Effects of self-complexity on mood-incongruent recall

Some people cope with negative moods by retrieving positive memories, which is mood-incongruent recall. Though mood-incongruent recall is helpful for mood-regulation, the factors that influence people's ability to utilize mood-incongruent recall are not well understood. This study investigated whether complex knowledge structure is a factor for the ability of mood-incongruent recall, based on self-complexity. In the experiment, 50 participants were requested to recall positive memories in both neutral and negative moods. The results of this study indicated that self-complexity was an important factor associated with participants' ability to recall positive memories while they were in negative moods. Participants who rated high in self-complexity were those whose knowledge is structured in a complex way, recalled more highly positive memories in negative moods than in neutral moods. On the other hand, participants who were rated low in self-complexity with simple knowledge structures recalled memories with a lower extent of positivity in negative moods than those in neutral moods.     

Current negative mood encourages changes in end-of-life treatment decisions and is associated with false memories

To investigate the effects of mood on people's end-of-life treatment decisions and their false memories of those decisions, participants took part in two sessions. At Time 1, participants were experimentally induced into positive or negative moods. They decided whether they would want to receive or refuse treatments in a range of hypothetical medical scenarios, such as tube feeding while in a coma. Four weeks later, at Time 2, participants were induced into the same or the opposite mood and made these decisions a second time. They also recalled their previous decisions. Participants in negative moods at Time 2 changed more of their current decisions and falsely remembered more of their previous decisions than participants in positive moods. These findings suggest that people's current moods influence whether they change their treatment decisions; current decisions in turn bias recall of past decisions.     

The identity function of autobiographical memory: time is on our side

Autobiographical memory plays an important role in the construction of personal identity. We review evidence of the bi-directional link between memory and identity. Individuals' current self-views, beliefs, and goals influence their recollections and appraisals of former selves. In turn, people's current self-views are influenced by what they remember about their personal past, as well as how they recall earlier selves and episodes. People's reconstructed evaluations of memories, their perceived distance from past experiences, and the point of view of their recollections have implications for how the past affects the present. We focus on how people's constructions of themselves through time serve the function of creating a coherent--and largely favourable--view of their present selves and circumstances.     

Motivated prediction of future feelings: effects of negative mood and mood orientation on affective forecasts

This article examines the role of motivational factors in affective forecasting. The primary hypothesis was that people predict positive emotional reactions to future events when they are motivated to enhance their current feelings. Three experiments manipulated participants' moods (negative vs. neutral) and orientation toward their moods (reflective vs. ruminative) and then assessed the positivity of their affective predictions for future events. As hypothesized, when participants adopted a reflective orientation, and thus should have been motivated to engage in mood-regulation processes, they predicted more positive feelings in the negative than in the neutral mood condition. This pattern of mood-incongruent affective prediction was not exhibited when participants adopted a ruminative orientation. Additionally, within the negative mood condition, generating affective forecasts had a more positive emotional impact on reflectors than on ruminators. The findings suggest that affective predictions are sometimes driven by mood-regulatory motives.     

Memory accessibility, mood regulation, and dysphoria: difficulties in repairing sad mood with happy memories?

Recent studies have suggested that mood-incongruency effects are due to mood-regulatory processes, in which people retrieve positive memories to repair negative moods. In Study 1, the authors investigated whether dysphoria influences the accessibility of autobiographical memories following a positive or a negative mood induction combined with subsequent rumination or distraction. The results showed a mood-repair effect for nondysphoric but not for dysphoric participants following rumination. In Study 2, participants were asked to either distract themselves or to recall positive autobiographical memories after a negative mood induction. Whereas nondysphoric participants' mood improved under both conditions, dysphoric participants' mood improved only after distraction. These results suggest that dysphoria is associated with a reduced ability to use mood-incongruent recall to repair sad moods.     

Mood Regulation and Memory: Repairing Sad Moods with Happy Memories

A total of 106 undergraduates participated in a study examining how individuals retrieve memories to repair negative moods. Participants first completed a measure of depression. Two weeks later, participants were assigned to either a sad or neutral mood induction. After mood induction, they recalled two memories, rated their affective responses to the memories, and indicated why they chose the valence and order of the memories. Consistent with mood-congruent recall, participants in the sad condition reported sadder memories than those in the neutral condition. However, participants with prior low depression scores tended to recall more positive second memories, whereas participants with higher prior depression scores recalled consecutive negative memories. Sixty-eight per cent of sad participants who retrieved a negative first and positive second memory mentioned mood repair as motivating the recruitment of the more positive second memory.     

