Same old, same old: the same-order representation theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor

The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them–the theory ‘divides the phenomenal labor’ in an illicit fashion. This ‘failure of intimacy’ is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy. A version of this paper was presented at the ‘Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness’ conference, Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona, March 18th–20th, 2005.     

A theory of consciousness

Consciousness is the subjective awareness of momentary experience interpreted in the context of personal memory and present state. I propose that two brain systems converge to create consciousness. The exogenous system sends information about multimodal external stimuli to basal dendrites in widely dispersed pyramidal cell ensembles in the cortex of the brain; this system produces synchronized fragments of sensations. The endogenous system distributes readout of representations of memories, activated in systems established by associative learning, diffusely to apical dendrites. Convergence of exogenous and endogenous inputs enhances cellular excitability, and fragmented sensations are thereby converted to fragments of perception. Local field potentials periodically modulate all cortical membrane potentials and facilitate synchronous discharge of these excited elements. Feedback between the cortex and the thalamus results in a cortico-thalamo-cortical reverberation, binding the fragments into a unified global percept. Sustained reverberation produces a resonating electromagnetic field of synchronized elements. The momentary content of information in the brain is this distributed coherence, which is negative entropy. Consciousness is a physical property of this field, producing the subjective awareness of this information.     

On the general theory of meaningful representation

The numerical representations of measurement, geometry and kinematics are here subsumed under a general theory of representation. The standard theories of meaningfulness of representational propositions in these three areas are shown to be special cases of two theories of meaningfulness for arbitrary representational propositions: the theories based on unstructured and on structured representation respectively. The foundations of the standard theories of meaningfulness are critically analyzed and two basic assumptions are isolated which do not seem to have received adequate justification: the assumption that a proposition invariant under the appropriate group is therefore meaningful, and the assumption that representations should be unique up to a transformation of the appropriate group. A general theory of representational meaningfulness is offered, based on a semantic and syntactic analysis of representational propositions. Two neglected features of representational propositions are formalized and made use of: (a) that such propositions are induced by more general propositions defined for other structures than the one being represented, and (b) that the true purpose of representation is the application of the theory of the representing system to the represented system. On the basis of these developments, justifications are offered for the two problematic assumptions made by the existing theories.Material from this paper was presented at a conference on meaningfulness in the theory of measurement held at New York University in December 1984, hosted by J. C. Falmagne. I would like to thank Patrick Suppes for arranging my invitation to this conference, and David Krantz, R. Duncan Luce, and Fred Roberts for helpful comments. I would also like to thank an anonymous referee for extremely detailed and helpful comments and suggestions, the most important of which are acknowledged in footnotes.     

Belief in discourse representation theory

Conclusion I hope I have convinced the reader that DR theory offers at least some exciting potential when applied to the semantics of belief reports. It differs considerably from other approaches, and it makes intuitively acceptable predictions that other theories do not. The theory also provides a novel approach to the semantics of other propsitional attitude reports. Further, DR theory enables one to approach the topic of anaphora within belief and other propositional attitude contexts in a novel way, thus combining the semantics developed here with one of the theory's original motivations (Kamp, 1981a). However, these are unfortunately topics that I must reserve for another time.I am grateful to Dan Bonevac, Irene Heim, Richard Larson, Stan Peters, Rich Thomason and especially Hans Kamp and an anonymous reviewer for the Journal of Philosophical Logic for comments on previous drafts of this paper, as well as to The Center for Cognitive Science for research support.     

Towards a general theory of representation

Summary The models of science are representations of a part of reality. Every science has its own specific rules of constructing models, but there are many common rules that must be followed. These rules are to be part of what may be called a general theory of representation. This paper discusses some general aspects of representation that must be considered before such a general theory can be created. There are five sections: (1) an introduction to the topic of representation in general; (2) an overview of some general types of representation, such as goal-directed and self-organizational representations; (3) a short discussion of representation in some specific disciplines; (4) some formal aspects of representations; and (5) a discussion of epistemological aspects of representation, especially scientific reduction and mental causation.This paper was written during participation in the Research Project Mind and Brain, at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld, BRD.     

