Attachment,Infidelity, and Loneliness in College Students Involved in a Romantic Relationship: The Role of Relationship Satisfaction,Morbidity, and Prayer for Partner

This study examined the mediating effects of relationship satisfaction, prayer for a partner, and morbidity in the relationship between attachment and loneliness, infidelity and loneliness, and psychological morbidity and loneliness, in college students involved in a romantic relationship. Participants were students in an introductory course on family development. This study examined only students (n = 345) who were involved in a romantic relationship. The average age of participants was 19.46 (SD = 1.92) and 25 % were males. Short-form UCLA Loneliness Scale (ULS-8), (Hays and DiMatteo in J Pers Assess 51:69–81, doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa5101_6, 1987); Relationship Satisfaction Scale (Funk and Rogge in J Fam Psychol 21:572–583, doi:10.1037/0893-3200.21.4.572, 2007); Rotterdam Symptom Checklist (De Haes et al. in Measuring the quality of life of cancer patients with the Rotterdam Symptom Checklist (RSCL): a manual, Northern Centre for Healthcare Research, Groningen, 1996); Prayer for Partner Scale, (Fincham et al. in J Pers Soc Psychol 99:649–659, doi:10.1037/a0019628, 2010); Infidelity Scale, (Drigotas et al. in J Pers Soc Psychol 77:509–524, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.3.509, 1999); and the Experiences in Close Relationship Scale-short form (Wei et al. in J Couns Psychol 52(4):602–614, doi:10.1037/0022-0167.52.4.602, 2005). Results showed that relationship satisfaction mediated the relationship between avoidance attachment and loneliness and between infidelity and loneliness. Physical morbidity mediated the relationship between anxious attachment and psychological morbidity. Psychological morbidity mediated the relationship between anxious attachment and physical morbidity. The present results expand the literature on attachment by presenting evidence that anxious and avoidant partners experience loneliness differently. Implications for couple’s therapy are addressed. Future research should replicate these results with older samples and married couples.     

Selfless or Selfish? Generativity and Narcissism as Components of Legacy

Erikson’s concept of generativity, or caring for the next generation, acknowledges the presence of narcissism or any type of self-preoccupation as potentially negative. However, other theories articulate generativity as including features of self-involvement, such as a drive for symbolic immortality (McAdams and de St. Aubin J Pers Soc Psychol 62(6):1003–1015. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.62.6.1003, 1992). Recent empirical research also supports this view by identifying generativity and narcissism as both incorporating the beneficial components of agency and communion (Frimer et al. J Pers Soc Psychol 101(1):149–163. doi:10.1037/a0023780, 2011; Gebauer et al. J Pers Soc Psychol 103(3):854–878. doi:10.1037/a0029629, 2012). Moreover, creating a legacy—something left behind when one dies—entails levels of both generativity and narcissism; thus, in the presence of generativity, narcissism may be seen as positive rather than negative. The current study examined generativity and narcissism, and their association with legacy, which was coded from midlife adults’ narratives concerning the future (age 55–58; N = 155). The findings indicated that a combination of high generativity and high narcissism was associated with the highest level of composite legacy, one in which both self and other are implicated. Results are discussed in light of the potentially positive outcomes of narcissism and its synergistic properties for legacy creation when combined with generativity.     

No-Futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism

According to no-futurism, past and present entities are real, but future ones are not. This view faces a skeptical challenge (Bourne in Australas J Philos 80(3):359–371 2002; A future for presentism, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2006; Braddon-Mitchell in Analysis 64(283):199–203 2004): if no-futurism is true, how do you know you are present? I shall propose a new skeptical argument based on the physical possibility of Gödelian worlds (Albert Einstein: philosopher-scientist, Open Court, La Salle, pp. 555–562, 1949). This argument shows that a no-futurist has to endorse a metaphysical contingentist reading of no-futurism, the view that no-futurism is contingently true. But then, the no-futurist has to face a new skeptical challenge: how do you know that you are in a no-futurist world?     

