Intrinsic cognitive models

Theories concerning the structure, or format, of mental representation should (1) be formulated in mechanistic, rather than metaphorical terms; (2) do justice to several philosophical intuitions about mental representation; and (3) explain the human capacity to predict the consequences of worldly alterations (i.e., to think before we act). The hypothesis that thinking involves the application of syntax‐sensitive inference rules to syntactically structured mental representations has been said to satisfy all three conditions. An alternative hypothesis is that thinking requires the construction and manipulation of the cognitive equivalent of scale models. A reading of this hypothesis is provided that satisfies condition (1) and which, even though it may not fully satisfy condition (2), turns out (in light of the frame problem) to be the only known way to satisfy condition (3).     

Simulation à la Goldman: pretend and collapse

Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions. To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined. Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (Goldman 2006). We argue that this path leads to the resurgence of the threat of collapse (Davies 1994), diluting the principled distinction between simulation and theory use. Exploration of a related method of real-mental states operating in a pretend mode leads to a factually untenable model. Our main goal here is to raise this problem as a challenge for Goldman’s reconfigured simulation theory. Only at the end we will briefly sketch a possible alternative way of quarantine that preserves the replicative element of simulation and avoids collapse. Figure 1 provides a guide to our argument. Fig. 1 Structure of argument

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Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they believe

There is currently much controversy about which, if any, mental states chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates understand. In the current two studies we tested both chimpanzees’ and human children’s understanding of both knowledge-ignorance and false belief - in the same experimental paradigm involving competition with a conspecific. We found that whereas 6-year-old children understood both of these mental states, chimpanzees understood knowledge-ignorance but not false belief. After ruling out various alternative explanations of these and related findings, we conclude that in at least some situations chimpanzees know what others know. Possible explanations for their failure in the highly similar false belief task are discussed.     

The interaction of cognitive styles and classroom environment in determining first-graders' behavior

This study investigates the importance of two “person” variables, reflection impulsivity and divergent thinking, and one “situation” variable, the classroom climate of first-grade classrooms, for the classroom adaptation of first-graders. Three types of classrooms differing in classroom climate were selected: open, intermediate, and traditional. Subjects were the children (n = 189) in these classrooms. Classroom adaptation variables included self concept, school attendance, and teacher ratings of classroom behavior, overall academic rank, and personal preference. Both main effect and interactional relationships between “person” and “situation” variables and classroom adaptation were hypothesized. Classroom environment was found to affect degree of classroom disturbance manifested by the children with students in open classrooms exhibiting most and students in the intermediate classrooms exhibiting least. Boys in the open classrooms had higher achievement anxiety and lower teacher preference ratings than boys in traditional or intermediate classrooms. Reflective children obtained higher ratings as self-reliant learners and, for boys, reflection was related to low classroom disturbance and high achievement anxiety. Interactional relationships between classroom environment and reflection-impulsivity were also found for boys. Divergent thinking was not related to classroom adjustment for boys. Girls high in divergent thinking were higher in school involvement and achievement anxiety and more preferred by teachers.     

From commonsense to science,and back: The use of cognitive concepts in neuroscience

Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and interpret behaviour. CCCs are also used to convey neuroscientific results, not only to wider audiences but also to the scientific inner circle. We show that translations from CCCs to brain activity, and from brain data to CCCs are made in implicit, loose and unsystematic ways. This results in hard to connect data as well as possibly unwarranted extrapolations. We argue that the cause of these problems is a covert adherence to a position known in philosophy of mind as ‘mental realism’. The most fruitful way forward to a clearer and more systematic employment of CCCs in cognitive neuroscience, we argue, is to explicitly adopt interpretivism as an alternative for mental realism. An interpretative stance will help to avoid conceptual confusion in cognitive science and implies caution when it comes to big conclusions about CCCs.     

