Bodily feelings and felt inclinations

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - The paper defends a version of the perceptual account of bodily feelings, according to which having a feeling is feeling something about one’s body....     

Encapsulated social perception of emotional expressions

In this paper I argue that the detection of emotional expressions is, in its early stages, informationally encapsulated. I clarify and defend such a view via the appeal to data from social perception on the visual processing of faces, bodies, facial and bodily expressions. Encapsulated social perception might exist alongside processes that are cognitively penetrated, and that have to do with recognition and categorization, and play a central evolutionary function in preparing early and rapid responses to the emotional stimuli.     

The perception/cognition distincton: Challenging the representational account

A central goal for cognitive science and philosophy of mind is to distinguish between perception and cognition. The representational approach has emerged as a prominent candidate to draw such a distinction. The idea is that perception and cognition differ in the content and the format in which the information is represented —just as perceptual representations are nonconceptual in content and iconic in format, cognitive representations are conceptual in content and discursive in format. This paper argues against this view. I argue that both perception and cognition can use conceptual and nonconceptual contents and be vehiculated in iconic and discursive formats. If correct, the representational strategy to distinguish perception from cognition fails.     

Bodily feelings and atmospheres the felt situational impact upon education

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - This paper argues for the importance of a passive form of embodiment for educational purposes to capture tacit environmental influences. G. Buck’s...     

The face and person perception: insights from social cognition

Social-cognitive investigations of face perception have tended to be motivated by different goals than cognitive and neuropsychological studies-namely, to understand the dynamics of social categorization rather than identity recognition-and the result has been a lack of cross-pollination of insights and ideas between the disciplines. We review the evidence from social cognition, with an eye to discussing how this work aligns with the Bruce and Young (1986) model of face recognition. Acknowledging the invaluable impact the model has exerted on our understanding of face recognition, we suggest that considering the bottom-up constraints of visual processing and the top-down influences of semantic knowledge will contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of face perception.     

Same meaning but different feelings: Different expressions influence satisfaction in social comparisons

The same social comparison information may be expressed in different ways (e.g. ‘I am better than him’ versus ‘he is worse than me’). The results of four studies indicated that the way social comparison is expressed can affect an individual's satisfaction (i.e. ‘better’ versus ‘worse’). Specifically, in upward comparisons, the expression ‘I am worse than him’ makes individuals feel less satisfied than the expression ‘he is better than me’. In downward comparisons, those who use the expression ‘I am better than him’ are more satisfied than those who use the expression ‘he is worse than me’. The motivation of information processing acted as the mediator.     

A direct link between gaze perception and social attention

How information is exchanged between the cognitive mechanisms responsible for gaze perception and social attention is unclear. These systems could be independent; the "gaze cueing" effect could emerge from the activation of a general-purpose attentional mechanism that is ignorant of the social nature of the gaze cue. Alternatively, orienting to social gaze direction might be directly determined by the operation of cognitive mechanisms specifically dedicated to gaze perception. This second notion is the dominant assumption in the literature, but there is little direct support for this account. Here, we systematically manipulated observers' perception of gaze direction by implementing a gaze adaptation paradigm. Gaze cueing was reduced only in conditions where perception of specific averted gaze stimuli was impaired (Experiment 1). Adaptation to a pointing stimulus failed to impact gaze cueing (Experiment 2). Overall, these data suggest a direct link between the specific operation of gaze perception mechanisms and the consequential orienting of attention.     

Nonconscious fear conditioning, visceral perception, and the development of gut feelings

When people are presented with backward-masked images of fear-relevant stimuli and only some of these images are paired consistently with electric shocks, they can predict the occurrence of shocks even though they do not consciously know which images they have seen. We postulated that they may use the perception of visceral cues from the conditional fear response to facilitate the prediction of shocks. In this study, ability to detect heartbeats was used to index sensitivity to visceral cues. The results showed that subjects who could detect their heartbeats performed better than chance in predicting whether or not they would receive a shock during the conditioning task. The findings support the notion that hunches, or "gut feelings," are based in part on the perception of visceral cues.     

