Is there really an omission effect?

The omission effect, first described by Spranca and colleagues (Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991), has since been extensively studied and repeatedly confirmed (Cushman, Murray, Gordon-McKeon, Wharton, & Greene, 2012). All else being equal, most people judge it to be morally worse to actively bring about a negative event than to passively allow that event to happen. In this paper, we provide new experimental data that challenges previous studies of the omission effect both methodologically and philosophically. We argue that previous studies have failed to control for the equivalence of rules that are violated by actions and omissions. Once equivalent norms are introduced, our results show that the omission effect is eliminated, even if the negative outcome of the behavior is foreseen and intended by the agent. We show that the omission effect does not constitute a basic, moral disposition but occurs exclusively in complex moral situations. Building on these empirical results, we cast doubt onto two influential explanations of the omission effect, the Causal Relevance Hypothesis and the Overgeneralization Hypothesis, and provide a novel explanation of the phenomenon. Furthermore, we discuss various ramifications of the interplay between our understanding of omissions and legal systems.     

Visual extinction and awareness: The importance of binding dorsal and ventral pathways

Patients with visual extinction were tested on three tasks involving stimulus identification and localization. In the first experiment, in which patients were to identify and localize stimuli, they demonstrated high levels of contralesional omissions. This primarily occurred under conditions of double simultaneous stimulation (DSS), consistent with the character of extinction. In contrast, when patients had to simply localize or count stimuli in Experiment 2, their contralesional omissions were very low. Similarly, when patients were to identify stimuli without localizing them (Experiment 3) they again showed very low contralesional error rates. These results support the view (Baylis, Driver, & Rafal, 1993) that visual extinction may be greatest when information about location cannot be bound to information about identity.     

Moore and Schaffer on the Ontology of Omissions

In this paper, I discuss Michael Moore’s and Jonathan Schaffer’s views on the ontology of omissions in context of their stances on the problem of omissive causation. First, I consider, from a general point of view, the question of the ontology of omissions, and how it relates to the problem of omissive causation. Then I describe Moore’s and Schaffer’s particular views on omissions and how they combine with their stances on the problem of omissive causation. I charge Moore and Schaffer with inconsistencies and insufficiencies within their overall theories, and consider their replies. Finally, I propose my own view on the ontology of omissions and solution to the problem of omissive causation.     

Dissociating veridicality,consistency, and confidence in autobiographical and event memories for the Columbia shuttle disaster

A total of 449 students were tested for their event memories and autobiographical memories of hearing about the Columbia shuttle disaster of 1st February 2003. Four different groups were tested 2, 18, 27, or 51 days after the event. All participants were then re-tested after 5 months (second session) and again after 1 year (third session) from the first interview. Dissociations between consistency and confidence and between event and autobiographical memories were found. Consistency and confidence in event memories, but not in autobiographical memories, were affected by time. In contrast, repeated testing selectively enhanced autobiographical memories, in accordance with the narrative and rehearsal hypothesis of Neisser and Harsh (1992). For event memories, veridicality was inversely correlated to consistency, which in turn was inversely correlated to confidence, and mainly based on omissions. As regards veridicality, the analyses showed an increase of false memories at long time delays. Results are discussed with reference to recent studies contrasting autobiographical and event memories.     

Measures of observer agreement when binomial data are collected in free operant situations

This paper examines a model and defines reasonable assumptions underlying different measures of observer agreement for categorical data collected in free operant situations. It is assumed that two or more observers classify operant behaviors of subjects into occurrences and nonoccurrences by recognition by validated response classes (categories) such that the rates of false positives and observer biases are acceptably low. Thus errors are mostly omissions, i.e., failing to observe events that occur. Four alternative cases are derived, together with formulas for calculating significance tests, variances, and standard errors, three of which do not depend on knowledge of the proportion of time points at which the event does not occur.We wish to acknowledge NICHD Grant HD-10570, The Neuropharmacology of Developmental Disorders, George Breese, Ph.D., and C. T. Gualtieri, M.D., Principal Investigators; NIEHS Grant ES-01104; USPHS Grant HD-03110; and MCH Project 916 to the Division for Disorders of Development and Learning.     

