3~6岁儿童二级错误信念认知的发展

采用“新故事”对来自两所幼儿园的133名3~6岁儿童的二级错误信念进行了测查,探查了这一阶段儿童二级错误信念认知的发展。研究主要得出以下结论：4岁左右的儿童能够掌握二级未知知识,但是儿童对于二级错误信念的理解要晚1~2年,6岁左右是儿童二级错误信念发展的关键期。儿童对于信念问题的错误回答主要是基于一级推理,相当一部分的6岁儿童能够基于二级推理对信念问题做出合理解释。儿童对于二级错误信念认知的发展不是一个全或无的过程,而是一个逐步发展的过程。     

3～6岁儿童情绪伪装认知能力发展及其与错误信念理解的关系

个体的情绪伪装能力是其情绪社会化发展极为重要的方面,选取某幼儿园123名3～6岁儿童为被试,通过“区分外表-真实情绪”任务和“错误信念”任务考察3～6岁儿童情绪伪装认知能力的发展特点,进而探讨情绪伪装认知与错误信念理解的关系.结果表明：（1）儿童情绪伪装认知能力随年龄增长而提高,3～5岁为儿童情绪伪装认知能力的快速发展期;（2）儿童在消极情境下区分内外情绪的能力显著高于在积极情境中的表现;同时,对两种情绪伪装动机（社会适应、自我保护）的认知能力无显著差异;（3）儿童情绪伪装认知和错误信念理解能力显著相关,两种错误信念（意外内容、意外地点）理解都能很好地预测情绪伪装认知能力.     

幼儿二级错误信念认知、亲社会行为与同伴接纳的关系

探讨了113名3~6岁儿童的二级错误信念认知、亲社会行为与同伴接纳之间的关系,结果表明：在总体上,儿童的亲社会行为是其同伴接纳的最佳预测变量;二级错误信念认知和亲社会行为对儿童同伴接纳的影响存在一定的年龄效应,二级错误信念认知是年幼组儿童同伴接纳的最佳预测变量,而亲社会行为则是年长组儿童同伴接纳的最佳预测变量。     

幼儿心理理论愿望信念理解与情绪理解关系研究

考察了幼儿心理理论信念愿望理解与情绪理解的发展状况及相互关系.运用实验法对256名3~6岁儿童施测.结果表明:(1)幼儿心理理论愿望-信念理解与情绪理解的发展在3~6岁期间随年龄逐渐提高.4岁是基于信念的情绪理解能力发展的关键年龄;4~5岁是幼儿情绪观点采择能力发展的关键年龄.(2)幼儿基于信念的情绪理解能力的发展晚于错误信念理解能力的发展.(3)幼儿心理理论的愿望-信念理解与情绪理解之间相关显著.     

幼儿对基于信念的惊奇情绪的认知发展

采用简化的错误信念任务,考察了90名3~5岁幼儿对自己或他人信念证伪引发的惊奇情绪认知及其错误信念理解。结果显示,3~5岁幼儿对自身或是故事主人公信念证伪之后的惊奇情绪理解表现出显著的发展趋势,其归因均以情境定向为主,只有极少数幼儿提到了相应的信念状态。3、4、5幼儿对他人、以及自身错误信念的认知基本是一致的,通过率分别为一半左右、76.7%、93.3%。幼儿对惊奇情绪产生原因的逆向推理能力在3~5岁之间获得了显著的发展,这一能力显著差于其错误信念认知,且略低于其顺向预测能力。这些结果揭示出幼儿很早就发展的心理理论以及心理表征技能在惊奇情绪理解中的作用     

幼儿情绪理解、亲社会行为与同伴接纳之间的关系

以131名3~6岁的儿童为被试,探讨了不同层次情绪理解能力的发展及其与儿童的亲社会行为、同伴接纳之间的关系。结果表明,儿童的表情识别、情绪解码和二级情绪理解能力表现出了不同的发展趋势;在总体上,儿童的情绪解码能力和亲社会行为能显著地预测其同伴接纳;情绪理解和亲社会行为对儿童同伴接纳的影响存在一定的年龄效应,情绪解码能力是年幼儿童同伴接纳的最佳预测变量,亲社会行为则是年长儿童同伴接纳的最佳预测变量。     

