Bios politikos and bios theoretikos in the Phenomenology of Hannah Arendt

Abstract

Hannah Arendt frequently referred to herself as a phenomenologist in that she wished to reveal how action, in the Greek sense of praxis, engenders a public space of appearances or of phenomenality. The life of the Greek city‐state, of the polis, was made possible through this activity, this bios politikos. However, beginning with Plato and continuing right down to Hegel and Heidegger, there has been a sustained attempt to cover up and conceal the specific phenomenality of the bios politikos in favour of the bios theoretikos, involving the substitution of poiesis and theoria for the life of praxis. At the roots of this concealment of the active life is a misunderstanding of the true nature of the theoretical and its highest form, namely, thinking.     

Defending a Common World: Hannah Arendt on the State,the Nation and Political Education

For a long time, one of the most important tasks for education in liberal democracies has been to foster the next generation in core democratic values in order to prepare them for future political responsibilities. In spite of this, general trust in the liberal democratic system is in rapid decline. In this paper, the tension between the ambitions of liberal-democratic educational systems and contemporary challenges to central democratic ideas is approached by reconsidering Hannah Arendt’s critique of political education. This will be done informed by her analysis of the tension between the concepts of state and nation. By showing how education, depending on its role as a tool of the state or the nation, may be a fundamental requirement for the establishment of a common world or the most effective tool for its destruction, the paper argues for the need to understand Arendt’s educational thinking in light of her wider political analysis. Rather than downplaying the provocative aspects of her critique, the paper argues for the need to use it as a starting point for thinking again how education may become an emancipatory undertaking capable of disarming contemporary threats to human plurality and freedom.     

Political itineraries and anarchic cosmopolitanism in the thought of Hannah Arendt

In this paper, I argue that Arendt's understanding of freedom should be examined independently of the search for good political institutions because it is related to freedom of movement and has a transnational meaning. Although she does not say it explicitly, Arendt establishes a correlation between political identities and territorial moves: She analyzes regimes in relation to their treatment of lands and borders, that is, specific geographic movements. I call this correlation a political itinerary. My aim is to show genealogically that her elaboration on the regimes of ancient, modern, and ‘dark’ times is supported by such a correlation. I read Arendt in light of the current clash between an amorphous global political identity (and ‘new’ international order) and the renewal of nationalisms. I show that, for Arendt, the world is divided by necessary frontiers – territorial borders and identity frames – and that the political consists precisely of the effort to transgress them. Arendt never proposed a restoration of authority but, on the contrary, a worldwide anarchic (that is, based on no predetermined rule) politics of de‐localization and re‐localization; in her terms, a politics of free movement of founded identities, a cosmopolitanism, which, nevertheless, would have nothing to do with global sovereignty.     

Hannah Arendt,evil and the eradication of thought

Evil deeds may be committed intentionally or out of madness, but it is those who follow orders that present us with the most complex moral, philosophical and psychological questions. In writing about the banality of evil, Hannah Arendt argues that “in granting pardon, it is the person and not the crime that is forgiven; in rootless evil there is no person left whom one could ever forgive.” Arendt postulates that “being a person” necessarily entails the acts of memory and thought. This paper explores Arendt’s ideas on memory and thought and how these processes can become subverted in the service of a higher order. Clinical material illustrates Whitmer’s idea of dissociation as an “impairment of subjectivity” as distinct from Freud’s view of dissociation as a form of repression. This shift in theoretical perspective sheds new light on our understanding of the totalitarian state of mind, i.e. of the mind of a “nobody”, and the conditions within which evil is committed.     

Bringing Plurality Together: Common Sense,Thinking and Philosophy in Arendt

Arendt's concept of common sense has generally been misunderstood. It is almost exclusively interpreted in light of Kant's common sense, either as an espousal of the latter or as a distortion of it. This narrow reading of Arendtian common sense has led to a problem, as her uses of the concept do not always fit its Kantian understanding. This has led to accusing her of being inconsistent, or as holding on to several, incompatible concepts of common sense. This article argues that Arendt has one complex concept of common sense, used more or less consistently throughout her writings. Rather than understanding Arendt's common sense in light of Kant's, as most readers do, I demonstrate its links to Aristotle and to the eighteenth‐century Scottish school of common sense. By doing so I turn attention to a difficulty that has thus far not been adequately treated, namely the fact that Arendt presents two, allegedly contradictory pictures of the relation between common sense on the one hand and science and philosophy on the other: a picture in which science and philosophy depend upon common sense, versus one in which they find themselves in a conflict that eventually leads to the loss or demise of common sense. The last part of the article suggests a way to settle the tension between these two pictures, by understanding the political significance Arendt ascribes to them as two distinct yet complementary ways of approaching the modern phenomenon of totalitarianism.     

