Resistance in treatment as a means of avoiding inner conflict

It is not commonly known that, in his eighties, Michael Fordham sought the help of Donald Meltzer in what Dr Meltzer described as ‘more a weekly supervision of dreams than an analysis’. Dr Fordham is said to have commented that it was ‘a weekly supervision of my inner world - and you can't get closer to psychoanalysis than that’ He was greatly helped by these ‘supervisions’ and at the end of their work together, Meltzer suggested that Fordham wrote his memoirs. This resulted in The Making of an Analyst: Michael Fordham, published in 1993.

This fascinating account of Fordham's life and work contains much of interest about his personal development. He talks with candour about his confusions and passions in what is at times a surprisingly revealing manner. In particular Fordham talks openly about his closest relationships and how they affected him. The book was published, as he wanted it to be, after careful discussion with James Astor and Karl Figlio.

We are pleased to be able to publish the following contribution from Dr Meltzer about the book which he prompted. It is a mixture of personal responses on reading the book and memories of the man.     

Self-Coherence and Mutuality in the Analytic Dyad: Commentary on Michael Shoshani (Rosenbaum's) Dare to be Human

Michael Shoshani (Rosenbaum's) book Dare to be Human lays bare Michael's emotional relationship with his patient Daniel. Initially, Michael's early childhood relational behavioral patterns are evoked by Daniel's extreme emotional detachment and rejection of Michael as a person. Both analytic partners experienced extreme boundary violations as children in the form of violent beatings, Michael by his father and Daniel by his mother. Michael's mother was overbearing like Daniel's. Both, highly sensitized to intrusions and perceived slights by the other, remain locked in a doer/done to dynamic until Michael successfully breaks through the enactment by learning to stay with Daniel's distress, contain and regulate his own hurt feelings, and provide more space in the relationship by shifting to four times a week and moving Daniel to the couch. Through this process both analytic partners feel safer with each other, deepen their understanding of their own internal object world, and feel intimately engaged with each other. Daniel's life outside the analysis parallels his success in the analytic relationship.     

You Must Have Thought This Book Was About You1: Reply to Daniel Dennett

Daniel Dennett's review 2 of my book, Human Nature and the Limits of Science, 3 was apparently conceived as part of a multiple review, anticipating an author's response, so I am grateful for the opportunity to satisfy this expectation. Indeed, Dennett uses this excuse to justify devoting his own contribution to responding to those parts of the book directed explicitly at his own work, leaving other imagined reviewers to take care of other issues. Since he has things to say about most of the topics in the book he evidently interpreted this remit widely, in fact taking the book as “presented as an antidote of sorts to [his] own world view” (p. 482). Let me begin, therefore, by reassuring Dennett that, while I certainly had some critical things to say about some of his views, the book most certainly was not intended as an ad hominem attack. The nine pages (out of 187) on which his work is cited fairly accurately reflects the extent to which his views figured in my thinking. Curiously, his ire seems most strongly aroused by my assault on his views on free will in which, apparently, I agree with nearly everything he says and, worse still, fail to cite him at all.     

EVOLUTION,CULTURE, AND SIN: RESPONDING TO PHILIP HEFNER'S PROPOSAL

Abstract. In his recent book, The Human Factor, Philip Hefner proposes to deepen theological understanding of the natural world and the place of humans within it. He describes humans as products of converging streams of genes and culture, and as possessors of freedom that requires them to be “created cocreators.” In accordance with the requirements of “the way things really are” (God), humans are to become divine agents in enlarging the realm of freedom in the world through self-sacrificing altruism. While Hefner's insights are admirable, his work could be viewed, in part, as a covert expression of nineteenth century liberal beliefs in progress. In fact, human culture and freedom are more ambiguous products of both good and evil, and hence we must take more cognizance of the pervasiveness of what theology has termed sin.     

