Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy

Of the many brain events evoked by a visual stimulus, which are specifically associated with conscious perception, and which merely reflect non-conscious processing? Several recent neuroimaging studies have contrasted conscious and non-conscious visual processing, but their results appear inconsistent. Some support a correlation of conscious perception with early occipital events, others with late parieto-frontal activity. Here we attempt to make sense of these dissenting results. On the basis of the global neuronal workspace hypothesis, we propose a taxonomy that distinguishes between vigilance and access to conscious report, as well as between subliminal, preconscious and conscious processing. We suggest that these distinctions map onto different neural mechanisms, and that conscious perception is systematically associated with surges of parieto-frontal activity causing top-down amplification.     

Attentional sensitization of unconscious visual processing: Top-down influences on masked priming

Classical theories of automaticity assume that automatic processes elicited by unconscious stimuli are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences. In contrast to these classical conceptions, we argue that automatic processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways and propose an attentional sensitization model of unconscious visual processing: According to this model, unconscious visual processing is automatic in the sense that it is initiated without deliberate intention. However, unconscious visual processing is susceptible to attentional top-down control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly. In this article, we describe our attentional sensitization model and review recent evidence demonstrating attentional influences on subliminal priming, a prototypical example of an automatic process. We show that subliminal priming (a) depends on attentional resources, (b) is susceptible to stimulus expectations, (c) is influenced by action intentions, and (d) is modulated by task sets. These data suggest that attention enhances or attenuates unconscious visual processes in congruency with attentional task representations similar to conscious perception. We argue that seemingly paradoxical, hitherto unexplained findings regarding the automaticity of the underlying processes in many cognitive domains can be easily accommodated by our attentional sensitization model. We conclude this review with a discussion of future research questions regar-ding the nature of attentional control of unconscious visual processing.     

Perceptual awareness and categorical representation of faces: evidence from masked priming

How internal categories influence how we perceive the world is a fundamental question in cognitive sciences. Yet, the relation between perceptual awareness and perceptual categorization has remained largely uncovered so far. Here, we addressed this question by focusing on face perception during subliminal and conscious perception. We used morphed continua between two face identities and we assessed, through a masked priming paradigm, the perceptual processing of these morphed faces under subliminal and supraliminal conditions. We found that priming from subliminal faces followed linearly the information present in the primes, while priming from visible faces revealed a non-linear profile, indicating a categorical processing of face identities. Our results thus point to a special relation between perceptual awareness and categorical processing of faces, and support the dissociation between two modes of information processing: a subliminal mode involving analog treatment of stimuli information, and a supraliminal mode relying on discrete representation.     

Perceiving causality after the fact: postdiction in the temporal dynamics of causal perception

In simple dynamic events we can easily perceive not only motion, but also higher-level properties such as causality, as when we see one object collide with another. Several researchers have suggested that such causal perception is an automatic and stimulus-driven process, sensitive only to particular sorts of visual information, and a major research project has been to uncover the nature of these visual cues. Here, rather than investigating what information affects causal perception, we instead explore the temporal dynamics of when certain types of information are used. Surprisingly, we find that certain visual events can determine whether we perceive a collision in an ambiguous situation even when those events occur after the moment of potential 'impact' in the putative collision has already passed. This illustrates a type of postdictive perception: our conscious perception of the world is not an instantaneous moment-by-moment construction, but rather is formed by integrating information presented within short temporal windows, so that new information which is obtained can influence the immediate past in our conscious awareness. Such effects have been previously demonstrated for low-level motion phenomena, but the present results demonstrate that postdictive processes can influence higher-level event perception. These findings help to characterize not only the 'rules' of causal perception, but also the temporal dynamics of how and when those rules operate.     

Affective and cognitive reactions to subliminal flicker from fluorescent lighting

This study renews the classical concept of subliminal perception (Peirce & Jastrow, 1884) by investigating the impact of subliminal flicker from fluorescent lighting on affect and cognitive performance. It was predicted that low compared to high frequency lighting (latter compared to former emits non-flickering light) would evoke larger changes in affective states and also impair cognitive performance. Subjects reported high rather than low frequency lighting to be more pleasant, which, in turn, enhanced their problem solving performance. This suggests that sensory processing can take place outside of conscious awareness resulting in conscious emotional consequences; indicating a role of affect in subliminal/implicit perception, and that positive affect may facilitate cognitive task performance.     

