“不可说的”还能“说”吗?——冯友兰与前期维特根斯坦之视域比较

在20世纪30年代,冯友兰与维特根斯坦两位哲学家一次"意味相投"的交谈和对"不可说的"东西的浓厚兴趣,把我们的视野锁定在"不可说的"问题论域上。冯友兰要用"负的方法""讲"出"不可说的"形而上学世界,而前期维特根斯坦则以"沉默"的方式待之。我们认为,前期维持根斯坦的"不可说"论是建立在西方哲学传统的"客观实在"基础之上的,而冯友兰"负的方法"是建立在中国哲学传统的"体验的存在"之上的。这也意味着,是否承认"体验的存在"的本体论意义上的合法地位,将决定着冯友兰与前期维特根斯坦哲学的不同路向以及所彰显出的中西哲学精神的异同。     

究竟什么是“不可说”的——对维特根斯坦《逻辑哲学论》的扩展性解读

“凡是不可说的东西,必须对之沉默。”这是维特根斯坦《逻辑哲学论》的最后一个命题;之后,《逻辑哲学论》就保持了沉默。但研究者不可能保持沉默,而必须说明“不可说”的究竟是什么,为什么要保持沉默。当然,经过研究者的爬梳剔抉、精心阐释,在汗牛充栋的研究文献面前,“不可说”的东西已然露出了各式各样的“真面目”。本文试图给出另外一种诠释方案,期望在维特根斯坦与哲学传统的关联中诠释其思想的可扩展性。一在《逻辑哲学论》中,维特根斯坦严格限定了“可说”之“说”的内涵:(1)只有判断或命题才可能对世界有所言说;(2)命题而非概念或名…     

维特根斯坦美学:划界问题

1 维特根斯坦是当代西方分析哲学思潮中最重要的哲学家之一。大多数人认为维特根斯坦的前后哲学是截然不同的,但维特根斯坦的美学却始终一致。其首要问题是一个划界的问题——和他的哲学划界的格式一样——为美学中可说的与不可说的划出界限,如果将其表述得更具美学特征,则是在可批评的和不可批评的之间划界。在维特根斯坦看来,那些不可说的也即神秘的东西便是“界限”,它之所以是界限在于它给予了全部可能性而不是一种被给予的可能性。这种界限至少有两种类型:一种是“逻辑形式”(Logical form),逻辑形式使得世界这样存在着和这样被表述着;另一种是伦理     

从维特根斯坦看魏晋“言意之辨”

一、维特根斯坦对可说与不可说的划分 维特根斯坦在逻辑哲学论前言中如下说道：这本书所讨论的是哲学问题,并且,正如我所相信的那样,这些问题之所以被提出来．是源于人类对语言逻辑的误解。整本书的主旨可以用以下的话来概括：凡是能够说的事情,都能够说清楚,而对于不能谈论的事情,就必须保持沉默。     

维特根斯坦与新指称理论——兼答欣提卡问题

欣提卡主张,前期维特根斯坦的指称观与新指称理论高度相似,进而暗示新指称理论存在着重要理论缺陷。通过批判性地考察维特根斯坦前后期的指称观和分析《逻辑哲学论》中的名称和对象之关系,本文指出前期维特根斯坦与新指称理论迥然有别,从而对欣提卡的哲学问题给出了答复。通过对《哲学研究》中关于直接指称表达式讨论的分析,本文指出,后期维特根斯坦对指示词和专名的性质作出了区分,其指称关系主张具有消去论特征。本文还进一步批评了那种认为后期维特根斯坦是指称的描述主义者的流行观点,并指出语境原则是贯穿前后期维特根斯坦指称论述的基本思路。     

论《逻辑哲学论》的形而上学性

关于前后期维特根斯坦之间的联系,前人或持断裂说,或持连续说。连续说的根据是认为前后期维特根斯坦在哲学观上并无什么改变。其实,前后期维特根斯坦不仅在语言观上,在哲学观上也有一种根本性的断裂和转向,所谓相似性只是表面上的。本文从三个方面:哲学不是自然科学;哲学是描述与澄清;独一的大问题来展开对前期维特根斯坦哲学观的考察,以期认清《逻辑哲学论》的形而上学性。维特根斯坦从前期到后期的所谓转向,根本上是从形而上学思想方式向非形而上学思想方式的转向。     

