Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey test

Chalmers and Hájek argue that on an epistemic reading of Ramsey??s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty. They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and if one is rational, to think of anyone as infallible-if-rational. But this is not because of Moore-paradoxical beliefs. Rather it is because applying the test requires a certain supposition about conscious belief. It is important to understand the nature of this supposition.     

‘Foolishness to Greeks’: Plantinga and the Epistemology of Christian Belief

A central theme in the Christian contemplative tradition is that knowing God is much more like ‘unknowing’ than it is like possessing rationally acceptable beliefs. Knowledge of God is expressed, in this tradition, in metaphors of woundedness, darkness, silence, suffering, and desire. Philosophers of religion, on the other hand, tend to explore the possibilities of knowing God in terms of rational acceptability, epistemic rights, cognitive responsibility, and propositional belief. These languages seem to point to very different accounts of how it is that we come to know God, and a very different range of critical concepts by which the truth of such knowledge can be assessed. In this paper, I begin to explore what might be at stake in these different languages of knowing God, drawing particularly on Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology of Christian belief. I will argue that his is a distorted account of the epistemology of Christian belief, and that this has implications for his project of demonstrating the rational acceptability of Christian faith for the 21st century.

Corporal punishment and long-term behavior problems: the moderating role of positive parenting and psychological aggression

The aims of this study were: (a) to examine the prevalence of corporal punishment (CP) of children in Spain; (b) to analyze the extent to which CP is used in combination with psychological aggression and positive parenting among Spanish parents; and (c) to investigate whether the relation between CP and behavior problems is moderated by a positive parenting context in which CP may be used, and by the co-occurrence of psychological aggression. The sample comprised 1,071 Spanish university students (74.8% female; 25.2% male). Findings indicate a high prevalence of CP of Spanish students, revealing that significantly more mothers than fathers used CP. Furthermore, more CP is related to more use of psychological aggression and less of positive parenting. Regression analyses revealed that CP was associated with an increased probability of antisocial traits and behaviors regardless of whether there was positive parenting and psychological aggression. These results highlight that, though many Spanish parents use CP as a disciplinary strategy, it appears to be related to negative outcomes for children regardless the parental context in which it is used.     

Disclosing Academic Dishonesty: Perspectives From Nigerian and New Zealand Health Professional Students

Few cross-national studies have been conducted on academic dishonesty. The aim of this study was to explore students’ disclosed levels of academic dishonesty between New Zealand and Nigeria. The measures obtained included incidence, acceptability, and justification of dishonest action. It was hypothesized that there would be differences between the two groups and that differences could be explained in terms of deontology, cultural relativism, utilitarianism, rational fair exchange, and/or response bias. There were 844 medical and health science students who participated in the study and completed a questionnaire that explored incidence, acceptability, and justification of dishonest action. A binary logistic regression revealed that age and incidence were significant predictors of country allocation. Nigerian students reported more engagement in dishonest behaviors, and it is argued that these students have diverse cultural expectations, language variances, response strategies, norms, beliefs, and values. Educational interventions are essential to address concerns related to academic dishonesty such as promoting cross-cultural discourse, providing study skills programs, utilizing peer mentoring, creating formal exchange strategies, and endorsing honor codes.     

Towards defining a unified concept for the acceptability of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS): A conceptual analysis based on the case of Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA)

A key success factor in the future implementation of new in-vehicle technologies is in understanding how users will experience and respond to these devices. Although it is recognized that acceptance, acceptability and/or support is important, consistency in the definition of acceptability, and how it can be measured, is absent. In this paper we conceptualize acceptance as the attitudes towards a new device after its introduction and acceptability as the attitudes to it before its introduction. It is our goal to describe and conceptualize the most common and relevant socio-psychological factors that can influence acceptance and acceptability of Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA). By analysing the different theories and methods used in ISA trials we arrived at the 14 most potential indicators that could influence the definition of acceptability and acceptance. A test survey was conducted to determine if these indicators are relevant and if they affect acceptability. The use of a factor analysis helped to single out those questions that were deemed relevant in doing our conceptual acceptability analysis, and to allocate correlations between the different items. We conclude that we have found a concept with some main possible indicators that directly influence the acceptability of ISA.     

