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1.
Restating an interlocutor’s position in an incredulous tone of voice can sometimes serve legitimate dialectical ends. However,
there are cases in which incredulous restatement is out of bounds. This article provides an analysis of one common instance
of the inappropriate use of incredulous restatement, which the authors call “modus tonens.” The authors argue that modus tonens
is vicious because it pragmatically implicates the view that one’s interlocutor is one’s cognitive subordinate and provides
a cue to like-minded onlookers that dialectical opponents are not to be treated as epistemic peers.
相似文献
Robert B. TalisseEmail: |
2.
Jenny Slatman 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(3):321-342
This article provides a phenomenological analysis of the difference between self-recognition and recognition of another, while
referring to some contemporary neuroscientific studies on the rubber hand illusion. It examines the difference between these
two forms of recognition on the basis of Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s work. It argues that both phenomenologies, despite
their different views on inter-subjectivity, allow for the specificity of recognition of another. In explaining self-recognition,
however, Husserl’s account seems less convincing. Research concerning the rubber hand illusion has confirmed that self-recognition
involves more than an immediate experience of oneself. Merleau-Ponty’s later work, describing self-recognition as the result
of assimilative identification, will be used to explain the possibility of illusion between one’s “hereness” and “thereness”.
The possibility of this illusion is inherent to self-recognition, while it is lacking in recognition of another.
相似文献
Jenny SlatmanEmail: |
3.
David Braun 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):243-262
I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.”
King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.
相似文献
David BraunEmail: |
4.
Thor Grunbaum 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(2):243-261
This article is about how to describe an agent’s awareness of her bodily movements when she is aware of executing an action
for a reason. Against current orthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent’s experience of moving has an epistemic
place in the agent’s awareness of her own intentional action. In “The problem,” I describe why this should be thought to be
problematic. In “Motives for denying epistemic role,” I state some of the main motives for denying that bodily awareness has
any epistemic role to play in the content of the agent’s awareness of her own action. In “Kinaesthetic awareness and control,”
I sketch how I think the experience of moving and the bodily sense of agency or control are best described. On this background,
I move on to present, in “Arguments for epistemic role,” three arguments in favour of the claim that normally the experience
of moving is epistemically important to one’s awareness of acting intentionally. In the final “Concluding remarks,” I round
off by raising some of the worries that motivated the denial of my claim in the first place.
相似文献
Thor GrunbaumEmail: |
5.
Olli Pyyhtinen 《Human Studies》2008,31(3):279-298
The essay discusses the philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel’s theorizing about the individual. Whereas it is typically
within the context of the modern metropolis and the mature money economy that Simmel’s ideas have been discussed in the secondary
literature, I render those ideas in another light by addressing the ontological and existential issues crucial to his conception
of the individual. In Simmel, the individual is divided between the “what” and the “who,” between the qualities which make
one something individual and one’s non-repeatable and finite existence which makes one someone singular. I argue that whereas the first dimension can be understood sociologically, in terms of social relations, the latter
is not accessible to sociology as such, but must be treated philosophically. Therefore, if we wish to address this duality
that lies at the heart of individuality, a “philosophical turn” for sociology is called for.
相似文献
Olli PyyhtinenEmail: |
6.
Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stephen Maitzen 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):567-574
In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired
debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued
that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different
answers.
相似文献
Stephen MaitzenEmail: |
7.
Wolfgang Fasching 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(2):131-148
In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic
and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization.
Finally I suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”,
but should be conceived of as a dimension, namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences.
相似文献
Wolfgang FaschingEmail: |
8.
Daniel E. Flage 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):379-380
This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”
相似文献
Daniel E. FlageEmail: |
9.
Gary Foster 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(2):153-168
Harry Frankfurt characterizes love as “a disinterested concern for the existence of what is loved, and for what is good for
it.” As such, he views romantic love as an inauthentic paradigm for love since such love desires reciprocation, sexual gratification
and so on. I argue that Frankfurt’s conception of love is (a) too general—he does not distinguish between the type of love
one has for one’s partner, one’s country, a moral ideal, etc., (b) it overemphasizes the role of bestowal at the expense of
the part played by appraisal and (c) it is insufficiently social. Certain forms of love, romantic love and friendship for
instance, are defined largely in terms of reciprocation. For Frankfurt, reciprocation is somewhat of an accidental feature
of love. This deficiency in Frankfurt’s conception of love can be traced to a problem in his conception of selfhood which
I argue is insufficiently social in nature.
相似文献
Gary FosterEmail: |
10.
Imtiaz Moosa 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):159-182
In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical
claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing
how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent
conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not.
My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible.
相似文献
Imtiaz MoosaEmail: |
11.
