Transference: current concepts and controversies

In this paper I have presented a brief outline of some of the more important issues regarding transference. To summarize I shall restate ten transference issues heretofore discussed: What should be included in the definition of transference? Should it be defined narrowly or broadly? In what ways can transference be usefully viewed in relation to reality? What merit is there in distinguishing the working alliance from transference? Should self and object transference be differentiated? Should transference neuroses be discriminated from transference reactions on the one hand and from transference psychoses on the other? In addition to sexual and aggressive transferences, should sexualized and aggressivitized transferences, respectively, be distinguished? How may transference be conceived of as a vehicle of cure and yet also as a resistance to cure? What is to be said for the relative merit of the "here and now" versus the "there and then?" What is the role of transference in relation to insight on the one hand and to the therapeutic object on the other? What are some of the basic issues in countertransference?     

Primordial texts: An object relations approach to biblical hermeneutics

What is object relations theory? What is the place of an object relations perspective in biblical hermeneutics as a process? After briefly introducing object relations theory, this presentation discusses the place of an object relations perspective in the hermeneutical process by analyzing D. Winnicott's “squiggle” game with childreń as a hermeneutical paradigm, and by examining critical themes such as: subject-object relations or the relationship between text and the interpreter or interpreting community, transitional space, and the suspension of disbelief or the locus of illusion in hermeneutical understanding.     

Hierarchies, similarity, and interactivity in object recognition: "category-specific" neuropsychological deficits.

Category-specific impairments of object recognition and naming are among the most intriguing disorders in neuropsychology, affecting the retrieval of knowledge about either living or nonliving things. They can give us insight into the nature of our representations of objects: Have we evolved different neural systems for recognizing different categories of object? What kinds of knowledge are important for recognizing particular objects? How does visual similarity within a category influence object recognition and representation? What is the nature of our semantic knowledge about different objects? We review the evidence on category-specific impairments, arguing that deficits even for one class of object (e.g., living things) cannot be accounted for in terms of a single information processing disorder across all patients; problems arise at contrasting loci in different patients. The same apparent pattern of impairment can be produced by damage to different loci. According to a new processing framework for object recognition and naming, the hierarchical interactive theory (HIT), we have a hierarchy of highly interactive stored representations. HIT explains the variety of patients in terms of (1) lesions at different levels of processing and (2) different forms of stored knowledge used both for particular tasks and for particular categories of object.     

Instrumental Values – Strong and Weak

What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental value is a kind of value, then it is a kind of extrinsic final value.     

关于中国教育心理学史研究的几个问题

全文讨论三个问题:什么是中国教育心理学史?为什么要研究中国教育心理学史?怎样研究中国教育心理学史?以便了解中国心理学史的对象与范围,目的与意义,指导思想、原则与方法。     

Why is Law a Normative Discipline? on Hans Kelsen’s ‘Normology’

What does it mean to claim of law that it is a normative discipline? Can the answer be so simple that one need merely refer to law’s normative object of study and the conclusions that the legal participant must allegedly draw from this? What, in any case, is a ‘normative discipline’? The essay attempts to address these questions by analysing Hans Kelsen’s ‘normological’ theory of law through his work on sovereignty and especially by focusing on the normative character of Kelsen’s epistemological claims regarding law. A theoretical critique of Kelsen is offered through Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological account of logic as a normative discipline.     

Countertransference and the Erotic

Eros is like a huge spark that ignites our passion and then confronts us with the problem of living out this fire in ordinary space and time. What do we each know of this spark, this flame? Who or what was it’s object? Where have we felt this force for unity in ourselves, with another person, with life itself? Where are we unlived erotically? Where are the chinks in our erotic life? In focusing on the erotic in clinical work, we usually begin with the analysand’s transference. I want to explore eros in the life of the analyst for our relation to eros influences the clinical work we do. When eros is constellated, two possibilities of relationship present themselves: to an actual other who must be reckoned with as real, and to a psychic content, equally real, which we do not invent or control. How do we experience this electricity? What is our desire like? What does it take us back to, and toward what unseen purpose does it propel us? Eros brings with it a sense of purpose, of going somewhere important, something that enlists body, soul, and spirit.     