Concreteness and word production

Two experiments are reported that investigated the effect of concreteness on the ability to generate words to fit sentence contexts. When participants attempted to retrieve words from dictionary definitions in Experiment 1, abstract words were associated with more omissions and more alternates than were concrete words. These findings are consistent with the view that the semantic–lexical weights in the word production system are weaker for abstract than for concrete words. We found no evidence that greater competition from semantic neighbors was an additional reason why abstract words were harder to produce. Participants also reported more positive tip-of-the-tongue states (TOTs) when attempting to produce abstract words from their definitions, consistent with more phonological retrieval problems for abstract than for concrete words. In Experiment 2, participants attempted to generate words to fit into a sentence that described a specific event. The difference between the numbers of abstract and concrete words recalled was significantly smaller in the event condition than in the definition condition, and evidence no longer emerged of greater phonological retrieval failure for abstract words. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that the semantic–lexical weights, but not the lexical–phonological weights, are weaker for abstract than for concrete words in the word production system.     

Activating event knowledge

An increasing number of results in sentence and discourse processing demonstrate that comprehension relies on rich pragmatic knowledge about real-world events, and that incoming words incrementally activate such knowledge. If so, then even outside of any larger context, nouns should activate knowledge of the generalized events that they denote or typically play a role in. We used short stimulus onset asynchrony priming to demonstrate that (1) event nouns prime people (sale-shopper) and objects (trip-luggage) commonly found at those events; (2) location nouns prime people/animals (hospital-doctor) and objects (barn-hay) commonly found at those locations; and (3) instrument nouns prime things on which those instruments are commonly used (key-door), but not the types of people who tend to use them (hose-gardener). The priming effects are not due to normative word association. On our account, facilitation results from event knowledge relating primes and targets. This has much in common with computational models like LSA or BEAGLE in which one word primes another if they frequently occur in similar contexts. LSA predicts priming for all six experiments, whereas BEAGLE correctly predicted that priming should not occur for the instrument-people relation but should occur for the other five. We conclude that event-based relations are encoded in semantic memory and computed as part of word meaning, and have a strong influence on language comprehension.     

The four faces of omission

In this paper, the ontological, terminological, epistemological, and ethical aspects of omission are considered in a coherent and balanced framework, based on the idea that there are omissions which are actions and omissions which are non-actions. In particular, we suggest that the approach to causation which best deals with omission is Mackie's INUS conditional proposal. We argue that omissions are determined partly by the ontological conditional structure of reality, and partly by the interests, beliefs, and values of observers. The final upshot is that moral judgments involved in cases of omissions cannot be grounded on, but are the ground for judgments about what INUS conditions count as omissions.     

Phenomenal characteristics of co‐created guided imagery and autobiographical memories

Concern has recently been raised about the potential for guided images to be mistaken for memories of actual events. According to the reality‐monitoring framework, such misattributions can occur due to the similarity of sensory and reflective memory characteristics acquired at encoding, or due to source judgement processes at retrieval. A study was conducted to examine the similarity of guided images and perceived memories at imagery encoding, and after a short delay. Participants rated the characteristics of an actual event, a natural imagery event (e.g. a fantasy), and a guided imagery experience, immediately and after a one‐week interval. For each condition, participants discussed their memory or guided imagery experience with the researcher as they reviewed or created it. Ratings indicated that guided imagery was similar to perceived memory with respect to sensory characteristics. However, the factors associated with supporting memories (contextual and temporal detail, setting familiarity, and recollection of surrounding events) were less vivid for guided imagery than for perceived events. In all cases, these patterns were stable over time. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moral Responsibility,Voluntary Control,and Intentional Action

Many theorists writing about moral responsibility accept that voluntary control is necessary for responsibility. Call such theorists volitionists. Recently, volitionism has been called into question by theorists I call nonvolitionists. Yet neither volitionists nor nonvolitionists have carefully articulated a clear volitionist thesis, nor have they sufficiently explained the concept of voluntary control that somehow seems connected to volitionism. I argue that attempts to explain the volitionist thesis, voluntary control, and their relation are more problematic than have previously been recognized. Instead, I recommend understanding volitionism in terms of intentional actions and omissions. This understanding has several benefits. It clarifies the debate and its parameters, it avoids the problematic notion of voluntary control while relying on the clearer notion of intentional action, and it highlights that the debate between volitionists and nonvolitionists essentially concerns the nature and scope of obligations. As a result, understanding volitionism in terms of intentional actions and omissions can help breathe new life into the volitionist debate.     

