共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Kirsten Jacobson 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(3):355-373
Though “dwelling” is more commonly associated with Heidegger’s philosophy than with that of Merleau-Ponty, “being-at-home”
is in fact integral to Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I consider the notion of home as it relates to Merleau-Ponty’s more familiar
notions of the “lived body” and the “level,” and, in particular, I consider how the unique intertwining of activity and passivity
that characterizes our being-at-home is essential to our nature as free beings. I argue that while being-at-home is essentially
an experience of passivity—i.e., one that rests in the background of our experience and provides a support and structure for
our life that goes largely unnoticed and that is significantly beyond our “conscious” control—being-at-home is also a way
of being to which we attain. This analysis of home reveals important psychological insights into the nature of our freedom as well as into the nature
of the development of our adult ways of coping and behaving. 相似文献
2.
Dorothea Olkowski 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(4):525-544
The chapter on temporality in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, is situated in a section titled, “Being-for-Itself and Being-in-the-World.” As such, Merleau-Ponty’s task in the chapter
on temporality is to bring these two positions together, in other words, to articulate the manner in which time links the
cogito (Being-for-Itself) with freedom (Being-in-the-World). To accomplish this, Merleau-Ponty proposes a subject located at the
junction of the for-itself and the in-itself, a subject which has an exterior that makes it possible for others to have an
interior. This analysis will take Merleau-Ponty to an impasse where, on the one hand, there appears to be an objective world
and the time of objects in that world, and on the other, there is the subject’s notion of events and the passing of time.
Referring to Bergson’s notion of time, this essay proposes that there must be a temporal interval between perception, feeling
and action in order for the subject to be “temporal by means of an inner necessity,” as Merleau-Ponty prescribes. 相似文献
3.
Whereas Phenomenology of Perception concludes with a puzzling turn to “heroism,” this article examines the short essay “Man, the Hero” as a source of insight
into Merleau-Ponty’s thought in the early postwar period. In this essay, Merleau-Ponty presented a conception of heroism through
which he expressed the attitude toward post-Hegelian philosophy of history that underwrote his efforts to reform Marxism along
existential lines. Analyzing this conception of heroism by unpacking the implicit contrasts with Kojève, Aron, Caillois, and
Bataille, I show that its philosophical rationale was to supply experiential evidence attesting to the latent presence of
human universality. It is a mythic device intended to animate the faith necessary for Marxist politics by showing that universal
sociality is possible, and that the historically transformative praxis needed to realize it does not imply sacrifice. This
sheds considerable light on Merleau-Ponty’s early postwar political thought. But inasmuch as the latter cannot be severed from his broader philosophical concerns, the prospect is raised that
his entire phenomenological project in the early postwar period rested on a myth. Not necessarily a bad myth, but a myth nonetheless. 相似文献
4.
This paper presents a new modal logic for ceteris paribus preferences understood in the sense of “all other things being equal”. This reading goes back to the seminal work of Von
Wright in the early 1960’s and has returned in computer science in the 1990’s and in more abstract “dependency logics” today.
We show how it differs from ceteris paribus as “all other things being normal”, which is used in contexts with preference defeaters. We provide a semantic analysis and
several completeness theorems. We show how our system links up with Von Wright’s work, and how it applies to game-theoretic
solution concepts, to agenda setting in investigation, and to preference change. We finally consider its relation with infinitary
modal logics. 相似文献
5.
Luce Irigaray 《Continental Philosophy Review》2004,37(4):389-405
In this essay, which is preceded by an interview with the translator, the author revisits her earlier critique of Merleau-Ponty’s
privileging of the visible, but also takes further her own thinking by drawing specifically on the issues raised within the
context of painting. The focal point of her discussion is Merleau-Ponty’s essay, “Eye and Mind.”
This paper was first published in Italian as “Dipingere l’invisible,” Segni e Comprensione 44 (December 2001): 10–16. This
English translation is from the French version. 相似文献
6.
Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan 《Human Studies》2007,30(4):395-409
In this paper I address some related aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished texts, The Visible and the Invisible and The Prose of the World. The point of departure for my reading of these works is the sense of philosophical disillusionment which underlies and motivates
them, and which, I argue, leads Merleau-Ponty towards an engagement with art in general and with literature in particular.
