作为第一哲学的超越论现象学

胡塞尔将他的超越论的现象学哲学称作"第一哲学",强调它是一种由最终根源奠立的普通科学的开端和基础,它正是要研究那些最初的、自身包含一切存在与真理之起源的东西,即超越论的主观性.一切真正的科学都必须从这种科学中寻求它们的全部基本概念和原理的、它们的一切方法的、一切其他原则的最后来源.胡塞尔通过对哲学史的考察表明,这一思想也是贯穿于数千年哲学史中的统一动机,并且已在历史上取得了值得重视的成就.胡塞尔所提出的现象学还原的方法,正是要揭示这种超越论主观性的领域.他称这种方法是一种全新的反思方法,是彻底的纯粹的对自身的思考,是完全不同于自然态度的"非自然的"态度.但是胡塞尔在这里提供的不仅是现象学还原的"方法",而且同时还提供了一种有关现象学还原的"现象学",即现象学还原的"理论".     

The Transcendental Source of Logic by Way of Phenomenology

In this article I am going to argue for the possibility of a transcendental source of logic based on a phenomenologically motivated approach. My aim will be essentially carried out in two succeeding steps of reduction: the first one will be the indication of existence of an inherent temporal factor conditioning formal predicative discourse and the second one, based on a supplementary reduction of objective temporality, will be a recourse to a time-constituting origin which has to be assumed as a non-temporal, transcendental subjectivity and for that reason as possibly the ultimate transcendental root of pure logic. In the development of the argumentation and taking into account W.V. Quine’s views in his well-known Word and Object, a special emphasis will be given to the fundamentally temporal character of universal and existential predicative forms, to their status in logical theories in general, and to their underlying role in generating an inherently non-finitistic character reflected, for instance, in the undecidability of certain infinity statements in formal mathematical theories. This is shown also to concern metatheorems of such vital importance as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems in mathematical foundations. Moreover in the course of the discussion the quest for the ultimate limits of predication will lead to the notions of separation and intentional correlation between an ‘observing’ subject and the object of ‘observation’ as well as to the notion of syntactical individuals taken as the irreducible non-analytic nuclei-forms within analytical discourse.     

Practical Intentionality and Transcendental Phenomenology as a Practical Philosophy

This paper will deal with the problem of practical intentionality in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. First, through an analysis of a passage found in Logical Investigations, I will show Husserl's earlier position with respect to the problem of practical intentionality. I will then go on to critically assess this position and, with reference to some of Husserl's works written after the 1920's, prove that every intentionality should be regarded as a practical intentionality. Correspondingly, transcendental phenomenology should also be characterized as a practical philosophy. I make this statement with the following two senses in mind; transcendental phenomenology is a practical philosophy, first, in the sense that it investigates the various forms of practical intentionality and, second, in the sense that transcendental intentionality as the grounding source of transcendental phenomenology is also a kind of practical intentionality.     

梦意识现象学初探——关于想象、梦与超越论现象学

文章试图运用"双重自我"的概念,结合想象现象对一般梦现象进行现象学上的考察,并期望借助考察的结论给清明之梦一个现象学的解释。在文章的最后,还将用梦作比喻,探讨它对超越论现象学的启示。     

Husserlian Phenomenology and Derridean Deconstruction: Their Fundamental Methodological Commitments

This paper reinterprets the relation between Derridian deconstruction and Husserlian phenomenology on the basis of their respective methodological commitments. According to the proposed view, epoché, reduction, and eidetic variation are the fundamental methodological principles of Husserlian phenomenology. This paper interprets Derrida’s reading of Husserl as presenting a type of semiological reductionism, which is marked by the absorption of the fundamental phenomenological principles within a semiological framework. Conceiving of meaning as a sign that refers to other signs, Derrida contends that neither epoché, nor reduction, nor eidetic variation can be carried through successfully; their validity is thereby indefinitely deferred. This paper also addresses the relationship between indication and expression, the Principle of all Principles, the living present, and their alleged deconstruction in Derrida’s writings. I conclude with some suggestions concerning how, apart from deconstructing phenomenology, one could also phenomenologize deconstruction. According to my suggestion, this would require problematizing evidence that underlies the central claims and commitments of deconstruction.     

An Examination of Irigaray's Commitment to Transcendental Phenomenology in The Forgetting of Air and The Way of Love

Although sexual difference is widely regarded as the concept that lies at the center of Luce Irigaray's thought, its meaning and significance is highly contested. This dissensus, however, attests to more than merely the existence of a recalcitrant conceptual ambiguity. That is, Irigaray's discussion of sexual difference remains fraught not because she leaves this concept undefined but because the centrality of sexual difference in fact marks a complex and unstable nexus of phenomena that shift throughout her work. Consequently, if Irigaray is indeed the preeminent thinker of sexual difference, this is not in virtue of her recurrent appeal to a monolithic, readily digestible concept but rather somehow despite the absence of precisely this gesture. In this paper, I will attempt to elucidate the peculiar preeminence of sexual difference in Irigaray's work by identifying her persistent, though largely unexamined, commitment to transcendental phenomenology. Indeed, I attempt to show that the complex of phenomena of sexual difference emerges in L'oubli de l'air and The Way of Love as a modulation of Heidegger's own revision of transcendental phenomenology. In this sense, the peculiar preeminence of sexual difference does not mark the centrality of a concept but Irigaray's amplification of this Heideggerian gesture.     

