The misrepresentation of science by philosophers and teachers of science

In education there is a concern that science teachers misrepresent the nature of science to students. An assumption that is implicit in this concern is that science teachers should be teaching the philosophy of science as it is understood by philosophers. This paper argues that both philosophers and science teachers misrepresent science when they engage in their respective disciplines, and it is evident the two misrepresentations are of different types. In philosophy, the misrepresentation is of a philosophical-epistemological nature where advocates of particular views maintain that advocates of other views misinterpret the nature of science. In education, the misrepresentation is of a cognitive, teaching nature where teachers' practical interpretations are not congruent with philosophers' interpretations of science. The discrepancy that exists between the two misrepresentations is due to the intentions of the two disciplines, and assuming that science teachers should teach a philosophically coherent interpretation of the nature of science is an over-simplification of the problem. The concepts of espoused theories and theories-in-use are used to link the two interpretations of science and provide suggestions for future research that may help clarify misrepresentations of science in science education.     

Joseph LeConte on evolution,education, and the structure of knowledge

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century the theory of evolution profoundly influenced American thought. In the form of Social Darwinism it significantly shaped views on race, civilization, and political theory. Sociology and psychology were developing concurrently as disciplines. All of these were destined to have an effect upon education, for many intellectuals believed that science in general and evolutionary theory in particular were directly applicable to all areas of thought. Among the advocates of such a role for science and evolutionary theory was Joseph LeConte, whose views on the subject are outlined and compared with his contemporaries.     

A Plea for Judgment

Judgment is central to engineering, medicine, the sciences and many other practical activities. For example, one who otherwise knows what engineers know but lacks ??engineering judgment?? may be an expert of sorts, a handy resource much like a reference book or database, but cannot be a competent engineer. Though often overlooked or at least passed over in silence, the central place of judgment in engineering, the sciences, and the like should be obvious once pointed out. It is important here because it helps to explain where ethics fits into these disciplines. There is no good engineering, no good science, and so on without good judgment and no good judgment in these disciplines without ethics. Doing even a minimally decent job of teaching one of these disciplines necessarily includes teaching its ethics; teaching the ethics is teaching the discipline (or at least a large part of it).     

The Revival of Panpsychism and its Relevance for the Science-Religion Dialogue

Panpsychism, whereby mentality is considered fundamental within the natural world, does not appear prima facie to be a friend to with either natural science or Christian theology. This article challenges this first impression. Within the science and theology dialogue, panpsychism has been a central component of Process theologians’ efforts to integrate these disciplines into a larger metaphysical framework; but, this is not the method adopted in this paper. Instead, it is argued that panpsychism gives scholars the potential for greater progress in two field defining discussions: quantum accounts of special divine action and theistic evolution. It is shown that panpsychism currently finds sufficient consonance with the relevant scientific disciplines and has substantial benefits for theologians engaged in these areas. Panpsychism holds great promise as the philosophy of mind for future generations of science-and-religion scholars.     

Theological Realism and the Observability of God

A popular way of arguing for theological realism depends on analogies with defences of realism in the philosophy of science. This article questions the success and theological propriety of this strategy by comparing theological and scientific methodologies. First, for the analogies to work it is necessary to show that the theological counterparts of objections to scientific realism can be rebutted; however, it appears that orthodox theology cannot accomplish this. Second, the topic of un/observability in science and theology is analysed. It is shown that the two disciplines have different accounts of the topic and that comparisons between the two undermine a central argument of versions of theological realism based on the philosophy of science.     

The Philosophy of Interdisciplinarity: Sustainability Science and Problem-Feeding

Traditionally, interdisciplinarity has been taken to require conceptual or theoretical integration. However, in the emerging field of sustainability science this kind of integration is often lacking. Indeed sometimes it is regarded as an obstacle to interdisciplinarity. Drawing on examples from sustainability science, we show that problem-feeding, i.e. the transfer of problems, is a common and fruitful-looking way of connecting disparate disciplines and establishing interdisciplinarity. We identify two species of problem-feeding: unilateral and bilateral. Which of these is at issue depends on whether solutions to the problem are fed back to the discipline in which the problem originated. We suggest that there is an interesting difference between the problem-feeding approach to interdisciplinarity and the traditional integrative perspective suggested by among others Erich Jantsch and his colleagues. The interdisciplinarity resulting from problem-feeding between researchers can be local and temporary and does not require collaboration between proximate disciplines. By contrast, to make good sense of traditional integrative interdisciplinarity we must arguably associate it with a longer-term, global form of close, interdisciplinary collaboration.     

