Terrorism and the Uses of Terror

“Terrorism”' is sometimes defined as a “form ofcoercion.” But there are important differences between ordinary coercion and terrorist intimidation. This paper explores some of those differences, particularly the relation between coercion, on the one hand, and terror and terrorization, on the other hand. The paper argues that while terrorism is not necessarily associated with terror in the literal sense, it does often seek to instill a mental state like terror in the populations that it targets. However, the point of instilling this mental state is not necessarily coercive or intimidatory: one can try to instill terror as an act of punishment, or as an expressive or therapeutic act, or because one values the political consequences that might follow, or because one thinks terror is preferable, from an ethical point of view, to the inauthentic complacency that characterizes the targeted population at present. Though this paper asks questions about the definition of “terrorism,” these questions are not asked for their own sake. The quest for a canonical definition of “terrorism” is probably a waste of time. But asking questions which sound like questions of definition is sometimes a fruitful way of focusing our reflections on terrorism and organizing our response. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The temporality of Merleau-Ponty’s intertwining

In his last work, The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty explored the fact that we believe that perception occurs in our heads (“in the recesses of a body”) and, hence, assert that the perceptual world is “in” us, while also believing that we are “in” the world we perceive.  In this article, I examine how this intertwining of self and world justifies the faith we have in perception. I shall do so by considering a number of examples.  In each case, the object “in itself” will turn out to be neither within us nor outside of us, but rather at the intersection set by the intertwining. I will then turn to what this disclosure of this object reveals about human temporality and, indeed, about human being as a place (or “clearing”) that permits disclosure.     

Motivational Cognitivism and the Argument from Direction of Fit

An important argument for the belief-desire thesis is based on the idea that an agent can be motivated to act only if her mental states include one which aims at changing the world, that is, one with a “world-to-mind”, or “telic”, direction of fit. Some cognitivists accept this claim, but argue that some beliefs, notably moral ones, have not only a “mind-to-world”, or “thetic”, direction of fit, but also a telic one. The paper first argues that this cognitivist reply is deficient, for only the “dominant” direction of fit of an attitude is responsible for its character and function. Further, it seems that the dominant direction of fit of an attitude is determined by its psychological mode, and so all beliefs seem to have a dominant thetic direction of fit, and to be motivationally inert. The main part of this paper, however, is devoted to explaining how it is that attitudes, like moral attitudes, can truly have two directions of fit in a way which enables them to be both cognitive and motivational. Reflection on the nature of beliefs suggests that the claim that the dominant direction of fit of an attitude is determined by its psychological mode should be qualified. The reasons beliefs provide draw their authority for the agent – their demanding nature – from the objects represented by these beliefs, and so, it is the beliefs’ content which determine their dominant direction of fit, as far as their role in practical reasoning is concerned. Thus, in the sense relevant to practical reasoning a belief with a normative content does have a dominant telic direction of fit. At the same time, in the sense relevant to its satisfaction conditions a moral belief has a dominant thetic direction of fit, which underlies its classification as a cognitive attitude. Cognitivists, then, can have it both ways.     

The logic of scientific and religious principles

Summary In every domain, the philosopher finds some principle which is unfalsifiable in so far as all experience is interpreted in accordance with it. This principle is tautologous or analytic-within-its domain in that it defines fundamental terms with which it characterizes experiences: Newton’s Laws define “mass” and “the equality of times”; the Principle of the Rectilinear Propagation of LIght defines “light”; the Principle of Evolution defines “adaptation” and “natural selection”; and the Principle of the Conservation of Energy defines “a closed system.” Moreover, each principle is employed as a methodological rule or a tacit imperative to the investigator to interpret experience or to draw inferences in accordance with it. Nevertheless, each principle has empirical content: not only by virtue of its place within its respective domain but also because there are sufficient rules of correspondence which make the statement-form empirically relevant; not only because the principle itself is taken to be true but also because empirical inferences are drawn in accordance with it. To construe these principles as mere counterfactuals would be clearly incorrect. Counterfactuals, as Rescher would characterize them, are “belief-contravening suppositions” because certain beliefs are excluded if one is to be consistent. Although this is certainly true of these principles, the range of beliefs contravened is far larger than those beliefs excluded in mere laws of nature. For, to give up these principles would be to give up explaining the entire domain of experience to which they are applicable.     