Pop-out without awareness: unseen feature singletons capture attention only when top-down attention is available

Visual pop-out occurs when a unique visual target (e.g., a feature singleton) is present in a set of homogeneous distractors. However, the role of visual awareness in this process remains unclear. In the experiments reported here, we showed that even though subjects were not aware of a suppressed pop-out display, their subsequent performance on an orientation-discrimination task was significantly better at the pop-out location than at a control location. These results indicate that conscious visual awareness of a feature singleton is not necessary for it to attract attention. Furthermore, the subliminal pop-out effect disappeared when subjects diverted their attention toward a rapid sequential visual presentation task while presented with the same subliminal pop-out display. These results suggest that top-down attention is necessary for the subliminal pop-out effect and that the cognitive processes underlying attention and awareness are somewhat independent.     

Perceiving a story outside of conscious awareness: When we infer narrative attributes from subliminal sequential stimuli

Perceiving a story behind successive movements plays an important role in our lives. From a general perspective, such higher mental activity would seem to depend on conscious processes. Using a subliminal priming paradigm, we demonstrated that such story perception occurs without conscious awareness. In the experiments, participants were subliminally presented with sequential pictures that represented a story in which one geometrical figure was chased by the other figure, and in which one fictitious character defeated the other character in a tug-of-war. Although the participants could not report having seen the pictures, their automatic mental associations (i.e., associations that are activated unintentionally, difficult to control, and not necessarily endorsed at a conscious level) were shifted to line up with the story. The results suggest that story perception operates outside of conscious awareness. Implications for research on the unconscious were also briefly discussed.     

A hemispheric asymmetry for the unconscious perception of emotion

Previous research has demonstrated that hemispheric asymmetries for conscious visual perception do not lead to asymmetries for unconscious visual perception. These studies utilized emotionally neutral items as stimuli. The current research utilized both emotionally negative and neutral stimuli to assess hemispheric differences for conscious and unconscious visual perception. Conscious perception was measured using a subjective measure of awareness reported by participants on each trial. Unconscious perception was measured by an "exclusion task," a form of word-stem-completion task. Consistent with predictions, negative stimuli were consciously perceived most often when presented to the right hemisphere. Negative stimuli presented to the right hemisphere showed no evidence of unconscious perception, suggesting that the hemispheric asymmetry for the conscious perception of negative information occurs at the expense of unconscious perception.     

Seeing is believing: Utilization of subliminal symbols requires a visible relevant context

Sensory input that is not available for conscious report can still affect our behavior. Recent findings suggest that such subliminal information has the potency to influence behavior in a way that is dependent on the observer’s current intentions. Here, we investigate whether conscious observation of stimulus relevance provides an incentive for the utilization of nonconscious stimuli. We manipulated the predictive power of directional cues to selectively affect the incentive to utilize them for a subsequent target detection task. Central arrow cues rendered invisible by interocular suppression elicited a facilitatory cuing effect, but only when intermixed with visible arrow cues that were highly predictive with respect to (i.e., 80 % congruent with) the subsequent target location. When the visible cues were nonpredictive (50 % congruent), no subliminal cuing effect was found. An analysis of learning effects corroborates these findings; Cuing effects elicited by both visible and invisible cues increased over the course of the experiment, but only when intermixed visible cues were highly predictive. In a second experiment, we demonstrated that the intrinsic relevance of invisible cues (either 50 % or 100 % congruent) has no effect on the utilization of visible cues. We conclude that conscious perception is required to make statistical inferences about the relevance of symbolic cues. Once statistical information is extracted consciously, it affects subsequent nonconscious processing in a way that fits the current context. Accordingly, one of the possible functions of consciousness could be to extract general rules out of the conscious information, to provide guidelines for future behavior.     

Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action?

David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action‐related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception‐related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action ( Bruno & Franz, 2009 ; Dassonville & Bala, 2004 ; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008 ; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008 ). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process ( Schenk & McIntosh, 2010 ). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action‐guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi‐conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division.     