Living with Gratitude: Spouse’s Gratitude on One’s Depression

Research has shown that gratitude makes people happier (McCullough and Tsang in Psychol Gratitude, Oxford University Press, pp 123–141, 2004; Wood et al. in Clin Psychol Rev 30(7):890–905, 2010), healthier (McCullough et al. in J Pers Soc Psychol, 86(2):295–309, 2004), more considerate (Bartlett and DeSteno in Psychol Sci 17(4):319–325, 2006), and better evaluated (Gordon et al. in Pers Individ Differ 50(3):339–343, 2011), enabling more stable relationships (Algoe et al. in Pers Relationsh 17(2):217–233, 2010; Algoe et al. in Emotion 8(3):425–429, 2008; Lambert et al. in Psychol Sci 21(4):574–580, 2010). However, no study has extended research beyond individual persons to investigate the impact of one’s gratitude on the mental well-being of those who surround her or him. Thus, we tested this possibility and found in Study 1 that within marriage, husbands’ depositional gratitude negatively correlated with their wives’ depressive emotion. The results of Study 2 validated Study 1 by showing that a wife’s depression would be relatively palliated if her husband was assigned to express appreciation to her and not share daily hassles. While a causal relationship was demonstrated as hypothesized, a difference between genders also emerged. We discuss in particular the latter in terms of its mechanism, limitations, and practical implications for marriage.     

Promoting Healthy Behavior from the Pulpit: Clergy Share Their Perspectives on Effective Health Communication in the African American Church

African Americans continue to suffer disproportionately from health disparities when compared to other ethnicities (ACS 2010; CDC 2007). Research indicates that the church and the pastor in the African American community could be enlisted to increase effectiveness of health programs (Campbell et al. in Health Edu Behav 34(6):864–880, 2007; DeHaven et al. in Am J Public Health 94(6):1030–1036, 2004). The objective of this study was to investigate African American pastors’ perceptions about health promotion in the church and how these perceptions could serve as a guide for improving health communication targeting African Americans. Semi-structured interviews with African American clergy revealed that pastors feel strongly about the intersection of health, religion and spirituality; they also believe that discussing health screening and other health issues more frequently from the pulpit and their own personal experiences will ultimately impact health behavior among congregants. This study suggests that African American clergy see themselves as health promoters in the church and believe this communication (i.e., pastor-endorsed health information materials) will impact health behavior among underserved and minority populations.     

On the Evolutionary Defense of Scientific Antirealism

Van Fraassen (The scientific image, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980) claims that successful theories exist today because successful theories survive and unsuccessful ones die. Wray (Erkenntnis 67:81–89, 2007; Erkenntnis 72:365–377, 2010) appeals to Stanford’s new pessimistic induction (Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), arguing that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation is better than the realist explanation that successful theories exist because they are approximately true. I argue that if the pessimistic induction is correct, then the evolutionary explanation is neither true nor empirically adequate, and that realism is better than selectionism because realism explains more phenomena in science than selectionism.     

And Yet it Moves! A Reply to “Rectifying Misconception: A Comprehensive Response to Gardner,Moore, and Marks Comments on ‘Some Concerns About the Psychological Implications of Mindfulness: A Critical Analysis’ ”

In this brief article I reply to Gardner et al. (J Ration Emot Cogn Behav Ther. doi:10.1007/s10942-014-0196-1, 2014)’s comments to my previous article titled “Some concerns about the psychological implications of mindfulness. A critical analysis” (David, in J Ration Emot Cogn Behav Ther. doi:10.1007/s10942-014-0198-z, 2014). While initially—humorously and for the sake of debate—adopting an attitude towards mindfulness based on a modified version of Galileo’s Abjuration, I then critically argued that Gardner et al.’s criticism is focused on a priori defending a construct and its associated practices that, by the very nature of empirically supported constructs/interventions, are not perfect (i.e., panacea), but subject to clarifications, limitations, and improvements.     

