Superstitious Rule Generation is Affected by Probability and Type of Outcome

The Psychological Record - One hundred and fifty participants played a computer task in which pOints were either gained (reinforcement) or lost (punishment) randomly on 75%, 50%, or 25% of trials....     

The Knowledge Rule and the Action Rule

In this paper I compare Timothy Williamson's knowledge rule of assertion with Ishani Maitra and Brian Weatherson's action rule. The paper is in two parts. In the first part I present and respond to Maitra and Weatherson's master argument against the knowledge rule. I argue that while its second premise, to the effect that an action X can be the thing to do though one is in no position to know that it is, is true, its first premise is not: the data do not support the claim that whenever X is the thing for one to do, one is in a position to assert that it is. In the second part I consider Maitra and Weatherson's alternative hypotheses, arguing that they do not provide a better explanation of the linguistic data. I conclude, in particular, that the knowledge rule is preferable to the action rule.     

The Smith-Walley Interpretation of Subjective Probability: An Appreciation

The right interpretation of subjective probability is implicit in the theories of upper and lower odds, and upper and lower previsions, developed, respectively, by Cedric Smith (1961) and Peter Walley (1991). On this interpretation you are free to assign contingent events the probability 1 (and thus to employ conditionalization as a method of probability revision) without becoming vulnerable to a weak Dutch book. Special Issue Formal Epistemology I. Edited by Branden Fitelson     

Conditionals and theory change: Revisions,expansions, and additions

This paper dwells upon formal models of changes of beliefs, or theories, which are expressed in languages containing a binary conditional connective. After defining the basic concept of a (non-trivial) belief revision model. I present a simple proof of Gärdenfors's (1986) triviality theorem. I claim that on a proper understanding of this theorem we must give up the thesis that consistent revisions (additions) are to be equated with logical expansions. If negated or might conditionals are interpreted on the basis of autoepistemic omniscience, or if autoepistemic modalities (Moore) are admitted, even more severe triviality results ensue. It is argued that additions cannot be philosophically construed as parasitic (Levi) on expansions. In conclusion I outline somed logical consequences of the fact that we must not expect monotonic revisions in languages including conditionals.I wish to thank Peter Gärdenfors for a number of helpful comments, André Fuhrmann and Wolfgang Spohn for extensive discussion of parts of this paper, and Winfred Klink for kindly checking my English.     

The Concept of Inductive Probability

The word ‘probability’ in ordinary language has two different senses, here called inductive and physical probability. This paper examines the concept of inductive probability. Attempts to express this concept in other words are shown to be either incorrect or else trivial. In particular, inductive probability is not the same as degree of belief. It is argued that inductive probabilities exist; subjectivist arguments to the contrary are rebutted. Finally, it is argued that inductive probability is an important concept and that it is a mistake to try to replace it with the concept of degree of belief, as is usual today.     

The Measurement of Qualitative Probability

This essay presents necessary and sufficient conditions for representing a binary relation on a space of bounded random variables with a unique quantitative expectations operator. This result is used to provide a new characterization of qualitative probability. We also show that two distinct probability measures can induce the same qualitative ordering of events, even though they always produce different qualitative expectations relations. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

German Inflection: The Exception That Proves the Rule

Language is often explained as the product of generative rules and a memorized lexicon. For example, most English verbs take a regular past tense suffix (ask-asked), which is applied to new verbs (faxed, wugged), suggesting the mental rule "add - ed to a Verb." Irregular verbs (break-broke, go-went) would be listed in memory. Alternatively, a pattern associator memory (such as a connectionist network) might record all past tense forms and generalize to new ones by similarity; irregular and regular patterns would differ only because of their different numbers of verbs. We present evidence that mental rules are indispensible. A rule concatenates a suffix to a symbol for verbs, so it does not require access to memorized verbs on their sound patterns, but applies as the "default," whenever memory access fails. We find 21 such circumstances for regular past tense formation, including novel, unusual-sounding, and rootless and headless derived words; in every case, people inflect them regularly (explaining quirks like flied out, sabre-tooths, walk-mans). Contrary to the connectionist account, these effects are not due to regular words constituting a large majority of vocabulary. The German participle -t applies to a much smaller percentage of verbs than its English counterpart, and the German plural -s applies to a small minority of nouns. But the affixes behave in the language like their English counterparts, as defaults. We corroborate this effect in two experiments eliciting ratings of participle and plural forms of novel German words. Thus default suffixation is not due to numerous regular words reinforcing a pattern in associative memory. Because default cases do not occupy a cohesive similarity space, but do correspond to the range of a symbol, they are evidence for a memory-independent, symbol-concatenating mental operation.     