I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s emerging conception of ethics—premised on the paradox of a “universal singularity” and concerned
with the concrete experience of the individual subject, rather than with abstractions and formal categories—can best be articulated
through the formalist concept of “defamiliarization,” the fundamental performativity of all literature, and the dialogic relations
which, though inherent in all discourse, become most powerfully evident in the dynamics of reading.
相似文献
Daphna Erdinast-VulcanEmail: |
7.
Silvia Stoller 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(1):97-110
Until now post-structuralism and phenomenology are widely regarded as opposites. Contrary to this opinion, I am arguing that
they have a lot in common. In order to make my argument, I concentrate on Judith Butler’s poststructuralist concept of performativity
to confront it with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological concept of expressivity. While Butler claims that phenomenological
theories of expression are in danger of essentialism and thus must be replaced by non-essentialist theories of performativity,
I hold that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expressivity must strictly be understood in anti-essentialist terms. Following this
line of interpretation, “expressivity” and “performativity”—as well as phenomenology and post-structuralism—are not opposites
but partners in the search for an anti-essentialist gender concept. Consequently, feminist phenomenology turns out to be a
non-essentialist approach that combines phenomenological and post-structural insights. 相似文献
8.
Bernard Flynn 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(2):125-138
This article follows the development of Merleau-Ponty’s political philosophy from his 1947 text, Humanism and Terror, through a number of essays in the Adventures of the Dialectic, to the Preface to Signs published in 1959. It shows the process by which Merleau-Ponty escaped the “grip of marxism” as a philosophy of history.
It notes the link between his philosophy of history and the concrete historical events of his times, particularly the Russian
Revolution and its degeneration into Stalinism. It suggests a certain analogy between Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on the October
Revolution and Kant’s reflection on the French Revolution. The notion of the universal class of the proletariat is the guiding thread in the analyses of both Merleau-Ponty’s proximity to marxism and the process by which he frees himself
from its grip. We observe the role that this concept plays in Humanism and Terror and in the essays on Weber and Lukacs in the Adventure of the Dialectic where we eventually see its dissolution. It is argued that Merleau-Ponty arrives at a new conception of historical meaning
which is neither totalizing or empiricist. The paper concludes by presenting an outline of the direction that his philosophy
of history took after he extricated himself from marxism. This new philosophy took the form of a critical reflection on the
role of the “notion of the hero” in 20th century political philosophy in general, particularly in Heidegger and Sartre.
相似文献
Bernard FlynnEmail: |
9.
Thomas J. Nenon 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(4):427-439
This article compares the differences between Kant’s and Husserl’s conceptions of the “transcendental.” It argues that, for
Kant, the term “transcendental” stands for what is otherwise called “metaphysical,” i.e. non-empirical knowledge. As opposed
to his predecessors, who had believed that such non-empirical knowledge was possible for meta-physical, i.e. transcendent
objects, Kant’s contribution was to show how there can be non-empirical (a priori) knowledge not about transcendent objects,
but about the necessary conditions for the experience of natural, non-transcendent objects. Hence the transcendental for Kant
ends up connoting a philosophy that claims to show how subjective forms of intuition and thinking have objective validity
for all objects as appearances. By contrast, Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy takes a different set of problems for its
starting point. His quest is to avoid the uncertainty of empirical knowledge about all kinds of objects that present themselves
to us as something other than, something transcendent to, consciousness. Transcendental or reliable knowledge is made possible
through the phenomenological reduction that focuses strictly on consciousness as immediately self-given to itself—reflection
upon “pure” consciousness. The contents of such consciousness are not the same for everyone and at every time, so they are
not necessary and invariant in the way that Kant’s pure forms of subjectivity are. Since Husserl however also claims that
the all objects, as intentional objects, are constituted in and for consciousness, an investigation into the structures of
pure subjectivity can also be called “transcendental” in a further sense of showing the genesis of our knowledge of objects
that are transcendent to consciousness. Moreover, since Husserl’s philosophical interest is precisely upon the structures
of that consciousness, he also concentrates on necessary conditions for the constitution of these objects in his philosophical
work. Hence, there ends up being a great deal of overlap between his own transcendental project and Kant’s in spite of the
differences in what each of them means by the term “transcendental.”
