Body Awareness: a phenomenological inquiry into the common ground of mind-body therapies

Enhancing body awareness has been described as a key element or a mechanism of action for therapeutic approaches often categorized as mind-body approaches, such as yoga, TaiChi, Body-Oriented Psychotherapy, Body Awareness Therapy, mindfulness based therapies/meditation, Feldenkrais, Alexander Method, Breath Therapy and others with reported benefits for a variety of health conditions. To better understand the conceptualization of body awareness in mind-body therapies, leading practitioners and teaching faculty of these approaches were invited as well as their patients to participate in focus groups. The qualitative analysis of these focus groups with representative practitioners of body awareness practices, and the perspectives of their patients, elucidated the common ground of their understanding of body awareness. For them body awareness is an inseparable aspect of embodied self awareness realized in action and interaction with the environment and world. It is the awareness of embodiment as an innate tendency of our organism for emergent self-organization and wholeness. The process that patients undergo in these therapies was seen as a progression towards greater unity between body and self, very similar to the conceptualization of embodiment as dialectic of body and self described by some philosophers as being experienced in distinct developmental levels.     

An inquiry on radical empathy and the phenomenological reduction in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty

In this paper, I wish to explore the contribution of the phenomenological reduction to a distinct form of empathy, which has been identified and called by Ratcliffe (Inquiry 55(5):473–495, 2012) radical empathy. This form of empathy brings to light the sense of reality experienced by the subject rather than a mere mental state. However, I shall consider whether and how the phenomenological reduction allows different interpretations of the same experience, thereby impacting on our understanding of another’s sense of reality. Far from dismissing the role of the reduction, I propose a reconsideration of its relevance for radical empathy. In order to spell out my argument, I propose a case ex negativo that looks at Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s different analyses of the sense of reality experienced by obsessive patients. I argue that this interpretative difference ultimately depends on two opposite uses of the reduction itself, and that Merleau-Ponty’s account offers a promising perspective to reintegrate and contextualize the phenomenological reduction into radical empathy.     

The self-consciousness scale: a discriminant validity study

A recent Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS) measures Private and Public Self-Consciousness and Social Anxiety. The present research was intended to establish discriminant validity for the two Self-consciousness components with respect to several other variables. 105 male undergraduates completed the SCS, the Otis Test of Mental Ability, an abbreviated Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (measuring need for achievement), a Test Anxiety Questionnaire, and the EASI Temperament Survey. Private Self-consciousness did not correlate significantly with any other measure. Public Self-consciousness correlated weakly with the temperaments of Sociability and Emotionality. The Self-consciousness components of the SCS thus appear to be relatively independent of the other measures tested.     

Venturing into the visual voice: combining photos and interviews in phenomenological inquiry around marginalisation and chronic illness

In this article, we present a reflection on the research process of combining photographs with phenomenologically oriented interviews. Two studies in the field of chronic illness with marginalised individuals (lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans* people living with MS; men diagnosed with breast cancer) are employed to illustrate a range of conceptual, methodological and pragmatic issues. Both studies draw upon an integrative theoretical framework within a critical health psychology epistemological paradigm informed by phenomenological psychology and visual methodologies. The data collected for both studies have been analysed through interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). We offer some thoughts regarding certain challenges and opportunities of synergising verbal and visual data and illustrate our arguments through a series of examples from the two studies, which are critically discussed. We argue that qualitative research in psychology benefits from an enhanced multimethodological approach employing existential phenomenological psychology and visual methodologies, especially when exploring chronic illness in marginalised communities, and we outline benefits for the wider community of qualitative researchers in psychology.     

