Strong versus weak quantum consequence operations

This paper is a study of similarities and differences between strong and weak quantum consequence operations determined by a given class of ortholattices. We prove that the only strong orthologics which admits the deduction theorem (the only strong orthologics with algebraic semantics, the only equivalential strong orthologics, respectively) is the classical logic.     

Interpolation and Definability in Guarded Fragments

The guarded fragment (GF) was introduced by Andréka, van Benthem and Németi as a fragment of first order logic which combines a great expressive power with nice, modal behavior. It consists of relational first order formulas whose quantifiers are relativized by atoms in a certain way. Slightly generalizing the admissible relativizations yields the packed fragment (PF). In this paper we investigate interpolation and definability in these fragments. We first show that the interpolation property of first order logic fails in restriction to GF and PF. However, each of these fragments turns out to have an alternative interpolation property that closely resembles the interpolation property usually studied in modal logic. These results are strong enough to entail the Beth definability property for GF and PF. Even better, every guarded or packed finite variable fragment has the Beth property. For interpolation, we characterize exactly which finite variable fragments of GF and PF enjoy this property.     

A MODEST MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

We formulate a new modal ontological argument; specifically, we show that there is a possible world in which an entity that has at least the property of omnipotence exists. Then we argue that if such an entity is possible, it is necessary as well.     

DEFLATIONISM AND THE SUCCESS ARGUMENT

Deflationists about truth typically deny that truth is a causal–explanatory property. However, the now familiar 'success argument' attempts to show that truth plays an important causal–explanatory role in explanations of practical success. Deflationists have standardly responded that the truth predicate appears in such explanations merely as a logical device, and that therefore truth has not been shown to play a causal–explanatory role. I argue that if we accept Jackson and Pettit's account of causal explanations, the standard deflationist response is inconsistent, for on this account even logical properties can be causally explanatory. Therefore the deflationist should remain neutral as to whether truth is a causal–explanatory property, and focus instead on the claim that truth, if it is a property, is a merely logical one.     

AN INTUITIONISTIC CHARACTERIZATION OF CLASSICAL LOGIC

By introducing the intensional mappings and their properties, we establish a new semantical approach of characterizing intermediate logics. First prove that this new approach provides a general method of characterizing and comparing logics without changing the semantical interpretation of implication connective. Then show that it is adequate to characterize all Kripke_complete intermediate logics by showing that each of these logics is sound and complete with respect to its (unique) ‘weakest characterization property’ of intensional mappings. In particular, we show that classical logic has the weakest characterization property , which is the strongest among all possible weakest characterization properties of intermediate logics. Finally, it follows from this result that a translation is an embedding of classical logic into intuitionistic logic, iff. its semantical counterpart has the property .      

Message Exchange Games in Strategic Contexts

When two people engage in a conversation, knowingly or unknowingly, they are playing a game. Players of such games have diverse objectives, or winning conditions: an applicant trying to convince her potential employer of her eligibility over that of a competitor, a prosecutor trying to convict a defendant, a politician trying to convince an electorate in a political debate, and so on. We argue that infinitary games offer a natural model for many structural characteristics of such conversations. We call such games message exchange games, and we compare them to existing game theoretic frameworks used in linguistics—for example, signaling games—and show that message exchange games are needed to handle non-cooperative conversation. In this paper, we concentrate on conversational games where players’ interests are opposed. We provide a taxonomy of conversations based on their winning conditions, and we investigate some essential features of winning conditions like consistency and what we call rhetorical cooperativity. We show that these features make our games decomposition sensitive, a property we define formally in the paper. We show that this property has far-reaching implications for the existence of winning strategies and their complexity. There is a class of winning conditions (decomposition invariant winning conditions) for which message exchange games are equivalent to Banach- Mazur games, which have been extensively studied and enjoy nice topological results. But decomposition sensitive goals are much more the norm and much more interesting linguistically and philosophically.     