IV—Kant's Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic

This paper gives an interpretation of Kant's argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. I argue against a common way of reading this argument, which sees Kant as arguing that substantive a priori claims about mind-independent reality would be unintelligible because we cannot explain the source of their justification. I argue that Kant's concern with how synthetic a priori propositions are possible is not a concern with the source of their justification, but with how they can have objects. I argue that Kant's notion of intuition needs to be understood as a kind of representation which involves the presence to consciousness of the object it represents, and that this means that a priori intuition cannot present us with a mind-independent feature of reality.     

The Transcendental Method and (Post-)Empiricist Philosophy of Science

This paper reconsiders the relation between Kantian transcendental reflection (including transcendental idealism) and 20th century philosophy of science. As has been pointed out by Michael Friedman and others, the notion of a “relativized a priori” played a central role in Rudolf Carnap’s, Hans Reichenbach’s and other logical empiricists’ thought. Thus, even though the logical empiricists dispensed with Kantian synthetic a priori judgments, they did maintain a crucial Kantian doctrine, viz., a distinction between the (transcendental) level of establishing norms for empirical inquiry and the (empirical) level of norm-governed inquiry itself. Even though Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions is often taken to be diametrically opposed to the received view of science inherited from logical empiricism, a version of this basically Kantian distinction is preserved in Kuhn’s thought. In this respect, as Friedman has argued, Kuhn is closer to Carnap’s theory of linguistic frameworks than, say, W.V. Quine’s holistic naturalism. Kuhn, indeed, might be described as a “new Kant” in post-empiricist philosophy of science. This article examines, first, the relativization of the Kantian a priori in Reichenbach’s work, arguing that while Reichenbach (after having given up his original Kantianism) criticized “transcendentalism”, he nevertheless retained, in a reinterpreted form, a Kantian-like transcendental method, claiming that the task of philosophy (of science) is to discover and analyze the presuppositions underlying the applicability of conceptual systems. Then, some reflections on Kuhn’s views on realism are offered, and it is suggested that Kuhn (as well as some other influential contributors to the realism debate, such as Hilary Putnam) can be reinterpreted as a (relativized, naturalized) Kantian transcendental idealist. Given the central importance of Kuhnian themes in contemporary philosophy of science, it is no exaggeration to claim that Kantian transcendental inquiry into the constitutive principles of empirical knowledge, and even transcendental idealism (as the framework for such inquiry), still have a crucial role to play in this field and deserve further scrutiny.     

现象学和宗教现象学:对一种宗教学方法的思考

本文拟通过对哲学意义上的现象学和宗教现象学核心概念的整理,考查二者之间的联系与区别,并试图从哲学现象学的角度反观宗教现象学,重新思考宗教现象学的可能性及宗教研究的方法问题。     

Steven Galt Crowell,Husserl, Heidegger,and the Space of Meaning: Paths toward Transcendental Phenomenology

Continental Philosophy Review -     

A New Quasi‐Transcendental Approach to Kant's Theory of Radical Evil

How to make sense of Kant's theory of radical evil is a controversial problem, for the solution of which three approaches have been attempted: (1) the anthropological, (2) the transcendental, and (3) the quasi‐transcendental. This article aims at developing a new quasi‐transcendental approach to radical evil, and its main innovation consists in reinterpreting the propensity to evil as a potential for moral evil, whose nuanced modality (i.e., potentiality) lies between full actuality and logical (empty) possibility. This evil potential inherent to our species' nature can be actualized by individual Willkür in one's evil Gesinnung. Thanks to this reinterpretation, not only the compatibility of radical evil with individual freedom will be convincingly demonstrated, because the potential for evil only strongly pushes rather than necessitating individuals to do evil, but also Kant's bold statement “the human being is by nature evil” becomes easily confirmable, because even a single individual's illegal action provides sufficient empirical evidence to a regressive argument for the transcendental precondition for evil in his species' nature.     

The Noema as Nash Equilibrium. Husserlian Phenomenology and Game Theory

Philosophia - The noema is one of the most daring and controversial concept of the Husserlian theory of intentionality. It was first introduced by Husserl in 1912, within some research...     

先验哲学的超验意境——从《夜之颂》看诺瓦利斯的独特精神诉求

《夜之颂》是德国早期浪漫主义作家诺瓦利斯的代表作。在这篇作品中,他将夜的概念引申到哲学和宗教范畴中,通过本体超验,勾画出夜精神不朽的宗教寓意和现实寓意。超验是这部作品的点睛之笔,作者通过体验夜的不同意境,表达了内心世界对完美精神的追求。