Publishing in Scientific Journals: We're Not Just Talking to Ourselves Anymore

ABSTRACT— Increasingly, psychological research is part of the integrative science that spans multiple disciplines, but variable publication standards undermine some of the integrative progress that might otherwise be made. Word limits for articles, norms for shorter reviews (which would improve turnaround time), electronic availability, and appropriate marketing of research will bring psychology closer to the central role it could play in integrative science.     

DISCIPLINING RELATIVISM AND TRUTH

Abstract. Imre Lakatos's philosophy of science can provide helpful leads for theological methodology, but only when mediated by the disciplines that lie between the natural sciences and theology. The questions of relativism and truth are used as indices for comparing disciplines, and Lakatos's theory of natural science is taken as the starting point. Major modifications of Lakatos's work are demanded as one moves from the natural sciences, through economics, the interpretive social sciences, literary theory, and into theology. Although theology may consist of Lakatosian research programs, it also includes programs of interpretation and programs for living. This conclusion must influence our definition of theological truth and our assessment of theological relativism.     

Ethical Assurance Statements in Political Science Journals

Many journals in the physical sciences require authors to submit assurances of compliance with human subjects and other research ethics standards. These requirements do not cover all disciplines equally, however. In this paper we report on the findings of a survey of perceptions of ethical and managerial problems from journal editors in political science and related disciplines. Our results show that few journals in political science require assurance statements common to journals for other scientific disciplines. We offer some reasons for this as well as some recommendations for implementing ethical assurance safeguards for political science.     

The unity of science

The paper addresses the question of how the unity of science can adequately be characterized. A mere classification of scientific fields and disciplines does not express the unity of science unless it is supplemented with a perspective that establishes a systematic coherence among the different branches of science. Four ideas of this kind are discussed. Namely, the unity of scientific language, of scientific laws, of scientific method and of science as a practical‐operational enterprise. Whereas reference to the unity of scientific language and of scientific laws does not provide a viable basis for the unity of science, the methodological and practical unity might. The unity of science can be characterized by the way in which methodological criteria enter into the assessment or evaluation of theories, and, moreover, by a transdisciplin‐ary approach to problems. Accordingly, the unity of science is not expressed by theoretical uniformity but by the unity of scientific practice.     

IS THEOLOGY RESPECTABLE AS METAPHYSICS?

Theology involves inquiry into God's nature, God's purposes, and whether certain experiences or pronouncements come From God. These inquiries are metaphysical, part of theology's concern with the veridicality of signs and realities that are independent from humans. Several research programs concerned with the relation between theology and science aim to secure theology's intellectual standing as a metaphysical discipline by showing that it satisfies criteria that make modern science reputable, on the grounds that modern science embodies contemporary canons of respectability for metaphysical disciplines. But, no matter the ways in which theology qua metaphysics is shown to resemble modern science, these research programs seem destined for failure. For, given the currently dominant approaches to understanding modern scientific epistemology, theological reasoning is crucially dissimilar to modern scientific reasoning in that it treats the existence of God as a certainty immune to refutation. Barring the development of an epistemology of modern science that is amenable to theology, theology as metaphysics is intellectually disreputable.     

Science and Religion: Some Demarcation Criteria

Discussions on the congruence, compatibility, and contradictions between science and religion have been going on since the rise of modern science. In our own times, there are many efforts to build bridges of harmony between the two. Most of these are anchored to particular religious traditions or denominations and also (often) to specific disciplines, notably cosmology, physics, and biology. Though these discussions serve commendable purposes for members of specific faiths and/or disciplines, they are also, for precisely this reason, of restricted appeal. There are not too many discussions of the topic that consider science and religion from a global perspective. It will therefore be useful to define science and religion in terms of their unique characteristics, draw the line of demarcation between them, and show where they overlap. This is what this paper attempts to do.     

