Social exclusion modulates pre-reflective interpersonal body representation

Perception of affordance is enhanced not only when that object is located in one’s own peripersonal space, as compared to when it is located within extrapersonal space, but also when the object is located in another person’s peripersonal space [as measured by a spatial alignment effect (SAE)]. It has been suggested that this reflects the existence of an interpersonal body representation (IBR) that allows us to represent the perceptual states and action possibilities of others. Here, we address the question of whether IBR can be modulated by higher level/reflective social cognition, such as judgments about one’s own social status. Participants responded with either the right or the left hand as soon as a go signal appeared. The go signal screen contained a task-irrelevant stimulus consisting of a 3D scene in which a mug with a left- or right-facing handle was positioned on a table. The mug was positioned either inside or outside the reaching space of the participants. In a third of the trials, the mug was positioned within the reaching space of an avatar seated at the table. Prior to this task we induced an experience of social ostracism in half of the participants by means of a standardized social exclusion condition. The results were that the SAE that normally occurs when the mug is in the avatar’s reaching space is extinguished by the induced social exclusion. This indicates that judgments about one’s own social status modulate the effect of IBR.     

Plural self-awareness

It has been claimed in the literature that collective intentionality and group attitudes presuppose some “sense of ‘us’” among the participants (other labels sometimes used are “sense of community,” “communal awareness,” “shared point of view,” or “we-perspective”). While this seems plausible enough on an intuitive level, little attention has been paid so far to the question of what the nature and role of this mysterious “sense of ‘us’” might be. This paper states (and argues for) the following five claims: (1) it is neither the case that the sense in question has the community (or “us”) in its content or as its object nor does the attitude in question presuppose a preexistent community (or “us”) as its subject. (2) The “sense of ‘us’” is plural pre-reflective self-awareness. (3) Plural pre-reflective self-awareness plays the same role in the constitution of a common mind that singular pre-reflective self-awareness plays in the individual mind. (4) The most important conceptions of plural subjects, collective persons, or group agents in the current literature fail to recognize the nature and role of plural self-awareness, and therefore fall short in important respects. (5) In spite of the striking similarities between the plural and the singular mind, there are important differences to consider. The authority of the singular first person point of view has no equivalent in the plural case.     

Bodily knowing

This paper questions the view that knowledge must be articulable or at least experiential. It asserts that what distinguishes habitual yet intentional action from a mechanistic response is its grounding in a suitable claim to knowledge. However, it denies that a necessary condition for knowing how to perform an action is the ability of the subject to either articulate the particulars of that act, or experience it as appropriate.     

Anticipating seizure: pre-reflective experience at the center of neuro-phenomenology

The purpose of this paper is to show through the concrete example of epileptic seizure anticipation how neuro-dynamic analysis (using new mathematical tools to detect the dynamic structure of the neuro-electric activity of the brain) and "pheno-dynamic" analysis (using new interview techniques to detect the pre-reflective dynamic micro-structure of the corresponding subjective experience) may guide and determine each other. We will show that this dynamic approach to epileptic seizure makes it possible to consolidate the foundations of a cognitive non pharmacological therapy of epilepsy. We will also show through this example how the neuro-phenomenological co-determination could shed new light on the difficult problem of the "gap" which separates subjective experience from neurophysiological activity.     

Bodily feelings and felt inclinations

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - The paper defends a version of the perceptual account of bodily feelings, according to which having a feeling is feeling something about one’s body....     

Reactions to objective self-awareness

In order to determine reactions to objective self-awareness, 96 female undergraduates received either positive or negative feedback on a “creativity” task prior to being given an opportunity to write a response to a visual cue. Half of the subjects were made objectively self-aware, via a mirror, during the visual cue task; half were not. In addition, half of the subjects were led to believe that the visual cue task was highly related to creativity, while half learned that the task was low in relevance. A “longer the response, the better” standard of correctness was established for all subjects. As predicted, the results indicated that when made objectively self-aware, subjects who received negative feedback wrote more in response to the visual cue than did those who received positive feedback, a difference which was not obtained for the subjectively self-aware subjects. The task relevance manipulation also produced a significant main effect. A similar pattern of results was obtained on a measure of the time spent on the task. The implications of the results for objective self-awareness theory are considered.     

