Parity,moral options,and the weights of reasons

The (moral) permissibility of an act is determined by the relative weights of reasons, or so I assume. But how many weights does a reason have? Weight Monism is the idea that reasons have a single weight value. There is just the weight of reasons. The simplest versions hold that the weight of each reason is either weightier than, less weighty than, or equal to every other reason. We'll see that this simple view leads to paradox in at least two ways. We must complicate the picture somehow. I consider two candidate complications. The first, Parity Monism, is inspired by Ruth Chang's suggestion that parity is a fourth comparative beyond the traditional three (>, <, =). This view complicates the single weight relation by allowing that the weights of reasons can be on a par. Unfortunately, Parity Monism resolves only one of the two paradoxes that afflict simple versions of Weight Monism. To resolve both paradoxes, we need our second candidate complication, Weight Pluralism. This view holds that reasons have at least two weight values (e.g., justifying weight and requiring weight) and these two values aren't always equivalent. Parity is no substitute for Pluralism.     

Coefficients Alpha,Beta, Omega,and the glb: Comments on Sijtsma

There are three fundamental problems in Sijtsma (Psychometrika, 2008): (1) contrary to the name, the glb is not the greatest lower bound of reliability but rather is systematically less than ω _t (McDonald, Test theory: A unified treatment, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, 1999), (2) we agree with Sijtsma that when considering how well a test measures one concept, α is not appropriate, but recommend ω _t rather than the glb, and (3) the end user needs procedures that are readily available in open source software.     

Correlational analysis of speakers' heights, weights, and temporal speech features.

Correlation coefficients on height, weight, and temporal features were computed separately for 15 female and 15 male speakers. With only one exception, speakers' heights and weights were not significantly correlated with their temporal characteristics. Implications of these findings and suggestions for future research are discussed.     

Spectral weights and the profile bowl

In these experiments, listeners detected changes in the shape of a complex spectrum that varied in overall level. With multicomponent complexes, a typical finding is that the listeners were more sensitive to changes made in the middle components of the spectrum than to changes made at either edge. We used a technique developed by Berg (1989) to estimate the weight listeners attached to the different components of the spectrum in making these judgements. For reasons not understood, the pattern of spectral weights was nearly optimum for a change made in the middle component of the spectrum and much poorer when the change occurred at either edge.     

Predetermination of test weights

Derivations are presented relating the length of a test to its weight in a composite. Tests of varying length are constructed so that their weights will be of predetermined magnitudes, and the results compared with expectations. Weighting schemes involving standard deviations of raw scores and of true scores are compared. An important secondary derivation is presented from which it is possible to estimate test reliability knowing only the relative length of a test, its shortened form, and the standard deviation of each.     

Agency, subjective time, and other minds

Intentional binding refers to a temporal attraction in the perceived times of actions and effects. So far, it has solely been investigated using judgments of the perceived time of actions or their effects. The authors report 3 experiments using an alternative method: the estimation of a time interval between a voluntary action and its subsequent effect. Interval estimates were obtained for intervals bounded by different kinds of actions and effects: The actions were either performed by the participants themselves or by the experimenter. The effects, in turn, were movements either applied to the body of the participant or to the experimenter. First, the results validated interval estimation as a method for exploring action awareness. Second, intentional binding was stronger for self-generated compared with observed actions, indicating that private information about the action contributes to action awareness. In contrast, intentional binding did not depend on whether a somatic effect was applied to the participant's or to another person's body. Third, for self-generated actions, external events gave rise to a stronger intentional binding than did somatic effects. This finding indicates that intentional binding especially links actions with their consequences in the external world.     

Enactivism,other minds,and mental disorders

Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are (at least partially) externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called “direct social perception” (DSP): the idea that we can sometimes perceive features of other minds directly in the character of their embodiment and environmental interactions. I argue that if DSP is true, we can probably also perceive certain features of mental disorders as well. I draw upon the developmental psychologist Daniel Stern’s notion of “forms of vitality”—largely overlooked in these debates—to develop this idea, and I use autism as a case study. I argue further that an enactive approach to DSP can clarify some ways we play a regulative role in shaping the temporal and phenomenal character of the disorder in question, and it may therefore have practical significance for both the clinical and therapeutic encounter.

     

Social desirability response bias as one source of the discrepancy between subjective weights and regression weights

This study of the judgment process investigated whether social desirability response bias is more closely associated with directly weighted subjective weights than less directly assessed regression weights. Graduating college students indicated their preferences for 11 job characteristics in four different tasks: (a) a statistical weighting task completed honestly, (b) a statistical weighting task completed to “look good” to a recruiter, (c) a subjective weighting task completed honestly, and (d) a subjective weighting task completed to “look good” to a recruiter. Predicted judgments were calculated from the weights obtained in each condition. Pearson correlation coefficients using these predicted judgments were computed between conditions; the relationship between the honest and positive impression predicted judgments derived from subjective weights was significantly greater than the relationship between honest and positive impression predicted judgments derived from regression weights for 19 of 23 participants. It was concluded that social desirability response bias was more closely related to subjective weights than to regression Weights.     

