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John D. Arras 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2009,30(1):11-30
In this commentary, I critically discuss the respective views of Gert and Beauchamp–Childress on the nature of so-called common
morality and its promise for enriching ethical reflection within the field of bioethics. Although I endorse Beauchamp and
Childress’ shift from an emphasis on ethical theory as the source of moral norms to an emphasis on common morality, I question
whether rouging up common morality to make it look like some sort of ultimate and universal foundation for morality, untouched
by the dialectics of time and reflective equilibrium, was an equally good move. As for Gert’s magisterial conception of common
morality, I conclude that certain elements of his system are controversial at best and woefully inadequate at worst. He has
a tendency to find in common morality what he himself put there, and his highly restricted conception of duties of assistance
strikes this reader as ad hoc, inadequately defended, and unworthy of a project whose goal is to lessen the amount of misery
in the world.
相似文献
John D. ArrasEmail: |
3.
We have two aims in this paper. The first is negative: to demonstrate the problems in Bernard Gert’s account of common morality,
in particular as it applies to professional morality. The second is positive: to suggest a more satisfactory explanation of
the moral basis of professional role morality, albeit one that is broadly consistent with Gert’s notion of common morality,
but corrects and supplements Gert’s theory. The paper is in three sections. In the first, we sketch the main features of Gert’s
account of common morality in general. In the second, we outline Gert’s explanation of the source of professional moral rules
and demonstrate its inadequacy. In the third section, we provide an account of our own collectivist needs-based view of the
source of the role-moral obligations of many professional roles, including those of health care professionals.
相似文献
Andrew AlexandraEmail: |
4.
Patricia Sheridan 《Sophia》2007,46(3):263-275
Hutcheson’s theory of morality shares far more common ground with Clarke’s morality than is generally acknowledged. In fact,
Hutcheson’s own view of his innovations in moral theory suggest that he understood moral sense theory more as an elaboration
and partial correction to Clarkean fitness theory than as an outright rejection of it. My aim in this paper will be to illuminate
what I take to be Hutcheson’s grounds for adopting this attitude toward Clarkean fitness theory. In so doing, I hope to bring
to light an otherwise unexpected continuity between moral sense theory and the moral rationalism to which it is usually opposed,
and, in so doing, draw attention to the anti-sceptical realism that lies at the heart of both accounts.
相似文献
Patricia SheridanEmail: |
5.
Peter J. King 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(3):327-345
Academic discussion of pornography is generally restricted to issues arising from the depiction of adults. I argue that child-pornography
is a more complex matter, and that generally accepted moral judgements concerning pornography in general have to be revised
when children are involved. I look at the question of harm to the children involved, the consumers, and society in general,
at the question of blame, and at the possibility of a morally acceptable form of child-pornography. My approach involves an
objectivist meta-ethics and a utilitarian view of practical ethics, and I bring out the advantages of these theories to the
consideration of moral issues such as this one.
相似文献
Peter J. KingEmail: |
6.
Rauprich O 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2008,29(1):43-71
The notion of common morality plays a prominent role in some of the most influential theories of biomedical ethics. Here,
I focus on Beauchamp and Childress’s models in the fourth and fifth edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics as well as on a revision that Beauchamp proposed in a recent article. Although there are significant differences in these
works that require separate analysis, all include a role for common morality as starting point and normative framework for
theory construction in combination with a coherence theory of moral justification. I defend to some extent the existence and
empirical significance of common morality, as delineated by Beauchamp and Childress in different versions, but criticize its
normative role. It is neither convincing as a moral foundation nor well compatible with a standard coherentist justification.
I suggest that the authors should give up the foundational account for a more modest account of common morality as resource
of well-established moral insights and experiences, which have proved generally valid but neither sufficient nor infallible.
Beauchamp’s latest proposal appears as a step in this direction; indeed, it may be the beginning of the end of his common-morality
theory.
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Oliver RauprichEmail: |
7.
We review several instances where cognitive research has identified distinct psychological mechanisms for moral judgment that
yield conflicting answers to moral dilemmas. In each of these cases, the conflict between psychological mechanisms is paralleled
by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories. A parsimonious account of this data is that key claims
supporting different moral theories ultimately derive from the psychological mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments.
If this view is correct, it has some important implications for the practice of philosophy. We suggest several ways that moral
philosophy and practical reasoning can proceed in the face of discordant theories grounded in diverse psychological mechanisms.
相似文献
Fiery CushmanEmail: |
8.
Carolina Sartorio 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):117-133
I argue that, according to ordinary morality, there is moral inertia, that is, moral pressure to fail to intervene in certain
circumstances. Moral inertia is manifested in scenarios with a particular causal structure: deflection scenarios, where a
threatening or benefiting process is diverted from a group of people to another. I explain why the deflection structure is
essential for moral inertia to be manifested. I argue that there are two different manifestations of moral inertia: strict
prohibitions on interventions, and constraints on interventions. Finally, I discuss the connection between moral inertia and
the distinction between killing and letting die (or doing and allowing harm).
相似文献
Carolina SartorioEmail: |
9.
Adam Kadlac 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(1):35-52
This paper explores Descartes’s work with an eye towards abiding issues in moral epistemology. In so doing, I focus on the
role played by the so-called provisional morality that surfaces in “Discourse on the Method”. What I argue is that despite
the tenuousness with which it seems to be held, Descartes remained committed to the truth of this morality even in the midst
of his most strenuous philosophical reflections. Put in the contemporary epistemological terms which provide the context of
my discussion, I argue that Descartes believed in the goodness of his provisional morality as opposed to merely accepting
its maxims.
相似文献
Adam KadlacEmail: |
10.