Bodily structure and body representation

Synthese - This paper is concerned with representational explanations of how one experiences and acts with one’s body as an integrated whole. On the standard view, accounts of bodily...     

The roots of self-awareness

In this paper we provide an account of the structural underpinnings of self-awareness. We offer both an abstract, logical account – by way of suggestions for how to build a genuinely self-referring artificial agent – and a biological account, via a discussion of the role of somatoception in supporting and structuring self-awareness more generally. Central to the account is a discussion of the necessary motivational properties of self-representing mental tokens, in light of which we offer a novel definition of self-representation. We also discuss the role of such tokens in organizing self-specifying information, which leads to a naturalized restatement of the guarantee that introspective awareness is immune to error due to mis-identification of the subject.     

Bodily Disorientation and Moral Change

Neglect of the moral promise of disorientation is a persistent gap in even the most sophisticated philosophies of embodiment. In this article, I begin to correct this neglect by expanding our sense of the range and nature of disoriented experience and proposing new visions of disorientation as benefiting moral agency. Disorientations are experienced through complex interactions of corporeal, affective, and cognitive processes, and are characterized by feelings of shock, surprise, unease, and discomfort; felt disorientations almost always make us unsure of how to go on. I argue that experiences of disorientation can strengthen the moral agency of individuals. I begin by clarifying experiences of felt ease and orientation. I then characterize disoriented embodiment by investigating select experiences that often involve or accompany disorientation, focusing throughout on how disorientation prompts changes in motivation and action. I conclude by charting how disoriented embodiments can help individuals become better moral agents overall, in part by challenging norms that restrict embodiment and undermining dualistic conceptions of the self.     

Self-consciousness, self-awareness, and self-attribution

Self-awareness was either manipulated by a mirror (experimental) or not (control). Subjects were selected for being high or low in private self-consciousness (disposition to attend to one's thoughts, feelings, motives). Private self-consciousness had a stronger effect on self-attributions than did self-awareness. These findings have implications for attribution, self-consciousness, and the relationship between manipulations and dispositions.     

Representation and self-awareness in intentional agents

Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for conditional and counterfactual thinking. Contextual or indexical representations are necessary in order that the inner world relates to the actual external world and thus can be used as a basis for action. To have full-blown intentionality, the agent should also have a detached self-awareness, that is, be able to entertain self-representations that are independent of the context.     

Cognitive consequences of self-awareness

Recent research stimulated by Duval and Wicklund's self-awareness theory has shown that self-focused attention influences a wide range of attitudes, attributions, and behavior. The cognitive processes that supposedly mediate these effects have not been carefully explored, however. In order to discover whether a manipulation of self-awareness actually activates self-relevant thoughts, two studies were conducted using the Stroop color-word measure of concept activation in memory. The first revealed a pattern of differences between means that was consistent with the hypothesis, although the expected interaction of word content and presence of mirror and camera to produce longer color-naming latencies did not appear. Also, self-relevant words were read faster than neutral words, even though they had been matched for length, frequency, and part of speech. In the second study (a refinement of the first), the expected interaction was significant. The results support one of the central claims of self-awareness theory and suggest an alternative interpretation of classic findings concerning anxiety and memory.     

Dissociation and self-awareness in directed daydreaming

Self-awareness, as the ability to be the observer of one's own cognitive. affective, and volitional states, was explored in directed daydreaming. Self-awareness of varying complexity and depth was found in the dissociated ego states, which were experienced as relatively discontinuous with each other in space and time, and discontinuous with the subjects' usual experience of a cohesive self. An extreme expression of shallow self-awareness was found for a few subjects who reported a fantasy with no experience of a self. The most elaborate form of self-awareness, coconsciousness , was found for the majority of subjects in the two-ego state group, where both of their ego states were associated with an identity feeling, and where one ego state evidenced full awareness of the thoughts and feelings of the other state. Coconsciousness was found to be a prerequisite for deep self-awareness in directed daydreaming.     

Bodily Integrity and Conceptions of Subjectivity

This paper examines two different ways of understanding the concept of bodily integrity and their political implications. In Drucilla Cornell's use of the concept, the body cannot be separated from the mind. Protecting bodily integrity means protecting possibilities of imagining the self as whole. Martha Nussbaum's theorizing is based on a liberal way of conceptualizing subjectivity, in which the mind and the body are separate, and bodily integrity is used to refer to physical inviolability.