The Exception Makes the Rule: Reply to Howson

Colin Howson argues that (1) my sociologistic reliabilism sheds no light on the objectivity of epistemic content, and that (2) sorites does not threaten the reliability of modus ponens. I reply that argument (1) misrepresents my position, and that argument (2) is beside the point.     

再认记忆中的概率学习效应:加工分离框架

采用加工分离程序(PDP)与多项加工树模型,对比检验PDP与背景鉴别模型的构思效度;操纵加工水平与项目比例,考察再认记忆中的内隐学习效应。结果表明:(1)包含和排除测验都表现出加工水平效应,包含测验具有视听通道效应。(2)在单一操作中分离出意识回忆和自动加工两种过程。(3)在语义编码条件下出现了概率学习效应,自动加工可能具有情境依存性。未发现支持背景鉴别模型的结果。     

动机的概率意义——概率归并定理与Monty Hall问题的非贝叶斯解

本文探讨Monty Hall问题认知困惑的形成因素。通过对该问题数学结构的分析,导出一个与该问题的解密切相关的定理——概率归并定理;并依据该定理给出了Monty Hall问题的一种更直观的数学解。     

How Affect Shapes Risky Choice: Distorted Probability Weighting Versus Probability Neglect

People's choices between prospects with relatively affect‐rich outcomes (e.g., medical side effects) can diverge markedly from their choices between prospects with relatively affect‐poor outcomes (e.g., monetary losses). We investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying this “affect gap” in risky choice. One possibility is that affect‐rich prospects give rise to more distortion in probability weighting. Another is that they lead to the neglect of probabilities. To pit these two possibilities against each other, we fitted cumulative prospect theory (CPT) to the choices of individual participants, separately for choices between options with affect‐rich outcomes (adverse medical side effects) and options with affect‐poor outcomes (monetary losses); additionally, we tested a simple model of probability neglect, the minimax rule. The results indicated a qualitative difference in cognitive mechanisms between the affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems. Specifically, in affect‐poor problems, the large majority of participants were best described by CPT; in affect‐rich problems, the proportion of participants best described by the minimax rule was substantially higher. The affect gap persisted even when affect‐rich outcomes were supplemented by numerical information, thus providing no support for the thesis that choices in affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems diverge because the information provided in the former is nonnumerical. Our findings suggest that the traditional expectation‐based framework for modeling risky decision making may not readily generalize to affect‐rich choices. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Studies of Stereotypes: I. The Directionality and Uniformity of Responses to Stereotypes

Abstract

Cattell, R. B. Personality and Motivation: Structure and Measurement. New York: World Book, 1957. Reviewed by J. A. Radcliffe.     

破解“通勤悖论”:通勤时间如何影响幸福感

本文从社会过渡带和心理过渡带两个方面对"通勤悖论"进行解析,构建了通勤时间影响幸福感的理论模型。通过对广州市白领的追踪调查和多项式回归分析,结果发现:(1)婚姻状态(社会过渡带)具有调节作用,未婚员工通勤时间负向影响生活满意度,已婚员工通勤时间对生活满意度和快乐度有曲线影响;(2)恢复体验(心理过渡带)具有交互效应,心理解脱调节了未婚员工通勤时间与通勤效用的关系,放松体验调节了未婚员工通勤时间与快乐度的关系;(3)已婚员工通勤时间与通勤效用和快乐度的关系受放松体验调节,与生活满意度的关系受心理解脱调节;(4)通勤时间对生活满意度和快乐度的影响,以及婚姻状态和恢复体验的交互效应,以通勤效用为中介;(5)员工在"通勤时间陷阱"(1.75~2.75小时)的效用均衡。结论有助于分析"通勤悖论"的深层原因,对城市管理、企业管理和个人都具有积极启示。