The body of the other: intercorporeality and the phenomenology of agoraphobia

How is our experience of the world affected by our experience of others? Such is the question I will be exploring in this paper. I will do so via the agoraphobic condition. In agoraphobia, we are rewarded with an enriched glimpse into the intersubjective formation of the world, and in particular to our embodied experience of that social space. I will be making two key claims. First, intersubjectivity is essentially an issue of intercorporeality, a point I shall explore with recourse to Merleau-Ponty’s account of the prepersonal body. The implication of this claim is that evading or withdrawing from the other remains structurally impossible so long as we remain bodily subjects. Second, the necessary relation with others defines our thematic and affective experience of the world. Far from a formal connection with others, the corporeal basis of intersubjectivity means that our lived experience of the world is mediated via our bodily relations with others. In this way, intercorporeality reveals the body as being dynamically receptive to social interactions with others. Each of these claims is demonstrated via a phenomenological analysis of the agoraphobe’s interaction with others. From this analysis, I conclude that our experience of the world is affected by our experience of others precisely because we are in a bodily relation with others. Such a relation is not causally linked, as though first there were a body, then a world, and then a subject that provided a thematic and affective context to that experience. Instead, body, other, and world are each intertwined in a single unity and cannot be considered apart.     

On the transcendental undercurrents of phenomenology: the case of the living body

Continental Philosophy Review - Today the phenomenological concept of the lived body figures centrally in several philosophical and special scientific debates. In these wide and widening fields,...     

Buddhist shrines: bringing sacred context and shared memory into the home

Previous research has recognized shrines in homes as sites of shared cultural memory with the function of contextualising religious narratives and bringing the sacred into the home. For Buddhists, shrines occupy a grey area between the cultural and the religious and have not been widely considered as indicators of religiosity. A quantitative study of 417 British teenagers self-identifying as Buddhists found that the 70% who had a home shrine were less likely to visit a Buddhist temple, but more likely to exhibit daily personal religious practice and to bow to parents. The attitude profile of those with shrines showed that these teenagers were generally happier at school, more collectivist, polarised regarding their identities, and strict about intoxicants. Heightened affective religiosity was linked with having a home shrine, particularly for female, late-teen, and heritage Buddhists. The article argues that, for these groups of Buddhists, a shrine represents a locus for shared memory, especially accessible to those of Sensing Psychological Types, but, for males, early teens, and converts, there is more a sense of shrines giving context to their Buddhist narratives.     

Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action

This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge out of a complex dynamic feedback system at the subpersonal level. Moreover reflection on the role of eye movements in visual perception establishes a further sense in which a distinction between sensorimotor behaviour and cognition cannot be sustained. The sensorimotor theory has recently come under critical fire (see e.g. Block, J Philos CII(5):259–272, 2005; Prinz, Psyche, 12(1):1–19, 2006; Aizawa, J Philos CIV(1), 2007) for mistaking a merely causal contribution of action to perception for a constitutive contribution. We further argue that the sensorimotor theory is particularly vulnerable to this objection in a way that Hurley’s active perception theory is not. This presents an additional reason for preferring Hurley’s theory as providing a conceptual framework for the enactive programme.     

Typical intellectual engagement and cognition in the ninth decade of life: The Lothian Birth Cohort 1921

Investment traits-the tendency to seek out and engage in cognitive activity-might affect intellectual growth across the life span, specifically the development from fluid to crystallized intelligence. Here we explore how childhood IQ at age 11 years, IQ at age 79, and the investment trait Typical Intellectual Engagement (TIE) at age 81 affect the mean level and change in verbal fluency scores, used as an indicator of crystallized intelligence, across the ages 79, 83, and 87 in the Lothian Birth Cohort 1921 (maximum N = 569; Deary, Whiteman, Starr, Whalley, & Fox, 2004). A first latent growth model showed significant variance in the mean level of verbal fluency and significant decline in verbal fluency from age 79 to age 87. The rate of change was invariant across study participants in the Lothian Birth Cohort 1921. A second model found that IQ at age 11 significantly predicted IQ at age 79 (β = .66; p < .001), which in turn predicted verbal fluency and TIE in the ninth decade of life with standardized path parameters of .46 and .15 (p < .001), respectively. TIE had a significant association with verbal fluency (β = .14, p = .002); together, IQ at age 11 and 79 and TIE accounted for 25.5% of the variance in verbal fluency. A final model identified the TIE subfactor of intellectual curiosity as a significant mediator of the effect of IQ on verbal fluency; the TIE subfactors abstract thinking, reading, and problem solving showed no significant associations. In summary, TIE-in particular, intellectual curiosity-significantly mediated the effects of IQ on crystallized intelligence in old age. Because there was no significant between-subjects variance in verbal fluency trajectories in the current study, neither TIE nor IQ were associated with individual differences in cognitive decline. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Enactivism and the “problem” of perceptual presence

