The false fame illusion in people with memories about a previous life

The present study examined whether individuals with full-blown memories of highly implausible events are prone to commit source monitoring errors. Participants reporting previous-life memories and those without such memories completed a false fame task. This task provides an index of source monitoring errors (i.e., misclassifying familiar non-famous names as famous names). Participants with previous-life memories had a greater tendency to judge the names of previously presented non-famous people as famous than control participants. The two groups did not differ in terms of correct recognition of new non-famous names and famous names. Although dissociation, cognitive failures, sleep-related experiences, depressive symptoms, and signs of psychological distress were all significantly higher in participants with previous-life memories than in controls, these variables did not predict the false fame illusion.     

Inducing and reducing false memories: a Swedish version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm

Participants tend to falsely remember a nonpresented critical word after having studied a list of the word's primary associates. We present here a Swedish version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm, which provides a tractable method of experimentally inducing and investigating such illusory memories. In Experiment 1 it was demonstrated that the constructed stimulus material induced highly reliable false-recall and false-recognition effects, and, moreover, that veridical and false memories were associated with a similar phenomenological experience of remembering. The results from Experiment 2 indicated that the susceptibility to false recognition can be substantially reduced when participants are explicitly required to monitor the sources of their memories. These findings are consistent with predictions derived from the source-monitoring framework.     

Aging and strategic retrieval processes: reducing false memories with a distinctiveness heuristic

The authors show that a strategic retrieval process--the distinctiveness heuristic--is a powerful mechanism for reducing false memories in the elderly. Individuals studied words, pictures, or both types of items and then completed a recognition test on which the studied items appeared once, whereas the new words appeared twice. After studying either pictures only or a mixture of pictures and words, both younger and older adults falsely recognized fewer repeated new words than did participants who studied words. Studying pictures provided a basis for using a distinctiveness heuristic during the recognition test: Individuals inferred that the absence of memory for picture information indicates that an item is "new."     

Dissonance-induced false memories: Evidence from a free-choice paradigm

People often misremember the past as consistent with the present. Recent research using an induced-compliance paradigm has revealed that cognitive dissonance is one mechanism that can underlie this memory distortion. We sought to replicate and extend this finding using a free-choice paradigm: Participants made either an easy or a difficult choice between two smartphones and, either immediately or two days later, reported their memories for their decision experience. Participants who made a difficult decision produced the spread-of-alternatives effect expected by dissonance theory, and they were also more likely than those in the easy conditions to misremember their initial decision more favourably than they had initially rated it. Overall, our findings replicate the effect of dissonance on memory distortion and, further, show that the effect generalises to other dissonance-inducing situations.     

Gamma oscillations distinguish true from false memories

ABSTRACT— To test whether distinct patterns of electrophysiological activity prior to a response can distinguish true from false memories, we analyzed intracranial electroencephalographic recordings while 52 patients undergoing treatment for epilepsy performed a verbal free-recall task. These analyses revealed that the same pattern of gamma-band (28–100 Hz) oscillatory activity that predicts successful memory formation at item encoding—increased gamma power in the hippocampus, prefrontal cortex, and left temporal lobe—reemerges at retrieval to distinguish correct from incorrect responses. The timing of these oscillatory effects suggests that self-cued memory retrieval begins in the hippocampus and then spreads to the cortex. Thus, retrieval of true, as compared with false, memories induces a distinct pattern of gamma oscillations, possibly reflecting recollection of contextual information associated with past experience.     

Children's emotional false memories

Eight- and 12-year-old children were presented with neutral and negative emotional Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists equated on familiarity and associative strength. Both recall and recognition (A') measures were obtained. Recall measures exhibited the usual age increments in true and false recollection. True neutral items were better recalled and recognized than true negative emotional items. Although the children showed more false recall for neutral than for negative emotional lists, false recognition was higher for negative emotional than for neutral items. A' analyses also showed that whereas true neutral information and false neutral information were easily discriminated by children regardless of age, the same was not the case for true and false negative emotional information. Together, these results suggest that although children may be able to censor negative emotional information at recall, such information promotes relational processing in children's memory, making true and false emotional information less discriminable overall.     