相似文献
Thomas J. NenonEmail: |
10.
Jenny Slatman 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(3):321-342
This article provides a phenomenological analysis of the difference between self-recognition and recognition of another, while
referring to some contemporary neuroscientific studies on the rubber hand illusion. It examines the difference between these
two forms of recognition on the basis of Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s work. It argues that both phenomenologies, despite
their different views on inter-subjectivity, allow for the specificity of recognition of another. In explaining self-recognition,
however, Husserl’s account seems less convincing. Research concerning the rubber hand illusion has confirmed that self-recognition
involves more than an immediate experience of oneself. Merleau-Ponty’s later work, describing self-recognition as the result
of assimilative identification, will be used to explain the possibility of illusion between one’s “hereness” and “thereness”.
The possibility of this illusion is inherent to self-recognition, while it is lacking in recognition of another.
相似文献
Jenny SlatmanEmail: |
11.
David Morris 《Human Studies》2008,31(4):399-421
This article studies the phenomenology of chronic illness in light of phenomenology’s insights into ecstatic temporality and
freedom. It shows how a chronic illness can, in lived experience, manifest itself as a disturbance of our usual relation to
ecstatic temporality and thence as a disturbance of freedom. This suggests that ecstatic temporality is related to another
sort of time—“provisional time”—that is in turn rooted in the body. The article draws on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Heidegger’s Being and Time, shedding light on the latter’s concept of ecstatic temporality. It also discusses implications for self-management of chronic
illness, especially in children.
相似文献
David MorrisEmail: |
12.
Xianglong Zhang 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(1):60-65
The author examines He Lin’s interpretation of Zhu Xi’s method of intuition from a phenomenological-hermeneutical perspective
and by exposing Zhu’s philosophical presuppositions. In contrast with Lu Xiangshan’s intuitive method, Zhu Xi’s method of
reading classics advocates “emptying your heart and flowing with the text” and, in this spirit, explains the celebrated “exhaustive
investigation on the principles of things (ge wu qiong li).” “Text,” according to Zhu, is therefore not an object in ordinary sense but a “contextual region” or “sensible pattern”
that, when merged with the reader, generates meanings. Furthermore, by discussing the related doctrines of Lao Zi, Zhuang
Zi, Hua-Yan Buddhism, Zhou Dunyi, and Zhu Xi’s own “One principle with many manifestations (li yi fen shu),” the author identifies the philosophical preconditions of Zhu’s method. Based on this analysis, the author goes on to illustrate
Zhu’s understanding of “observing potential yet unapparent pleasure, anger, sorrow and happiness” and “maintaining a serious
attitude (zhu jing).” 相似文献
13.
John Lippitt 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2007,61(3):131-150
In this article, I offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard’s key concerns about friendship: its “preferential” nature
and its being a form of self-love. Kierkegaard’s endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as “second self” involves a
common but misguided assumption: that friendship depends largely upon likeness between friends. This focus obscures a vitally important element, highlighted by the so-called “drawing” view of friendship.
Once this is emphasized, we can see a significant aspect - though by no means all - of Kierkegaard’s worry as misplaced. However,
the “drawing” view also enables us to begin to see what a “Kierkegaardian” friendship might look like. 相似文献
14.
Chuanhua Peng 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(2):193-216
Xunzi’s philosophy of language was mainly unfolded through the “discrimination of ming 名 (names) and shi 实 (realities)” and the “discrimination of yan 言 (words) and yi 意 (meanings).” Particularly, the “discrimination of names and realities” was centered on the propositions that “realities
are realized when their names are heard” and that “names are given to point up realities,” including the view on the essence
of language such as “names expect to indicate realities” and “conventions established by usage,” the view of development of
language such as “coming form the former usage and being newly established,” and the view of functions of language such as
“discriminating superiority and inferiority and differentiating identities and differences”; while the “discrimination of
words and meanings” mainly contained two aspects: One was that words could completely represent meanings while it could not
do so on the other hand, and the other was that the Dao should be grasped through “an unoccupied, concentrated and quiet mind.”
Xunzi’s philosophy of language stressed both language’s value attribute and its cognitive attribute, and it is the greatest
achievement of pre-Qin dynasty’s philosophy of language. 相似文献
15.