Daniel D. Novotny 《Axiomathes》2007,17(1):41-51
According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are
compatible and true—“the world is one”. The aim of this paper is to show that Searle fails to make the compatibility between
mentalism and physicalism intelligible. The paper has three parts: first, I criticize drawing an analogy between solidity
and consciousness as macro-features of systems with micro-features. Second, I argue that Searle’s defence of the ontological
irreducibility of consciousness is terminologically confused and that his argument for the trivial nature of that irreducibility
is unsuccessful. Third, I defend Nagel’s argument for the causal irreducibility of conscious minds by answering some of Searle’s
objections to it.
相似文献
Daniel D. NovotnyEmail: |
12.
Gregory Landini 《Axiomathes》2009,19(2):115-142
This is a critical discussion of Nino B. Cocchiarella’s book “Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism.” It focuses on paradoxes
of hyperintensionality that may arise in formal systems of intensional logic.
相似文献
Gregory LandiniEmail: |
13.
Igor Douven 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(3):361-375
It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining
in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival
rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis
of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. As an interesting aside,
it will be seen that these sentences also harbor a lesson for Bayesian epistemology itself.
相似文献
Igor DouvenEmail: |
14.
Understanding the Subjective Point of View: Methodological Implications of the Schutz-Parsons Debate
The bone of contention that divides Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons in their 1940–1941 debate is that Schutz acknowledges
an ontological break between the commonsense and scientific worlds whereas Parsons only considers it “a matter of refinement.”
Schutz’s ontological distancing that disconnects the “world of consociates” where social reality is directly experienced in
face-to-face contacts, and the “world of contemporaries” where the Other is experienced in terms of “types” has been crucial
to social scientists. Implicated in the break is that all intellectual attempts to understand experiences of Others must be
based on the “models” constructed in the “world of contemporaries” (or “predecessors”); hence, epistemologically, to grasp
the subjective point of view with a here-and-now understanding is an outright impossibility. Based on a Schutzian perspective,
the author suggests that the sociologist must objectivize the Thou-orientations involved in his/her analysis in order that
s/he can possibility grasp the subjective point of view in objective terms.
相似文献
Wing-Chung HoEmail: |
15.
In this article we defend the inferential view of scientific models and idealisation. Models are seen as “inferential prostheses”
(instruments for surrogative reasoning) construed by means of an idealisation-concretisation process, which we essentially
understand as a kind of counterfactual deformation procedure (also analysed in inferential terms). The value of scientific
representation is understood in terms not only of the success of the inferential outcomes arrived at with its help, but also
of the heuristic power of representation and their capacity to correct and improve our models. This provides us with an argument
against Sugden’s account of credible models: the likelihood or realisticness (their “credibility”) is not always a good measure
of their acceptability. As opposed to “credibility” we propose the notion of “enlightening”, which is the capacity of giving
us understanding in the sense of an inferential ability.
相似文献
Xavier de Donato RodríguezEmail: |
Jesús Zamora Bonilla (Corresponding author)Email: |
16.
17.
Chris R. Schlauch 《Pastoral Psychology》2006,55(1):61-80
This essay considers how we “create meaning” in the interplay of “felt sense” and “symbols,” and examines the direct and immediate interplay between some common everyday experiences and a series of concepts from psychoanalytic perspectives to reveal how this interplay has affinities with religion. Psychoanalysis and religion are overlapping projects. Psychoanalytic symbolizing of experience facilitates our knowing features of religion not previously known, as well as knowing features previously known, in new ways.
相似文献
Chris R. SchlauchEmail: |
18.
J. Angelo Corlett 《Journal of Academic Ethics》2008,6(3):205-209
This paper amounts to a reply to Professor Donald G. Brown’s thoughtful comment on my “Ethical Issues in Journal Peer-Review”,
which appeared in this journal.
相似文献
J. Angelo CorlettEmail: |
19.
Mark E. Jonas 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2009,28(2):153-169
In this paper, I argue that Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of self-overcoming has been largely misinterpreted in the philosophy
of education journals. The misinterpretation partially stems from a misconstruction of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, and leads
to a conception of self-overcoming that is inconsistent with Nietzsche’s educational ideals. To show this, I examine some
of the prominent features of the so-called “debate” of the 1980s surrounding Nietzsche’s conception of self-overcoming. I
then offer an alternative conception that is more consistent with Nietzsche’s thought, and provides a more nuanced understanding
of Nietzsche’s “anti-democratic” pedagogy. Ultimately, I argue that while Nietzsche’s educational philosophy is not egalitarian,
it can be effectively utilized in “democratic” classrooms, assuming his concept of self-overcoming is properly construed.
相似文献
Mark E. JonasEmail: |
20.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
相似文献
Phillip MontagueEmail: |