Tropes As Character-Grounders

There is a largely unrecognized ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope. Disambiguation throws into relief two fundamentally different conceptions of a trope and provides two ways to understand and develop each metaphysical theory that puts tropes to use. In this paper I consider the relative merits that result from differences concerning a trope's ability to ground the character of ordinary objects. I argue that, on each conception of a trope, there are unique implications and challenges concerning character-grounding.     

Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects

I argue that a solution to puzzles concerning the relationship ofobjects and their properties – a version of the `bundle' theory ofparticulars according to which ordinary objects are mereologicalfusions of monadic and relational tropes – is also a solution topuzzles of material constitution involving the allegedco-location of material objects. Additionally, two argumentsthat have played a prominent role in shaping the current debate,Mark Heller's argument for Four Dimensionalism and Peter vanInwagen's argument against Mereological Universalism, are shownto be unsound given this version of the bundle theory.     

Tropes of the crusades in Indonesian Muslim discourse

This paper concerns the ways in which tropes of the Crusades are used in contemporary Indonesian Islamic discourse. It is based on the analysis of contemporary textual materials and on ethnographic research conducted between 1978 and 2009. It is argued that tropes of the Crusades and now linked to an Islamist discourse that is Anti-Western and Anti-Semitic and that they are employed as mythological archetypes that link the colonial past with contemporary Indonesian politics and world affairs.     

Tropes,Particularity, and Space-Time

Several difficulties, concerning the individuation and the variation of tropes, beset the initial classic version of trope theory. K. Campbell (Abstract particulars, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990) presented a modified version that aims to avoid those difficulties. Unfortunately, the revised theory cannot make the case that one of the fundamental tropes, space-time, is a genuine particular.     

Events,Tropes, and Truthmaking

Nominalizations are expressions that are particularly challenging philosophically in that they help form singular terms that seem to refer to abstract or derived objects often considered controversial. The three standard views about the semantics of nominalizations are [1] that they map mere meanings onto objects, [2] that they refer to implicit arguments, and [3] that they introduce new objects, in virtue of their compositional semantics. In the second case, nominalizations do not add anything new but pick up objects that would be present anyway in the semantic structure of a corresponding sentence without a nominalization. In the first and third case, nominalizations in a sense ‘create’ new objects’, enriching the ontology on the basis of the meaning of expressions. I will argue that there is a fourth kind of nominalization which requires a quite different treatment. These are nominalizations that introduce ‘new’ objects, but only partially characterize them. Such nominalizations generally refer to events or tropes. I will explore an account according on which such nominalizations refer to truth makers.     

Tropes or Universals: How (Not) to Make One's Choice

This article discusses a familiar version of trope theory as opposed to a familiar version of the theory of universals, examining how these two rivals address the problem of “attribute agreement”—a problem that has been at the root of the very reason for developing these theories in the first place. The article shows that there is not much of a difference between the ways these two theories handle the problem, and in a more general way it argues that there is little reason for preferring one theory over the other. It is not interested in this claim only for the sake of the debate between trope theory and the theory of universals. Indeed, the reasons why it claims that it is so difficult to choose one theory over the other can be applied to other cases as well (where they might lead to claims of metaphysical equivalence).     

Languages in space

The activation-orienting hypothesis and possible effects of hemispace for verbal stimuli in the native (Croatian) and foreign (English) language were studied on a sample of 72 healthy female right-handers. In an experimental design involving two competing commands referring to objects in left and right hemispace presented simultaneously to the two ears it was recorded which of the two was attended to first. The activation-orienting hypothesis was confirmed for Croatian but not for English. Clear dissociation between the two languages was found with respect to preferred hemispace: for the stimuli in the native language the subjects preferred the left hemispace, whereas for the stimuli in the foreign language they preferred the right hemispace.     

Limited space or space within limits

This paper has arisen out of the understandings gained following the in-patient treatment of a severely disturbed and self-damaging young woman with a borderline personality disorder. The phenomenon of projective identification is considered in terms of its capacity affectively to control apparently separate and independent professional structures within a hospital setting so that an entire institution may become mobilised into reflecting and acting out one patient's internal world. This phenomenon is illustrated using examples from the patient's own art-work and by clinical vignettes which aim to highlight the destructively regressive processes which occurred. One of the greatest difficulties was found to be the seemingly inevitable loss of boundaries between self and object; between intrapsychic and interpersonal; between staff-member and patient. Consequently some thoughts are offered concerning the need for structures, practical and theoretical, which can be utilised to help recognise and understand the enormously complex and diverse events which such a situation so often engenders.     