Conscious awareness is required for holistic face processing

Investigating the limits of unconscious processing is essential to understand the function of consciousness. Here, we explored whether holistic face processing, a mechanism believed to be important for face processing in general, can be accomplished unconsciously. Using a novel “eyes-face” stimulus we tested whether discrimination of pairs of eyes was influenced by the surrounding face context. While the eyes were fully visible, the faces that provided context could be rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression. Two experiments with three different sets of face stimuli and a subliminal learning procedure converged to show that invisible faces did not influence perception of visible eyes. In contrast, surrounding faces, when they were clearly visible, strongly influenced perception of the eyes. Thus, we conclude that conscious awareness might be a prerequisite for holistic face processing.     

Don’t make me angry,you wouldn’t like me when I’m angry: Volitional choices to act or inhibit are modulated by subliminal perception of emotional faces

Volitional action and self-control—feelings of acting according to one’s own intentions and in being control of one’s own actions—are fundamental aspects of human conscious experience. However, it is unknown whether high-level cognitive control mechanisms are affected by socially salient but nonconscious emotional cues. In this study, we manipulated free choice decisions to act or withhold an action by subliminally presenting emotional faces: In a novel version of the Go/NoGo paradigm, participants made speeded button-press responses to Go targets, withheld responses to NoGo targets, and made spontaneous, free choices to execute or withhold the response for Choice targets. Before each target, we presented emotional faces, backwards masked to render them nonconscious. In Intentional trials, subliminal angry faces made participants more likely to voluntarily withhold the action, whereas fearful and happy faces had no effects. In a second experiment, the faces were made supraliminal, which eliminated the effects of angry faces on volitional choices. A third experiment measured neural correlates of the effects of subliminal angry faces on intentional choice using EEG. After replicating the behavioural results found in Experiment 1, we identified a frontal-midline theta component—associated with cognitive control processes—which is present for volitional decisions, and is modulated by subliminal angry faces. This suggests a mechanism whereby subliminally presented “threat” stimuli affect conscious control processes. In summary, nonconscious perception of angry faces increases choices to inhibit, and subliminal influences on volitional action are deep seated and ecologically embedded.     

Working memory biasing of visual perception without awareness

Previous research has demonstrated that the contents of visual working memory can bias visual processing in favor of matching stimuli in the scene. However, the extent to which such top-down, memory-driven biasing of visual perception is contingent on conscious awareness remains unknown. Here we showed that conscious awareness of critical visual cues is dispensable for working memory to bias perceptual selection mechanisms. Using the procedure of continuous flash suppression, we demonstrated that “unseen” visual stimuli during interocular suppression can gain preferential access to awareness if they match the contents of visual working memory. Strikingly, the very same effect occurred even when the visual cue to be held in memory was rendered nonconscious by masking. Control experiments ruled out the alternative accounts of repetition priming and different detection criteria. We conclude that working memory biases of visual perception can operate in the absence of conscious awareness.     

The conscious experience of color constancy and neural responses to subliminal deviations – A behavioral and EEG/ERP oddball study

IntroductionColor constancy, a property of conscious color experience, maintains object color appearance across illuminant changes. We investigated the neural correlates of subliminal vs. conscious stimulus deviations of color constancy manipulations.MethodsBehavioral and Oddball EEG/ERP experiments were conducted (n = 20). Psychophysical illuminant variation discrimination thresholds were first estimated, to establish individual perceptual awareness ranges, allowing for simulation of natural daylight spectral and spatial variations on colored surfaces, at different ambiguity levels.ResultsBehavioral results validated illuminant choice. ERPs showed a significant modulation of posterior P1 component specifically for the subliminal global uniform deviation condition, respecting color constancy. Neural correlates of conscious percepts were identified at posterior N2-P3 latencies, parietal (P3b) and frontal regions.ConclusionsWe identified an early subliminal correlate of low-level illuminant change, which reflects automatic unconscious detection of global color constancy deviations. Its suppression under conscious perception is probably due to top-down suppression according to prediction error models.     

Measuring any conscious content versus measuring the relevant conscious content: Comment on Sandberg et al.

Sandberg et al. show that the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) scale is sensitive compared to confidence ratings and wagering in detecting accurate perception. They go on to argue that the PAS scale is hence a sensitive measure of conscious perception compared to confidence ratings, a claim disputed here. The fact that some visual content is conscious does not entail that the visual content relevant to making a discrimination is conscious. For example, if one saw a square but was only aware of seeing a flash of something, then one has not consciously seen a square. When PAS and confidence ratings come in conflict, we suggest that it is confidence ratings that more reliably indicate the conscious status of contents allowing discrimination.     