Jerome on Sinlessness: a Via Media between Augustine and Pelagius

This article will explore Jerome's understanding of sinlessness and will argue that he saw himself just as opposed to Augustine as to Pelagius. I begin by exposing Jerome's context in the Pelagian Controversy. I then expose his understanding of sinlessness. Next, I turn to his arguments in Ep. 133 and the first two books of his Dialogi contra Pelagianos. In book three of that text, we notice a change in his arguments which indicates that Jerome is no longer arguing only against Pelagius; he now disagrees with Augustine as well. I then examine a variety of issues besides sinlessness in the third book of the Dialogi that reveal that Jerome disagreed with Augustine on multiple topics, showing that his opposition to Augustine's position on sinlessness was not exceptional. Finally I turn to statements by Jerome that seem to indicate a positive appreciation for the Bishop of Hippo, but which on closer inspection are seen to contain latent criticisms.     

Truce thinking and just war theory

In his book, A Theory of Truces, Nir Eisikovits offers a perceptive and timely ethics of truces based on the claim that we need to reject the ‘false dichotomy between the ideas of war and peace’ underpinning much current thought about conflict and conflict resolution. In this article, I concur that truces and ‘truce thinking’ should be a focus of concern for any political theory wishing to address the realities of war. However, Eisikovits’s account, to be convincing, requires engagement with a tradition of thought figuring only marginally in his reflections on truces, that is, just war theory. I argue this for three reasons. Without incorporation of the just war principles that should inform the decisions to enter conflict, to maintain conflict, and to cease conflict, any theory of truces will be, first, normatively inadequate, failing to provide us with requisite direction, and, second, open to the charge of permitting intolerable injustices, a charge Eisikovits wishes to avoid. Third, engagement with just war theory is important for arriving at a nuanced understanding of peacemaking, one which grants truces their place in our deliberations and spurns simplistic ‘war versus peace’ binaries whilst keeping more ambitious ideals of peace firmly in sight.     

Saving Character

In his recent book Lack of Character, Jon Doris argues that people typically lack character (understood in a particular way). Such a claim, if correct, would have devastating implications for moral philosophy and for various human moral projects (e.g. character development). I seek to defend character against Doris's challenging attack. To accomplish this, I draw on Socrates, Aristotle, and Kant to identify some of the central components of virtuous character. Next, I examine in detail some of the central experiments in social psychology upon which Doris's argument is based. I argue that, properly understood, such experiments reveal differences in the characters of their subjects, not that their subjects lack character altogether. I conclude with some reflections on the significance of such experiments and the importance of character.     

Seeking The Real

A critical discussion of Barry Stroud's claim, in his book The Quest for Reality, that we could never rationally arrive at the conclusion that, for example, the world is not really colored.     

Is Jesus Still “ACTing Up”?

In this essay, I discuss the continuing relevance of Jesus ACTED UP in three dimensions: the pastoral, the academic, and the self-critical. Framing the essay with personal reflections, I first describe how the book continues to meet the pastoral needs of the LGBTIQ community, especially by channeling our rage in a constructive way. I then describe how the book continues to be relevant to the academic community by speaking truth to power. Finally, I describe how the book continues to speak to the LGBTIQ community by cautioning against a turning inwards of oneself (i.e. incurvatus in se). I conclude the essay with a personal note of gratitude to Bob Shore-Goss for the ways in which he personally embodies these three dimensions in his life and work.     

Eschatology and Theology of Hope: The Impact of Gaudium et Spes on the Thought of Edward Schillebeeckx

Before the Second Vatican Council, Edward Schillebeeckx O.P. (1914–2009) had begun to reassess and the role and nature of eschatology as a discipline within Catholic theology. He began to formulate an early theology of hope in the 1950s which he would later develop quite extensively. His reflections during the Council on the famous draft of Gaudium et Spes, and on the finished document reveal the urgency of rethinking the essential relationship between ‘church’ and ‘world’. This article examines the impact of Gaudium et Spes on Schillebeeckx's work in two aspects. First, the way that it helped to orient his eschatological thought towards an emphasis on the ‘future’. The distance between the ‘already’ and the ‘not yet’, coupled with the essential place of creation as the site of God's salvific activity in history, began to push Schillebeeckx towards an eschatological and primarily future‐oriented understanding of Christian praxis and preaching. Second, this article will examine the anthropology that Schillebeeckx reads from Gaudium et Spes and the way in which a ‘new image’ of humanity, in light of a future‐oriented eschatology, contributed to his attempts to rethink the tension between ‘church’ and ‘world’.     