维特根斯坦的“语言的唯我论”和哲学的语言学转变

一般认为,唯我论是维特根斯坦前期哲学的重要内容,甚至是前期哲学的“本质特征”。的确,理解维特根斯坦的唯我论不仅有助于全面地理解维特根斯坦的前期哲学,而且,只有正确地理解维特根斯坦的唯我论,才可以认识到维特根斯坦的《逻辑哲学论》在本世纪哲学的语言学转变中的巨大作用和它产生的不可估量的影响。     

维特根斯坦与分析哲学--访彼得·哈克教授

问:在<维特根斯坦在20世纪分析哲学中的地位>[2]这本书中,您认为,维特根斯坦对20世纪分析哲学的发展影响巨大,这既包括其前期哲学对维也纳学派的影响,也包括其后期哲学对牛津"日常语言学派"的影响.您认为维特根斯坦在20世纪分析哲学的发展中究竟扮演了一个什么样的角色呢?     

世界、事实与个体——维特根斯坦的一种逻辑视野

维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中提出了一个著名论题:“世界是事实的总和”(维特根斯坦,1.1。下引只注序号)①;得出了一个很有意思的结论:“凡是不可说的东西,必须对之沉默”(7);而他在论述过程中有一个清晰的思路:世界———事实———思想———句子———真值函项———句子的普遍形式(参见王路)②。按照维特根斯坦的解释,世界是由事实构成的,而语言是由句子构成的。语言与世界相对应,句子与事实相对应,句子之间的关系与事实之间的关系相对应。句子之间有逻辑关系,维特根斯坦揭示了这种关系,同时说明它们在世界中是可显示的,却不是可说的。…     

“说不可说”之哲学意蕴

一、从维特根斯坦的一句名言谈起维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中有句名言:凡是能够说的事情,都能够说清楚,而凡是不能说的事情,就应该沉默。(维特根斯坦,第20页)这句话用通俗简明的语言来说就是:可说的,说;     

Say What? On Grice On What Is Said

Abstract: In this paper I argue that there is a very important, though often neglected, dissimilarity between the two Gricean conceptions of ‘what is said’: the one presented in his William James Lectures and the one sketched in the ‘Retrospective Epilogue’ to his book Studies in the Way of Words. The main problem lies with the idea of speakers' commitment to what they say and how this is to be related to the conventional, or standard, meaning of the sentences uttered in the act of saying. Since the later notion of ‘what is said’, or ‘dictiveness’, is claimed to be logically independent from ‘formality’ (roughly, conventional meaning), Grice seems to maintain that there are cases in which content that is not expressed by a sentence in a context may nevertheless count as what is said. I propose an account of what is said that brings together the two apparently irreconcilable approaches. The price to be paid for a Gricean, however, is to accept a duality of behaviour between (natural language counterparts of) logical constants and logical variables.     

Brentano on the individuation of mental acts

This paper aims to present and evaluate Brentano's account of the individuation of mental acts. In his early works, Brentano assimilated mental acts to tropes; however, he encountered difficulties in explaining their individuation, since the usual solutions for the individuation of tropes were not readily applicable to his theory of mental acts. In a later period, Brentano introduced into his psychology what he called the “soul,” and this allowed him to explain the individuation of mental acts. Finally, after his “reistic” turn, he excluded mental acts from his ontology, for he rejected abstracta of any kind, including abstract particulars, and admitted only things, or res (in Latin), that is, concrete particulars; in his late philosophy, there are no “thinkings,” but only “thinkers.” However, he still needed to explain what individuates different thinkers, and this was again the soul. In the conclusion, the paper critically compares the different theoretical options considered by Brentano.     

An Introduction to Nicolai Hartmann’s Critical Ontology

Nicolai Hartmann contributed significantly to the revitalization of the discipline of ontology in the early twentieth century. Developing a systematic, post-Kantian critical ontology ‘this side’ of idealism and realism, he subverted the widespread impression that philosophy must either exhaust itself in foundationalist epistemology or engage in system-building metaphysical excess. This essay provides an introduction to Hartmann’s approach in light of the recent translation of his early essay ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’ (1923) In it Hartmann criticizes both the pretensions of epistemology as well as the principal errors of classical ontology, and he proposes a series of correctives that lead to his development of a highly original and elaborate stratified categorial ontology. This introduction explains the most important errors of the ‘old’ ontology, his correctives to them, and further fleshes out these correctives with reference to his mature ontological work.     