Grammaticality,Acceptability, and Probability: A Probabilistic View of Linguistic Knowledge

The question of whether humans represent grammatical knowledge as a binary condition on membership in a set of well‐formed sentences, or as a probabilistic property has been the subject of debate among linguists, psychologists, and cognitive scientists for many decades. Acceptability judgments present a serious problem for both classical binary and probabilistic theories of grammaticality. These judgements are gradient in nature, and so cannot be directly accommodated in a binary formal grammar. However, it is also not possible to simply reduce acceptability to probability. The acceptability of a sentence is not the same as the likelihood of its occurrence, which is, in part, determined by factors like sentence length and lexical frequency. In this paper, we present the results of a set of large‐scale experiments using crowd‐sourced acceptability judgments that demonstrate gradience to be a pervasive feature in acceptability judgments. We then show how one can predict acceptability judgments on the basis of probability by augmenting probabilistic language models with an acceptability measure. This is a function that normalizes probability values to eliminate the confounding factors of length and lexical frequency. We describe a sequence of modeling experiments with unsupervised language models drawn from state‐of‐the‐art machine learning methods in natural language processing. Several of these models achieve very encouraging levels of accuracy in the acceptability prediction task, as measured by the correlation between the acceptability measure scores and mean human acceptability values. We consider the relevance of these results to the debate on the nature of grammatical competence, and we argue that they support the view that linguistic knowledge can be intrinsically probabilistic.     

Turning the Tables with 'Homophobia'

The charge of homophobia, indiscriminately made in a large part of our Western culture today, is ill conceived, illogical and false. This sweeping charge may be pictured as a triangle of informal logical fallacies. The more prominent side, the one which the general public encounters first, is what I shall call the fallacy of turning the tables : the rhetorical device of making the source of criticism the object of criticism. The other side of the charge is the fallacy of equivocation . The boundary of the term 'homophobia' is made so elastic that it can stretch around, not just phobias, but every kind of rational fear as well; and not just around every kind of fear, but also around every critical posture or idea that anyone may have about the practice of homosexuality. At the base of the charge, and undergirding the other two fallacies, is the fallacy of begging the question . A commitment to the complete acceptability of the practice of homosexuality enables its proponents to 'know' beforehand that all criticisms against it must originate in the defective psychology of the critic.     

Moral Arguments in the Debate over Nanotechnologies: Are We Talking Past Each Other?

How are we to understand the fact that the philosophical debate over nanotechnologies has been reduced to a clash of seemingly preprogrammed arguments and counterarguments that paralyzes all rational discussion of the ultimate ethical question of social acceptability in matters of nanotechnological development? With this issue as its starting point, the study reported on here, intended to further comprehension of the issues rather than provide a cause-and-effect explanation, seeks to achieve a rational grasp of what is being said through the appeals made to this or that principle in the range of arguments put forward in publications on the subject. We present the results of the study’s analyses in two parts. In the first, we lay out the seven categories of argument that emerged from an analysis of the literature: the arguments based on nature, dignity, the good life, utility, equity, autonomy, and rights. In the second part, we present the background moral stances that support each category of argument. Identifying the different categories of argument and the moral stance that underlies each category will enable a better grasp of the reasons for the multiplicity of the arguments that figure in discussions of the acceptability of nanotechnologies and will ultimately contribute to overcoming the tendency towards talking past each other that all too often disfigures the exchange. Clarifying the implications of the moral arguments deployed in the debate over nanotechnologies may make it possible to reduce the confusion observable in these exchanges and contribute to a better grasp of the reasons for their current unproductiveness.     

Rational Suicide: An Empirical Investigation of Counselor Attitudes

This study investigated attitudes of mental health counselors toward rational suicide. Over 80% of respondents were moderately supportive of the idea that people can make well‐reasoned decisions that death is their best option, and further, they identified a consistent set of criteria to evaluate such decisions. Additionally, analyses revealed that as the scenario moved from client, to friend, to self, rational suicide seemed to gain in acceptability for these professionals. Implications for training and practice in light of the apparent responsibilities with suicidal clients defined in the 1995 American Counseling Association's Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice are discussed.     

Acceptability of personal hormone monitoring for contraception: longitudinal and contextual variables

A new contraceptive technology may advance the science of family planning but may do little to affect health if potential users do not deem it an acceptable method. The authors conducted an acceptability study of a newly developed contraceptive method--personal hormone monitoring. A sample of 480 English volunteers present at the 6th month of a 13-month longitudinal study completed surveys regarding their attitudes toward a personal hormone monitor for the purpose of contraception. The authors used the participants' responses to determine (a) the extent to which the participants accepted the monitor, (b) how their ratings of acceptability changed over time, (c) the extent to which contextual variables predicted changes in acceptability over time, and (d) whether those contextual variables predicted final acceptability of the monitor. Results suggested that no single method of family planning is best for everyone and specified the people for whom personal hormone monitoring may be most suitable.     