Relating reference points and weights in MOLP

A frequent problem for decision makers (DMs) analysing decisions involving multiple objectives is the identification and selection of the most preferred option from the set of non‐dominated solutions. Two techniques, weighted sum optimization and reference point optimization, have been developed to address this problem for multiobjective linear programming problems (MOLP). In this paper, we examine the relationship between these two techniques. We demonstrate that the values of the dual variables associate with auxiliary constraints of the reference point technique are equal to the weight values used to compute the same non‐dominated solution via the weighted sum technique. This insight will enable the development of new interactive solution procedures for MOLPs which allow the DM to readily switch from one method to the other during the search for the most preferred non‐dominated solution. The advantages of the approach are discussed in the paper. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Solidarity,justice, and recognition of the other

Solidarity has for a long time been referred to as the core value underpinning European health and welfare systems. But there has been debate in recent years about whether solidarity, with its alleged communitarian content, can be reconciled with the emphasis on individual freedom and personal autonomy. One may wonder whether there is still a place for solidarity, and whether the concept of justice should be embraced to analyse the moral issues regarding access to health care. In this article, I will answer this question by analysing the normative foundations of the concept of justice, followed by a deeper examination of the concept of solidarity in continental philosophy. More specifically, I will compare the philosophical traditions rooted in Kant (with emphasis on autonomy and individual rights) to approaches rooted in Hegel (with emphasis on individual relations of recognition). In addition, I will present the work of Avishai Margalit on the decent society to criticize a predominantly liberal approach to access to health care. The importance of solidarity lies particularly in its emphasis on relational aspects and the role of recognition in care practices, which are usually ignored in liberal approaches to justice. However, the article will argue that solidarity is not an alternative to a rights-based concept of justice, but must be considered as a necessary complement to it.     

Other minds,other people,and human opacity

This paper explains the absence of the problem of other minds in ancient philosophy and links its rise in early modern philosophy with the distinction between primary and secondary qualities and the consequent veil of ideas. The futile struggles of early modern philosophers with the problems is delineated. So too are the incoherent theories of modern neuroscientists and psychologists. The sources of the manifold confusions are pinned down to use and misuse of the concept of mind, to misunderstandings about the nature of the human ability to say how things are subjectively with oneself, to misconstruals of the nature of introspection and self-knowledge, and to the misguided picture of the “inner” and the “outer”. Philosophical misunderstandings about knowledge of other minds has masked the genuine limitations on our knowledge and understanding of our fellow human beings. Some of these rest on ignorance, others on the constitutional indeterminacy of the mental.     

Monotonicity,convexity, and other qualitative psychophysical laws

General methods are described for directly testing qualitative psychophysical laws, such as monotonicity and convexity. These methods consist of estimating lower and higher orders of derivatives and procedures for verifying qualitative laws involving these derivatives. The quantitative power law hypothesis is compared for goodness of fit with the qualitative hypothesis that the psychophysical function is monotone and convex, in application to bisection brightness data. Other topics include discussion of a possible topological formulation of the distinction between qualitative and quantitative laws; the search for psychophysical invariants; and the failure of qualitative laws such as convexity to conform to Luce's invariance-theoretic principles of theory construction.     

Jung, Evans-Wentz and various other gurus

How did Jung become deeply concerned with Asian religions and particularly with the Tibetan Buddhism of a Welshman from Trenton, New Jersey? Could that man be considered one of Jung's gurus? This essay begins six years after Jung, at twenty, was admitted to the medical school of Basel University and became a member of the Zofingiaverein, a student society. The next year he gave the first of a series of lectures on the interpretation of Christ as the model of the ‘god-man’, like the Apostle Paul, Confucius, Zoroaster and the Buddha, who was ‘drummed into the Hindu boy’. (Jung's Zofingia Lectures were discovered only after his death, in 1961, and were published in English in 1983). The present essay discusses Jung's early Buddhist interest as displayed in The Psychology of the Unconscious (finally, in a revision, entitled Symbols of Transformation), in Psychological Types and later in his foreword of the Wilhelm translation of the I Ching. Jung was influenced by the gurus Richard Wilhelm and his son Hellmut, the scholar J. W. Hauer (with whom he later broke off relations because of Hauer's Nazi politics), the indologist Heinrich Zimmer, and the Zen master D. T. Suzuki. Walter Yeeling Wentz was born in Trenton in 1878 and brought up in his family's theosophist faith. The Wentzes moved to San Diego in 1900, and Walter added his mother's Celtic surname, Evans, to the German Wentz. He was educated at Stanford University and travelled in Europe, studying Celtic folklore, and widely in the Near East, Tibet, India, and Oxford – studying religions everywhere and editing Tibetan books. He lived his last decades in San Diego and conducted a correspondence with Jung, while living in a cheap hotel, or in an ashram.