How Gödel Relates Platonism to Mathematics

It is well known that Gödel takes his realistic world view as closely related to mathematics, especially to his own work in the foundations of mathematics. He reports, publicly as well as privately, that Platonism is fundamental to his major work in logic and set theory, and suggests that this philosophical position can be seen as a product of reflections on mathematics. These views of Gödel, however, are often regarded as being insufficiently formulated or argued for. In this article, the author tries to consider some points which are related to the understanding of the Gödelian mode of the interaction between mathematics and philosophy.     

More than a feeling: Wittgenstein and William James on love and other emotions

One of the most significant features of Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (written after he had completed most of the Philosophical Investigations) is his reflections on emotions. Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic was developed in direct response to his reading of William James’s chapter on emotions in his 1890 masterpiece, The Principles of Psychology. This paper examines the competing views of emotions that emerge in these works, both of which attempt to overcome the Cartesian dualist conception in different ways. The main point of disagreement concerns the relation between emotions and their bodily expression (e.g. the relation between grief and weeping). My interpretation focuses on Wittgenstein's remarks on the emotion of love because, I argue, it is a particularly problematic case. To elucidate his largely unexplored view of love, I draw on his remarks on understanding and criteria in the Philosophical Investigations. I argue that by examining the examples of complex emotions like love, we can arrive at a more accurate characterization of Wittgenstein's general view of mental concepts and mental phenomena.     

The Future of Philosophy

In this article the editor of the Philosophical Quarterly briefly outlines the editorial process at that journal; explains why it is foolhardy to attempt to predict the future of philosophy; and, finally, attempts such a prediction. Drawing on his recent book Ethics for a Broken World, he argues that climate change, or some other disaster, may lead to a broken world where the optimistic assumptions underlying contemporary philosophy no longer apply. He argues that the possibility of a broken world has deep and unexpected implications for philosophy.     

On Understanding Worship in School Part Two: On worship and educating

This article continues a discussion begun in Part One. Together they re-examine the central thesis of Professor John Hull's (1975) book, School Worship, An Obituary, that the practice of worship in school is inappropriate. He attempted to establish his thesis through the analysis of the concept of education and of the concept of worship, and thus to show their essential incompatibility. Part One reviewed what an incompatibility might mean in the school context. After all, many diverse activities are pursued during the school day that, practically speaking, could not be done simultaneously in the same room. His thesis must be taken in the stronger form that, theoretically, the sense of education and the sense of worship are such that the two activities together are conceptually incoherent. The earlier article also reviewed his analysis of the concept of education. It questioned his definition and showed that it hinged on some of the dubious assumptions of an evidentialist philosophy. A better view of understanding and pedagogy might actually require the practise of worship in school. If it is the intention of our society to communicate the substance of religious life to the young, training them in worship may be the best, if not the only, way to do this. The features of education that Hull has identified have been selected for their rhetorical force. They appear to challenge what are assumed to be essential features of worship. Whether they do so in fact will depend on one's understanding of worship, but in what follows, his key assumptions about worship are put to the test and found wanting. Part Two, therefore, investigates Hull's understanding of worship. It finds that he believes a prior unconditional commitment to the belief 'God exists' is of the essence of worship. For him, it is this commitment that puts it at odds with education which he believes must scrutinise everything. The arguments against Hull here are designed to show that he is mistaken in his understanding of worship. Practices do not develop on the formation of belief systems first. Furthermore, religiously speaking, worship actually embraces a radical questioning. Finally, his assumption that there is a logical incompatibility in having an unconditional commitment and in embracing the practice of radical questioning is tested against the figure of Socrates. In the life of Socrates one can see how piety and educational practice belong together in such a way that one is the expression of the other. It is concluded that the nature of education and worship are at stake. These may have changed in such a way that they can no longer be pursued together. But there was a time when education flowered into worship, and worship found its substance in education. Hull's case concerning their intrinsic conceptual incoherence through philosophical analysis does not succeed. He has only shown us how our world has changed, and that, not necessarily for the better.     