A causal-model theory of conceptual representation and categorization

This article presents a theory of categorization that accounts for the effects of causal knowledge that relates the features of categories. According to causal-model theory, people explicitly represent the probabilistic causal mechanisms that link category features and classify objects by evaluating whether they were likely to have been generated by those mechanisms. In 3 experiments, participants were taught causal knowledge that related the features of a novel category. Causal-model theory provided a good quantitative account of the effect of this knowledge on the importance of both individual features and interfeature correlations to classification. By enabling precise model fits and interpretable parameter estimates, causal-model theory helps place the theory-based approach to conceptual representation on equal footing with the well-known similarity-based approaches.     

Formalization of Damasio's theory of emotion, feeling and core consciousness

This paper contributes an analysis and formalization of Damasio's theory on core consciousness. Three important concepts in this theory are 'emotion', 'feeling' and 'feeling a feeling' (or core consciousness). In particular, a simulation model is described of the dynamics of basic mechanisms leading via emotion and feeling to core consciousness, and dynamic properties are formally specified that hold for these dynamics at a more global level. These properties have been automatically checked for the simulation model. Moreover, a formal analysis is made of relevant notions of representation used by Damasio. As part of this analysis, specifications of representation relations have been verified and confirmed against the simulation model.     

创伤后应激障碍的双重表征理论及其检验

创伤后应激障碍的双重表征理论(dual representation theory of PTSD,DRT)基于多重记忆系统的观点,强调特定加工通路(即视觉加工腹侧通路和背侧通路)在侵入性表象形成和提取中的作用。DRT认为,两类不同性质的竞争性认知任务(即言语任务和视觉空间任务)分别占用特定加工通路的认知资源从而影响创伤信息加工和创伤记忆再巩固;工作记忆模型(working memory model,WMM)则强调竞争性认知任务对整体认知资源的占用。目前,DRT和WMM均得到了一些研究的支持。未来的研究应考虑个体的工作记忆能力;开展更多干预研究,并尝试改进研究方法,以及设计与文化相符、更加生活化的竞争性认知任务。此外,在加强模拟干预研究的同时也要增加临床应用研究,适当开展真实创伤情境的干预研究,还要加强相关信息加工能力训练的研究。     

The global workspace (GW) theory of consciousness and epilepsy

The global workspace (GW) theory proposes that conscious processing results from coherent neuronal activity between widely distributed brain regions, with fronto-parietal associative cortices as key elements. In this model, transition between conscious and non conscious states are predicted to be caused by abrupt non-linear massive changes of the level of coherence within this distributed neural space. Epileptic seizures offer a unique model to explore the validity of this central hypothesis. Seizures are often characterized by the occurrence of brutal alterations of consciousness (AOC) which are largely negatively impacting patients' lives. Recently, we have shown that these sudden AOC are contemporary to non-linear increases of neural synchrony within distant cortico-cortical and cortico-thalamic networks. We interpreted these results in the light of GW theory, and suggested that excessive synchrony could prevent this distributed network to reach the minimal level of differentiation and complexity necessary to the coding of conscious representations. These observations both confirm some predictions of the GW model, and further specify the physiological window of neural coherence (minimum and maximum) associated with conscious processing.     

Towards a theory of the integration of the Other in representation

In this article, the author tries to uncover the elements of a theoretical model which would take into account the psychic transformations necessary to facilitate the emergence of representation. Toward this end, he firstly relies on Jung's notion of the archetype and Freud's idea of hallucinatory wish fulfilment, which he reconsiders in the light of the writings of Fordham (de-integration and re-integration of the primary self), and of Jean Laplanche (primary seduction), and linking it to the model based on chaos theory as developed in physics. He thus concludes that under the influence of primary seduction, the archetype is able to become a veritable, strange psychic attractor, enabling the determining factor of the instinctual axis of the archetype to open up to the possibility of symbolization, a necessary underlying feature for the occurrence of subjectivity. He ends his argument with a brief clinical vignette which illustrates the effect of openness to the psychic unknown constituted by primary seduction in the transference.