Towards a general theory of representation

Summary The models of science are representations of a part of reality. Every science has its own specific rules of constructing models, but there are many common rules that must be followed. These rules are to be part of what may be called a general theory of representation. This paper discusses some general aspects of representation that must be considered before such a general theory can be created. There are five sections: (1) an introduction to the topic of representation in general; (2) an overview of some general types of representation, such as goal-directed and self-organizational representations; (3) a short discussion of representation in some specific disciplines; (4) some formal aspects of representations; and (5) a discussion of epistemological aspects of representation, especially scientific reduction and mental causation.This paper was written during participation in the Research Project Mind and Brain, at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld, BRD.     

Towards a theory of question asking

Summary An outline of a theory of question asking is presented. Explicit information questions are conceived as possible means used by a questioner to reach actual goals. The information sought by the question is fundamentally related, and even dependent upon, knowledge already available to the person. Contradictory knowledge and knowledge about which the person is not sufficiently confident are seen as special cases of missing knowledge. Experimental evidence in support of these and related postulates is presented. Intrinsic to the theory is the conception of the psychological aspects involved in the asking of a question: the perceived need to ask in relation to the concurrent goals of the person, the alternative means of inferring rather than asking, knowing whom to ask, and tolerance for not (yet) asking.An elaborated version of a paper presented to XXIIND INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY, Leipzig, July 6–11, 1980     

Towards a unified theory of reciprocity

In a unified theory of human reciprocity, the strong and weak forms are similar because neither is biologically altruistic and both require normative motivation to support cooperation. However, strong reciprocity is necessary to support cooperation in public goods games. It involves inflicting costs on defectors; and though the costs for punishers are recouped, recouping costs requires complex institutions that would not have emerged if weak reciprocity had been enough.     

Towards a computational theory of experience

A standing challenge for the science of mind is to account for the datum that every mind faces in the most immediate – that is, unmediated – fashion: its phenomenal experience. The complementary tasks of explaining what it means for a system to give rise to experience and what constitutes the content of experience (qualia) in computational terms are particularly challenging, given the multiple realizability of computation. In this paper, we identify a set of conditions that a computational theory must satisfy for it to constitute not just a sufficient but a necessary, and therefore naturalistic and intrinsic, explanation of qualia. We show that a common assumption behind many neurocomputational theories of the mind, according to which mind states can be formalized solely in terms of instantaneous vectors of activities of representational units such as neurons, does not meet the requisite conditions, in part because it relies on inactive units to shape presently experienced qualia and implies a homogeneous representation space, which is devoid of intrinsic structure. We then sketch a naturalistic computational theory of qualia, which posits that experience is realized by dynamical activity-space trajectories (rather than points) and that its richness is measured by the representational capacity of the trajectory space in which it unfolds.     

Towards a theory of the organism

A tentative theory of the organism is derived from McClare’s (1971) notion ofstored energy and Denbigh’s (1951) thermodynamics of the steady state, as a dynamically closed, energetically self-sufficient domain of cyclic non-dissipative processes coupled to irreversible dissipative processes. This effectively frees the organism from thermodynamic constraints so that it is poised for rapid, specific intercommunication, enabling it to function as a coherent whole. In the ideal, the organism is a quantum superposition of coherent activities over all space-time domains, with instantaneous (nonlocal) noiseless intercommunication throughout the system. Evidence for quantum coherence is considered and reviewed.     

Towards a theory of mood function

In light of Laura Sizer's and Robert Thayer's models of mood, I propose a functional theory to explain in what sense moods are adaptive. I argue that mood involves a mechanism which monitors our physical and mental energy levels in relation to the perceived energy demands of our environment, and generates corresponding cognitive biases in our reasoning style, attention, memory, thought, and creativity. The function of this mechanism is to engage us in the right task with the right amount of energy by maintaining equilibrium between the energy we possess and the energy our environment demands.     