Bodily Disorientation and Moral Change

Neglect of the moral promise of disorientation is a persistent gap in even the most sophisticated philosophies of embodiment. In this article, I begin to correct this neglect by expanding our sense of the range and nature of disoriented experience and proposing new visions of disorientation as benefiting moral agency. Disorientations are experienced through complex interactions of corporeal, affective, and cognitive processes, and are characterized by feelings of shock, surprise, unease, and discomfort; felt disorientations almost always make us unsure of how to go on. I argue that experiences of disorientation can strengthen the moral agency of individuals. I begin by clarifying experiences of felt ease and orientation. I then characterize disoriented embodiment by investigating select experiences that often involve or accompany disorientation, focusing throughout on how disorientation prompts changes in motivation and action. I conclude by charting how disoriented embodiments can help individuals become better moral agents overall, in part by challenging norms that restrict embodiment and undermining dualistic conceptions of the self.     

Assessment of private and public self-consciousness: a Dutch replication

In the present article a replication of a study by Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975), who constructed a Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS), is reported. The SCS was translated into Dutch, and its properties and its relation to Locus of Control was investigated. The norms and reliability coefficients presented are consistent with prior research. Also the results of a factor analysis that yielded the three factors: Private, Public Self-consciousness, and Social Anxiety are consistent with these findings. However, Private Self-consciousness did not correlate significantly with Locus of Control.     

Experience and self-consciousness

Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person, Dan Zahavi answers “yes”. I criticize three core arguments offered in support of this answer—a well-known regress argument, what I call the “interview argument,” and a phenomenological argument. Drawing on Sartre, I introduce a phenomenological contrast between plain experience and self-conscious experience. The contrast challenges the thesis that conscious experience entails self-consciousness.     

Self-representation: searching for a neural signature of self-consciousness

Human self-consciousness operates at different levels of complexity and at least comprises five different levels of representational processes. These five levels are nonconceptual representation, conceptual representation, sentential representation, meta-representation, and iterative meta-representation. These different levels of representation can be operationalized by taking a first-person-perspective that is involved in representational processes on different levels of complexity. We refer to experiments that operationalize a first-person-perspective on the level of conceptual and meta-representational self-consciousness. Interestingly, these experiments show converging evidence for a recruitment of medial cortical and parietal regions during taking a first-person-perspective, even when operating on different degrees of complexity. These data lend support for the speculative hypothesis, that there exist a neural signature for human self-consciousness that is recruited independent from the degree of representational complexity to be performed.     

The relationship between self-consciousness and interpersonal effectiveness and a new scale to measure individual differences in self-consciousness

The purpose of this research was to explore the relationship between a dispositional tendency to become self-conscious and interpersonal effectiveness. It was hypothesized that excessive self-consciousness may be a significant component of social inadequacy and this prediction was confirmed in two experiments. In both studies, maladaptive self-consciousness was measured using a new scale and the development and validity for the test are reported. In the first study, the social skills of persons high or low in maladaptive self-consciousness were assessed using sociometric ratings made by acquaintances. Persons high in maladaptive self-consciousness were perceived by their peers as more socially inadequate. The second study was conducted in a controlled laboratory setting and involved placing persons high or low in maladaptive self-consciousness in a dyadic interaction with a randomly selected partner. Following this, both participants were asked to report their feelings and reactions during the interaction and to make behavioral ratings of their partner. Trained observers also made behavioral ratings of both interactants. It was hypothesized that maladaptive self-consciousness would be associated with ineffective social behavior, reduced sensitivity to one's partner, and a heightened self-perception of inadequacy. These predictions were confirmed and the implications of the relationship between maladaptive self-consciousness and social inadequacy are discussed.     

Spontaneity: a psychoanalytic inquiry

Abstract

This paper examines the experience of consulting to experiential groups and endeavours to draw some conclusions about this significant element in training.     

Interkinaesthetic affectivity: a phenomenological approach

This Husserlian transcendental-phenomenological investigation of interkinaesthetic affectivity first clarifies the sense of affectivity that is at stake here, then shows how Husserl’s distinctive approach to kinaesthetic experience provides evidential access to the interkinaesthetic field. After describing several structures of interkinaesthetic-affective experience, I indicate how a Husserlian critique of the presupposition that we are “psychophysical” entities might suggest a more inclusive approach to a biosocial plenum that includes all metabolic life.

