Grasping visual illusions: no evidence for a dissociation between perception and action

Neuropsychological studies prompted the theory that the primate visual system might be organized into two parallel pathways, one for conscious perception and one for guiding action. Supporting evidence in healthy subjects seemed to come from a dissociation in visual illusions: In previous studies, the Ebbinghaus (or Titchener) illusion deceived perceptual judgments of size, but only marginally influenced the size estimates used in grasping. Contrary to those results, the findings from the present study show that there is no difference in the sizes of the perceptual and grasp illusions if the perceptual and grasping tasks are appropriately matched. We show that the differences found previously can be accounted for by a hitherto unknown, nonadditive effect in the illusion. We conclude that the illusion does not provide evidence for the existence of two distinct pathways for perception and action in the visual system.     

The hare and the snail: Dissociating visual orienting from conscious perception

A method for investigating attentional effects of peripheral visual objects, independently of perceptual identification, is described. We report an experiment using this method which shows that visual processing of peripheral objects differs radically, depending on whether participants move attention in response to an object or consciously perceive that object. When luminance contrast was reduced, conscious perceptual discrimination of peripheral letters was massively slower and less accurate—but both low and high contrast letters elicited rapid attentional orienting effects and these rapid orienting effects were equal in magnitude across low and high contrast. This pattern is consistent with known differences in luminance sensitivity between the dorsal and ventral visual processing streams, and with rapid dorsal–ventral interaction mediated via re-entrant feedback. Our findings show that the control system responsible for rapid movements of attention is exquisitely sensitive to visual form information at low levels of contrast, and involves a different neurocognitive pathway to that which gives rise to conscious perception.     

Erratum to: Voluntary action alters the perception of visual illusions

Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics -     

A double dissociation between action and perception in the context of visual illusions: opposite effects of real and illusory size

The idea that there are two distinct cortical visual pathways, a dorsal action stream and a ventral perception stream, is supported by neuroimaging and neuropsychological evidence. Yet there is an ongoing debate as to whether or not the action system is resistant to pictorial illusions in healthy participants. In the present study, we disentangled the effects of real and illusory object size on action and perception by pitting real size against illusory size. In our task, two objects that differed slightly in length were placed within a version of the Ponzo illusion. Even though participants erroneously perceived the physically longer object as the shorter one (or vice versa), their grasping was remarkably tuned to the real size difference between the objects. These results provide the first demonstration of a double dissociation between action and perception in the context of visual illusions and together with previous findings converge on the idea that visually guided action and visual perception make use of different metrics and frames of reference.     

Internal representation of visual texture as the basis for the judgment of similarity

The relationship between Fourier spectra of visual textures (represented both by the actual frequency components and by the response of four hypothetical channels selectively sensitive to spatial frequency) and the perceptual appearance of the textures was investigated. Thirty textures were synthesized by combining seven spatial frequencies whose amplitudes were randomly chosen and then scaled to give an overall contrast of .9. Similarity judgments were collected using both the method of triadic comparison (two subjects, 4,060 trials each) and the method of paired comparison (six subjects, 435 trials each). The similarity judgments were subjected to MDSCAL and INDSCAL dimensions were found to be optimally oriented in terms of spatial frequency information without rotation. The seven spatial frequency components accounted for 90.6% of the variance in the 3-D INDSCAL space, while the four channels accounted for 91.8% of the variance in the first two dimensions. The data further suggest that the four channels may interact in an opponent process manner. The results support the idea that the visual internal representation of stimuli is based on spatial frequency analysis rather than feature extraction.     

Grasping possibilities for action: influence of object function and action capabilities

The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of object function and the observer's action capabilities on grasp facilitation. We used a stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) protocol in which participants were asked to reach and grasp a drinking glass using one of two grasps - the thumb-up or the thumb-down grasp. The reaction time (RT) was used as the index of grasp facilitation. In Experiment 1, we found evidence for the facilitation of "functionally relevant" grasps - where the type of grasp facilitated depended on the location of opening but not the shape of the object. However, this effect was found only when attention was directed toward the location of the opening. In Experiments 2 and 3, we found that this facilitation was also affected by whether participants had the ability to functionally interact with the object. These results show that S-R compatibilities are influenced both by the object's function and the actor's action capabilities, and are interpreted in Gibson's (1979) framework of affordances.     

Footsteps and inchworms: illusions show that contrast affects apparent speed

A horizontal grey bar that drifts horizontally across a surround of black and white vertical stripes appears to stop and start as it crosses each stripe. A dark bar appears to slow down on a black stripe, where its edges have low contrast, and to accelerate on a white stripe, where its edges have high contrast. A light-grey bar appears to slow down on a white stripe and to accelerate on a black stripe. If the background luminances at the leading and trailing edges of the moving bar are the same, the bar appears to change speed, and if they are different the bar appears to change in length. A plaid surround can induce 2-D illusions that modulate the apparent direction, not just the speed, of moving squares. Thus, the motion salience of a moving edge depends critically on its instantaneous contrast against the background.     