Mood and recall of autobiographical memory: the effect of focus of self-knowledge

Mood state facilitates recall of affectively congruent memories (i.e., mood-congruent recall). Mood state may also promote motivation to alleviate a negative affective state, leading to retrieval of affectively incongruent memories (i.e., mood incongruent recall). The present study demonstrates that the focus of self-knowledge influences the occurrence of both mood-congruent recall and mood-incongruent recall. Three experiments found that mood-congruent recall occurred when participants recalled their experiences from a self-aspect that was related to the elicitor of moods, whereas mood-incongruent recall occurred when they recalled their experiences from a self-aspect that was unrelated to the elicitor of moods. These results suggest that the nature of the self-aspect from which persons recall their experiences determines whether mood-congruent or mood-incongruent recall occurs.     

Mood regulation in depression: Differential effects of distraction and recall of happy memories on sad mood

Recent research suggests that the recall of positive memories plays an important role in mood regulation. In this study, the authors examined the ability of currently depressed, formerly depressed, and never-depressed participants to regulate sad mood through the recall of positive memories or through distraction. Although improvement in mood was found for all participants in response to distraction, under instructions to recall positive memories, never-depressed participants' moods improved, whereas formerly depressed participants' sad moods remained unchanged. It is important to note that depressed participants exhibited a worsening of their sad moods after recalling positive memories. These results suggest both that depression is associated with an impaired ability to use positive recall to regulate a sad mood and that this impairment continues to be evident following recovery.     

The impact of negative moods on self-enhancing cognitions: the role of reflective versus ruminative mood orientations

This research program examined how self-focused attention to feelings affects the relation between mood negativity and self-enhancing thought. The primary hypothesis was that the particular manner in which people focus on their moods (reflective vs. ruminative) determines whether they reveal positive (i.e., mood-incongruent) or negative (i.e., mood-congruent) self-relevant thoughts in response to negative moods. Studies 1-4 revealed that social comparisons, temporal comparisons, and other self-enhancing cognitions (i.e., attributions, disidentification, relationship evaluations) are more likely to be mood incongruent when people adopt a reflective orientation to their negative feelings and more likely to be mood congruent when they adopt a ruminative orientation. Additionally, moods and mood orientations affected self-enhancing thoughts through the mediating influence of mood regulation goals and intentions (Studies 5 and 6).     

How We Feel is a Matter of Time: Relationships Between Time Perspectives and Mood

Both personality and emotional experiences may be influenced by people’s time perspectives. The Zimbardo time perspective inventory measures five trait dimensions related to past, present and future perspectives. Two studies were conducted to investigate how these time perspective dimensions related to mood. The first study (n = 260) confirmed that ZTPI scales predicted moods including energetic arousal, tense arousal and Hedonic Tone, revealing that past negative and Present Hedonistic time perspectives are the most robust predictors of current emotional states. Moreover, future time perspective proved to predict energetic arousal, but the effect was suppressed by present hedonism. The second study (n = 65) measured mood twice in a 4-week period, and focused on relationships between the ZTPI and recalled and anticipated mood. Analyses conducted using DBTP, an index of temporal harmony based on the ZTPI scores, proved that balanced time perspective was related to more positive mood states in both studies. Findings confirmed that time perspective appears to influence both recall and anticipation of mood. For example, past negative time perspective is associated with anticipation of negative moods, and Past Positive perspective relates to both recall and anticipation of energy. Time perspective may structure the individual’s affective experience.     

Mood and the DRM paradigm: An investigation of the effects of valence and arousal on false memory

Recent studies regarding the effect of mood on the DRM (Deese–Roediger–McDermott) illusion have not been able to clearly establish yet whether valence or arousal is most critical in determining susceptibility to false memories, nor what the underlying processes are. In three experiments, both the valence and the level of arousal of participants' mood were manipulated. Six conditions were used: positive mood with high/low arousal, negative mood with high/low arousal, neutral mood, and a control condition. Memory was tested by means of immediate and delayed recognition and immediate free recall. The mood induction procedure was effective. For recognition memory, there was an effect of arousal on the endorsement of critical lures. Low-arousal moods elicited more false recognition than high-arousal moods, regardless of valence. Based on signal detection analyses, the effect was attributed to more liberal response criteria with low arousal, in combination with a tendency towards improved item-specific memory with high arousal.     

