The embodied mind

Abstract :  This paper considers Fonagy et al's concept of mentalization and contrasts aspects of this with aspects of Bion's model of the mind. The author argues that although mentalization adds to our understanding of mind it has limitations; that it may tend to over-emphasize certain types of external interaction between infant and carer and under-emphasize internal psychobiological processes. What is at issue here is the way in which an infant's carers facilitate the development of meaning out of experience. Bion's concept supposes a relatively 'interior' model in which, in important ways, the carer enables the infant to derive the meaning of his or her experience, whilst on the other hand Fonagy et al tend to talk more in terms of the ways in which the carer endows the infant's experience with meaning. Reference is made to Fordham's concept of states of 'Identity'. Fordham has pointed out that Freud's model is one in which mind is conceived of as evolving out of an infant's complex identifications with his or her carer(s); Jung's model envisages developmentally early states of identity as the means by which inherent capacities are realized.     

Other minds embodied

I distinguish three kinds of other minds problems—conceptual, epistemological and empirical. I argue that while Merleau-Ponty believes embodiment helps with tackling the conceptual and epistemological problems, he suggests that it is of no clear use in solving (an important variant of) the empirical problem. I sketch some considerations that could lend support to Merleau-Ponty’s claims about the conceptual and epistemological problems, without claiming that these are conclusive. I then proceed to argue that Merleau-Ponty’s take on the empirical problem is essentially correct.     

Temporality and embodied self-presence

Continental Philosophy Review - As Merleau-Ponty points out, our sense of time is that of passage. This demands that we think of time both as extended—that is, as including the past and the...     

The phenomenology of embodied attention

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - This paper aims to conceptualize the phenomenology of attentional experience as ‘embodied attention.’ Current psychological research, in...     

Six views of embodied cognition

The emerging viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in the body’s interactions with the world. This position actually houses a number of distinct claims, some of which are more controversial than others. This paper distinguishes and evaluates the following six claims: (1) cognition is situated; (2) cognition is time-pressured; (3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; (4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; (5) cognition is for action; (6) offline cognition is body based. Of these, the first three and the fifth appear to be at least partially true, and their usefulness is best evaluated in terms of the range of their applicability. The fourth claim, I argue, is deeply problematic. The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, but it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims.     

Constraining theories of embodied cognition

Influences of perceptual and motor activity on evaluation have led to theories of embodied cognition suggesting that putatively complex judgments can be carried out using only perceptual and motor representations. We present an experiment that revisited a movement-compatibility effect in which people are faster to respond to positive words by pulling a lever than by pushing a lever and are faster to respond to negative words by pushing than by pulling. We demonstrate that the compatibility effect depends on people's representation of their selves in space rather than on their physical location. These data suggest that accounting for embodied phenomena requires understanding the complex interplay between perceptual and motor representations and people's representations of their selves in space.     

Unconstraining theories of embodied cognition

The approach/avoidance effect refers to the finding that valenced stimuli trigger approach and avoidance actions. Markman and Brendl [Markman, A. B., & Brendl, M. (2005). Constraining theories of embodied cognition. Psychological Science, 16, 6-16] argued that this effect is not a truly embodied phenomenon, but depends on participants’ symbolic representation of the self.In their study, participants moved valenced words toward or away from their own name on the computer screen. This would induce participants to form a ‘disembodied’ self-representation at the location of their name, outside of the body. Approach/avoidance effects occurred with respect to the participant’s name, rather than with respect to the body.In three experiments, we demonstrate that similar effects are found when the name is replaced by a positive word, a negative word or even when no word is presented at all. This suggests that the ‘disembodied self’ explanation of Markman and Brendl is incorrect, and that their findings do not necessarily constrain embodied theories of cognition.     

Meaning and relational well-being: a reflection on the state of the art and a way forward

This paper provides a brief overview of facets of meaning and relational well-being highlighting the foci of current research on meaning, relationships as sources of meaning, contextual relevance and meta-theoretical assumptions. Lacunae in knowledge are indicated and a model proposed as framework for further research on meaning and relational well-being which was the focused topic of this special issue.     

Physical models and embodied cognition

Synthese - Philosophers have recently paid more attention to the physical aspects of scientific models. The attention is motivated by the prospect that a model’s physical features strongly...     

Implicit mindreading and embodied cognition

In this paper, I examine the plausibility of Embodied Accounts of Social Cognition by finding fault with the most detailed and convincing version of such an account, as articulated by Daniel Hutto (2008). I argue that this account fails to offer a plausible ontogeny for folk psychological abilities due to its inability to address recent evidence from implicit false belief tasks that suggest a radically different timeline for the development of these abilities.     

Learning and development of embodied numerosity

Recent empirical evidence indicates that seemingly abstract numerical cognitions are rooted in sensory and bodily experiences. In particular in finger counting finger-based representations reflect a specific case of embodied cognition, we termed embodied numerosity. Furthermore, we suggest that finger-based representations should be considered a distinct representation of number (magnitude) and argue that this representation is activated automatically whenever we encounter a number. We discuss in what way such a theoretical framework can account for the associations of fingers and numbers observed so far. In the final part, we evaluate whether the concept of embodied numerosity should be generalized beyond finger-based representations with particular focus on whether bodily-sensory experiences (such as moving the whole body along the mental number line) may corroborate numerical capabilities. In a series of intervention studies, we consistently observed more pronounced training effects for our embodied numerosity trainings for different age groups, different digital media, different number ranges, and different control conditions. Taken together, we conclude that embodied representations of number (magnitude) exist, are not limited to finger-based representations, and influence number processing in a systematic and functional way that can be used to foster the efficiency of numerical trainings.     

Disgust as embodied loss aversion

A quickly expanding literature has examined the link between physical disgust and morality. This article critically integrates the existing evidence and draws the following conclusions: First, there is considerable evidence that experimentally induced disgust and cleanliness influence moral judgment, but moderating variables and attributional processes need to be considered. Second, moral considerations have substantial effects on behavioural concomitants of disgust, such as facial expressions, economic games and food consumption. Third, while disgust involves a conservation concern, it can manifest itself in both liberal and conservative political attitudes. Overall, disgust can be considered to form part of a behavioural loss aversion system aimed at protecting valuable resources, including the integrity of one’s body. Recommendations are offered to investigate the role of disgust more rigorously in order to fully capture its role in moral life.     

Disgust as embodied moral judgment

How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments relative to controls. Experiment 4 found that disgust had a different effect on moral judgment than did sadness. In addition, Experiments 2-4 showed that the role of disgust in severity of moral judgments depends on participants' sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. Taken together, these data indicate the importance-and specificity-of gut feelings in moral judgments.