold only for predominantly affective attitudes and not cognitive attitudes. Indeed, results of Experiment 1 show that the relative effectiveness of congruent relative to incongruent persuasion appeals holds for brands with predominantly affective associations, but not those with predominantly cognitive associations. Experiment 2 explores one reason for this anomalous finding: Cognitive attitudes may be relatively impervious to persuasive appeals because the probability of targeting the specific attribute on which the cognitive attitude is based is smaller. The results are supportive, showing that significant persuasion effects are found when the specific beliefs on which cognitive attitudes are based are taken into account. However, these effects only occur under conditions of low cognitive load and not high cognitive load where resources for the cognitive processing of the appeals are limited. We discuss the implications of the research for the role of attitude structure in understanding persuasion effects and the interplay of affective and cognitive elements in persuasion processes.     

Closing the distance: Counselling at open university residential schools

Counselling at Open University Summer Schools is identified as a very distinctive counselling context, differentiated both from that of distance learning systems and from the campus-based services available to further and higher education students. A rationale for its inclusion is advanced in terms of giving learners continuity of support, ready access to information and advice, and help in integrating the affective and cognitive aspects of learning. Variables affecting the organisation of counselling services are elicited and options outlined, with an illustrative case-study of a counselling week. Difficulties in relating this practice to a relevant body of theory, definitions and models are indicated. Finally, three key elements for a counselling model are suggested: a plural and eclectic understanding of counselling; a conception of learning as concerning both affective and cognitive domains; and the framework of a time-limited helping context.     

Emotion,cognition, and decision making

We examine two explanations of the subliminal affective priming effect. The feelings-as-information model (Schwarz &; Clore, 1988) holds that judgements are based on perceptible feelings. Hence, affective influences depend on the source to which feelings are (mis)attributed. In contrast, the affective primary hypothesis (Zajonc, 1980) suggests that affective influences should resist attributional interventions. This is because the affective system responsible for preferences is separate from the cognitive system responsible for inferences; because early affective processes are automatic and therefore inaccessible to higher-order interventions; and because early affective responses are not represented as conscious feelings. We tested these explanations in two experiments that crossed subliminal affective priming with (mis)attribution manipulations. Both studies found reliable shifts in judgements of neutral stimuli as a result of primes even when subjects were aware that their feelings might not be diagnostic for the judgement at hand. Subjects did not report experiencing any feelings in response to the primes. The obtained affective priming effect was independent of response times and subjective reports of engaging in judgemental corrections. However, the priming effect did prove sensitive to the experimental instructions. We discuss the implications of these findings for the affective primacy hypothesis and the feelings-as-information model.     

Specifying the Neuropsychology of Affective Disorders: Clinical,Demographic and Neurobiological Factors

Neuropsychological research in patients with affective disorders shows heterogeneous results with regard to the severity and profile of cognitive impairments. In this paper we hypothesize that the investigation of clinical (subtypes, comorbidity, traumatization, personality, severity, diurnal swings, course, duration, age of onset, biased processing, rumination, motivation, experience of failure, sleep, suicidal tendencies, computer attitudes), demographic (age, education, gender) and neurobiological factors (structural and functional brain changes, glucocorticoids, medication, ECT) that are related to cognitive performance has specified the understanding of severity and profile of neuropsychological impairments. We reviewed the literature pertaining to clinical, demographic and neurobiological factors following Pubmed and PsychInfo databases using different combinations of general key-terms including “Affective Disorder,” “Depression,” “Mania,” “Neuropsychological,” “Neurobiological,” “Moderator,” and “Review” as well as more specific demographic, clinical and neurobiological search terms. Findings from the literature show that the consideration of these factors has improved knowledge about the severity of neuropsychological impairments in patients with affective disorders whereas the neuropsychological profile is still poorly understood. Despite limited understanding, however, the existent results provide promising suggestions for the development of treatment programs.     

Affective processes as mediators of links between close relationships and physical health

Close relationships are known to predict physical health outcomes. The time has come for a shift toward achieving a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms. One promising group of psychological mechanisms is affective processes, such as discrete emotions, emotion regulation, and affect reactivity. In this paper, we discuss the evidence linking relationship functioning with both the positive and negative valences of each affective process, considering the contributions of different types of close relationships across the lifespan, and the evidence for each affective process impacting physical health. We note evidence suggesting that affective processes may also have a causal impact on relationship function. When available, we review literature testing full mediational pathways, from relationship functioning to affective processes to physical health, as the ideal methodology for testing these links. Finally, we identify core themes and propose key future directions for this research.     

On motivational influences,moving beyond valence,and integrating dimensional and discrete views of emotion

ABSTRACT

The field of cognition and emotion has grown considerably over the past 30 years, with an increased emphasis on the relationships between emotional and motivational components and how they contribute to basic perceptual, cognitive, and neural processes. For instance, research has revealed that emotion often influences these processes via emotion’s relationship with motivational dimensions, as when positive emotions low versus high in approach motivational intensity have different influences on attentional and other cognitive processes. Research has also revealed that motivational direction (approach vs. withdrawal) and affective valence (positive vs. negative) are not as closely related as once was theorised; that is, positive affect is not inevitably associated with approach motivation and negative affect is not inevitably associated with withdrawal motivation. These and other lines of research with anger have suggested that the field needs to move beyond a focus on affective valence and it needs to consider an integration of dimensional and discrete models of emotion. The article also includes some suggestions for improving methods of measuring and inducing emotions and some recommendations for future researchers.