Is retrieving positive self-concordant specific memory beneficial to mood repair? The moderation effect of depressive symptoms

The present study examined whether positive specific memory recall improves mood more than overgeneral memory recall. Moreover, this study examined the mood contrast effect in subclinically depressed participants. The mood contrast effect refers to when people ruminate on discrepancies between the current self and a past ideal self by recall of positive self-discrepant (low self-concordant) memories and thereby, fall into a negative mood. Undergraduate students (N?=?161) underwent a negative mood induction, and then concentrated on positive specific memory recall, positive overgeneral memory recall, or distraction. Results showed that there were no group differences in mood repair. Nevertheless, recalled memory self-concordance was associated with sad mood repair in the specific memory group, and moreover, this effect was not significant in people high in depressive symptoms. We discussed the results of mood repair effect from the perspective of baseline negative mood in subclinical depression.     

Beyond Hedonism and Associationism: A Configural View of the Role of Affect in Evaluation,Processing, and Self-Regulation

Most existing models assume that negative moods are more likely than positive moods to (a) induce recall of negatively toned information, (b) lead to less favorable evaluations, (c) induce more systematic but less flexible processing, and (d) arouse a desire to change the mood. A series of studies is discussed in which each of these effects and its opposite are obtained. The consistent pattern of data in these studies supports a configural, as opposed to a simple hedonistic or associationistic, view of mood. From the configural perspective, people do not seek positive moods; they seek positive outcomes. And, in some contexts, these outcomes can be signaled by a negative mood.     

From chump to champ: people's appraisals of their earlier and present selves

The authors present and test a theory of temporal self-appraisal. According to the theory, people can maintain their typically favorable self-regard by disparaging their distant and complimenting their recent past selves. This pattern of appraisals should be stronger for more important attributes because of their greater impact on self-regard and stronger for self-ratings than for ratings of other people. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that participants are more critical of distant past selves than of current selves, and Study 3 showed that this effect is obtained even when concurrent evaluations indicate no actual improvement. Studies 4 and 5 revealed that people perceived greater improvement for self than for acquaintances and siblings over the same time period. Study 6 provided support for the predicted effects of temporal distance and attribute importance on people's evaluation of past selves.     

Moods and Memories: Elation, depression, and the remembering of the events of one's life

Three experiments investigated the influence of current mood states on the remembering of past events of one's own life. In the first and the second experiment, participants were induced to experience either the mood state of elation or the mood state of depression. They then reported events and experiences that had occurred during the previous week. In the first and the second experiments, using converging methods for assessing memory for past events, participants differentially reported past events and experiences whose affective quality was congruent with their current mood states: participants in elated mood states preferentially reported pleasant events and happy experiences, and participants in depressed mood states preferentially reported unpleasant events and unhappy experiences. Additional evidence from the second experiment suggests that the differential remembering of affectively positive or affectively negative events requires that, at the time of the remembering of these events, participants actually experience the mood states of elation or depression and not simply attempt to remember past events that could account for elation or depression. In the third experiment, designed to assess the plausibility of “experimental demand” interpretations of these findings, participants who experienced ostensibly effective mood inductions that were actually ineffective failed to manifest differential remembering of affectively positive and affectively negative events. Implications of this series of experiments for understanding the mechanisms that may link moods and memories, as well as the intrapersonal and the interpersonal consequences of mood states, are discussed.     

Tunnel memories for autobiographical events: central details are remembered more frequently from shocking than from happy experiences

In three experiments, undergraduates recorded as many details as possible for autobiographical memories of highly positive and highly negative events in their lives. Experiment 1 replicated earlier findings for memories of highly negative events: Central details were recorded more frequently than peripheral details, and a weak correlation was found between emotional intensity and number of central details. In Experiment 2, undergraduates recorded details of memories of both their happiest and their most shocking events. Central details dominated over peripheral details only in memories of shocking events. This finding was replicated in Experiment 3. Recording memory details affected the participants' moods and generated a mood congruence effect in a subsequent recall of word-cued memories. The finding suggest that tunnel memories--enhanced memory for the central details of an event--are limited to emotionally negative memories. The findings contradict expectations derived from the notion of repression.     