Honesty–humility and a person–situation interaction at work

Person–situation interactions have attracted researchers' attention for decades. Likewise, the current work focuses on the interaction of honesty–humility and situational conditions in bringing about counterproductive work behaviour (CWB). As such, we introduce perceptions of organizational politics as a situational construct representing an opportunity for CWB. In a sample of N = 148 employees we found that particularly individuals low in honesty–humility were affected by situational circumstances. By contrast, those high in honesty–humility reported practically the same (lower) amount of CWB independent of the level of perceptions of organizational politics. In other words, employees low in honesty–humility were especially likely to condition their behaviour on environmental factors, a result that mirrors previous findings. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preference Structure Modelling for Multi-objective Decision Making: A Goal–Programming Approach

We propose a new approach for modelling preference structures in multi-objective decision-making (MODM) problems. The basic idea of the approach is to first develop PROMETHEE-influenced objective functions and then to use these to reformulate the problem as a distance-based goal–programming (GP) model. Three basic functional forms are proposed and explicit expressions are developed for them. Among other things, the expressions allow for the straightforward development of an interactive framework while keeping the information requirements from the decision maker (DM) at a minimum. An ‘automatic’ piecewise linear approximation scheme is proposed for solving the GP model. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Multi-Crit. Decis. Anal. 6 : 150–154 (1997) No. of Figures: 0. No. of Tables: 0. No. of References: 12.     

Teaching a perspective‐taking component skill to children with autism in the natural environment

We evaluated procedures for teaching three children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder the perspective‐taking component skill of tacting what others are sensing across all five senses: see, taste, feel, hear, and smell. Using a multiple baseline across participants design, we evaluated a training package consisting of multiple exemplar training, reinforcement, and error correction. The treatment package was implemented in the natural environment and was effective for teaching participants to tact what others sensed. Generalization across untrained stimuli and people was observed from baseline to posttraining for all participants. We discuss how this component skill may be related to teaching further skills related to perspective taking such as tacting what others know, predicting future behavior based upon one's beliefs, and creating false beliefs in others for the purpose of adaptive deceptive behaviors such as keeping secrets, surprises, and bluffing during games.     

Children's Representation and Imitation of Events: How Goal Organization Influences 3‐Year‐Old Children's Memory for Action Sequences

Children's imitation of adults plays a prominent role in human cognitive development. However, few studies have investigated how children represent the complex structure of observed actions which underlies their imitation. We integrate theories of action segmentation, memory, and imitation to investigate whether children's event representation is organized according to veridical serial order or a higher level goal structure. Children were randomly assigned to learn novel event sequences either through interactive hands‐on experience (Study 1) or via storybook (Study 2). Results demonstrate that children's representation of observed actions is organized according to higher level goals, even at the cost of representing the veridical temporal ordering of the sequence. We argue that prioritizing goal structure enhances event memory, and that this mental organization is a key mechanism of social‐cognitive development in real‐world, dynamic environments. It supports cultural learning and imitation in ecologically valid settings when social agents are multitasking and not demonstrating one isolated goal at a time.     

Children's moral judgments of commission and omission based on their understanding of second‐order mental states1

Abstract: Children's moral judgments about acts of commission and omission with negative outcomes were studied based on their understanding of mental states. Children (N = 142) in the first, third, and fifth grades made judgments about four tasks composed of two levels of mental states (first‐order or second‐order) and two types of acts (commission or omission). The results showed that the 7‐year‐olds responded considering only first‐order mental states, but the 9‐ and 11‐year‐olds also used second‐order mental states in their judgments. Whether the acts were commission or omission did not make a difference. These results indicate that children can make moral judgments regarding acts of commission and omission based on an understanding of second‐order mental states by approximately the age of 9 years.     