F. Allan Hanson 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(3):415-424
Recent social theory has departed from methodological individualism’s explanation of action according to the motives and dispositions
of human individuals in favor of explanation in terms of broader agencies consisting of both human and nonhuman elements described
as cyborgs, actor-networks, extended agencies, or distributed cognition. This paper proposes that moral responsibility for
action also be vested in extended agencies. It advances a consequentialist view of responsibility that takes moral responsibility
to be a species of causal responsibility, and it answers objections that might be raised on the basis of intentions and deserts.
相似文献
F. Allan HansonEmail: |
11.
Is Law’s Conventionality Consistent with Law’s Objectivity? 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Matthew H. Kramer 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):241-252
Legal positivism’s multi-faceted insistence on the separability of law and morality includes an insistence on the thoroughly
conventional status of legal norms as legal norms. Yet the positivist affirmation of the conventionality of law may initially
seem at odds with the mind-independence of the existence and contents and implications of legal norms. Mind-independence,
a central aspect of legal objectivity, has been seen by some theorists as incompatible with the mind-dependence of conventions.
Such a perception of incompatibility has led some anti-positivist theorists to reject the notion of law’s conventionality,
and has led some positivist theorists to query law’s mind-independence. What will be contended here is that both camps are
mistaken.
相似文献
Matthew H. KramerEmail: |
12.
Obstetric Ultrasound and the Technological Mediation of Morality: A Postphenomenological Analysis 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Peter-Paul Verbeek 《Human Studies》2008,31(1):11-26
This article analyzes the moral relevance of technological artifacts and its possible role in ethical theory, by taking the
postphenomenological approach that has developed around the work of Don Ihde into the domain of ethics. By elaborating a postphenomenological
analysis of the mediating role of ultrasound in moral decisions about abortion, the article argues that technologies embody
morality and help to constitute moral subjectivity. This technological mediation of the moral subject is subsequently addressed
in terms of Michel Foucault’s ethical position, in which ethics is about actively co-shaping one’s moral subjectivity. Integrating
Foucauldian ethics and postphenomenology, the article argues that the technological mediation of moral subjectivity should
be at the heart of an ethical approach that takes the moral dimensions of technology seriously.
相似文献
Peter-Paul VerbeekEmail: |
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14.
Michael Veber 《Sophia》2007,46(2):177-187
Recent studies provide some support for the idea that prayer has curative powers. It is argued that even if prayers are effective
in these kinds of cases it cannot be because God is answering them. While many have challenged theological explanations for
the efficacy of prayer on epistemic grounds, the argument presented here concludes that the theological explanation conflicts
with the standard conception of God. In particular, if God answers prayers in these kinds of cases then God is immoral.
相似文献
Michael VeberEmail: |
15.
The Argument from Moral Experience 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Don Loeb 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):469-484
It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality,
has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according
to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according
to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in
this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically
claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact,
we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I
take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B)
epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I
argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.
相似文献
Don LoebEmail: |
16.
Edmund Wall 《Philosophia》2008,36(2):237-249
17.
Andrew Mason 《Res Publica》2009,15(2):179-194
Some moral theorists defend a holistic account of practical reasons and deny that the possibility of moral thought depends
upon the existence of moral principles. This article explores the implications of this position for theorising about justice,
which has often aspired to provide us with an ordered list of principles to govern our institutions and practices.
相似文献
Andrew MasonEmail: |
18.
Vaughn E. Huckfeldt 《Philosophia》2007,35(1):23-41
The dispute between Kantians and Humeans over whether practical reason can justify moral reasons for all agents is often characterized
as a debate over whether reasons are hypothetical or categorical. Instead, this debate must be understood in terms of the
distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. This paper considers Alan Gewirth’s Reason and Morality as a
case study of a Kantian justification of morality focused on deriving categorical reasons from hypothetical reasons. The case
study demonstrates first, the possibility of categorical agent-relative reasons, and second, that inattention to this possibility
has caused considerable confusion in the debate between Kantians and Humeans.
相似文献
Vaughn E. HuckfeldtEmail: |
19.
It is commonly believed that people become selfish and turn to looting, price gouging, and other immoral behaviour in emergencies.
This has been the basis for an argument justifying extraordinary measures in emergencies. It states that if emergencies are
not curtailed, breakdown of moral norms threaten (‘the moral black hole’). Using the example of natural disasters, we argue
that the validity of this argument in non-antagonistic situations, i.e. situations other than war and armed conflict, is highly
questionable. Available evidence suggests that people in such emergencies typically do not display panic reactions or exaggerated
selfishness, and that phenomena such as looting and price gouging are rare. Furthermore, a version of the moral-black-hole
argument based on the mere possibility of a moral black hole occurring runs into problems similar to those of Pascal’s Wager.
We conclude that we should be wary against applying the moral-black-hole argument to non-antagonistic cases.
相似文献
Per SandinEmail: |
20.
Hypothetical Retrospection 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Sven Ove Hansson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):145-157
Moral theory has mostly focused on idealized situations in which the morally relevant properties of human actions can be known
beforehand. Here, a framework is proposed that is intended to sharpen moral intuitions and improve moral argumentation in
problems involving risk and uncertainty. Guidelines are proposed for a systematic search of suitable future viewpoints for
hypothetical retrospection. In hypothetical retrospection, a decision is evaluated under the assumption that one of the branches
of possible future developments has materialized. This evaluation is based on the deliberator’s present values, and each decision
is judged in relation to the information available when it was taken. The basic decision rule is to choose an alternative
that comes out as morally acceptable (permissible) from all hypothetical retrospections.
相似文献
Sven Ove HanssonEmail: |