Moorean responses to skepticism: a defense

Few philosophers believe that G. E. Moore’s notorious proof of an external world can give us justification to believe that skepticism about perceptual beliefs is false. The most prominent explanation of what is wrong with Moore’s proof—as well as some structurally similar anti-skeptical arguments—centers on conservatism: roughly, the view that someone can acquire a justified belief that p on the basis of E only if he has p-independent justification to believe that all of the skeptical hypotheses that undermine the support lent by E to p are false. In this paper I argue that conservatism does not make trouble for Moore’s proof. I do this by setting up a dilemma concerning the notion of “justification to believe” that figures in conservatism. On one understanding of justification to believe, conservatism is subject to obvious counterexamples. On another understanding of justification to believe, conservatism is consistent with Moore’s “proof” conferring justification upon its conclusion. Since these two understandings exhaust the logical space, the conservative indictment of Mooreanism fails.     

Why did this happen to me? Religious believers’ and non-believers’ teleological reasoning about life events

People often believe that significant life events happen for a reason. In three studies, we examined evidence for the view that teleological beliefs reflect a general cognitive bias to view the world in terms of agency, purpose, and design. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that individual differences in mentalizing ability predicted both the tendency to believe in fate (Study 1) and to infer purposeful causes of one’s own life events (Study 2). In addition, people’s perception of purpose in life events was correlated with their teleological beliefs about nature, but this relationship was driven primarily by individuals’ explicit religious and paranormal beliefs (Study 3). Across all three studies, we found that while people who believe in God hold stronger teleological beliefs than those who do not, there is nonetheless evidence of teleological beliefs among non-believers, confirming that the perception of purpose in life events does not rely on theistic belief. These findings suggest that the tendency to perceive design and purpose in life events—while moderated by theistic belief—is not solely a consequence of culturally transmitted religious ideas. Rather, this teleological bias has its roots in certain more general social propensities.     

Cyber terror: Missing in action

This article discusses the limited utility of the concepts of “cyber terrorism” or “electronic Pearl Harbor.” It contrasts the absence of cyber terror incidents with the large number of terrorist attacks and computer security incidents in recent years. It suggests that this discrepancy is explained both by the low appeal of cyber weapons to terrorists and because critical infrastructures and nations are not vulnerable to computer attacks. The article calls for a more rigorous approach to data collection for cyber security incidents, and suggests cyber security should not be seen primarily as a national security issue. Before joining CSIS, he served in the U.S. Foreign Service and worked on security, intelligence, and technology issues. Lewis’s current research covers cyber security, spectrum management, authentication, and technology’s role in national security. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1984.     

Prospective teachers’ beliefs about students’ goal orientations: A carry-over effect of prior schooling experiences?

This study examined the relationship between prospective teachers’ (N = 166) retrospective perceptions of their own past achievement goals and their current beliefs about students’ goal orientations and achievement behaviors. Results of hierarchical regression analysis provide correlation evidence in support of a “carry-over effect” of prospective teachers’ past goal orientations on their current beliefs about students. Specifically, prospective teachers’ were found to believe that their future students will pursue goal orientations analogous to their own past goal orientations. In addition, prospective teachers’ explanations for why students might engage in or avoid achievement-directed behaviors were examined. Regardless of past goal orientation, “internal motives” (e.g., improvement and self-satisfaction) represented the most frequent explanation offered by prospective teachers for why students engage in achievement behaviors. Prospective teachers with past performance-approach goals were significantly more likely to view avoidance as a sign of “laziness,” whereas those with past performance-avoidant goals were more likely to view avoidance as resulting from a “lack of confidence and support.” Implications for subsequent research are discussed.     