Patterns of Religious Coping among Bereaved College Students

Contemporary research has suggested that bereavement is a paramount issue in college populations, a group which has historically been underrepresented in grief research (Balk. in Death studies 25:67–84, 2001; Balk et al. in Death Studies 34:459–468, 2010). Indeed, there has been a call to generate new research on grief with specific populations and age groups (Center for the Advancement of Health. in Death Studies 28:568–575, 2004). Religion is often described as a primary way that individuals cope with bereavement in particular (Frantz et al. in Pastor Psychol 44(3):151–163, 1996) and has been shown to effect college student reactions to stress in general (Merrill et al. in Mental Health, Religion & Culture 12(5):501–511, 2009). The RCOPE (Pargament et al. in J Clin Psychol 56(4):519–543, 2000, J Health Psychol 9:713–730, 2004) is a frequently used measure of religious coping, but has not been evaluated with a bereaved undergraduate population. Given that emerging adulthood is a critical developmental phase of religious identity (Fowler. in New Directions for Child Development 3(52):27–45, 1991), the current study examined the factor structure of the RCOPE within a sample of bereaved college students. An exploratory factor analysis was performed, which approximated the factor structure proposed by Pargament et al. (J Clin Psychol 56(4):519–543, 2000). However, a high correlation between the positive and negative religious coping subscales (r = 0.71) detracted from the predictive utility of Pargament et al.′s (2000) two overarching subscales. Therefore, an exploratory factor analysis with an orthogonal rotation was used to identify two uncorrelated subscales (adaptive religious coping and maladaptive religious coping). This new two-factor, 39-item version of the RCOPE was found to demonstrate good internal consistency (α > 0.8) as well as convergent and discriminant validity. The interaction between religious coping strategies and core beliefs about the predictability of the world is explored, and directions for future research and clinical practice are suggested.     

Tempo and Temperament: A Music Lesson on the Significance of Time for the Art of Pastoral Care

This article will focus on the relationship between tempo and temperament and the power of music to facilitate healing, especially for individuals who struggle with temperament or mood disorders, by examining briefly how individuals diagnosed with depression may be helped by listening to or performing music as a form of treatment. Current research into the “science” of music is providing concrete evidence for the reality that musicians and music therapists have long intuited to be true–music does have the capacity to facilitate healing by influencing brain activity and altering moods (Cambell and Doman 2011; Levitin 2007, 2008; Mannes 2011; Powell 2010; Pruyser 1983; Rose 2004). Insofar as music is an integral part of most worship traditions, it provides a common ground for conversation that may seem more natural and less formidable to ministers and lay people alike than the structures of conventional counseling or care-giving relationships, especially for those who have a tendency to be suspicious of all things psychological.     

Exemplification as molecular function

Since the publication of Universals and Scientific Realism (Armstrong 1978a, b) until Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (Armstrong 2010), via Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Armstrong 1989), a World of States of Affairs (Armstrong 1997), and Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), David Armstrong has developed one of the most influential theories of instantiation in contemporary analytic metaphysics (see, for example, Lewis, in Aust J Phil 61(4), 343–377, 1983; Baxter in Aust J Phil, 79, 449–464, 2001; Forrest, in Aust J Phil, 83, 213–228, 2006). Instantiation has been advocated by Armstrong to give a solution to what he has called the “pressing problem” of “the multiple location of property universals” (Armstrong, in Universals: An opinionated introduction. University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 89–90). Here I argue that Armstrong’s theory of instantiation fails to solve the problem because it involves two kinds of instantiation to account for particulars “having” and “sharing” universals. As a viable alternative to Armstrong’s theory, I propose a theory of instantiation capable of accounting for both phenomena in a univocal way.     

Rational intuition and understanding

Rational intuitions involve a particular form of understanding that gives them a special epistemic status. This form of understanding and its epistemic efficacy are not explained by several current theories of rational intuition, including Phenomenal Conservatism (Huemer, Skepticism and the veil of perception, 2001; Ethical intuitionism, 2005; Philos Phenomenol Res 74:30–55, 2007), Proper Functionalism (Plantinga, Warrant and proper function, 1993), the Competency Theory (Bealer Pac Philos Q 81:1–30, 2000; Sosa, A virtue epistemology, 2007) and the Direct Awareness View (Conee, Philos Phenomenol Res 4:847–857, 1998; Bonjour, In defense of pure reason, 1998). Some overlook it; others try to account for it but fail. We can account for the role of understanding in rational intuition by returning to the view of some of the early Rationalists, e.g. Descartes and Leibniz. While that view carries a prohibitive cost, it does contain an insight that may help us solve the problem of giving understanding its due.     