The impact of visual illusions on perception, action planning, and motor performance

The present study extended recent research revealing that illusions can influence performance in golf putting (Witt, Linkenauger, & Proffitt Psychological Science, 23, 397–399, 2012), by exploring the potential mediating roles of attention and action planning. Glover and Dixon’s (Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 27, 560–572, 2001) planning–control model suggests that both perceptual and movement-planning processes are prone to illusion-based bias. We therefore predicted that both the perception of target size and a measure of attentional control related to movement planning in golf putting (the quiet eye) would be influenced by the illusion. Moreover, as performance could not be corrected using online control (once the ball was struck), we predicted that these biases would also influence performance. We therefore proposed a three-stage process by which illusory context biases perceptual processes, which in turn bias subsequent attentional control related to movement planning, which in turn biases motor performance. Forty novice golfers completed an Ebbinghaus illusion putting task that was designed to manipulate their perceptions of target size, while quiet eye duration and performance (mean radial error) were measured. The results indicated that the illusion was effective in facilitating differences in perceived target size, with perceptually bigger holes promoting longer quiet eye durations and more accurate putting. Follow-up mediation analyses revealed that illusion-based differences in size perception partially mediated illusion-based differences in both quiet eye duration and performance. Moreover, the relationship between illusion-based differences in quiet eye duration and performance was also significant. Future research should further test this three-stage process of bias in other far-aiming tasks in which online control cannot be used.     

The Ebbinghaus illusion modulates visual search for size-defined targets: evidence for preattentive processing of apparent object size

Five search experiments investigated whether the apparent size of objects is, like their retinal size, coded in preattentive vision. Observers searched for a target circle that was either larger or smaller than distractor circles, with both types of test circles surrounded by context circles modulating apparent size (i.e., the Ebbinghaus illusion). The size ratio between the test and the context circles was manipulated in such a way that the test circles were surrounded by, for example, smaller context circles (making the larger target appear even larger) or by larger context circles (making the smaller distractors appear even smaller). Under optimal conditions, the detection reaction times were independent of the number of test circles in the display, and the Ebbinghaus illusion facilitated the detection of the target even in comparison with control conditions without any context circles. This finding is consistent with preattentive, spatially parallel processing of apparent size.     

Target size and luminance in apparent brightness of the peripheral visual field.

Four target sizes between 15 and 120 min. of arc with six luminance levels covering the range between 398.1 and 1.26 cd/m2 in steps of .5 log units were presented to 0, 20, 40, 60, and 80 degrees nasal retinal loci. In both peripheral and foveal viewing, magnitude estimates to apparent brightness judged by 12 Ss changed as a function of target size and luminance. The exponent of the power function was not dependent on retinal loci but on target size. However, when target size increased, the apparent brightness was slightly greater with peripheral viewing than with foveal viewing.     

Subjective criteria and illusions in visual testing: some methodological limitations

It is argued that illusions cannot generally be investigated with criterion-independent methods. This limits the value of the data obtained from them. This is particularly important when the results are compared between groups of subjects, for example, between dyslexic readers and controls, since it is possible that the differences between the groups reflect differences with regard to criteria rather than real perceptual differences.     

Mental control and visual illusions: Toward explaining race-biased weapon misidentifications

People are biased to misidentify harmless objects as weapons when the objects are associated with African Americans (Payne, 2001). Two studies examined the processes underlying this bias. The illusory perception hypothesis argues that stereotypes alter the subjective construal of the object. In contrast, the executive failure hypothesis argues that even when perception of the item is intact, misidentifications can result from failures to control responses. Immediately after making an error, participants were able to accurately express that they had made a mistake via confidence ratings (Experiment 1) and by correcting their judgment (Experiment 2). Subjective confidence judgments were extremely well calibrated to accuracy, and participants virtually never believed their own mistakes. Conditions likely to create errors through both illusions and control failures are discussed.     

Contour: A hypermedia environment for teaching about subjective contours and other visual illusions

Contour is an interactive HyperCard stack for the Apple Macintosh computer, which presents users with a wealth of information (text, graphics, sound, and animation) concerning the history, theory, and methodology used in the research of a class of visual illusions calledsubjective contour illusions. The stack is divided into six sections (Introduction, Findings, Index, References, Map, and File Creator), which allow users to access differing types of information in several ways. As users navigate through the stack, they are presented with multimedia information that they can trace through author, theory, or type of illusion. The stack allows users to make notes to themselves on the information presented, to execute a literature search of the most relevant articles in the subjective contour literature, and to save them in text file for printing in a word processing program. The study of subjective contour illusions can be viewed as a microcosm of issues in the field of visual perception.     

Spontaneous trait inferences as self-generated primes: implications for conscious social judgment.