Reading the Lives of Others: Biography as Political Thought in Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir

In this essay, I focus on two biographical works by Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir that I read as political texts: Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess (Arendt 1957 ) and “Must We Burn Sade?” (Beauvoir 2012 ). Reading Arendt's Varnhagen and Beauvoir's “Sade” side by side illuminates their shared preoccupation with lived experience and their common political premises: the antagonism between freedom and sovereignty, and the centrality of action and constructive relations with others. My argument is that these texts constitute an original style of political thinking, which I call politico‐biographical hermeneutics, or reading the life of others as exercises in political theory. Politico‐biographical hermeneutics, as I take it, is not a systematic methodology, but an approach to interpreting sociopolitical forces as they come to bear and are embodied and inscribed in the lived experiences, struggles, and works of representative or exemplary individuals. This approach identifies the political lessons of lived experience and supports one of the central claims of feminist philosophy, namely, that the personal and the political are not antithetical, but relational.     

政治的宗教:对汉娜·阿伦特思想的若干反思

史华慈从阿伦特的诸多著作中得出结论,认为阿伦特哲学思考的终极关怀旨在探究现代危机的社会根源,这个危机根源可以概括为源自于古代城邦的追求政治行动、公共福祉和政治自由的高贵生活的缺失。史华慈基于思想史发展脉络及其犹太人身份,批判性地指出阿伦特的愿景所具有乌托邦式的民粹主义面向,受到古典崇拜的德国浪漫主义的影响,并背离了犹太教传统。史华慈通过对阿伦特整体思想的反思,一方面捍卫着犹太人的身份,另一方面也表达出了对解决现代社会危机之路径的不同看法。     

行动、叙事与认同:从阿伦特到利科

认同是人生在世的基本处境,涉及人生活的方方面面,但就其本质而言,它关涉到自我,是对我是谁的追问,因而是一个古老且持久的哲学问题。与此同时,人作为一种存在于世界之中的历史性的存在者,对我是谁加以追问的认同,内在地有一个共同体的公共维度。因此,认同问题呈现的是个人与共同体的相互构成。通常,关于认同的论述,无论是基于笛卡尔精神实体的非还原论,还是基于洛克记忆经验的还原论,都忽视了认同的公共维度,而陷入了某种程度上的本质主义。阿伦特通过私人领域与公共领域的划分,强调认同在本质上是一个谁而非什么的问题,认为人在公共领域的行动彰显了一个人的谁,这种对于一个谁的彰显通过叙事得以持存。认同正是在这种行动和叙事中,与发生过的事件达成和解,呈现一个持久、开放的公共形象。借此,利科阐述了一种叙事认同观念。     

The Gender‐Neutral Feminism of Hannah Arendt

Though many have recently attempted either to locate Arendt within feminism or feminism within the great body of Arendt's work, these efforts have proven only modestly successful. Even a cursory examination of Arendt's work should suggest that these efforts would prove frustrating. None of her voluminous writings deal specifically with gender, though some of her work certainly deals with notable women. Her interest is not in gender as such, but in woman as assimilated Jew or woman as social and political revolutionary. In this paper, I argue that Arendt recognized that what frequently passes for a gender question is not essentially a matter of gender at all, but rather an idiosyncratic form of loneliness that typically affects, though is by no means limited to, women. In her work one finds the conceptual tools necessary to understand the “woman problem” rather than an explicit argument or a solution to it.     

镜像神经元与主体间性现象学

来自神经科学最新研究发现的镜像神经元在对现象学理论主体间性的解释方面做出了极其重要的贡献。G.Rizzolatti和V.Gallese通过对灵长类动物的实验发现了一个位于大脑运动前区具有表征其它动物视觉编码的运动功能的神经元系统。这些镜像神经元可以表征与个体自身行为相似的动作图式。这些研究可能会延伸到关于人类其他认知与情感功能的研究。我将会分析这一神经科学发现是如何被"转译"成现象学意义上我们自身经验到的感知、情感和意志。     

The concept of violence in the work of Hannah Arendt

Arendt claimed that violence is not part of the political because it is instrumental. Her position has generated a vast corpus of scholarship, most of which falls into the context of the realist-liberal divide. Taking these discussions as a starting point, this essay engages with violence in Arendt’s work from a different perspective. Its interest lies not in Arendt’s theory of violence in the world, but in the function that violence performed in her work, namely, in the constitutive role of violence in her thought. It argues that the concept of violence allowed Arendt to make important distinctions serving to catalyze the categories that constitute her political philosophy and, in particular, the categories of public and private. More specifically, it claims that the concept of violence in Arendt’s work is the a priori background against which both the public and private realms should be defined.     

Karl Marx and Hannah Arendt on the Jewish question: political theology as a critique

The article is dedicated to the politico-theological critique of Judaism from the position of Christianity. It shows the affinity of Marx’s early critique of liberal state and of Hannah Arendt’s criticism of formal legalistic thinking in the contemporary judicial treatment of Nazism (and of similar international political crimes). Marx’s critique of nation-state finds its unlikely continuation in Arendt’s critique of international law. The politico-theological argument is explicit in Marx and implicit in Arendt, but both develop the Hegelian criticism of liberal state which shows its reliance on the abstract law, on the one hand, and on the egotistic abstract individual, on the other. The theological undercurrent of the argument is both sign of its limitations, and of the subsisting relevance of the politico-theological framework, even in the similarly novel circumstances of the twentieth century. It is only within and through the theological critique and critique of theology that these issues would stand a chance of resolution.