Social cognition in simple action coordination: A case for direct perception

In this paper we sketch the outlines of an account of the kind of social cognition involved in simple action coordination that is based on direct social perception (DSP) rather than recursive mindreading. While we recognize the viability of a mindreading-based account such as e.g. Michael Tomasello’s, we present an alternative DSP account that (i) explains simple action coordination in a less cognitively demanding manner, (ii) is better able to explain flexibility and strategy-switching in coordination and crucially (iii) allows for formal modeling. This account of action coordination is based on the notion of an agent’s field of affordances. Coordination ensues, we argue, when, given a shared intention, the actions of and/or affordances for one agent shape the field of affordances for another agent. This a form of social perception since in particular perceiving affordances for another person involves seeing that person as an agent. It is a form of social perception since it involves perceiving affordances for another person and registering how another person’s actions influence one’s own perceived field of affordances.     

Friends,friendlessness, and social cognition

I applaud the methods and findings of the target article by Fink and colleagues (Brit. J. Dev. Psychol, 2015; 33, 1–17) who demonstrate an important link between theory of mind and children's social lives. In particular, enhanced theory of mind in preschool buffers children from friendlessness in the transition to school. Going further, I suggest needed steps for the field to experimentally demonstrate causal links between children's theory of mind and their social actions and interactions.     

On the distinction between perception and cognition

To uphold the distinction between perception and cognition for certain classes of tasks or phenomena, it is proposed that three criteria must be met: (1) when perceptual and cognitive functions serve different biological purposes, (2) when stimulus information in dynamic events is necessary, but not sufficient for veridical perception, and (3) when the task emphasizes explicit retrieval, as opposed to implicit use of information. Conversely, when the three criteria have not been met, conditions for theoretical unification exist.     

Action, mindreading and embodied social cognition

One of the central insights of the embodied cognition (EC) movement is that cognition is closely tied to action. In this paper, I formulate an EC-inspired hypothesis concerning social cognition. In this domain, most think that our capacity to understand and interact with one another is best explained by appeal to some form of mindreading. I argue that prominent accounts of mindreading likely contain a significant lacuna. Evidence indicates that what I call an agent??s actional processes and states??her goals, needs, intentions, desires, and so on??likely play important roles in and for mindreading processes. If so, a full understanding of mindreading processes and their role in cognition more broadly will require an understanding of how actional mental processes interact with, influence, or take part in mindreading processes.     

Language, meaning, and social cognition.

Social cognition is meant to examine the process of meaningful social interaction. Despite the central involvement of language in this process, language has not received the focal attention that it deserves. Conceptualizing meaningful social interaction as the process of construction and exchange of meaning, the authors argue that language can be productively construed as a semiotic tool, a tool for meaning making and exchange, and that language use can produce unintended consequences in its users. First, the article shows a particular instance of language use to be a collaborative process that influences the representation of meaning in the speaker, the listener, and the collective that includes both the speaker and listener. It then argues that language use and social cognition may have reciprocal effects in the long run and may have significant implications for generating and maintaining cultural differences in social cognition.     

Bodily perspective taking goes social: the role of personal,interpersonal, and intercultural factors

Mentally placing the self in the physical position of another person might engage social perspective taking because participants have to match their own position with that of another. We investigated the influence of personal (sex), interpersonal (siblings, parental marital status), and cultural (individualistic, collectivistic) factors on individuals' abilities to mentally take the position of front‐facing and back‐facing figures in an online study (369 participants). Replicating findings from laboratory studies responses were slower for front‐facing than back‐facing figures. Having siblings, parents' marital status, and cultural background influenced task performance in theoretically predictable ways. The present perspective‐taking task is a promising experimental paradigm to assess social perspective taking and one that is free from the response biases inherent in self‐report.     

Differentiation and unification in perception and cognition

It has been suggested that the development of distinctions between perception and cognition depends upon the perspective and the level of analysis chosen. Similarly, the unification of perception and cognition may be achieved from other perspectives and when other levels of analyses are applied. The fruitfulness, and disadvantages, of diverse suggestions for differentation/unification of perception and cognition are discussed briefly.