Acceptability of Personal Hormone Monitoring for Contraception: Longitudinal and Contextual Variables

Abstract

A new contraceptive technology may advance the science of family planning but may do little to affect health if potential users do not deem it an acceptable method. The authors conducted an acceptability study of a newly developed contraceptive method–personal hormone monitoring. A sample of 480 English volunteers present at the 6th month of a 13-month longitudinal study completed surveys regarding their attitudes toward a personal hormone monitor for the purpose of contraception. The authors used the participants' responses to determine (a) the extent to which the participants accepted the monitor, (b) how their ratings of acceptability changed over time, (c) the extent to which contextual variables predicted changes in acceptability over time, and (d) whether those contextual variables predicted final acceptability of the monitor. Results suggested that no single method of family planning is best for everyone and specified the people for whom personal hormone monitoring may be most suitable.     

Book Review

Putnam's internal realism attempts to overcome both radical subjectivism and metaphysical realism. While he agrees with subjectivists that we understand the world through conceptual schemes, Putnam rejects their ‘anything goes’ relativist conclusions, arguing that states and properties of the external world co-determine our understanding of the world, and that some theories are more rational to accept than others. Theories, in other words, while they can't be expected to correspond ‘absolutely’ to the external world, can nevertheless be objective-for-us. When theorising about rationality, however, Putnam runs into problems, claiming that the criteria of rational acceptability, determining the choice of conceptual schemes, are a set of historically evolving cultural norms. This causes a slide into subjectivism and relativism. In this paper, I argue that the main tenet of internal realism – the possibility of an objectivity-for-us – can be maintained. Taking a naturalistic approach, I defend the view that both the conceptual tools and the epistemic values making up our conceptual schemes are ultimately grounded in our genetically determined cognitive apparatus. The conceptual schemes mediating our understanding of the world, therefore, are not merely contingent cultural products but, to an important extent, necessary biological products. In this regard, although Putnam explicitly rejects any attempts to naturalise reason, I argue that it is precisely such a naturalistic approach that provides his internal realism with the necessary backing.     

Cognitive heterogeneity in genetically based prosopagnosia: A family study

Congenital prosopagnosia (CP) is a selective difficulty in recognizing familiar faces that is present from birth. There is mounting evidence for a familial factor in CP, possibly due to a simple autosomal inheritance pattern. However, potential candidate genes remain to be established, and the question whether genetically based CP is a single trait, or a cluster of related subtypes differing in the pattern of impairments to specific components of the face‐processing system, remains unanswered. In addition, since the great majority of so far described cases with CP were adult at the time of investigation, it remains unknown which specific aspects of face processing are impaired in small children with CP. Here we present the first study that specifically addresses these questions by elucidating the specific mechanisms underlying face‐recognition impairments in seven individuals with CP (aged 4–87 years) belonging to four generations of the same family. Our results indicate that genetically based CP is not a single trait but a cluster of related subtypes, since the pattern of impairments to specific components of the face‐processing system varies in individuals belonging to the same family. In addition, we show that the heterogeneity of the cognitive profile in CP with respect to specific aspects of face processing is apparent from early childhood.     

The effect of Stroop interference on the categorical perception of color

In two experiments, we examined the effects of Stroop interference on the categorical perception (CP; better cross-category than within-category discrimination) of color. Using a successive two-alternative forced choice recognition paradigm (deciding which of two stimuli was identical to a previously presented target), which combined to-be-remembered colors with congruent and incongruent Stroop words, we found that congruent color words facilitated CP, whereas incongruent color words reduced CP. However, this was the case only when Stroop interference was presented together with the target color, but not when Stroop stimuli were introduced at the test stage. This suggests that target name, but not test name generation, affects CP. Target name generation may be important for CP because it acts as a category prime, which, in turn, facilitates cross-category discrimination.     