25 years of research on the use of geometry in spatial reorientation: a current theoretical perspective

The purpose of this article is to review and evaluate the range of theories proposed to explain findings on the use of geometry in reorientation. We consider five key approaches and models associated with them and, in the course of reviewing each approach, five key issues. First, we take up modularity theory itself, as recently revised by Lee and Spelke (Cognitive Psychology, 61, 152–176, 2010a; Experimental Brain Research, 206, 179–188, 2010b). In this context, we discuss issues concerning the basic distinction between geometry and features. Second, we review the view-matching approach (Stürzl, Cheung, Cheng, & Zeil, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 34, 1–14, 2008). In this context, we highlight the possibility of cross-species differences, as well as commonalities. Third, we review an associative theory (Miller & Shettleworth, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 33, 191–212, 2007; Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 34, 419–422, 2008). In this context, we focus on phenomena of cue competition. Fourth, we take up adaptive combination theory (Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2006). In this context, we focus on discussing development and the effects of experience. Fifth, we examine various neurally based approaches, including frameworks proposed by Doeller and Burgess (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 5909–5914, 2008; Doeller, King, & Burgess, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 5915–5920, 2008) and by Sheynikhovich, Chavarriaga, Strösslin, Arleo, and Gerstner (Psychological Review, 116, 540–566, 2009). In this context, we examine the issue of the neural substrates of spatial navigation. We conclude that none of these approaches can account for all of the known phenomena concerning the use of geometry in reorientation and clarify what the challenges are for each approach.     

Lucky understanding without knowledge

Can one still have understanding in situations that involve the kind of epistemic luck that undermines knowledge? Kvanvig (The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009a; in: Haddock A, Miller A, Pritchard D (eds) Epistemic value, 2009b) says yes, Prichard (Grazer Philos Stud 77:325–339, 2008; in: O’Hear A (ed) Epistemology, 2009; in: Pritchard D, Millar A, Haddock A (eds) The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations, 2010) say sometimes, DePaul and Grimm (Philos Phenomenol Res 74:498–514, 2007) and Grimm (Br J Philos Sci 57:515–535, 2006; in: Bernecker S, Pritchard D (eds) The Routledge companion to epistemology, 2011), Kvanvig’s critics, say no. The cases put forth by Kvanvig’s critics share a common feature, which seems to drive the intuition that understanding can’t be lucky: the fact that the information that makes up the individual’s understanding comes exclusively from a bad source. I formulate a case that lacks this feature, drawing on the fact that understanding produced from scientific inquiry is often produced by collaboration. I argue that my case provides good evidence that understanding is not a species of knowledge.     

Margaret R. Miles’ Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter: An Eriksonian Perspective

My perspective on Margaret R. Miles’s Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter is informed by Erik H. Erikson’s life cycle model (Erikson 1950, 1959, 1963, 1964, 1968a, b, 1982; Erikson and Erikson 1997) and, more specifically, by my relocation of his life stages and their accompanying human strengths (Erikson 1964) according to decades (Capps 2008). I interpret Miles’s account of her life from birth to age forty as revealing the selves that comprise the composite Self (Erikson 1968a) that come into their own during the first four decades of the life cycle, i.e., the hopeful, willing, purposeful, and competent selves     

Luck,propositional perception,and the Entailment Thesis

Looking out the window, I see that it’s raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell, in Smith (ed.) Reading McDowell on mind and world, 2002; Turri, Theoria 76(3):197–206, 2010; Pritchard, Philos Issues (Supplement to Nous) 21:434–455, 2011; Pritchard, Epistemological disjunctivism, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not know that p. In this paper, I argue that their arguments are unsuccessful.     