Dissociating veridicality, consistency, and confidence in autobiographical and event memories for the Columbia shuttle disaster

A total of 449 students were tested for their event memories and autobiographical memories of hearing about the Columbia shuttle disaster of 1st February 2003. Four different groups were tested 2, 18, 27, or 51 days after the event. All participants were then re-tested after 5 months (second session) and again after 1 year (third session) from the first interview. Dissociations between consistency and confidence and between event and autobiographical memories were found. Consistency and confidence in event memories, but not in autobiographical memories, were affected by time. In contrast, repeated testing selectively enhanced autobiographical memories, in accordance with the narrative and rehearsal hypothesis of Neisser and Harsh (1992). For event memories, veridicality was inversely correlated to consistency, which in turn was inversely correlated to confidence, and mainly based on omissions. As regards veridicality, the analyses showed an increase of false memories at long time delays. Results are discussed with reference to recent studies contrasting autobiographical and event memories.     

Higher-order omissions and the stacked view of agency

Omissions are puzzling, and theyraise myriad questions for many areas of philosophy. In contrast, omissions ofomissions are not usually taken to be very puzzling since they are oftenthought to just be a fancy way of describing ordinary “positive” events, statesof affairs, or actions. This paper contends that – as far as agency isconcerned – at least some omissions of omissions are omissions, not actions. First,this paper highlights how our actions are accompanied by many first-orderomissions - i.e., omissions to act – and that there already are many strongreasons to think that at least some of these first-order omissions are agentiallydistinct from simultaneous actions and from other first-order omissions. Itthen argues that our actions and first-order omissions are also accompanied byhigher-order omissions – i.e., omissions to omit to act – and that higher-orderomissions are distinct from actions and first-order omissions for similarreasons. Higher-order omissions also illuminate a more holistic picture of agency,which involves recognizing that our exercises of agency at a moment in timeinclude all of our overlapping behaviors – our actions, first-order omissions,and higher-order omissions. This paper concludes by exploring the impacts ofhigher-order omissions.     

Causation as Simultaneous and Continuous

We propose that all actual causes are simultaneous with their direct effects, as illustrated by both everyday examples and the laws of physics. We contrast this view with the sequential conception of causation, according to which causes must occur prior to their effects. The key difference between the two views of causation lies in differing assumptions about the mathematical structure of time.     

The role of prior knowledge in explaining hypothetical events

Having subjects explain a hypothetical future event biases their subjective likelihood estimates for that event. However, Sherman, Zehner, Johnson, and Hirt (1983, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 1127–1143) found that the biasing effects of an explanation task were reduced when subjects formed an initial impression based on the information (prior to the explanation task). Nonetheless, there are no doubt many factors that may influence subjects' ability to form strong initial impressions. The present studies address two of these factors. Experiment 1 used both subjects who were knowledgeable and unknowledgeable (naive) about a stimulus domain (football). Experiment 2 used only knowledgeable subjects, but gave these subjects information about unfamiliar teams and players. Subjects first read information about teams in an upcoming game and were then asked to explain a hypothetical victory by one team. They then made judgments about the actual future game and recalled the information. Only knowledgeable subjects given an initial impression set and given information that was easily integrated with past knowledge were able to resist the explanation bias. All other subjects demonstrated judgments that were strongly biased in the direction of the outcome explained. An examination of the relation between judgment and recall implied that knowledgeable and naive individuals differed in the ways they made judgments.     

Processing resources in timing and sequencing tasks

Subjects performed timing and sequencing tasks under separate (single-task) and concurrent (dual-task) conditions in two experiments. The timing task required the subjects to generate a series of 5-sec temporal productions. The sequencing task in Experiment 1 involved verifying reasoning statements that described the ordering of a pair of letters. The task in Experiment 2 involved monitoring a familiar event sequence and detecting omissions in that sequence. Comparisons of single-task and dual-task conditions showed a pattern of bidirectional interference. In each experiment, the concurrent sequencing task caused temporal productions to become more variable and longer. The concurrent timing task interfered with sequencing by lengthening response times to the reasoning statements (Experiment 1) and by lengthening response times to sequence omissions and reducing sensitivity at detecting the omissions (Experiment 2). The results suggest that time perception and sequence perception are related cognitive processes that rely on a common set of attentional resources.     