One of us coined the notion of an “epistemology engine.” The idea is that some particular technology in its workings and use
is seen suggestively as a metaphor for the human subject and often for the production of knowledge itself. In this essay,
we further develop the conceptand claim that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological commitments, although suggestive, did not lead
him to appreciate the epistemological value of materiality. We also take steps towards establishing how an understanding of
this topic can provide the basis for reinterpreting the history of phenomenology. 相似文献
16.
Tu Weiming, as a leading spokesman for contemporary New Confucianism, has been reinterpreting the Confucian tradition in the
face of the challenges of modernity. Tu takes selfhood as his starting point, emphasizing the importance of cultivating the
human mind-and-heart as a deepening and broadening process to realize the anthropocosmic dao. He highlights the concept of a “fiduciary community” and advocates that, because of it, Confucianism remains a dynamic “inclusive
humanism.” Tu’s mode of thinking tallies well with Wilfred C. Smith’s vision of religion, specifically the latter’s exposition
of faith as a universal human quality and proposal of “corporate critical self-consciousness.” This article details the theories
of both scholars, highlights their similarities, and contrasts their differences. It argues that Smith’s world theology provides
a heuristic framework through which one understands how Tu has advanced his Confucian humanism from a Chinese philosophical
or cultural tradition to the midst of world religions. 相似文献
17.
How to Define a Number? A General Epistemological Account of Simon Stevin’s Art of Defining 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jurgen Naets 《Topoi》2010,29(1):77-86
This paper explores Simon Stevin’s l’Arithmétique of 1585, where we find a novel understanding of the concept of number. I will discuss the dynamics between his practice and
philosophy of mathematics, and put it in the context of his general epistemological attitude. Subsequently, I will take a
close look at his justificational concerns, and at how these are reflected in his inductive, a postiori and structuralist
approach to investigating the numerical field. I will argue that Stevin’s renewed conceptualisation of the notion of number
is a sort of “existential closure” of the numerical domain, founded upon the practice of his predecessors and contemporaries.
Accordingly, I want to make clear that l’Aritmetique have to be read not as an ontological analysis or exploration of the numerical field, but as an explication of a mathematical
ethos. In this sense, this article also intends to make a specific contribution to the broader issue of the “ethics of geometry.” 相似文献
18.
19.
Jiaxiang Hu 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(1):41-56
Mencius’ aesthetics unfolded around the ideal personality in his mind. Such an ideal personality belonged to a great man who
was sublime, practical and honorable, and it was presented as the beauty of magnificence or the beauty of masculinity. Mencius
put forward many propositions such as “the completed goodness that is brightly displayed is called greatness,” nourishing
“one’s grand qi 气 (the great morale personality),” “only after a man is a sage can he completely suits himself to his own form,” “the saints
only apprehended before me that of which my mind approves along with other men,” being “conscious of sincerity on self-examination,”
and flowing “abroad, above and beneath, like that of Heaven and Earth,” all of which described an ideal personality through
the course of its formation and its psychological experience. As a prominent school before the Qin dynasty, Mencius’ aesthetics
greatly developed the Confucian teaching of “internal sage.” It shared many similarities with Zhuangzi’s thought and was also
an aesthetic mode opposed to the latter. Both kinds of aesthetics were prominent: Mencius’ teaching was like imposingly towering
and muscularly overflowing majestic mountains; Zhuangzi’s thought was like gracefully flowing water with an air of femininity.
In real life though, Mencius’ teaching has greater practical significance in addressing the unbearable lightness of being,
a disease of modernity. 相似文献
20.
In this article I argue against Chad Hansen’s version of the “White Horse Dialogue” (Baimalun) of Gongsun Longzi as intelligible through writings of the later Moists. Hansen regards the Baimalun as an attempt to demonstrate how the compound baima, “white horse,” is correctly analyzed in one of the Moist ways of analyzing compound term semantics but not the other. I
present an alternative reading in which the Baimalun arguments point out, via reductio, the failure of either Moist analysis; in particular they point out how neither analysis accounts for ordinary, acceptable
inferences like “There is a white horse; therefore there is a horse.” At issue for Gongsun Longzi is a fundamental problem
with atomic terms: none of them seems capable of referring to a particular, “stand-alone” individual. 相似文献