Gender and Leadership: A Frame Analysis of University Home Web Page Images

With calls for (business) leaders to contribute to greater global fairness and social justice (BAWB 2006; Maak and Pless Journal of Business Ethics, 88, 537–550, 2009), this paper considers gender equality on University home web page images as one means of communicating equal access to leadership roles for both men and women. Although there are many paths for leadership development, one important purpose of Universities is to create people who will potentially become leaders in our society (Shapiro 2005). We analyzed the home web pages at 24 leading universities to identify implicit messages about gender roles, building on implicit leadership theory and leadership prototypes. Using an adapted version of Goffman’s frame analysis (1979), our results suggest depiction of gender equality in university home web pages, in contrast to studies of print advertisements (cf., Kang Sex Roles, 37(11/12), 979–996, 1997; Lindner Sex Roles, 51(7/8), 409–421, 2004). Our results also identify specific opportunities to depict greater equity and to continue to expand the potential for both women and men to be seen as being capable and belonging on this leadership path.     

Why metrical properties are not powers

What has the dispositional analysis of properties and laws (e.g. Molnar, Powers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Mumford, Laws in nature, Routledge London, 2004; Bird, Nature’s metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007) to offer to the scientific understanding of physical properties?—The article provides an answer to this question for the case of spacetime points and their metrical properties in General Relativity. The analysis shows that metrical properties are not ‘powers’, i.e. they cannot be understood as producing the effects of spacetime on matter with metaphysical necessity. Instead they possess categorical characteristics which, in connection with specific laws, explain those effects. Thus, the properties of spacetime do not favor the metaphysics of powers with respect to properties and laws.     

The Doomsday Argument and the Simulation Argument

The Doomsday Argument and the Simulation Argument share certain structural features, and hence are often discussed together (Bostrom 2003, Are you living in a computer simulation, Philosophical Quarterly, 53:243–255; Aranyosi 2004, The Doomsday Simulation Argument. Or why isn’t the end nigh, and you’re not living in a simulation, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/190/; Richmond 2008, Doomsday, Bishop Ussher and simulated worlds, Ratio, 21:201–217; Bostrom and Kulczycki 2011 A patch for the Simulation Argument, Analysis, 71:54–61). Both are cases where reflecting on one’s location among a set of possibilities yields a counter-intuitive conclusion—in the first case that the end of humankind is closer than you initially thought, and in the second case that it is more likely than you initially thought that you are living in a computer simulation. Indeed, the two arguments do have some structural similarities. But there are also significant disanalogies between the two arguments, and I argue that these disanalogies mean that the Simulation Argument succeeds and the Doomsday Argument fails.     

Evolution of the empirical and theoretical foundations of eyewitness identification reform

Scientists in many disciplines have begun to raise questions about the evolution of research findings over time (Ioannidis in Epidemiology, 19, 640–648, 2008; Jennions & Møller in Proceedings of the Royal Society, Biological Sciences, 269, 43–48, 2002; Mullen, Muellerleile, & Bryan in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1450–1462, 2001; Schooler in Nature, 470, 437, 2011), since many phenomena exhibit decline effects—reductions in the magnitudes of effect sizes as empirical evidence accumulates. The present article examines empirical and theoretical evolution in eyewitness identification research. For decades, the field has held that there are identification procedures that, if implemented by law enforcement, would increase eyewitness accuracy, either by reducing false identifications, with little or no change in correct identifications, or by increasing correct identifications, with little or no change in false identifications. Despite the durability of this no-cost view, it is unambiguously contradicted by data (Clark in Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 238–259, 2012a; Clark & Godfrey in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 22–42, 2009; Clark, Moreland, & Rush, 2013; Palmer & Brewer in Law and Human Behavior, 36, 247–255, 2012), raising questions as to how the no-cost view became well-accepted and endured for so long. Our analyses suggest that (1) seminal studies produced, or were interpreted as having produced, the no-cost pattern of results; (2) a compelling theory was developed that appeared to account for the no-cost pattern; (3) empirical results changed over the years, and subsequent studies did not reliably replicate the no-cost pattern; and (4) the no-cost view survived despite the accumulation of contradictory empirical evidence. Theories of memory that were ruled out by early data now appear to be supported by data, and the theory developed to account for early data now appears to be incorrect.