Assessing the state of organizational safety—culture or climate?

This article explores the concepts of safety culture and safety climate in an attempt to determine which is the more useful for describing an organization's “state of safety.” From a review of the literature purporting to measure safety culture or safety climate, it is argued that, although the two terms are often interchangeable, they are actually distinct but related concepts and should be treated accordingly. The term “safety climate” best describes employees' perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs about risk and safety, typically measured by questionnaire surveys and providing a “snapshot” of the current state of safety. “Safety culture” is a more complex and enduring trait reflecting fundamental values, norms, assumptions and expectations, which to some extent reside in societal culture. The expression of these “cultural” elements, perhaps, can be seen through safety management practices which are reflected in the safety climate. Basically, measurement of safety culture requires in-depth investigation including an analysis of how organizational members interact to form a shared view of safety.     

Scientific Realism: Old and New Problems

Scientific realism is a doctrine that was both in and out of fashion several times during the twentieth century. I begin by noting three presuppositions of a succinct characterization of scientific realism offered initially by the foremost critic in the latter part of the century, Bas van Fraassen. The first presupposition is that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between what is “empirical” and what is “theoretical”. The second presupposition is that a genuine scientific realism is committed to their being “a literally true story of what the world is like”. The third presupposition is that there are methods for justifying a belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory which do not also suffice to justify beliefs in its literal truth. Each of these presuppositions raises a number of problems, some of which are quite old and others rather newer. In each case, I briefly review some of the old problems and then elaborate the newer problems.     

Dysfunctional beliefs, self-monitoring, and marital conflict

Relationships among relationship beliefs, self-monitoring and conflict behavior were examined in 74 married couples. It was predicted that dysfunctional relationship beliefs would be negatively correlated with marital satisfaction and that high self-monitoring spouses would endorse more dysfunctional relationship beliefs and display more disagreeing and leadership conflict behavior. Dysfunctional beliefs were negatively correlated with satisfaction but low and high self-monitors did not differ in their conflict behavior. Discriminant analyses indicated that marital distress was a function of endorsement of dysfunctional relationship beliefs; decreased satisfaction with decisions; increased conflict relevance; and increased impression management reflected in high self-monitoring orientations among husbands and wives’ beliefs that their husbands were not behaving “normally.” The contribution of gender and impression management to marital distress is discussed. This study was funded by a University of Wisconsin-Madison faculty research grant awarded to the author.     

Assigning biological functions: making sense of causal chains

A meaningful distinction can be made between functions and mere effects in biological systems without resorting to teleological arguments: (i) biological systems must cope with a multitude of problems or they will cease to exist; (ii) the solutions to these problems invariably depend on circular causal chains (“feedback loops”); and (iii) biological functions are attributes of elements in biological systems that have an effect which, by contributing to the correcting behavior of a feedback control system, assists in solving a biological problem. The analysis is applied to several biological systems. The proposed solution is discussed primarily in its relation to two popular approaches to the concept of biological function, i.e., the “causal role accounts” and the “selected effect accounts”.     

"气"概念几个层次意义的分殊

In Chinese philosophy, although the concept of “qi” has numerous meanings, it is not completely without order or chaotic. Generally speaking, “qi” has several different levels of meanings, such as in philosophy, physics, physiology, psychology, ethics, and so on. On the philosophical level, “qi” is similar to “air,” and it is essentially similar to the “matter-energy” or “field” in physics, which refers to the origin or an element of all things in the world. It is from this point that the meanings of “qi” in physiology, psychology, ethics as well as aesthetics are derived. This paper analyzes the meanings of “qi” on five levels and seeks to clarify misunderstandings about “qi,” such as its alleged pan-vitalistic, conscious and pan-ethical characters. Translated by Yan Xin from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2006, (9): 34–41     