One of the classic debates in cognitive science is between nativism and empiricism about the development of psychological capacities. In principle, the debate is empirical. However, in practice nativist hypotheses have also been challenged for relying on an ill-defined, or even unscientific, notion of innateness as that which is “not learned”. Here this minimal conception of innateness is defended on four fronts. First, it is argued that the minimal conception is crucial to understanding the nativism-empiricism debate, when properly construed; Second, various objections to the minimal conception—that it risks overgeneralization, lacks an account of learning, frustrates genuine explanations of psychological development, and fails to unify different notions of innateness across the sciences—are rebutted. Third, it is argued that the minimal conception avoids the shortcomings of primitivism, the prominent view that innate capacities are those that are not acquired via a psychological process in development. And fourth, the minimal conception undermines some attempts to identify innateness with a natural kind. So in short, we have little reason to reject, and good reason to accept, the minimal conception of innateness in cognitive science.

     

The body maledict: Understanding the method of standpoint phenomenology through the work of Frantz Fanon

In this article, I examine the phenomenological methodology at work in Fanon's revision of the body schema. I argue that he implicitly utilizes a methodology I call standpoint phenomenology and show how this methodology emphasizes experiences that are not “universal” but specific to certain social groups in order to uncover shared ontological structures of experience. Fanon's work illustrates two key theses of standpoint phenomenology: (1) the thesis of situated phenomenology and (2) the thesis of inverted phenomenological privilege. I also draw a deep connection between classical and standpoint phenomenology by showing that it is the phenomenological analysis of breakdown experiences (e.g., corporeal malediction) that enables a standpoint approach to phenomenology. This breakdown methodology is explicitly developed by Heidegger and utilized implicitly by Merleau-Ponty. If I am right, standpoint phenomenology is both a natural development of and a considerable advance on the traditional methodology. This article, then, provides a better understanding of Fanon's place in the phenomenological tradition and, more broadly, makes explicit a new methodology for advancing phenomenological research.     

Tango and Enactivism: First Steps in Exploring the Dynamics and Experience of Interaction

Tango dancing is not just ethnographically interesting, but might actually provide a way to study interaction as such. An orientation to this improvisational dance as an embodied practice and experience is given. Enactivism is proposed as an adequate framework for further study. It is argued that approaching tango in terms of participatory sense-making, mutual incorporation and consensually coordinated action helps in clarifying its possible contributions to (cultural) psychology. Possible contributions such as facilitating the study of the dynamics of interaction, of intersubjectivity and of culture as joint activity.     

Network therapy for addiction: bringing family and peer support into office practice

Network therapy was developed as a specialized type of combined individual and group therapy to ensure greater success in the office-based treatment of addicted patients by using both psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral approaches to individual therapy while engaging the patient in a group support network composed of family members and peers. This article outlines the role of group cohesiveness as a vehicle for engaging patients in this treatment; the patient's family and peers are used as a therapeutic network, joining the patient and therapist at intervals in therapy sessions. This network is managed by the therapist to provide cohesiveness and support, to undermine denial, and to promote compliance with treatment. The author presents applications of the network technique designed to sustain abstinence and describes means of stabilizing the patient's involvement. Some specific techniques discussed include ambulatory detoxification, disulfiram and naltrexone administration, relapse prevention, and contingency contracting. Also discussed are recent research on the use of psychiatric residents and counselors for treatment, and use of the Internet in dissemination.     

Debunking enactivism: a critical notice of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism

In this review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice and action.     