The Space–Time Congruency Effect: A Meta‐Analysis

Several reaction time (RT) studies report faster responses when responses to temporal information are arranged in a spatially congruent manner than when this arrangement is incongruent. The resulting space–time congruency effect is commonly attributed to a culturally salient localization of temporal information along a mental timeline (e.g., a mental timeline that runs from left to right). The present study aims to provide a compilation of the published RT studies on this time–space association in order to estimate the size of its effect and the extent of potential publication bias in this field of research. In this meta‐analysis, three types of task are distinguished due to hitherto existing empirical findings. These findings suggest that the extent to which time is made relevant to the experimental task has a systematic impact on whether or not the mental timeline is activated. The results of this meta‐analysis corroborate these considerations: First, experiments that make time a task‐relevant dimension have a mean effect size of d = 0.46. Second, in experiments in which time is task irrelevant, the effect size does not significantly deviate from zero. Third, temporal priming studies have a surprisingly high mean effect size of d = 0.47, which, however, should be adjusted to d = 0.36 due to publication bias.     

The role of experience in children's developing folk epistemology: review and analysis from the theory–theory perspective

The role of experience in children's developing folk epistemology, specifically in their acquisition of an understanding of belief, is explored from the theory–theory perspective (i.e., the perspective claiming that children's conceptual development can be viewed as analogous to scientific theory development) through a selective review and analysis of extant empirical literature. Three types of investigations are identified: examinations of observed relationships between social experiences and belief understanding, attempts to facilitate the reasoning of children on the verge of belief understanding through experiences intended to compel children to face reasoning inconsistencies; and training studies demonstrating that children can be trained to understand belief over time through specific feedback experiences. A comparison of these studies reveals that experience is defined differently across them, resulting in varying and sometimes ambiguous implications for a theory–theory perspective on development. Implications for future research are discussed.     

Social and non‐social measures of cognition for predicting self‐reported and informant‐reported functional outcomes in early psychosis

The main aim of this study was to investigate the individual contributions of neurocognitive and social‐cognitive domains to self‐reported and informant‐reported functional outcome in early psychosis. We also sought to further characterize the nature of cognitive impairments in this sample and explore the interrelationships between the social‐cognitive measures and how they correlate with measures of neurocognition and clinical symptoms. In this study, 70 patients (mean age: 24.1; 87.1% males) with primary psychotic disorder diagnosed in the previous 5 years were assessed on multiple neurocognitive (processing speed, attention, working memory, immediate verbal memory, delayed recall, visual reasoning, inhibition, planning, cognitive flexibility), and social‐cognitive domains (theory of mind (ToM), emotion recognition, attributional style, metacognitive overconfidence) as well as measures of clinical symptoms. Functional outcome was assessed with three self‐reports and two informant‐reports. On average, patients performed one or more SD below healthy controls on measures of delayed recall, ToM and metacognitive overconfidence. Emotion recognition and ToM were intercorrelated and correlated with multiple neurocognitive domains and negative symptoms. Attributional style correlated with positive symptoms. In the context of multiple variables, self‐reported functional outcomes were predicted by attributional style, whereas emotion recognition and immediate verbal memory predicted variance in informant‐reported community functioning. These results support the suggestion of a likely distinction between the predictive factors for self‐reported and informant‐reported functional outcome in early psychosis and suggest that consideration of self‐assessment of functional outcome is critical when attempting to evaluate the effects attributional style has on functional disability.     

Building Simple Mechanical MindsUsing LEGO® Robots for Research and Teaching in Philosophy

In this essay I discuss how I built a cognitive-robotics lab using inexpensive LEGO® MINDSTORMS™ robot kits. The lab has provided pedagogical and research opportunities for a number of philosophy courses, and I briefly describe the results of those efforts. I also describe how one might build a similar lab. Philosophers need to be more directly involved in the field of robotics. There is much work to do in tidying up the philosophical debris left by the last wave of robotics research, which the researchers have been unwilling or unable to do themselves. The major barriers to participation have been hardware costs and a lack of technical expertise among most philosophers. In recent years, though, these barriers have become less of a problem. At the end, I present some ideas about the kinds of experiments that such kits make possible and how to expand beyond the limitations of the basic LEGO® hardware.     