Children's kinematic false memories

ABSTRACT

Individuals misrecognise as seen the never-presented natural continuation of an action. These false memories derive from the running of kinematic mental models of the actions seen, which rest on motor inferences from implicit knowledge. We verified an implied prediction: kinematic false memories should be detectable even in children. The participants in our experiments first observed photos in which actors were about to perform actions on objects. At recognition they were presented with the original photos, plus (a) distractors representing the unseen natural continuation of the original actions, (b) distractors representing the beginning of other actions on the same objects and (c) distractors representing completed different actions on the same objects. In contrast to the original studies in which participants expressed their confidence in recognition, in our experiments the participants catgorirzed the action as seen or not seen. After replicating the original results with the dichotomous recognition task (Experiment 1), we detected spontaneous false memories also in children (Experiment 2).     

Affect influences false memories at encoding: evidence from recognition data

Memory is susceptible to illusions in the form of false memories. Prior research found, however, that sad moods reduce false memories. The current experiment had two goals: (1) to determine whether affect influences retrieval processes, and (2) to determine whether affect influences the strength and the persistence of false memories. Happy or sad moods were induced either before or after learning word lists designed to produce false memories. Control groups did not experience a mood induction. We found that sad moods reduced false memories only when induced before learning. Signal detection analyses confirmed that sad moods induced prior to learning reduced activation of nonpresented critical lures suggesting that they came to mind less often. Affective states, however, did not influence retrieval effects. We conclude that negative affective states promote item-specific processing, which reduces false memories in a similar way as using an explicitly guided cognitive control strategy.     

Building false memories without suggestions

People can come to remember doing things they have never done. The question we asked in this study is whether people can systematically come to remember performing actions they never really did, in the absence of any suggestion from the experimenter. People built LEGO vehicles, performing some steps but not others. For half the people, all the pieces needed to assemble each vehicle were laid out in order in front of them while they did the building; for the other half, the pieces were hidden from view. The next day, everyone returned for a surprise recognition test. People falsely and confidently remembered having carried out steps they did not; those who saw all the pieces while they built each vehicle were more likely to correctly remember performing steps they did perform but equally likely to falsely remember performing steps they did not. We explain our results using the source monitoring framework: People used the relationships between actions to internally generate the missing, related actions, later mistaking that information for genuine experience.     

Item-specific processing reduces false memories

We examined the effect of item-specific and relational encoding instructions on false recognition in two experiments in which the DRM paradigm was used (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Type of encoding (item-specific or relational) was manipulated between subjects in Experiment 1 and within subjects in Experiment 2. Decision-based explanations (e.g., the distinctiveness heuristic) predict reductions in false recognition in between-subjects designs, but not in within-subjects designs, because they are conceptualized as global shifts in decision criteria. Memory-based explanations predict reductions in false recognition in both designs, resulting from enhanced recollection of item-specific details. False recognition was reduced following item-specific encoding instructions in both experiments, favoring a memory-based explanation. These results suggest that providing unique cues for the retrieval of individual studied items results in enhanced discrimination between those studied items and critical lures. Conversely, enhancing the similarity of studied items results in poor discrimination among items within a particular list theme. These results are discussed in terms of the item-specific/ relational framework (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993).     

Test-induced priming of false memories

Of interest was whether prior testing of related words primes false memories in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. After studying lists of related words, subjects made old-new judgments about zero, three, or six related items before being tested on critical nonpresented lures. When the recognition test was self-paced, prior testing of list items led to faster false recognition judgments, but did not increase the rate of false alarms to lures from studied lists. Critically, this pattern changed when decision making at test was speeded. When forced to respond quickly—presumably precluding the use of monitoring processes—clear test-induced priming effects were observed in the rate of false memories. The results are consistent with an activation-monitoring explanation of false memories and support that retrieving veridical memories can be a source of memory error.     

Part-set cuing of false memories

Part-set cuing inhibition describes the common finding that re-presenting items from a word list can reduce subjects’ overall recall performance for studied items. Do part-set cuing effects occur for false memories as well? In the present experiments, subjects studied lists of words drawn from Roediger and McDermott (1995). After studying each list, subjects completed math problems and then recalled the list items either with or without accompanying list cues. In Experiment 1, the recall cues consisted of items drawn randomly from the original list. In Experiment 2, an additional type of cued recall task was added in which the even numbered list items were used as cues. Taken together, these experiments demonstrate robust part-set cuing effects for critical nonpresented items. In addition, they show that whereas recall of critical words is reduced by the presence of cues at test, retrieval cues do not affect critical words and studied words in exactly the same manner.     