Dispute Irrational Beliefs and Teach Rational Beliefs: An Interview with Albert Ellis

In this interview, Ellis acknowledges that irrational beliefs have a higher biological basis than rational beliefs and that they are not at opposite ends of the same continuum. Ellis agrees that irrational beliefs are more involved in mental health problems while rational beliefs contribute to the psychology of success. The strength of conviction in both rational and irrational beliefs including self-acceptance and self-downing is explored. Ellis equates the conviction with which rational beliefs need to be held to influence emotions and behaviors with “faith.” He acknowledges the importance of faith built on facts rather than religiosity. Ellis agrees that ridding strongly motivated individuals of self-depreciation may lead to a decrease in their high frustration tolerance and, ultimately, their drive for and achievement of success. Ellis supports adding an “F” to the ABCDE model—forcefully agreeing with and applying new rational beliefs. Ellis discusses the need to develop a literature on therapeutic techniques and methods for helping people to apply rational beliefs more strongly to different areas of their lives. Ellis highlights the perils of self-efficacy positive psychology interventions if people’s innate tendency towards self-depreciation is ignored. The interviewer concludes the interview expressing the view that if we listen to Ellis, “we” need to re-think the ways we teach people of all ages to think rationally knowing that the rational re-statement of previously disputed irrational beliefs is only one of many different teaching methods. This interview was conducted in January, 2005, at the Albert Ellis Institute. At the time of the interview, Dr. Ellis was in good health. In this interview held over two separate sessions, a series of questions prepared by the interviewer were presented to Albert Ellis that were designed to stimulate discussion on differences between rational and irrational beliefs and on the issue of whether once irrational beliefs have been disputed, more time and REBT methods need to be devoted to helping clients strengthen their conviction in and application of rational beliefs.     

Coherence in Epistemology and Belief Revision*

A general theory of coherence is proposed, in which systemic and relational coherence are shown to be interdefinable. When this theory is applied to sets of sentences, it turns out that logical closure obscures the distinctions that are needed for a meaningful analysis of coherence. It is concluded that references to “all beliefs” in coherentist phrases such as “all beliefs support each other” have to be modified so that merely derived beliefs are excluded. Therefore, in order to avoid absurd conclusions, coherentists have to accept a weak version of epistemic priority, that sorts out merely derived beliefs. Furthermore, it is shown that in belief revision theory, coherence cannot be adequately represented by logical closure, but has to be represented separately. *Contribution to “Seven Bridges”     

Still an American? Mortality Salience and Treatment of Suspected Terrorists

In today's post‐9/11 world, it is important to consider the psychological factors related to beliefs about the proper treatment of those suspected of terrorist involvement. We report 2 experiments on the impact of mortality salience on people's willingness to deny procedural protections to terror suspects. Reminders of mortality led participants to extend more procedural protections to an American terrorism suspect, but fewer toward a Saudi Arabian. In Study 2, we replicated and extended the results of Study 1 by showing that support of extreme interrogation measures was specific to members of enemy out‐groups (e.g., Saudis), as opposed to non‐enemy out‐groups (e.g., Bulgarians). The results are discussed in terms of terror‐management theory.     

Can the World Help Us in Fixing the Reference of Natural Kind Terms?

According to Putnam the reference of natural kind terms is fixed by the world, at least partly; whether two things belong to the same kind depends on whether they obey the same objective laws. We show that Putnam's criterion of substance identity only “works” if we read “objective laws” as “OBJECTIVE LAWS”. Moreover, at least some of the laws of some of the special sciences have to be included. But what we consider to be good special sciences and what not depends upon our values. Hence, “objective laws” cannot be read as “OBJECTIVE LAWS”. It follows that the reference of natural kind terms cannot be fixed by the world, not even partly. The final conclusion applies to a variety of realisms. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.