Pappus in optical space

Optical space differs from physical space. The structure of optical space has generally been assumed to be metrical. In contradistinction, we do not assume any metric, but only incidence relations (i.e., we assume that optical points and lines exist and that two points define a unique line, and two lines a unique point). (The incidence relations have generally been assumed implicitly by earlier authors.) The condition that makes such anincidence structure into a projective space is the Pappus condition. The Pappus condition describes a projective relation between three collinear triples of points, whose validity can— in principle—be verified empirically. The Pappus condition is a necessary condition for optical space to be a homogeneous space (Lobatchevski hyperbolic or Riemann elliptic space) as assumed by, for example, the well-known Luneburg theory. We test the Pappus condition in a full-cue situation (open field, broad daylight, distances of up to 20 m, visual fields of up to 160° diameter). We found that although optical space is definitely not veridical, even under full-cue conditions, violations of the Pappus condition are the exception. Apparently optical space is not totally different from a homogeneous space, although it is in no way close to Euclidean.     

Correspondence in pictorial space

ATR Human Information Processing Research Laboratories, Kyoto, Japan We have investigated psychophysically determined image correspondences between pairs of photographs of a single three-dimensional (3-D) object in various poses. These correspondences were obtained by presenting the pictures simultaneously, side by side, and letting the subject match a marker in one picture with a marker (under manual control) in the other picture. Between poses, the object was rotated about a fixed vertical axis; thus, the shifts of the veridical correspondences (with respect to the surface of the object) were very nearly horizontal. In fact, the subjects produced appreciable scatter in both horizontal and vertical directions. The scatter in repeated sessions and between data depends on the local (landmarks) and global (interpolation) structure of the pictures. Since the object was fairly smooth (white semigloss finish) and nontextured, the only way to establish the correspondence is by way of the “pictorial relief.” The relief is some largely unknown function of the image structure and the observer. Apparently, more immediate entities (e.g., the shading or the contour) cannot be used as such, since they vary with the pose. We compare these data with results obtained with a surface attitude probe on a single picture. We studied various measures of consistency both within a single method and between methods. We found that subjects were confident in establishing correspondences, but results scattered appreciably in a way that depended on both global and local image structure. Correspondence results for various pose angles were mutually very consistent, but only to a minor extent with results of attitude measurements. The main finding was that subjects could establish correspondence on the basis of their 3-D interpretation (pictorial relief), even if the 2-D graytone distributions are quite different.     

Pseudoneglect in back space

Successful interaction with the environment depends upon our ability to retain and update visuo-spatial information of both front and back egocentric space. Several studies have observed that healthy people tend to show a displacement of the egocentric frame of reference towards the left. However representation of space behind us (back space) has never been systematically investigated in healthy people. In this study, by means of a novel visual imagery task performed within a virtual reality environment, we found that representation of right back space is perceived as smaller than the left. These results suggest that there is a selective compression or distortion for mental representation related to the right space behind us.     

Pappus in optical space

Optical space differs from physical space. The structure of optical space has generally been assumed to be metrical. In contradistinction, we do not assume any metric, but only incidence relations (i.e., we assume that optical points and lines exist and that two points define a unique line, and two lines a unique point). (The incidence relations have generally been assumed implicitly by earlier authors.) The condition that makes such an incidence structure into a projective space is the Pappus condition. The Pappus condition describes a projective relation between three collinear triples of points, whose validity can--in principle--be verified empirically. The Pappus condition is a necessary condition for optical space to be a homogeneous space (Lobatchevski hyperbolic or Riemann elliptic space) as assumed by, for example, the well-known Luneburg theory. We test the Pappus condition in a full-cue situation (open field, broad daylight, distances of up to 20 m, visual fields of up to 160 degrees diameter). We found that although optical space is definitely not veridical, even under full-cue conditions, violations of the Pappus condition are the exception. Apparently optical space is not totally different from a homogeneous space, although it is in no way close to Euclidean.     

Alleys in visual space

Geometry of frameless visual space is dealt with. First, parallel and equidistant alleys, horopters in the horizontal plane of eyes' level are discussed within the framework of the Luneburg's model that the frameless visual space is a Riemannian space of constant curvature. That basic postulate and the specific mapping functions assumed by Luneburg between the euclidean map of visual space and the physical space are kept separate, and efforts are directed to make the model applicable to more natural conditions of our visual space. A possibility is pointed out to remove the constraint “frameless” in the sense that perceptual geometrical properties are primarily determined by the convergence of optic axes. So far, only alleys in the horizontal plane extending from us toward infinity have been studied, but more often we perceive parallel lines, horizontal or vertical, in front of us like shelves of a bookcase. Hence, equations are derived for horopter plane appearing fronto-parallel in the three-dimensional visual space and alleys running horizontally or vertically on the horopter plane. It is shown that parallel and equidistant alleys are not the same in the horopter plane as in the horizontal plane, if the visual space is not euclidean. A method to evaluate the discrepancy between the two alleys without using any mapping functions is stated with some numerical examples.