True photographs and false memories

Abstract— Some trauma-memory-oriented psychotherapists advise clients to review old family photo albums to cue suspected "repressed" memories of childhood sexual abuse. Old photos might cue long-forgotten memories, but when combined with other suggestive influences they might also contribute to false memories. We asked 45 undergraduates to work at remembering three school-related childhood events (two true events provided by parents and one pseudoevent). By random assignment, 23 subjects were also given their school classes' group photos from the years of the to-be-recalled events as memory cues. As predicted, the rate of false-memory reports was dramatically higher in the photo condition than in the no-photo condition. Indeed, the rate of false-memory reports in the photo condition was substantially higher than the rate in any previously published study.     

Adaptive constructive processes: evidence from priming verbal reasoning with false memories

Previous research has demonstrated that false memories produced by the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm serve adaptive functions both in related memory tasks and in various cognitive processes. The present study investigated whether memory errors induced by associated words could influence performance on verbal reasoning tasks. Participants were asked to solve sentence-based verbal reasoning problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of word lists where the critical lures were also the solutions to the problems. The results showed that when false memories were generated, problems were solved more often and significantly faster than those that were primed without false memories or those that were unprimed, and that there was no evidence that the effect of priming with false memories observed in experiments was due to testing effects. The findings extend false memory priming effects to verbal reasoning processes, providing evidence with adaptive constructive processes.     

Social influence and mental routes to the production of authentic false memories and inauthentic false memories

Two studies assessed the extent to which people incorporated false facts provided by bogus others into their own recognition memory reports, and how these false memory reports were affected by: (a) truth of the information in others’ summaries supporting the false facts, (b) motivation to process stories and summaries, (c) source credibility, and (d) ease of remembering original facts. False memory report frequency increased when false facts in a summary were supported by true information and varied inversely with the ease with which original facts could be remembered. Results from a measure probing participants’ memory perceptions suggest that some false memories are authentic: People sometimes lack awareness of both the incorporation of false facts into their memory reports and where the false facts came from. However, many false memories are inauthentic: Despite reporting a false memory, people sometimes retain knowledge of the original stimulus and/or the origin of false facts.     

Importing perceived features into false memories

False memories sometimes contain specific details, such as location or colour, about events that never occurred. Based on the source-monitoring framework, we investigated one process by which false memories acquire details: the reactivation and misattribution of feature information from memories of similar perceived events. In Experiments 1A and 1B, when imagined objects were falsely remembered as seen, participants often reported that the objects had appeared in locations where visually or conceptually similar objects, respectively, had actually appeared. Experiment 2 indicated that colour and shape features of seen objects were misattributed to false memories of imagined objects. Experiment 3 showed that perceived details were misattributed to false memories of objects that had not been explicitly imagined. False memories that imported perceived features, compared to those that presumably did not, were subjectively more like memories for perceived events. Thus, perception may be even more pernicious than imagination in contributing to false memories.     

Strategies for verifying false autobiographical memories

This study examined the types of strategies people use to verify putative childhood memories and the degree to which their preferred strategies are restricted in typical memory implantation studies. We asked subjects to describe a situation in which they recalled a false childhood experience and a hypothetical situation in which they pretended to have developed a false memory after taking part in a memory implantation study. We also asked them how they did (or would) determine the source of the event. We found that subjects relied primarily on other people and cognitive strategies to verify their experiences. These results suggest that laboratory situations cultivate false memories in part because they prevent people from talking to others about the false event, which causes them to rely on less optimal strategies.     

Encoding context and false recognition memories

False recognition of an extralist word that is thematically related to all words of a study list may reflect internal activation of the theme word during encoding followed by impaired source monitoring at retrieval, that is, difficulty in determining whether the word had actually been experienced or merely thought of. To assist source monitoring, distinctive visual or verbal contexts were added to study words at input. Both types of context produced similar effects: False alarms to theme-word (critical) lures were reduced; remember judgements of critical lures called old were lower; and if contextual information had been added to lists, subjects indicated as much for list items and associated critical foils identified as old. The visual and verbal contexts used in the present studies were held to disrupt semantic categorisation of list words at input and to facilitate source monitoring at output.