Perception of ensemble statistics requires attention

To overcome inherent limitations in perceptual bandwidth, many aspects of the visual world are represented as summary statistics (e.g., average size, orientation, or density of objects). Here, we investigated the relationship between summary (ensemble) statistics and visual attention. Recently, it was claimed that one ensemble statistic in particular, color diversity, can be perceived without focal attention. However, a broader debate exists over the attentional requirements of conscious perception, and it is possible that some form of attention is necessary for ensemble perception. To test this idea, we employed a modified inattentional blindness paradigm and found that multiple types of summary statistics (color and size) often go unnoticed without attention. In addition, we found attentional costs in dual-task situations, further implicating a role for attention in statistical perception. Overall, we conclude that while visual ensembles may be processed efficiently, some amount of attention is necessary for conscious perception of ensemble statistics.     

Subliminal processes,dissociation and the 'I'

The study of unconscious processes leads to the hypothesis of the limit of consciousness, which involves two main kinds of psychic activity. The first represents psychic contents which are subliminal for their low energy, the second subliminal contents which are inaccessible to consciousness because they are dissociated in the subliminal region. Dissociation is a concept introduced by Pierre Janet for splitting consciousness due to traumatic events or during hypnosis. It takes a more general form in Hilgard's neo-dissociation theory of hypnotic phenomena and also in Jung's theory of the collective unconscious. Further generalization links it to the modern findings of explicit and implicit perception, leading to a shift in dissociation from hypothesis to clinical, experimental and theoretical reality. Studies in hypnosis also point to the existence of an integrative psychic entity, that comprises the conscious 'I'. Hilgard called this the hidden observer, and his findings represent empirical confirmation of Jung's term for the Self as mirror 'I', which leads to many important consequences for self-discovery and the meaning of life.     

Visual motion disambiguation by a subliminal sound

There is growing interest in the effect of sound on visual motion perception. One model involves the illusion created when two identical objects moving towards each other on a two-dimensional visual display can be seen to either bounce off or stream through each other. Previous studies show that the large bias normally seen toward the streaming percept can be modulated by the presentation of an auditory event at the moment of coincidence. However, no reports to date provide sufficient evidence to indicate whether the sound bounce-inducing effect is due to a perceptual binding process or merely to an explicit inference resulting from the transient auditory stimulus resembling a physical collision of two objects. In the present study, we used a novel experimental design in which a subliminal sound was presented either 150 ms before, at, or 150 ms after the moment of coincidence of two disks moving towards each other. The results showed that there was an increased perception of bouncing (rather than streaming) when the subliminal sound was presented at or 150 ms after the moment of coincidence compared to when no sound was presented. These findings provide the first empirical demonstration that activation of the human auditory system without reaching consciousness affects the perception of an ambiguous visual motion display.     

Auditory subliminal stimulation: a re-examination.

Unconscious or subliminal perception has historically been a thorny issue in psychology. It has been the subject of debate and experimentation since the turn of the century. While psychologists now agree that the phenomenon of visual subliminal stimulation is real, disagreement continues over the effects of such stimulation as well as to its existence in other sensory modalities, notably the auditory. The present paper provides an overview of unresolved issues in auditory subliminal stimulation which explains much of the difficulty that has been encountered in experimental work in this area. A context is proposed for considering the effects of auditory subliminal stimulation and an overview of current investigations in this field is provided.     

An examination of the right-hemisphere hypothesis of the lateralization of emotion

The Right-Hemisphere Hypothesis posits that emotional stimuli are perceived more efficiently by the right hemisphere than by the left hemisphere. The current research examines this hypothesis by examining hemispheric asymmetries for the conscious and unconscious perception of emotional stimuli. Negative, positive, and neutral words were presented for 17 ms to one visual field or the other. Conscious perception was measured by using a subjective report-of-awareness measure reported by participants on each trial. Unconscious perception was measured using an "exclusion task," a form of word-stem-completion task. Consistent with previous research, there was a right-hemisphere advantage for the conscious perception of negative information. As in previous studies, this advantage for conscious perception occurred at the expense of unconscious perception. Specifically, there was a right-hemisphere inferiority for the unconscious perception of negative information. Contrary to the predictions of the Right-Hemisphere Hypothesis, there were no hemispheric asymmetries for the perception of positive emotional information, thus suggesting that the Right-Hemisphere Hypothesis may not be applicable to all behavioral studies.