Towards a theory of communicative competence

In this, the second of two articles outlining a theory of communicative competence, the author questions the ability of Chomsky's account of linguistic competence to fulfil the requirements of such a theory. ‘Linguistic competence’ for Chomsky means the mastery of an abstract system of rules, based on an innate language apparatus. The model by which communication is understood on this account contains three implicit assumptions, here called ‘monologism’, ‘a priorism’, and ‘elementarism’. The author offers an outline of a theory of communicative competence that is based on the negations of these assumptions. In opposing the first two assumptions he introduces distinctions, respectively, between semantic universals which process experiences and those that make such processing possible, and between semantic universals which precede all socialization and those that are linked to the conditions of potential socialization. Against elementarism, he argues that the semantic content of all possible natural languages does not consist of combinations of a finite number of meaning components. Differences in systems of classification preclude this, and such differences can be seen to infect all respects of intercultural comparison. Using the notion of ‘performative utterance’, the author elucidates the role of dialogue‐constitutive universals as part of the formal apparatus required of a”; speaker's capacity to communicate. He then notes what would be required of a general semantics based on a theory of communicative competence; and finally points out how this theory might be used for social analysis.     

Towards a theory of intention revision

Although the change of beliefs in the face of new information has been widely studied with some success, the revision of other mental states has received little attention from the theoretical perspective. In particular, intentions are widely recognised as being a key attitude for rational agents, and while several formal theories of intention have been proposed in the literature, the logic of intention revision has been hardly considered. There are several reasons for this: perhaps most importantly, intentions are very closely connected with other mental states—in particular, beliefs about the future and the abilities of the agent. So, we cannot study them in isolation. We must consider the interplay between intention revision and the revision of other mental states, which complicates the picture considerably. In this paper, we present some first steps towards a theory of intention revision. We develop a simple model of an agent’s mental states, and define intention revision operators. Using this model, we develop a logic of intention dynamics, and then investigate some of its properties.     

Towards a model theory of diagrams

A logical system is studied whose well-formed representations consist of diagrams rather than formulas. The system, due to Shin [2, 3], is shown to be complete by an argument concerning maximally consistent sets of diagrams. The argument is complicated by the lack of a straight forward counterpart of atomic formulas for diagrams, and by the lack of a counterpart of negation for most diagrams.The authors are grateful to Jon Barwise and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions.     

Towards a neo-configurational theory of intrinsic motivation

Motivation and Emotion - This research seeks to improve our understanding of how intrinsic motivation is instantiated. Three motivation theories, flow theory, self-determination theory, and...     

Towards a cognitive theory of existential meaning

The capacity to attribute meaning to personal experiences may rest on a specialized cognitive system enabling this form of causal reasoning. Close examination of these attributional tendencies suggests that this system may be distinct from those underlying other forms of causal reasoning such as a “theory of mind” system in the behavioral domain, a folk physics system in the physical domain, and a folk biology system in the biological domain. A fourth, existential domain, an abstract ontological frame within which the subjective, narrative self is envisioned to be contained, may have driven the construction of an intuitive capacity in humans that encourages them to search for the underlying purpose or reason for having had certain life experiences. This system likely has specific, definable operational rules that are responsible for activating such explanatory searches. In addition, it appears anchored to a general intentionality system that promotes the attribution of teleological purpose and higher-order mental states to an abstract agency that is envisioned to cause events and personal experiences. Identifying the component parts of this specialized cognitive system through empirical investigations can help researchers to reconstruct both its evolutionary phylogeny and to track its developmental emergence.     

Towards a pluralist theory of singular thought

This paper investigates the question of how to correctly capture the scope of singular thinking. The first part of the paper identifies a scope problem for the dominant view of singular thought maintaining that, in order for a thinker to have a singular thought about an object o, the thinker has to bear a special epistemic relation to o. The scope problem has it is that this view cannot make sense of the singularity of our thoughts about objects to which we do not or cannot bear any special epistemic relation. The paper focuses on a specific instance of the scope problem by addressing the case of thoughts about the natural numbers. Various possible solutions to the scope problem within the dominant framework are assessed and rejected. The second part of the paper develops a new theory of singular thought which hinges on the contention that the constraints that need to be met in order to think singularly vary depending on the kind of object we are thinking about. This idea is developed in detail by discussing the difference between the somewhat standard case of thoughts about spatio-temporal medium-sized inanimate objects and the case of thoughts about the natural numbers. It is contended that this new Pluralist theory of singular thought can successfully solve the scope problem.