Detecting impossible changes in infancy: a three-system account

Can infants detect that an object has magically disappeared, broken apart or changed color while briefly hidden? Recent research suggests that infants detect some but not other 'impossible' changes; and that various contextual manipulations can induce infants to detect changes they would not otherwise detect. We present an account that includes three systems: a physical-reasoning, an object-tracking, and an object-representation system. What impossible changes infants detect depends on what object information is included in the physical-reasoning system; this information becomes subject to a principle of persistence, which states that objects can undergo no spontaneous or uncaused change. What contextual manipulations induce infants to detect impossible changes depends on complex interplays between the physical-reasoning system and the object-tracking and object-representation systems.     

A Correspondence Theory of Exemplification

What is exemplification? A proposition that attributes a property to an object is true if the object exemplifies the property. But according to the correspondence theory, a proposition is true if the corresponding fact exists. So if the correspondence theory is correct, an exemplification of a temporal property by an object is simply the concrete circumstance of the object’s having the property. But since not all properties are temporal, not all exemplifications are circumstances, and we need to recognise timeless as well as temporal facts. This distinction allows us to solve the problem of converse relations, and to give an account of the logically complex facts which deduction allows us to know.     

Perception, Causation, and Supervenience

What relation between an experience and a physical object makes the experience a perception of the object?¹ One common answer is that it is a certain kind of causal relation. The idea is that to perceive an object is just to undergo an experience appropriately caused by the object. This answer is incorrect. The reason is that perceiving an object does not supervene on the causal connection the object bears to the perceiver's experience. Whether or not a person perceives an object depends, in part, on conditions that could obtain or fail to obtain without variation in the causal processes (if any) by which the object causes the person's experience. In what follows, I explain and defend these claims.     

What do infants remember when they forget? Location and identity in 6-month-olds' memory for objects

What does an infant remember about a forgotten object? Although at age 6 months, infants can keep track of up to three hidden objects, they can remember the featural identity of only one. When infants forget the identity of an object, do they forget the object entirely, or do they retain an inkling of it? In a looking-time study, we familiarized 6-month-olds with a disk and a triangle placed on opposite sides of a stage. During test trials, we hid the objects one at a time behind different screens, and after hiding the second object, we removed the screen where the first object had been hidden. Infants then saw the expected object, the unexpected other object, or the empty stage. Bayes factor analysis showed that although the infants did not notice when the object changed shape, they were surprised when it vanished. This finding indicates that infants can represent an object without its features.     

When you name the pizza you look at the coin and the bread: Eye movements reveal semantic activation during word production

Two eyetracking experiments tested for activation of category coordinate and perceptually related concepts when speakers prepare the name of an object. Speakers saw four visual objects in a 2 3 2 array and identified and named a target picture on the basis of either category (e.g., “What is the name of the musical instrument?”) or visual-form (e.g., “What is the name of the circular object?”) instructions. There were more fixations on visualform competitors and category coordinate competitors than on unrelated objects during name preparation, but the increased overt attention did not affect naming latencies. The data demonstrate that eye movements are a sensitive measure of the overlap between the conceptual (including visual-form) information that is accessed in preparation for word production and the conceptual knowledge associated with visual objects. Furthermore, these results suggest that semantic activation of competitor concepts does not necessarily affect lexical selection, contrary to the predictions of lexical-selection-by-competition accounts (e.g., Levelt, Roelofs, &; Meyer, 1999).     

Psychoanalysis is a two‐way street

The paper discusses psychoanalysis as a mutual exchange between the analyst and analysand. A number of questions are raised: What was Ferenczi's and the early psychoanalysts' contribution to the interpersonal relational dynamics of psychoanalytic treatment? Why did countertransference become an indispensable tool in relationship‐based psychoanalysis? Why is the transference‐countertransference dynamic seen as a special dialogue between the analyst and analysand? What was Ferenczi's paradigm shift in the trauma theory? How did he combine the object relation approach with Freud's original trauma theory? The paper illustrates through some case study vignettes the intersubjective and intrapsychic dynamic in the process of traumatization. We can look at countertransference as an indicator of the patient's basic interpersonal experiences and traumas. Finally the paper discusses countertransference in the light of attachment theory, connecting the early initiatives of inter‐relational approaches in psychoanalysis with recent research.     

TRANSSACCADIC MEMORY AND INTEGRATION DURING REAL-WORLD OBJECT PERCEPTION

Abstract— What is the nature of the information that is preserved and combined across saccadic eye movements during the visual analysis of real-world objects? The two experiments reported investigated transsaccadic memory and transsaccadic integration, respectively In the critical condition, participants were presented with one set of contours from an object during one fixation and with a complementary set of contours during the next fixation In Experiment 1, participants could at best inconsistently detect contour changes across the saccade In Experiment 2, a change in visible contour had no influence on object identification. These results suggest that a veridical representation of object contour is neither consistently preserved nor integrated across a saccade.     