Utility of gambling under p(olynomial)-additive joint receipt and segregation or duplex decomposition

This article continues our exploration of the utility of gambling, but here under the assumption of a non-additive but p(olynomial)-additive representation of joint receipt. That assumption causes the utility of gambling term to have a multiplicative impact, rather than just an additive one, on what amounts to ordinary weighted utility. Assuming the two rational recursions known as branching and upper gamble decomposition, we investigate separately the rational property of segregation and the non-rational one of duplex decomposition. Under segregation, we show that each pair of disjoint events either exhibits weight complementarity or both support no utility of gambling, a property called UofG-singular. We develop representations for both cases. The former representation is a simple weighted utility with each term multiplied by a function of the event underlying that branch. The latter representation is an ordinary rank-dependent utility with Choquet weights but with no utility of gambling. Under duplex decomposition, we show that weights have the intuitively unacceptable property that there is essentially no dependence upon the events, making duplex decomposition, in this context, of little behavioral interest.     

Being of Two Minds (or of One in Two Ways): A New Puzzle for Constitution Views of Personal Identity

According to constitution views of persons, we are constituted by spatially coinciding human animals. Constitution views face an ‘overpopulation' puzzle: if the animal has my brain, there is another thinker where I am. An influential solution to this problem distinguishes between derivative and non-derivative property possession: persons non-derivatively have their personal properties, while inheriting others from their constituters. I will show that this solution raises a new problem, by constructing a puzzle with the absurd result that we instantiate certain properties incompatibly. In setting up the puzzle, I demonstrate the relevance of the bodily awareness and self-awareness literatures to overpopulation puzzles.     

Quasivarieties Generated by Simple MV-algebras

In this paper we show that the quasivariety generated by an infinite simple MV-algebra only depends on the rationals which it contains. We extend this property to arbitrary families of simple MV-algebras.     

Fuzziness in the Mind: Can Perception be Unconscious?

Recently, a new movement has arisen in the philosophy of perception: one that views perception as a natural kind. Strangely, this movement has neglected the extensive work in philosophy of science on natural kinds. The present paper remedies this. I start by isolating a widespread and influential assumption, which is that we can give necessary and sufficient conditions for perception. I show that this assumption is radically at odds with current philosophy of science work on natural kinds. I then develop an alternative, new view of perception. This new view takes as its starting point the dominant position on kinds in the life sciences: the homeostatic property cluster account. I show that, if you accept this view, then all of the putative cases of unconscious perception are more plausibly seen as cases where it is indeterminate whether the mental episode in question is an instance of perception.     

Priestley Duality for Quasi-Stone Algebras

In this paper we describe the Priestley space of a quasi-Stone algebra and use it to show that the class of finite quasi-Stone algebras has the amalgamation property. We also describe the Priestley space of the free quasi-Stone algebra over a finite set. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Invariance Properties for General Diagnostic Classification Models

In item response theory (IRT), the invariance property states that item parameter estimates are independent of the examinee sample, and examinee ability estimates are independent of the test items. While this property has long been established and understood by the measurement community for IRT models, the same cannot be said for diagnostic classification models (DCMs). DCMs are a newer class of psychometric models that are designed to classify examinees according to levels of categorical latent traits. We examined the invariance property for general DCMs using the log-linear cognitive diagnosis model (LCDM) framework. We conducted a simulation study to examine the degree to which theoretical invariance of LCDM classifications and item parameter estimates can be observed under various sample and test characteristics. Results illustrated that LCDM classifications and item parameter estimates show clear invariance when adequate model data fit is present. To demonstrate the implications of this important property, we conducted additional analyses to show that using pre-calibrated tests to classify examinees provided consistent classifications across calibration samples with varying mastery profile distributions and across tests with varying difficulties.     

Brouwer-Zadeh logic,decidability and bimodal systems

We prove that Brouwer-Zadeh logic has the finite model property and therefore is decidable. Moreover, we present a bimodal system (BKB) which turns out to be characterized by the class of all Brouwer-Zadeh frames. Finally, we show that BrouwerZadeh logic can be translated into BKB.     

A coherent moral relativism

Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.     

The Potentiality of the Embryo and the Somatic Cell

Recent arguments on the ethics of stem cell research have taken a novel approach to the question of the moral status of the embryo. One influential argument focuses on a property that the embryo is said to possess—namely, the property of being an entity with a rational nature or, less controversially, an entity that has the potential to acquire a rational nature—and claims that this property is also possessed by a somatic cell. Since nobody seriously thinks that we have a duty to preserve the countless such cells we wash off our body every day in the shower, the argument is intended as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that the embryo should be afforded the same moral status as a fully developed human being. This article argues that this argument is not successful and that it consequently plays into the hands of those who oppose embryonic stem cell research. It is therefore better to abandon this argument and focus instead on the different argument that potentiality, as such, is not a sufficient ground for the creation of moral obligations towards the embryo.     