学前儿童朴素情绪理论的发展

对情绪的心理层面的理解是幼儿心理理论发展中出现得相对较迟的能力, 他们如何通过愿望和信念等不同的心理状态对人们的情绪做出判断？随着年龄的增长, 他们采用不同策略推测情绪的能力又发生了什么变化？本研究结合主人公愿望是否得到满足的状态, 通过利用图片故事个别测查的方法探查了90名3~5岁学前儿童在“内容错误信念”任务中对他人情绪的推测。结果显示, 年幼儿童、尤其是3岁幼儿的高兴情绪理解受其对情境是否满足愿望的认知的影响, 呈现出显著的“积极情绪偏差效应”; 学前儿童对情绪的认知表现出从不能采用信念—愿望策略到错误地采用信念—愿望策略、到正确采用信念—愿望策略的发展模式, 且其基于信念的情绪理解在一定程度上呈现出落后于其错误信念理解的“滞后效应”。结果还显示幼儿的惊奇情绪判断不仅由信念成分决定, 也受愿望理解的影响。这些结果突显出心理状态在儿童情绪理解中的重要作用, 揭示出学前儿童相对完整的朴素情绪理论发展模式。     

儿童情绪伪装能力的发展研究

该文介绍了国外儿童情绪伪装能力发展及其影响因素的近期研究,这些研究结果表明：儿童最早在斗岁出现情绪伪装的认知能力,6岁时这种能力得到完善;儿童对情绪伪装认知能力和对物理属性的表面与真实的区分能力具有潜在的一致的认知基础;儿童情绪伪装能力的完善和错误信念的获得有关;文化通过社会化过程影响儿童的情绪伪装的发展。     

聋童与正常儿童对多种信念的认知

选取了122名3～12岁聋童,并分别用65名3～5岁的正常儿童作对照,开展了2个实验系列,探讨了儿童的正确信念、一级错误信念及二级错误信念认知的发展特点.结果如下: (1)聋童及正常儿童信念认知的发展过程中,无论是关于正确信念,还是关于一级错误信念,都是先发展自我信念认知,再发展他人信念认知;(2)关于正确信念、一级错误信念和二级错误信念认知的发展,聋童都比正常儿童滞后,但两者的发展趋势一致; (3)手语聋童在信念认知上略好于口语聋童; (4)父母为聋人或父母会手语的聋童,以及兄弟姐妹会手语的聋童,其信念认知水平要比其他聋童好.     

7~9岁儿童二级错误信念和失言理解的发展

采用二级错误信念任务、失言理解任务分别考察了90名7-9岁学龄儿童心理理论的发展。结果表明,7岁组儿童在二级错误信念和失言理解任务上的成绩与8岁组、9岁组存在显著差异,但8岁组和9岁组儿童之间没有显著差异,提示8岁可能是个体心理理论发展的又一个转折点。三组被试在二级错误信念理解上的成绩显著高于失言理解任务上的成绩,在控制年龄后,他们在两种心理理论任务上的成绩显著相关。另外,失言任务中三种心理状态理解的得分两两相关。综合以上结果,在学龄期,心理理论仍有质的发展,且心理理论的信念、情绪和意图等核心概念仍然相互关联。     

Misinformation and unexpected change: Testing the development of epistemic-state attribution

Summary Children's ability to infer a person's ignorance and false belief was tested in two stories which differed as to the relative ease for making these inferences. In the Unexpected Change story ignorance could be directly inferred from the emphasized fact that the target character had not witnessed the change, while false belief required the additional inference that the character would assume that things would stay as they had been initially. In the Misinformation Story false belief was made directly accessible by the content of a false message, while ignorance was not directly indicated by absence of information. It needed to be inferred from the fact that the available information was misleading. Results from 3- and 4-year-old Austrian and English children showed that manipulation of inferential difficulty did not affect their ability to make epistemic state attribution. In both stories children found it easier to attribute ignorance than false belief. To integrate this finding in the larger developmental context we suggest that children younger than 4 years find it difficult to distinguish between knowledge and ignorance because they do not understand the role of informational access in the formation of knowledge and they fail in false-belief attribution because they do not understand that incompatible truth values can be assigned to propositions.     

