The Modern Bhagavad Gītā: Caste in Twentieth-Century Commentaries

International Journal of Hindu Studies - By the twentieth century the Bhagavad Gītā had become the single most important Hindu book. A clear indication of its popularity is that many of...     

Role Ethics or Ethics of Role-Play? A Comparative Critical Analysis of the Ethics of Confucianism and the Bhagavad Gītā

Both Confucianism and the Bhagavad Gītā emphasize the moral authority of social roles. But how deep does the likeness between these ethical philosophies run? In this essay I focus upon two significant points of comparison between the role-based ethics of Confucianism and the Gītā: (1) the interrelation between formalized social roles and family feeling, and (2) the religious dimension of moral action. How is it that Confucians ground their social roles in family feeling, while the Gītā emphasizes rupture between role and sentiment? Furthermore, are we to understand Confucianism as presenting a social philosophy that eschews religious concerns, whereas the Gītā denies the moral significance of family feeling in lieu of obtaining soteriological freedom? Examining the aesthetic and religious dimensions of the ethics of Confucianism and the Gītā clarifies a key distinction that both views implicitly make, albeit for divergent reasons: the difference between living one’s roles and playing one’s roles.     

The Significance of Three Errors in the First Chapter of Bhagavadgītā

The recognition of three errors in verses 1.10, 11, and 36 of Bhagavadgītā and the truth behind it is essential to grasp the beginning of the tread of thought developed by Vedavyāsa from the first to the last verse of the entire text spanning over 18 chapters. Generally, only the first error in verse 1.10 has received recognition, but as soon as the error is recognized there was attempt either to interpret the verse violating its syntax and semantics to make its meaning consistent with epic facts or to redraft the verse taking it as an error of a copyist, who has exchanged Bhīṣma with Bhīma and vice versa while copying the original. But, the attempt to remove the errors by interpretation or redrafting makes the interpreters ignore the significance of the errors in development in the argument and the readers become blind to the logic of thought as it is developed in Bhagavadgītā spanning over the entire text of Bhagavadgītā.

     

The Anugītā as a Gloss on the Bhagavadgītā—Part I: The Origin of Erroneous Exegetical Tradition of the Bhagavadgītā

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - The Anugītā has been considered as the first gloss known to us on the Bhagavadgītā. The Anugītā set erroneous...     

The Bhagavadgītā, Sen,and Anderson

Joshua Anderson argues that Amartya Sen’s reading of the Bhagavadgītā is not accurate and so it cannot serve as an example of Sen’s comprehensive consequentialism. This article presents Sen’s reading of the Bhagavadgītā and Anderson’s criticisms of Sen’s readings. It discusses three types of readers: history readers, activist readers, and interventionist readers. It gives an interventionist reading of the Bhagavadgītā, supplementing Arjuna’s reasons and contesting those of K???a. It shows that Arjuna’s reasons are cogent and it respectfully argues that K???a’s arguments are incomplete and unconvincing. Even if Arjuna’s reasons are not ultimately decisive, they legitimately feature in his deliberations. It responds to Anderson, urging that Sen correctly advocates comprehensive consequentialism and agent-relativity, rather than cumulative outcomes and agent-neutrality, and that Sen correctly sees these contrasts exemplified in the Bhagavadgītā. It concludes with a discussion of the impartial spectator, kin, and self.     

The Forgotten Consort: The Goddess and Kāmadeva in the Early Worship of Tripurasundarī

International Journal of Hindu Studies - This article examines continuities between the Hindu Tantric tradition of Tripurasundarī, which later came to be known as ?rīvidyā, and...     

Art and war: Paradox of the Bhagavad Gitā

The first several chapters of the Bhagavad Gitā set themselves a daunting task: to explain how a life of action can be rendered compatible with a life of renunciation of desire. The situation, in fact, is designed to raise the issue in an excruciatingly intense form. As Krsna and Arjuna pause on the verge of the great battle, Arjuna asks how killing people—including his own teachers and members of his own family—in order to secure power and fame, can be squared with his religious and ethical convictions. This paper is an attempt to explicate Krsna's solution of the paradox, not from the point of view of Hindu tradition (in which it has, of course, driven whole movements of thought), but simply as a philosophical problem in its own right. I will argue that the paradox of the Gitā suggests a reconstrual of the way we conceive the relation of means and ends in our activities, a reconstrual that can be profitably elucidated through the concept of art. And I will argue that this reconstrual has the potential to change our relations to our world and to one another in a way that is deeply life‐affirming.     

Jivacide,Zombies and Jivanmuktas: the meaning of life in the Bhagavad Gitā

In discussing the meaning of life in the Bhagavad Gitā two obvious questions arise: first, what is the meaning of ‘the meaning of life'?, and second, how does that meaning apply to the Bhagavad Gitā? In Part I of this brief paper I will attempt to answer the first question by focusing on one of the common meanings of that phrase; in Part II, I will apply that very common meaning to the Bhagavad Gitā; and in the third and final part, I will point to a puzzle, the paradox of the jivanmukta, that would seem to follow from the discussion in the first two parts of this paper.

My own feeling is that the concept of ‘the meaning of life’ is a Western invention [1]. This being so, perhaps it would be wise to probe for that concept and its meaning among Western authors. We turn first, then, to one ancient writer, Aristotle of Stagira, and conclude Part I with a modern writer also concerned with the meaning of life, Albert Camus.     

The Arabico-Islamic background of Al-Fārābī's logic

This paper examines al-Fārābī's logical thought within its Arabico-Islamic historical background and attempts to conceptualize what this background contributes to his logic. After a brief exposition of al-Fārābī's main problems and goals, I shall attempt to reformulate the formal structure of Arabic linguistics (AL) in terms of the ontological and formal characteristics that Arabic logic is built upon. Having discussed the competence of al-Fārābī in the history of AL, I will further propose three interrelated theses about al-Fārābī's logic, in terms of which I will attempt to redefine it: the logico-linguistic conception, the project of logicization, and nuclear logic. The final question that will arise is how Aristotle's logic could be built upon AL, which has a nature contrary to logic. The present paper also contributes to examining our traditional research habits in Arabic studies.     

Some Reflections on the Meaning of Dīkṣā in Kerala According to Mātṛsadbhāvatantra

International Journal of Hindu Studies - One of the most important Hindu Tantric rites is known as dīk?ā, an initiation that grants access to mystical knowledge. This initiation...     

Kālīghāṭ and the Fashioning of Middle-Class Modernities

International Journal of Hindu Studies - The upper middle classes have worked over the past century to transform the Hindu temple from a symbol of “backwardness” to a symbol of the...     

Knowledge and Devotion in the Bhagavad-Gītā: A Suggestive Parallel from Chinese Buddhism

How is devotion (bhakti) related to knowledge (jñāna)? Does one lead to the other? Do they correspond to different paths for different people? Commentators on the Bhagavad-Gītā have debated these questions for centuries. In this essay I will suggest, as many Indian commentators have, that the paths of devotion and knowledge described in the Gītā can be harmonized. I will not draw from Indian texts, however, but from a suggestive parallel in the history of Chinese religions: namely, the development of a tradition of “dual cultivation” of Pure Land and Chan 禪. I will focus in particular on the works of Yunqi Zhuhong 雲棲祩宏 (1535–1615) and his use of the distinction between principle (li 理) and phenomenon (shi 事) to reconcile seemingly divergent religious paths. I will conclude by considering the implications of this synthesis for nondualist interpretations of the Gītā.