THE CREATED CO-CREATOR: WHAT IT IS AND IS NOT

Abstract In this article I briefly assesses Philip Hefner's concept of the created co‐creator by considering both what it does and does not claim. Looking at issues of reductionism, biological selfishness, biology and freedom, and environmental ethics, I point out strengths and weaknesses in Hefner's conception of the created co‐creator.     

HOLISTIC BIOLOGY: WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT MATTERS

Recent developments toward a more holistic biology do not eliminate reductionism and determinism, but they do suggest more complex forms of them, in which there are multiple, interacting influences, as there are in complex or chaotic systems. Though there is a place in biology for both systemic and atomistic modes of explanation, for those with a theological perspective the shift to complex explanations in biology is often welcome. It suggests a more subtle view of divine action in which God's purposes are affected through engagement with the complex systems of creation rather than by discrete interventions. It also invites us to connect the biological interdependence with the interdependence in the nature and purposes of God, and it is consonant with a mystical vision of the unity of all things.     

WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS AND HAS IT EVOLVED?

Research into consciousness has now become respectable, and much has been written about it. Is consciousness the exclusive property of human beings, or can it be found also in animals? Can machines become conscious? Is consciousness an illusion, and are all mental states ultimately reducible to the movement of molecules? If consciousness is other than matter, what connection does it have with matter? These and others like them are now serious scientific questions in the West. This article discusses consciousness within the frame of the following assertions: Consciousness has evolved from earlier states of awareness to be found in lower forms of life. The current scientific method is too restrictive for the study of conscience and its evolution. In particular classical logic leads scientists to ignore or reject consciousness as a legitimate field of study. Mind and matter, generalized as knowing and being, have equal status.     

NON‐RELATIVE REASONS AND HUMEAN THOUGHT: IF WHAT IS A REASON FOR YOU IS A REASON FOR ME,WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE THE HUMEAN?

Abstract: A variety of strategies have been used to oppose the influential Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. Among these strategies is the attempt to show that it is a conceptual truth that reasons for action are non‐relative. I introduce the notion of a basic reason‐giving consideration and show that the non‐relativity thesis can be understood as a corollary of the more fundamental thesis that basic reason‐giving considerations are generalizable. I then consider the relationship between the generalizability thesis and the Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. I argue that, contrary to a common assumption, there is a subtle and clearly motivated version of the Humean thesis that does not deny, and so is not threatened by, the generalizability thesis.     

WHERE ARE THE LATINAS?

The inclusion of scholarship about Latinas into psychology courses is considered by answering two questions: (1) How do we evaluate the scholarship that should be included? (2) What factors should be considered for inclusion? To answer the first question on the evaluation of scholarship, six criteria are presented. The factors to be considered for the inclusion of scholarship about Latinas are illustrated in a discussion of three topics that are often presented in introductory psychology courses: identity, gender role socialization, and educational achievement and aspirations. Our discussion questions the validity of the conceptualization of these three topics when Latinas and other ethno-racial groups are excluded and offers evidence of the possibilities for clarification and expansion of theory and knowledge when they are included.     

KNOWLEDGE HAPPENS: WHY ZAGZEBSKI HAS NOT SOLVED THE MENO PROBLEM

I argue that Linda Zagzebski's proposed solution to the Meno Problem faces serious challenges. The Meno Problem, roughly, is how to explain the value that knowledge, as such, has over mere true belief. Her proposed solution is that believings—when thought of more like actions—can have value in virtue of their motivations. This meshes nicely with her theory that knowledge is, essentially, virtuously motivated true belief. Her solution fails because it entails that, necessarily, all knowledge is motivated in a way that resembles the motivation of actions. Crucially, Zagzebski says the value derived from motivation comes from certain laudable feelings—like love of truth (she is explicit that love is a feeling). But there are possible cases of knowledge—probably some of which are actual—in which subjects do not or cannot experience these feelings.     

RELIABILITY IS NOT VALIDITY AND VALIDITY IS NOT RELIABILITY

Interrater correlations do provide an index of reliability of job performance ratings. We show that the arguments presented by Murphy and DeShon (2000) lead to the radical conclusion that traditional measurement models–both classical theory and generalizability theory models–can be used neither with job performance ratings nor with other measures used in I-O and other areas of psychology and the social sciences. We show that this untenable conclusion is based on confusion of validity issues and questions with reliability issues and questions. It is also based on the incorrect belief that classical measurement models are capable of addressing only random response measurement error and cannot address other forms of measurement error. We also show that the solution Murphy and DeShon offer to the problem of measurement error in ratings, as they define this problem, cannot work. Properly understood, the position taken by Murphy and DeShon leaves us with the nihilistic conclusion that no appropriate measurement models are possible in psychological research, thus making meaningful research impossible.     

ETERNITY IS A PRESENT,TIME IS ITS UNWRAPPING

There is debate in the philosophy of religion about whether the being of God is timelessly eternal or is instead temporal but unbounded. In this paper, I seek to defend the first view by motivating and deriving it from the Christian doctrines of the trinity and salvation. My goal is to present the notion of eternity in a way that makes clear that it belongs to God by nature and to man by grace, with the condition of time being part of the medium of grace. To this end, I also employ the doctrine of theosis, as found in Maximus the Confessor and Dumitru Staniloae, and the Augustinean theory of time.