Affective intentionality and self-consciousness

We elaborate and defend the claim that human affective states (“feelings”) are, among other things, self-disclosing. We will show why affective intentionality has to be considered in order to understand human self-consciousness. One specific class of affective states, so-called existential feelings, although often neglected in philosophical treatments of emotions, will prove central. These feelings importantly pre-structure affective and other intentional relations to the world. Our main thesis is that existential feelings are an important manifestation of self-consciousness and figure prominently in human self-understanding. We offer an ordering of four levels of existential feelings and also give considerations in favour of the essential bodily nature of these feelings.     

Adolescent loneliness, self-disclosure, and private self-consciousness: a longitudinal investigation

This study builds on an earlier investigation of the causal relations that exist among loneliness, self-disclosure, and private self-consciousness (Franzoi & Davis, 1985). Using structural equation techniques and a longitudinal (Year 1-Year 2) design, the present investigation tested a theoretical model that links these variables. Participants were 406 high school students. As in the previous study, results generally indicated a good fit between the theoretical model and the observed relations. In particular, however, this investigation provided new evidence concerning two alternative interpretations of the original Franzoi and Davis study. First, this study supports the original hypothesis that private self-consciousness leads to greater self-disclosure to peers, but it offers no support for the alternative view that such disclosure in turn increases private self-consciousness. Second, this investigation is somewhat equivocal with respect to the original hypothesis that greater self-disclosure reduces loneliness. Both this hypothesis and the alternative view that greater loneliness reduces self-disclosure, receive some support from the data in this study. Finally, the difficulty in obtaining significant longitudinal paths (from Year 1 to Year 2) suggests that the time lags in the variables' effects on one another are relatively short rather than long.     

Paranoia and self-consciousness.

A new instrument designed to assess paranoid thought in college students, together with reliability and validity data, was presented in Study 1. A single general factor accounted for a substantial portion of the variance in the full scale. Public self-consciousness was consistently and significantly correlated with the present measure of paranoia. In Study 2, both pretested paranoia and public self-consciousness were related to feelings of being watched (a classical manifestation of paranoia), although public self-consciousness had an effect only when there was a 2-way mirror present. In Study 3, self-attention, experimentally induced using a story construction task, again resulted in a heightened sense of being observed. Discussion focuses on paranoid cognition as characteristic of everyday thought and the implications of self-attention for social perception processes.     

Perfectionism, self-consciousness and anxiety

The relation between perfectionism, anxiety, and self-consciousness was studied in a normal sample. The perfectionism dimensions of Concern over Mistakes, Doubts about Action, and Socially Prescribed Perfectionism showed a pattern of correlations not only with measures of social anxiety, but also with measures of agoraphobic fears, and fears of bodily injury, death and illness. Public self-consciousness also correlated with various measures of anxiety, but these correlations disappeared when the relevant dimensions of perfectionism were controlled for. It is concluded that perfectionism is a more relevant construct in the study of anxiety than is public self-consciousness. The results are discussed in terms of possible causal relationships between perfectionism and anxiety.     

Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness

Recent research on bodily self-consciousness has assumed that it consists of three distinct components: the experience of owning a body (body ownership); the experience of being a body with a given location within the environment (self-location); and the experience of taking a first-person, body-centered, perspective on that environment (perspective). Here we review recent neuroimaging studies suggesting that at least two of these components—body ownership and self-location—are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located, respectively, in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction. We examine these results and consider them in relation to clinical evidence from patients with altered body perception and work on a variety of multisensory, body-related illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion, the full body illusion, the body swap illusion and the enfacement illusion. We conclude by providing a preliminary synthesis of the data on bodily self-consciousness and its neural correlates.