FORTUNATE MISFORTUNE

Sometimes people are unfortunate in ways which facilitate their success - and happiness. This creates the perplexity whether someone can be said to have been unfortunate, if an apparent misfortune has been, overall, beneficial to his or her life. I argue that whether something is a misfortune cannot be determined in itself, even in seemingly obvious cases. It depends also upon what one makes of it, what it makes of one. In short, it depends upon what happens later. People cannot claim to have suffered a misfortune for which they are to be pitied or compensated, when this ‘misfortune’ is crucial in having made them what they are, what they are happy to be. Hard determinism aside, the notion of ‘fortunate misfortune’ lacks, however, an easy parallel in ‘unfortunate good-fortune’.     

Merleau-Ponty and the Advent of Meaning: From Consummate Reciprocity to Ambiguous Reversibility

The three themes of perception, expression, and history proved to be significant and consistent concerns of Merleau-Ponty from his earliest to his latest writings. In turn, Merleau-Ponty was concerned to discover and show how meaning emerged within the context of each of these themes. My main goal in this essay will be to trace ways that Merleau-Ponty conceived of this emergence, and to how his conceptions underwent increasing sophistication from his earlier to later writings. In section I, I show how a kind of perceptual meaning arises out of an exchange between subject and object, perceived and perceived, and the visible and invisible. In section II, I show how expressive meaning arises out of an exchange between the spoken and speaking word, and the synchronic and diachronic registers of language. In these sections, I also point out that what starts roughly as binary dialogue (characterized by consummate reciprocity) between these matrices of meaning evolves into a more ambiguous interplay (characterized by such later ontological notions as invisibility, reversibility, and the flesh). In section III, I show how meaning arises in history out of an ambiguous interplay between past and present, ideas and institutions, the collective and individual, and the pre-determined and the free; and I suggest ways Merleau-Ponty might have integrated earlier scattered thoughts about meaning's emergence in history with his later ontology, had his work in these directions not been cut short.     

Before Analogy: Recovering Barth'sOntological Development

What is the nature of Barth's development over the 1920s? Barth himself understood this period as his "apprenticeship," and cites his 1931 book on Anselm as a significant juncture in moving beyond this stage in his thinking. Barth's emphasis upon both change and continuity lies at the heart of the discrepancy between two prominent interpreters of his theology, Hans Urs von Balthasar and Bruce McCormack. On the surface it appears as though their disagreement centers around Barth's employment of dialectic and analogy in his theology. However, our thesis is that this focus conceals the ontological strategies Barth's multifarious uses of analogy and dialectic always implied. Although McCormack is right to suggest that Balthasar's depiction of a shift from dialectic to analogy is inadequate, in the end McCormack's account of Barth's development over the 1920s conceals as much as it reveals. The following essay attempts to demonstrate the kinds of insights which can be made of the past accounts of Barth's development which focused on the transition from dialectic to analogy. Far from relegating these accounts to the sidelines, McCormack's work helps us see all the more clearly just what was at stake in figures like Balthasar's work. By looking past McCormack and Balthasar's respective periodizations of Barth's development, a clearer focus upon Barth's theological ontology can begin to take place.     

论马一浮"六艺之学"视野中的易学研究

作为现代新儒家早期思想的代表人物,马一浮先生提出了以儒家"六艺之学"统摄天下诸学的主张.这是马先生的一个创举,体现着他对传统儒学有意识地改造和发扬.作为"六艺之学"的一个分支,易学研究在马一浮先生的学术研究中无疑具有着"本体论"地位和作用,它所体现的"心之本体",不仅是"六艺"所自出的本原,也是"六艺之学"共同的目的和归宿.     

The Ontology of Thisness

This paper seeks to give an account of what it is for an individual to instantiate thisness (i.e. primitive individual essence). Thisnesses are peculiar entities, and even those who endorse their existence and instantiation by objects/entities, have said very little about how an individual and its thisness are related. My approach will be to seek out a model for the instantiation of thisness by canvassing broadly Aristotelian accounts of the substance/attribute relation, and then by making appropriate modifications to the most likely candidates in order to accommodate an individual's instantiation of thisness. What will emerge is that the model with the most utility makes thisness redundant in the case of material substances. Nonetheless, I will suggest that a version of the model can be appropriately applied in the case of other individuals which might instantiate thisness: for example, events (where these are conceived as a fundamental category of ontology distinct from material substances).