Relationship between Chinese children's imaginary companions and their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions

We investigated relationship between Chinese children's imaginary companions (ICs) and their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions in 180 children, aged 5–6 years old. We examined the potential differences in second-order false belief understanding and emotion understanding between children with and without ICs, children with egalitarian IC relationships and hierarchical IC relationships, as well as children with invisible friends and personified objects. The results revealed that children with ICs had better second-order false belief understanding and emotion understanding than children without ICs. Compared with children with hierarchical relationships, children with egalitarian relationships had better second-order false belief understanding. However, children with invisible friends and personified objects did not differ on their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions. The results suggest that compared with IC types, IC status and child-IC relationship qualities may be more relevant to children's theory of mind. It will be interesting for the future researchers to investigate the underlying mechanism of the differences between children with egalitarian IC relationships and hierarchical IC relationships.     

Truthful yet misleading: Elementary second-order deception in school-age children and its sociocognitive correlates

In highly competitive contexts, deceptive intentions might be transparent, so conveying only false information to the opponent can become a predictable strategy. In such situations, alternating between truths and lies (second-order lying behavior) represents a less foreseeable option. The current study investigated the development of 8- to 10-year-old children’s elementary second-order deception in relation to their attribution of ignorance (first- and second-order ignorance) and executive functions (inhibitory control, shifting ability, and verbal working memory). An adapted version of the hide-and-seek paradigm was used to assess children’s second-order lie-telling, in which children were asked to hide a coin in either of their hands. Unlike the standard paradigm, the opponent did not consistently look for the coin in the location indicated by the children, so children needed to switch between telling simple lies and truths (elementary second-order lies about the coin location) to successfully deceive the recipient. The results showed that older children were less likely to tell elementary second-order lies. However, across the sample, when children decided to lie, this ability was positively related to their second-order ignorance attribution and their verbal working memory. Moreover, we obtained preliminary evidence for the presence of a habituation effect in second-order lying, with children being more accurate and having less variability in their truthful-to-deceive responses (this being the more frequently elicited response) than when telling lies to deceive. Our findings could have implications for understanding the mechanisms underlying children’s ability to alternate between truths and lies to deceive.     

Counterfactual reasoning and moral emotion attribution

Studies in the happy victimizer paradigm have shown that preschool children attribute positive emotions to a norm violator whereas older elementary-school children tend to attribute negative emotions. The current research explored the possibility that children's counterfactual reasoning ability (i.e., their capacity to imagine alternatives to reality) can explain this age difference in moral emotion attribution. In Study 1, 100 4- and 8-year-old children attributed significantly more negative emotions to victimizers in a counterfactual-prime condition, in which an alternative course of action was presented before the emotion attribution, than in a no-prime condition, where no counterfactual prompt was given. Counterfactual reasoning ability significantly predicted negative emotion attribution in the no-prime condition. In Study 2, the counterfactual reasoning of 143 4- and 8-year-old children significantly predicted negative emotion attribution to the victimizer. When controlling for counterfactual reasoning, focusing on the victim of a violation did not affect emotion attribution to the violator.     

不同目击者对儿童道德情绪判断与归因的影响

本研究考察不同权威目击者对儿童道德情绪判断与归因的影响。实验以90个7~8岁儿童为被试,采用3(行为情境)×3(目击权威类型)的组间设计,考察了不同权威目击者条件下儿童对不同行为者的道德情绪判断和归因。结果发现,目击权威的类型对儿童道德情绪判断与归因的影响在不同的行为情境条件下是不同的。成人权威目击条件下,儿童对亲社会行为者的道德情绪判断分数最高,即更多判断他们会感到高兴,对损人者的道德情绪判断分数最低,即更多判断他们会感到不高兴。而同龄权威和非权威目击条件下儿童对不同行为者的情绪判断分数不存在显著差异。不同权威目击条件下儿童对行为者的情绪归因存在显著差异,奖惩定向更多出现在成人权威目击条件。研究显示,成人权威对儿童道德情绪的培养具有重要意义,能够显著影响儿童的道德情绪判断与归因。     

Theory of mind and epistemological development: the relation between children's second-order false-belief understanding and their ability to reason about evidence