Inherent emotional quality of human speech sounds

During much of the past century, it was widely believed that phonemes—the human speech sounds that constitute words—have no inherent semantic meaning, and that the relationship between a combination of phonemes (a word) and its referent is simply arbitrary. Although recent work has challenged this picture by revealing psychological associations between certain phonemes and particular semantic contents, the precise mechanisms underlying these associations have not been fully elucidated. Here we provide novel evidence that certain phonemes have an inherent, non-arbitrary emotional quality. Moreover, we show that the perceived emotional valence of certain phoneme combinations depends on a specific acoustic feature—namely, the dynamic shift within the phonemes' first two frequency components. These data suggest a phoneme-relevant acoustic property influencing the communication of emotion in humans, and provide further evidence against previously held assumptions regarding the structure of human language. This finding has potential applications for a variety of social, educational, clinical, and marketing contexts.     

Similarity, alignment, and conceptual combination: Comment on Estes and Glucksberg

In their paper “Interactive Property Attribution in Concept Combination,” Estes and Glucksberg (2000) suggest an alternative to the alignment view of property interpretation— one based on salience and relevance of features. I suggest that alignment as well as feature salience and relevance are crucial to property interpretation. In making their claims, Estes and Glucksberg also assume that similarity has inverse effects on two important ways of interpreting combinations (i.e., property and relation interpretations). I show that this assumption does not generally hold and provide an alternative explanation for their results (one based on the plausibility of relation interpretations).     

Alston's Anti‐Justificationism as a Strategy to Resolve the Conflict Between Internalism and Externalism

After a justificationist period, William P. Alston has tried to eliminate justification from the epistemology of belief. He introduced a list of epistemic desiderata all of which contribute to the positive status of beliefs and none of which has an exclusive and decisive role so that it could be isolated as the property of being justified. Careful examination reveals, however, that this list includes fewer desiderata than advertised. Truth‐conducive desiderata are most important for Alston, and these are five; during his discussion, however, Alston reduces these desiderata to only one, the reliability of process, which has an externalist character. Besides this desideratum, there is one other group of desiderata, all of which have an internalist character. What Alston has in fact done, then, through the presentation of his anti‐justificationist list, is to separate externalist and internalist elements for the positive status of belief and to give an independent role to each. Since Alston regards the truth‐conducive group as the most important, however, and since he has failed to show a real pluralism in this group, we may conclude that he continues to have a monistic approach to the evaluation of beliefs, which belies his alleged pluralism.     

Neural network models of categorical perception

Studies of the categorical perception (CP) of sensory continua have a long and rich history in psychophysics. In 1977, Macmillan, Kaplan, and Creelman introduced the use of signal detection theory to CP studies. Anderson and colleagues simultaneously proposed the first neural model for CP, yet this line of research has been less well explored. In this paper, we assess the ability of neural-network models of CP to predict the psychophysical performance of real observers with speech sounds and artificial/novel stimuli. We show that a variety of neural mechanisms are capable of generating the characteristics of CP. Hence, CP may not be a special model of perception but an emergent property of any sufficiently powerful general learning system.     

归纳推理中的属性中心性效应

通过三个实验研究了属性的中心性程度对归纳推理的影响,结果表明,在归纳推理中存在属性中心性效应,中心属性比其他属性（次中心属性、再次中心属性）更能影响归纳推理。但属性中心性效应的出现受到了前提对象和结论对象相似性程度的制约,当前提对象和结论对象的相似程度高时,中心属性比其他属性更能影响归纳推理;随着相似性水平的降低,中心属性的归纳推理力度越来越弱,而次中心属性、再次中心属性的归纳推理力度则会依次表现出越来越强的趋势,到最后当前提对象和结论对象的属性完全不相似时,最次中心属性的归纳推理力度达到最高水平,而中心属性的归纳推理力度则降低到最低水平。由于再次中心属性的归纳推理力度的最高水平没有显著高于随机水平,而中心属性的归纳推理力度的最低水平却显著低于随机水平,因此,研究者认为,在前提对象和结论对象完全不相似的情况下,被试将确信不能采用中心属性来进行归纳推理的力度判断,而采用猜测的方式选择了肯定可以排除的项目之外的其他项目,这体现了具有不确定的归纳推理活动的过程的典型特征