The meaning of before and after for preschool children

Preschool children's understanding of temporal relationships was examined in terms of their comprehension of sentences containing clauses linked by before and after. The relative importance of order of mention and main-subordinate relations strategies in children's interpretation of temporal order information was also evaluated.Divergent error patterns emerged on the tasks; omissions prevailed on the two tasks involving response to commands, reversals prevailed on the other. Further examination revealed that omissions reflected ambiguity in the linguistic structure of commands. Thus the effect of main-subordinate relations was confounded with directness of command. On all comprehension tasks, however, performance was superior on sentence forms in which order of mention and order of occurrence correspond.     

Judgments about collision in younger and older drivers

To travel safely, drivers must detect imminent collisions. Older drivers have more accidents per miles driven than younger drivers, potentially reflecting age differences in judgments about collision. Prior studies measured age differences in judgments about when a collision would occur (time to contact). Older adults made greater underestimations, but this would lower their risk for accidents. Judgments about when a collision would occur must be preceded by judgments about whether a collision would occur (Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (2001) Minneapolis). Results of the present study indicated that judgments about potential collision were less accurate for older drivers compared with younger drivers. This would increase their risk for accidents. Age differences in driver performance may be associated more with age differences in judgments about whether a collision would occur than with age differences in judgments about when a collision would occur. Age differences in judgments about potential collision suggest a new avenue to pursue in an account of differential accident rates in older and younger drivers.     

The cognitive representation of intending not to act: Evidence for specific non-action-effect binding

The question how we represent voluntary action on a cognitive level has recently become of increasing interest to researchers studying motor control. However, so far it has been neglected how we represent the voluntary omission of an action. In our attempt to investigate the representation of voluntary non-actions we demonstrated binding effects between voluntary non-actions and subsequent action effects (Kühn, Elsner, Prinz, & Brass, 2009). That study, however, only distinguished between acting or not acting, and did not address the question of whether non-actions are coded as general omissions or whether they can be encoded specifically as the actual negation of the action in question (“not-right” or “not-left”). Our current study provides first evidence for the specificity of representations of intentional non-actions. Additionally, we compare two ways in which the specific non-actions might be represented: an ironic representation account implying that negations are prone to be omitted and a reformulated representation account assuming that the negated action is suppressed and/or the alternative action is facilitated. Our results suggest that the representation of non-actions contains a facilitation of the alternative action rather than a suppression of the action in question.     

On Merely Modal Epistemic Peers: Challenging the Equal-Weight View

There is a controversy, within social epistemology, over how to handle disagreement among epistemic peers. Call this the problem of peer disagreement. There is a solution, i.e. the equal-weight view, which says that disagreement among epistemic peers is a reason for each peer to lower the credence they place in their respective positions. However, this solution is susceptible to a serious challenge. Call it the merely modal peers challenge. Throughout parts of modal space, which resemble the actual world almost completely, there are hordes of epistemic peers, who disagree with almost any arbitrarily chosen belief had by residents of the actual world. Further, the mere modality of these peers is not itself an epistemic difference-maker. Thus, on the equal-weight view, we should significantly lower the credence we place in most of our beliefs. Surely, this is seriously mistaken. Thus, there are serious considerations that cut against the equal-weight view.     

Contrasting patterns in the acquisition of spatial/temporal terms

Competing hypotheses about the acquisition of terms that refer to relationships in both time and space are tested. One hypothesis is that the language of time is acquired as a spatial metaphor; consequently, such terms will be acquired in their spatial sense first. The competing hypothesis is that differential experience with the dual senses of each term will result in different patterns of acquisition, depending upon which sense is dominant in actual usage. Comprehension of before-after, first-last, and ahead-behind by 4- to 6-year-olds was assessed in spatial, temporal, and spatial-temporal meaning tasks. Results support the second view: there is no consistent order of acquisition; the sense acquired first is the dominant sense, as determined by both linguistic evidence and empirical survey.