The study investigates the hypothesis that children's ability to attribute second-order beliefs facilitates their understanding of evidence, as seen in the ability to distinguish between causes and reasons. Seventy-four children 5–7 yr old were given belief and evidence tests. The belief tests assessed their ability to represent and reason from second-order false-beliefs, and the evidence tests assessed their ability to distinguish between the cause of a situation and a person's reason for believing it. The relation between performance on the two tests was determined, taking into account general language and non-verbal reasoning abilities. Results show that performance on the belief test and on the evidence part of the evidence test improved significantly over the age range, and that a significant proportion of variance in the evidence test scores is accounted for by second-order false-belief understanding, over and above that accounted for by general language and non-verbal abilities. The argument is made that second-order false-belief understanding is fundamental to children's epistemological development, underlying not just their understanding of evidence, but also their understanding of inference and truth.     

Does it always feel good to get what you want? Young children differentiate between material and wicked desires

One line of research on children's attributions of guilt suggests that 3‐year‐olds attribute negative emotion to self‐serving victimizers, slightly older children attribute happiness, and with increasing age, attributions become negative again (i.e., a three‐step model; Yuill et al., 1996, Br. J. Dev. Psychol., 14, 457). Another line of research provides reason to expect that 3‐year‐olds may be predisposed to view self‐serving moral transgression as leading to positive emotion; this is a linear developmental model in which emotion attributions to transgressors become increasingly negative over the course of childhood (e.g., Nunner‐Winkler & Sodian, 1988, Child Dev., 59, 1323). However, key differences in methodology make it difficult to compare across these findings. The present study was designed to address this problem. We asked how 3‐ to 9‐year‐old children (n = 111) reason about transgression scenarios that involve satisfying wicked desires (wanting to cause harm and doing so successfully) versus material desires (wanting an object and getting it successfully via harmful behaviour). Three‐year‐old children reasoned differently about desire and emotion across these two types of transgressions, attributing negative emotion in the case of wicked desires and positive emotion in the case of material desires. This pattern of emotion attribution by young children provides new information about how young children process information about desires and emotions in the moral domain, and it bridges a gap in the existing literature on this topic.     

6~10岁儿童对损人情境下行为者的道德情绪判断与归因

采用故事情境法探讨6~10岁儿童对损人情境下损人者和旁观者的道德情绪判断与归因的发展。结果发现：（1）在损人情境下,6岁儿童能理解损人行为是不对的,但直到8岁儿童才能理解旁观行为是不对的;（2）随着年龄增长,儿童判断损人者的愉悦程度逐渐降低,情绪归因从结果定向过渡到道德定向;儿童判断旁观者的愉悦程度逐渐降低,情绪归因从无法有效归因过渡到道德定向;（3）儿童对不同行为者的道德情绪判断同时受年龄和性别的影响,6岁男孩判断损人者愉悦程度显著高于女孩,6岁男孩判断旁观者愉悦程度显著低于女孩;8岁和10岁儿童对两类行为者的道德情绪判断未发现显著的性别差异。     

Who gets mad,sad, scared or happy at discipline? Emotion attributions explain child externalizing behaviour

Few studies have linked parental discipline with children's emotional experiences, and not much data explore children's emotional attributions to discipline linked to externalizing behaviour. With a sample from Brazil, this study examines which emotions children most aptly attribute to a protagonist facing spanking, time-out or inductive discipline for norm violations. We hypothesized that anger, sadness, and fear would have higher attribution rates at spanking or time-out, relative to inductive discipline and that happiness would have higher attribution rates at induction relative to the other discipline modalities. We expected these findings to be more pronounced in older children. Based on emotional functions, we also tested the role of neutrality and happiness attributions to discipline in children's externalizing behaviour. A two-way MANOVA, with discipline and child age as explanatory variables, showed that children attributed more anger at time-out or spanking than at induction, and more happiness and neutrality at induction than at either time-out or spanking. Older children attributed significantly more sadness and less fear or neutrality. Hierarchical regressions showed that child externalizing behaviour was negatively related to happy attributions in discipline independently of child emotion situation knowledge or demographics. The results are interpreted in light of a functional view of emotions.