On the Diversity of the Cognition Disciplines and the Development of A Unifying Philosophy of Information

The cognition and information theoretic sciences have now been in existence for the better part of a century. In that time, their varied disciplines have undergone extensive maturation, honing their methods, constitutions, and evaluation techniques in the pursuit of academic rigor, while not losing sight of the practical influences that have served as their almost universal cornerstone. Meanwhile, this period has also been marked by increasing disparity and gradual distancing of the philosophical underpinnings upon which each field is founded, adding strain to interdisciplinary collaborative efforts. This article presents an overview of select information‐science‐related cognition disciplines, and shows how the nascent Philosophy of Information (PI) can be adopted as a means of unifying these philosophical foundations in an empirically sound manner, without sacrificing general applicability. In addition, it demonstrates how PI is already rooted in the philosophies or epistemological views of several of the cognition disciplines, implicitly or otherwise.     

Theoretical and methodological elements for integrating ethics as a foundation into the education of professional and design disciplines

The paper addresses the integration of ethics into professional education related to the disciplines responsible for the conception and creation of the artificial (artefactual or technology). The ontological-epistemological paradigm of those disciplines is understood within the frame of the sciences of the artificial as established by Herbert Simon (1969). According to that paradigm, those sciences include disciplines not only related to the production of artefacts (technology), such as engineering, architecture, industrial design, etc, but also disciplines related to devised courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones, like medicine, law, education, etc. They are centered on intentional action and at their core is the activity of design, which is their common foundation and attitude, or their common culture. The science of design becomes the broader foundational discipline for any professions engaged in the intentional transformation of the world. The main distinction between design disciplines and scientific ones rests on the object-project dichotomy. Indeed, contrary to Science that sees the world as an object to be observed, Design sees the world as a project and acts upon the world through projects, which are grounded in intentions, ends, and values. Design disciplines are meant to transform the world, or part of it, and are teleological. Being so, they are embodied in an act that is ethical and their ontology-epistemology must be addressed also through practical reason to resituate all professional disciplines according to their involved nature. The paper introduces theoretical, methodological, and ethical elements to establish a model that integrates ethics into the education of the professional disciplines, design-based disciplines, responsible for the creation of the artificial, artefactual or technological, world. The model is articulated around the notions of ethical engagement and responsibility through the act of design understood as action with intention situated in a project, common in all professional disciplines. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Ethics and Social Responsibility in Engineering and Technology” meeting, New Orleans, 2003.     

Logical semantics as an empirical science

Exact philosophy consists of various disciplines scattered and separated. Formal semantics and philosophy of science are good examples of two such disciplines. The aim of this paper is to show that there is possible to find some integrating bridge topics between the two fields, and to show how insights from the one are illuminating and suggestive in the other.     

A view of the background of Freudian theory.

A major concern of nineteenth century scientists was to delineate the objective units or entities with which science deals. While some philosophers of science abandoned the search as futile and tried to redefine science, investigators in the biological sciences and the sciences of man attempted to discover new entities upon which to base their disciplines. A new understanding of hypnotism gave Freud the opportunity to isolate objective entities within the mind and to found a psychology on that basis.     

An historian's view of American social science

This paper explicates the argument of The Origins of American Science. Starting from my own historical premises and the origin of the social sciences in both historicism and science, I compare the divergent historical orientations of the sociologies of Robert Park and Max Weber. I argue that the inclination of American social science toward scientism and liberalism derives from the national ideology of American exceptionalism. Since this structural feature of American political culture was itself a part of history, I indicate how changes in historical consciousness and politics led American social scientists to reformulate exceptionalism and their disciplines. By the 1920s, their hope of establishing scientific control over, and maintaining the liberal direction of, the fast-changing national history was embodied in scientism. I close with some thoughts about the continuing power of scientism and exceptionalism since the 1920s and the possibility that an historical, Weberian model of social science could bridge the widening gap between scientistic and hermeneutic wings of the social science disciplines.     

What Can the Systems Community Contribute to Ensure the Survival of Civilization

Much of what we need to plan for our survival is already known, but what we know, how we know, and who knows is divided up between disciplines. Thus much of the problem of ensuring our survival is a matter of learning across the disciplines. We identify four modes through which we bring disciplinary knowledge together: the unity of science, integrated assessment, heuristic models, and distributed learning networks. Although none of them are perfect, we can learn how to put our knowledge together across the disciplines much better than we do.