Hume's nominalism and the Copy Principle

I consider some ways in which the Copy Principle (CP) and Hume's nominalism impinge on one another, arguing for the following claims. First, Hume's argument against indeterminate ideas isn't cogent even if the CP is accepted. But this does not vindicate Locke: the imagistic conception of ideas, presupposed by the CP, will force Locke to accept something like Hume's view of the way general terms function, the availability of abstract ideas notwithstanding. Second, Hume's discussion of nominalism provides support for the “old Hume” interpretation, that which takes the CP to be a criterion of meaningfulness, as against the “new Hume” reading, according to which it constrains what we can know. Finally, nominalism forces Hume to adopt a more complicated theory of ideas.     

What’s in the name? Categorical perception for unfamiliar faces can occur through labeling

The conditions under which categorical perception (CP) occurs for unfamiliar faces are unclear. Although CP is generally found only for familiar faces, it has been reported for unfamiliar faces after brief training (Levin & Beale, 2000) or even without any learning of the original faces (Campanella, Hanoteau, Seron, Joassin, & Bruyer, 2003). Three experiments investigated whether CP can be observed for an unfamiliar morphed face continuum without preexposure to the endpoints of the continuum (Experiment 1); with brief exposure to the endpoints (Experiment 2); or with exposure to named endpoints (Experiment 3). CP was always observed for matched pairs of famous faces. However, CP for unfamiliar faces was induced only when participants observed names paired with the endpoint faces before the start of the experiment. The results suggest that CP effects for unfamiliar faces can be observed extremely rapidly when clear category labels are presented.     

Theory change in immunology part I: Extended theories and scientific progress

This two-part article examines the competition between the clonal selection theory and the instructive theory of the immune response from 1957–1967. In Part I the concept of a temporally ‘extended theory’ is introduced, which requires attention to the hitherto largely ignored issue of theory individuation. Factors which influence the acceptability of such an extended theory at different temporal points are also embedded in a Bayesian framework, which is shown to provide a rational account of belief change in science. In Part II these factors, as elaborated in the Bayesian framework, are applied to the case of the success of the clonal selection theory and the failure of the instructive theory.     

Reason and Coercion: In defence of a Rational Control Account of Freedom

According to Pettit, an account of freedom in terms of rational control fails to suffice, for he argues that such an account lacks the resources to rule out coerced actions as unfree. The crucial feature of a coerced action is that it leaves the agent with a choice to make, an apparently rational choice to make. To the extent that it does this, it would seem to leave the agent as free as he would be in any other case where there is a choice to be made. However, we do not consider actions that are coerced to be on a par with actions that are not coerced, that are performed freely as we might say. We do not hold agents similarly responsible in the two sorts of cases. So it would seem that the rational control account fails, for it appears to fail to vindicate this differential practice. In this paper, I defend the rational control account. I outline two ways in which proponents of a rational control model, broadly understood, can respond to this criticism.     

The Acceptability and the Tolerability of Societal Risks: A Capabilities-based Approach

In this paper, we present a Capabilities-based Approach to the acceptability and the tolerability of risks posed by natural and man-made hazards. We argue that judgments about the acceptability and/or tolerability of such risks should be based on an evaluation of the likely societal impact of potential hazards, defined in terms of the expected changes in the capabilities of individuals. Capabilities refer to the functionings, or valuable doings and beings, individuals are able to achieve given available personal, material, and social resources. The likely impact of a hazard on individuals' capabilities should, we argue, be compared against two separate thresholds. The first threshold specifies the minimum level of capabilities attainment that is acceptable in principle for individuals to have in the aftermath of a hazard over any period of time. This threshold captures the level that individuals' capabilities ideally should not fall below. A risk is acceptable if the probability that the attained capabilities will be less than the acceptable level is sufficiently small. In practice, it can be tolerable for some individuals to temporarily fall below the acceptable threshold, provided this situation of lower capabilities attainment is temporary, reversible, and the probability that capabilities will fall below a tolerability threshold is sufficiently small. This second, tolerable threshold delimits an absolute minimum level of capabilities attainment below which no individual in a society should ever fall, regardless of whether that level of capabilities attainment is temporary or reversible. In this paper, we describe and justify this Capabilities-based Approach to the acceptability and tolerability of risks. We argue that the proposed theoretical framework avoids the limitations in current approaches to acceptable risk. The proposed approach focuses the attention of risk analysts directly on what should be our primary concern when judging the acceptability and the tolerability of risks, namely, how risks impact the well-being of individuals in a society. Also, our Capabilities-based Approach offers a transparent, easily communicable way for determining the acceptability and the tolerability of risks.