To see dynamic change: continuous focused attention facilitates change detection,but the effect persists briefly

What is the role of continuously focused attention on an object in change detection? To ensure focused attention on one object, we conducted a single object change detection task, manipulating an object’s location between pre-change and post-change displays (same or different location), and also manipulating a blank duration (the FOD task) and a pre-change object presentation duration (the FBD task). If attention is continuously focused at the spatial location of the pre-change object, a location shift of the post-change object should interrupt change detection due to a cognitive cost of attentional shift. Results suggest attention is focused continuously for a brief blank duration, and attention can facilitate the detection of change occurring at the location of attentional focus. Additionally, although attention is focused continuously for a long time if a target is visible, the effect of attention declines with time. The results clarify the new temporal characteristics of focused attention.     

Visual recognition: as soon as you know it is there, you know what it is

What is the sequence of processing steps involved in visual object recognition? We varied the exposure duration of natural images and measured subjects' performance on three different tasks, each designed to tap a different candidate component process of object recognition. For each exposure duration, accuracy was lower and reaction time longer on a within-category identification task (e.g., distinguishing pigeons from other birds) than on a perceptual categorization task (e.g., birds vs. cars). However, strikingly, at each exposure duration, subjects performed just as quickly and accurately on the categorization task as they did on a task requiring only object detection: By the time subjects knew an image contained an object at all, they already knew its category. These findings place powerful constraints on theories of object recognition.     

Young children's understanding of cultural common ground

Human social interaction depends on individuals identifying the common ground they have with others, based both on personally shared experiences and on cultural common ground that all members of the group share. We introduced 3‐ and 5‐year‐old children to a culturally well‐known object and a novel object. An experimenter then entered and asked, ‘What is that?’, either as a request for information or in a recognitory way. When she was requesting information, both 3‐ and 5‐year‐olds assumed she was asking about the novel object. When she seemed to recognize an object, 5‐year‐olds assumed she was referring to the culturally well‐known object. Thus, by 3 years of age, children are beginning to understand that they share cultural common ground with other members of their group.     

Moving towards solutions to some enduring controversies in visual search

How do we find a target item in a visual world filled with distractors? A quarter of a century ago, in her influential 'Feature Integration Theory (FIT)', Treisman proposed a two-stage solution to the problem of visual search: a preattentive stage that could process a limited number of basic features in parallel and an attentive stage that could perform more complex acts of recognition, one object at a time. The theory posed a series of problems. What is the nature of that preattentive stage? How do serial and parallel processes interact? How does a search unfold over time? Recent work has shed new light on these issues.     

Novel labels support 10-month-olds’ attention to novel objects

What is the source of the mutual exclusivity bias whereby infants map novel labels onto novel objects? In an intermodal preferential looking task, we found that novel labels support 10-month-olds’ attention to a novel object over a familiar object. In contrast, familiar labels and a neutral phrase gradually reduced attention to a novel object. Markman (1989, 1990) argued that infants must recall the name of a familiar object to exclude it as the referent of a novel label. We argue that 10-month-olds’ attention is guided by the novelty of objects and labels rather than knowledge of the names for familiar objects. Mutual exclusivity, as a language-specific bias, might emerge from a more general constraint on attention and learning.     

Does category labeling lead to forgetting?

What effect does labeling an object as a member of a familiar category have on memory for that object? Recent studies suggest that recognition memory can be negatively impacted by categorizing objects during encoding. This paper examines the “representational shift hypothesis” which argues that categorizing an object impairs recognition memory by altering the trace of the encoded memory to be more similar to the category prototype. Previous evidence for this idea comes from experiments in which a basic-level category labeling task was compared to a non-category labeling incidental encoding task, usually a preference judgment (e.g., “Do you like this item?”). In two experiments, we examine alternative tasks that attempt to control for processing demands and the degree to which category information is explicitly recruited at the time of study. Contrary to the predictions of the representational shift hypothesis, we find no evidence that memory is selectively impaired by category labeling. Overall, the pattern of results across both studies appears consistent with well-established variables known to influence memory such as encoding specificity and distinctiveness effects.