E.O. Wilson's Conquest of Earth

The publication of Edward O. Wilson's recent book, The Social Conquest of Earth, launches a new missile in the purported warfare between science and religion. The launching-pad is Wilson's embracing of group selection over kin selection to explain the evolutionary success of cooperation and even altruism in complex social groups. Rather than the selfish gene, groups of genetically diverse individuals who cooperate with one another drive evolution toward increased social organization, toward eusociality. Within the field of sociobiology, this is interesting. But Wilson does not stop here. He proceeds to engage in combat with all competing points of view, especially religious points of view. By relegating religion to a primitive stage of evolution and elevating science to an advanced stage, he provides justification for science to eliminate all its enemies and to establish hegemony in the worldview war. This article provides a critical analysis of Wilson's scientific method, especially his attempt to replace creation myths with his own scientized myths of origin. It concludes that Wilson need not do battle, because he could find among theologians allies in his understanding of human nature and his concern to make the world a better moral place.     

Sebastian Rodrigues in Shusaku Endo's Silence as a Theologian of the Cross1

In his book, On Being a Theologian of the Cross, Gerhard Forde asserts, “[T]he theology of the cross is an offensive theology. The offense consists in the fact that unlike other theologies it attacks what we usually consider the best in our religion.” If causing an offense against Christian theologians and the populace in general is considered a criterion for this theology, Shusaku Endo surely sets forth the theology of the cross in his novel, Silence. Although he would not identify his thesis by such a term, Endo presents the theology of the cross challenging the conventional understanding of the Christian faith. This short article explores Endo's book, Silence, examines how it demonstrates an articulation of the theology of the cross, and argues that Sebastian Rodrigues, the main character of the novel, is a theologian of the cross.     

Life,Joy, and Love: Together towards Life in Dialogue with Evangelii Gaudium and The Cape Town Commitment

This article offers reflections on key themes and missiological significances of the WCC's Together towards Life in dialogue with the other evangelical and Roman Catholic documents, specifically, Pope Francis’ apostolic exhortation Evangelii Gaudium and the Lausanne Movement's Cape Town Commitment. Organizing his reflections around the significant words in each document – life, joy, and love – as well as other meaningful and powerful words that arise in analysis, the author finds that these three new mission statements cover much of the same ground and are quite complementary, with concern for the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, and the forgotten and disregarded playing a central role in all of them. The article concludes that it is important to study these three documents together, as each has the potential to be a friendly yet challenging ecumenical dialogue partner to the others.     

Painting Is Thinking on the Threshold of Being

With permission of the Finnish artist Juhana Blomstedt, a selection of his thoughts on art collected in the book ''Muodon Arvo'' (The Value of Form) and from an interview with the psychoanalyst Veikko Talvitie, have been translated and reproduced in this issue. Aphoristic sentences, reflecting his views on the value of form, on time and memory, art as communication, abstract painting, or on the artist and his role in society, build up some of the chapters of his book, but the same sentences can also be found time and again in longer and more coherent texts. They seem to contain the essence of the artist's reflections on art and on ''the enigma of being in the world''.     

Pragmatic,Existentialist and Phenomenological Interpretations of Marxism

In his book, Hermeneutics and Reflection (2013), Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann outlines what he sees as the fundamental differences between Edmund Husserl’s “theoretical” phenomenology and Martin Heidegger’s “a-theoretical” phenomenology, which he frames in terms of the distinction between “reflective observation” and “hermeneutic understanding”. In this paper, I will clarify the sense of these terms in order to elucidate some of the crucial similarities and differences between Husserl and Heidegger. Against von Herrmann’s characterization of the Husserlian project, I argue that we should not consider these differences in terms of “reflection”, since this runs the risk of misconstruing Husserlian phenomenology with the philosophical tradition he was striving against. Taken together, by way of a close reading of von Herrmann, the following discussion will serve as a brief sketch of the early Heidegger’s turn away from Husserlian phenomenology and toward his own hermeneutic phenomenology.