The phenomenology of exception times: Qualitative differences between problem‐focussed and solution‐focussed interventions

Solution‐focussed brief therapy (SFBT) is a prominent psychotherapeutic approach that deals with a positive focus and promises brief interventions. In two experiments, a solution‐focussed technique was compared with a problem‐focussed intervention. By means of a structured questionnaire, subjects were encouraged to think about a standard (Experiment 1) or a facultative topic (Experiment 2). Subsequently, they generated either one or five exceptions or exemplary problem episodes. Dependent variables were confident in coping with the problem, ease of retrieval, psychic comfort and several phenomenological properties of the autobiographical memory. A solution‐oriented intervention increased self‐confidence and established a positive mood. Exception times had a more positive tone and were generally more easily retrieved than problem episodes.The study confirms the claims of the SFBT for empowerment and rapid reduction of current suffering. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Incremental validity of the typical intellectual engagement scale as predictor of different academic performance measures

The incremental validity of the Typical Intellectual Engagement (TIE) scale (Goff & Ackerman, 1992) as a predictor of academic performance (AP) was tested over and above other established determinants of AP, namely, psychometric g (as extracted from 5 cognitive ability tests) and the Big Five personality traits, assessed by the Neuroticism-Extraversion-Openness Five Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992). One hundred four British students were tested on arrival to university, and AP measures were collected longitudinally throughout a 3-year period. TIE, g, and Conscientiousness were the highest correlates of AP. A series of multiple-hierarchical regressions showed that TIE had significant incremental validity (over and above g and the Big Five) in the prediction of AP. Implications are discussed in light of the investment theory of intellectual competence and the utility of self-report inventories as predictors of academic achievement.     

Body dissatisfaction,engagement in body change behaviors and sociocultural influences on body image among Chinese adolescents

Body dissatisfaction and body image disorders are becoming increasingly prevalent in developing non-Western countries such as China, but there is a lack of research examining the sociocultural factors that in other contexts have been associated with these problems. The current study investigated body dissatisfaction, engagement in body change behaviors, and sociocultural pressures on body image, and the relationships between these variables among 517 adolescent males (N = 219) and females (N = 298) in China. Females reported greater body dissatisfaction than males, and males reported using strategies to increase their muscle bulk more often than females. Males reported pressure from a variety of sociocultural sources to increase their muscles or weight, while females reported pressure from the media to lose weight. For males body dissatisfaction was predicted by pressure from peers to increase their muscle bulk, while for females pressure to lose weight from peers, adult relatives, and the media was likely to increase body dissatisfaction. Pressure from the media and adult relatives was also predictive of body change behaviors in both males and females. The findings are discussed in relation to previous research in both Western and non-Western contexts.     

Autopoietic Enactivism,Phenomenology, and the Problem of Naturalism: A Neutral Monist Proposal

In this paper, I compare the original version of the enactive view—autopoietic enactivism—with Husserl’s phenomenology, regarding the issue of the relationship between consciousness and nature. I refer to this issue as the “problem of naturalism.” I show how the idea of the co-determination of subject and object of cognition, which is at the heart of autopoietic enactivism, is close to the phenomenological form of correlationism. However, I argue that there is a tension between an epistemological reading of the subject-object correlation that renounces to search for its metaphysical ground, and the enactivist focus on the biological basis of cognition, which seems to imply a view of nature as the metaphysical ground of the conscious mind. A similar problem arises in Husserl’s phenomenology in the contrast between the idea of the fundamental subject-object correlation, the concept of nature as a correlate of transcendental constitution, and the investigation of the corporeal and material grounding of consciousness. I find a way out of this problem by drawing on the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology. I argue that the investigation of the temporality of experience in genetic phenomenology leads us to investigate the metaphysical ground of the subject-object correlation, understood dynamically as co-constitution and co-origination. Then I propose to complement phenomenology and enactivism with a form of neutral monism, which conceives of the co-constitution of subject and object as grounded in a flow of fundamental, pre-phenomenal qualities.

     

Husserl's static and genetic phenomenology: Translator's introduction to two essays. Essay 1: Static and genetic phenomenological method. Essay 2: The phenomenology of monadic individuality and the phenomenology of the general possibilities and compossibilities of lived-experiences: static and genetic phenomenology

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