Temporal differences in trait self-ascription: when the self is seen as an other

Seven studies exploring people's tendency to make observer-like attributions about their past and future selves are presented. Studies 1 and 2 showed temporal differences in trait assessments that paralleled the classic actor-observer difference. Study 3 provided evidence against a motivational account of these differences. Studies 4-7 explored underlying mechanisms involving differences in the focus of attention of the sort linked to the classic actor-observer difference. In Study 4, people perceived past and future selves from a more observer-like perspective than present selves. In Studies 5 and 6, manipulating attention to internal states (vs. observable behavior) of past and future selves led people to ascribe fewer traits to those selves. Study 7 showed an inverse relationship for past and present selves between observer-like visual focus and salience of internal information.     

Mood repair and processing mode in depression

Recalling positive autobiographical memories is a powerful emotion regulation strategy that can be used to repair low mood and alleviate negative affect. Unlike healthy individuals, those with current or past depression do not experience an improvement in mood as a consequence of recalling positive memories. We tested whether differences in processing mode might account for this impairment. Following mood induction procedures designed to ensure equivalence of mood state, depressed (n = 35) and recovered depressed (n = 33) participants were instructed to recall a positive memory and focus on it while adopting either an abstract or a concrete mode of processing. Participants in the abstract processing condition experienced no change in mood, while those in the concrete processing condition showed improved mood after memory recall. This research illustrates that the process by which positive autobiographical memories are recalled is important in determining their emotional impact and suggests that psychological interventions for depression may be improved by explicitly targeting processing mode.     

Mood,dissociation and false memories using the Deese‐Roediger‐McDermott procedure

Who is likely to have a false memory? Does being in a certain transient state, such as a negative mood, mean that a person is more like to have a false memory? These important questions are examined using the Deese‐Roediger‐McDermott (DRM) procedure. The amount of false memories was compared with people's score on a dissociation measure and by mood. Unlike past research, which has used different procedures to explore false memories, we found that dissociation was not associated with false memories. We argue that this is because the DRM procedure requires two processes for a false memory (the generation of the critical lure and mistaking its source), while most false memory procedures only require one process (source monitoring error) because the errant information is suggested to the participant. This pattern of results suggests that only errors with the source monitoring process are associated with dissociation. We found that mood was related to false memories, but it was dependent on the specific task demands. If participants were told to recall as many words as they could, then people in a negative mood had more false memories. However, if they were told to recall as many words as they felt like recalling, then there were more false memories for people in a positive mood. This can be explained by the mood‐as‐input hypothesis. Results are discussed in relation to both theories and applications of memory.     

Mood and memories of parental rearing styles: A comparison of mood effects on questionnaire-cued and free recall of autobiographical memories

The relationship between memories of childhood experiences (e.g., adverse parenting) and adult depression often found raises questions of interpretation. On the one hand, both laboratory studies and clinicians' experiences suggest that subjects in a depressed mood frequently show a negative bias in perceptions and memories. Negative childhood memories in depressed persons might, therefore, be interpreted as epiphenomena of depressed mood instead of etiological factors. On the other hand, memories of childhood experiences seem remarkably stable across changes in depressed mood, especially when memories are elicited by means of standardized questionnaires. In the mood and memory literature several explanations for this stability are offered. For one thing, highly structured cues to elicit memories (such as in questionnaires) are hypothesized to be less susceptible to mood bias than unstructured memory cues (such as in free recall procedures). On the other hand, resource allocation theorists suggest that childhood memories, being well established and rehearsed, are relatively impervious to mood bias no matter how they are elicited. In this study we examined whether different methods of eliciting childhood memories (i.e., free recall and questionnaire-cued) are differentially susceptible to mood bias. To this aim, we used a mood induction procedure to induce depressed, neutral, and elated mood and assessed childhood memories both before and after the mood induction using both questionnaires and free recall to elicit memories. Results suggested that memories elicited by means of free recall as well as by means of questionnaire-cued recall were susceptible to depressed and elated mood bias. The implications for research addressing the link between childhood experiences and depression are discussed.