The priming literature has documented the influence of trait terms held outside of conscious awareness on later judgment relevant to the primed trait dimension. The present research demonstrated that spontaneous trait inferences can serve as self-generated primes. In Experiment 1, Ss instructed to memorize trait-implying sentences (thus spontaneously inferring traits outside of consciousness) showed assimilation effects in judgment. Ss instructed to form inferences from these sentences (thus consciously inferring traits) showed contrast effects. Experiment 2 demonstrated that these findings were due to semantic activation rather than to a general evaluative response. When evaluatively inconsistent trait constructs were primed, similar patterns of assimilation and contrast were found. Implications for the ubiquitous occurrence of priming through the process of social categorization are discussed.     

Intentional action: conscious experience and neural prediction

Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that "I" am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a movement against its internally predicted effects. However, it remains unclear whether our conscious experience of action depends on a precise matching process, or a retrospective inference that "I" must have been responsible for a particular event. We report an experiment in which normal subjects judged the perceived time of either intentional actions, involuntary movements, or subsequent effects (auditory tones) of these. We found that the subject's intention to produce the auditory tone produced an intentional binding between the perceived times of the subject's action and the tone. However, if the intention was interrupted by an imposed involuntary movement, followed by the identical tone, no such binding occurred. The phenomenology of intentional action requires an appropriate predictive link between intentions and effects, rather than a retrospective inference that "I" caused the effect.     

Grasping the diagonal: controlling attention to illusory stimuli for action and perception

Since the pioneering work of [Aglioti, S., DeSouza, J. F., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). Size-contrast illusions deceive the eye but not the hand. Current Biology, 5(6), 679-685] visual illusions have been used to provide evidence for the functional division of labour within the visual system-one system for conscious perception and the other system for unconscious guidance of action. However, these studies were criticised for attentional mismatch between action and perception conditions and for the fact that grip size is not determined by the size of an object but also by surrounding obstacles. Stoettinger and Perner [Stoettinger, E., & Perner, J., (2006). Dissociating size representations for action and for conscious judgment: Grasping visual illusions without apparent obstacles. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 269-284] used the diagonal illusion controlling for the influence of surrounding features on grip size and bimanual grasping to rule out attentional mismatch. Unfortunately, the latter objective was not fully achieved. In the present study, attentional mismatch was avoided by using only the dominant hand for action and for indicating perceived size. Results support the division of labour: Grip aperture follows actual size independent of illusory effects, while finger-thumb span indications of perceived length are clearly influenced by the illusion.     

Reaching with alien limbs: visual exposure to prosthetic hands in a mirror biases proprioception without accompanying illusions of ownership

In five experiments, we investigated the effects of visual exposure to a real hand, arubber hand, or a wooden block on reaching movements made with the unseen left hand behind a parasagittal mirror. Participants reached from one of four starting positions, corresponding to four levels of conflict between the proprioceptively and visually specified positions of the reaching hand. Reaching movements were affected most by exposure to the real hand, intermediately by the rubber hand, and least of all by the wooden block When the posture and/or movement of the visible hand was incompatible with that of the reaching hand, the effect on reaching was reduced. A "rubber hand illusion" questionnaire revealed that illusions of ownership of the rubber hand were not strongly correlated with reaching performance. This research suggests that proprioception is recalibrated following visual exposure to prosthetic hands and that this recalibration is independent of the rubber hand illusion.     

Interference effects demonstrate distinct roles for visual and motor imagery during the mental representation of human action

Four experiments were completed to characterize the utilization of visual imagery and motor imagery during the mental representation of human action. In Experiment 1, movement time functions for a motor imagery human locomotion task conformed to a speed-accuracy trade-off similar to Fitts' Law, whereas those for a visual imagery object motion task did not. However, modality-specific interference effects in Experiment 2 demonstrate visual and motor imagery as cooperative processes when the action represented is tied to visual coordinates in space. Biomechanic-specific motor interference effects found in Experiment 3 suggest one basis for separation of processing channels within motor imagery. Finally, in Experiment 4 representations of motor actions were found to be generated using only visual imagery under certain circumstances: namely, when the imaginer represented the motor action of another individual while placed at an opposing viewpoint. These results suggest that the modality of representation recruited to generate images of human action is dependent on the dynamic relationship between the individual, movement, and environment.     

Levels of processing in visual illusions: the combination and interaction of distortion-producing mechanisms

In order to assess the mode and sequence of interaction of visual-geometric illusion mechanisms, responses to simple and composite overestimation configurations were measured in 72 observers. Analysis suggests that some illusion mechanisms add their distortions to the outputs of others and that other mechanisms average. A logarithmic or near-logarithmic transformation seems to occur when illusory effects combine. A path analysis of the results suggests that some illusory mechanisms combine in a serial manner and that others operate on separate parallel channels. Notions based on simple addition of illusory effects and on serial linear processing are not supported by these analyses.