Everything Else Being Equal: A Modal Logic for <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ceteris Paribus</Emphasis> Preferences

This paper presents a new modal logic for ceteris paribus preferences understood in the sense of “all other things being equal”. This reading goes back to the seminal work of Von Wright in the early 1960’s and has returned in computer science in the 1990’s and in more abstract “dependency logics” today. We show how it differs from ceteris paribus as “all other things being normal”, which is used in contexts with preference defeaters. We provide a semantic analysis and several completeness theorems. We show how our system links up with Von Wright’s work, and how it applies to game-theoretic solution concepts, to agenda setting in investigation, and to preference change. We finally consider its relation with infinitary modal logics.     

Performance evaluations, need for cognition, and the acquisition of a complex skill: an attribute–treatment interaction

We proposed that intermittent evaluations of performance could be used to promote the acquisition of a complex skill. We also hypothesized that trainees low in need for cognition (NFC) would benefit more from intermittent evaluations compared to trainees high in NFC. Accordingly, 106 young adult males participated in 5 h of training in order to learn a complex computer task that simulated the demands of a dynamic aviation environment. Trainees’ performance was assessed either intermittently during training or at the end of training. Results indicated that intermittent performance evaluations enhanced the skill-based learning of trainees low in NFC, whereas intermittent skill evaluations tended to undermine the skill-based learning of trainees high in NFC. The findings are discussed in relation to Deci’s (1975) theory of intrinsic motivation and the need for more research examining attribute–treatment interactions with respect to training and skill acquisition.     

The Hennessy–Milner equivalence for continuous time stochastic logic with mu-operator

A continuous stochastic logic with a μ-operator μCSL is defined, and an interpretation through stochastic relations is proposed. We investigate morphisms for models of μCSL, showing that the associated congruences can be used for an investigation of bisimilarity. The Hennessy–Milner equivalence for μCSL is discussed, and it is shown that models are equivalent iff they are bisimilar, using a general criterion for bisimilarity from the theory of stochastic relations.     

Co‐authoring better futures for children and families – Anticipation Dialogue in children’s social care networks

Anticipation Dialogue (AD), in comparison to Open Dialogue, the lesser known form of dialogical network practices introduced by Seikkula and Arnkil, seems not to be used in children’s social care in the UK, and there is little literature about it. In this article I will introduce and explain Anticipation Dialogue and make links to other systemic ideas including Signs of Safety. I will review the literature and give a case example from my children’s social care practice.     

Adding “Circle of Security – Parenting” to treatment as usual in three Swedish infant mental health clinics. Effects on parents’ internal representations and quality of parent‐infant interaction

This study presents effects of adding Circle of Security‐Parenting (COS ‐P) to an already established comprehensive therapeutic model for early parent‐child intervention in three Swedish infant mental health (IMH ) clinics. Parents’ internal representations and quality of parent‐infant interaction were studied in a clinical sample comprised of 52 parent‐infant dyads randomly allocated to two comparable groups. One group consisted of 28 dyads receiving treatment as usual (TAU ) supplemented with COS ‐P in a small group format, and another group of 24 dyads receiving TAU only. Assessments were made at baseline (T1), 6 months after inclusion (T2) and 12 months after inclusion (T3). Changes over time were explored in 42 dyads. In the COS ‐P group, the proportion of balanced representations, as assessed with Working Model of the Child Interview (WMCI ), significantly increased between T1 and T3. Further, the proportion of emotionally available interactions, as assessed with Emotional Availability scales (EA ), significantly increased over time in the COS ‐P group. Improvements in the TAU ‐group were close to significant. Limitations of the study are mainly related to the small sample size. Strength is the real world character of the study, where COS ‐P was implemented in a clinical context not otherwise adapted to research. We conclude by discussing the value of supplementing TAU with COS ‐P in IMH treatment.