Contextualizing social identity in considerations of what it means to be a nurse

This paper describes research which provide the context for a discussion of how social representations can circumscribe identity possibilities and render feasible certain groups evaluations. Specifically, a research approach is advocated in which Social Identity and Social Representation Theory are integrated within single complementary paradigm, (Breakwell, 1993). A brief but critical examination of both theoretical traditions is ofered as the backdrop to this. A case study is described as a means of illustrating the unique potential of the integrated paradigm to predict and explain the meaning of social identity and the evaluations it affords. An investigation is then described involving 178 nurses ranging from Trainee to Charge Nurse status. Nurses were invited to use Q-sorts to describe the meaning of their group membership. As predicted from having identified the types of social representation of nurses available, two diferent identity orientations emerged: a communal-interpersonal (Patient Centred) and instrumental-intergroup (Professional Distinctiveness). The communal-interpersonal identity orientation was most typical of the lower status trainee nurses and also female nurses. In turn, higher status nurses and also male nurses, articulated a primarily instrumental-intergroup identity orientation. The evaluations signalled by group membership were also predictable from the identity orientations exhibited.     

Whatever it is better to be than not to be

The Anselmian claim that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought in virtue of being ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ may be accused of incoherence or even unintelligibility. By proposing a non-relative but apparently meaningful analysis thereof, I attempt to defend it against such criticism. In particular, I argue that ‘whatever it is better to be than not to be’ can be plausibly interpreted so as to imply very many attributes traditionally predicated of that than which a greater cannot be thought. Central to this line of reasoning is the assumption that whatever is an actual moral being is greater, simpliciter, than whatever is not an actual moral being.     

Diversity is what you want it to be: how social-dominance motives affect construals of diversity

We propose that diversity is a malleable concept capable of being used either to attenuate or to enhance racial inequality. The research reported here suggests that when people are exposed to ambiguous information concerning an organization's diversity, they construe diversity in a manner consistent with their social-dominance motives. Specifically, anti-egalitarian individuals broaden their construal of diversity to include nonracial (i.e., occupational) heterogeneity when an organization's racial heterogeneity is low. By contrast, egalitarian individuals broaden their construal of diversity to include nonracial heterogeneity when an organization's racial heterogeneity is high. The inclusion of occupational heterogeneity in perceptions of diversity allows people across the spectrum of social-dominance orientation to justify their support for or opposition to hierarchy-attenuating affirmative-action policies. Our findings suggest that diversity may not have a fixed meaning and that, without a specific delineation of what the concept means in particular contexts, people may construe diversity in a manner consistent with their social motivations.     

Direct instruction: What it is and what it is becoming

This essay describes the principles of Direct Instruction design and delivery used to establish clear, unambiguous communication and maximize student responding. Direct Instruction research findings are summarized: achievement of low-income students in Follow Through, longitudinal results, and the effectiveness of Direct Instruction for students with handicaps. Finally, new directions for Direct Instruction, technological applications and instruction of higher-order skills, are discussed.     

On what will be: reply to Westphal

Jonathan Westphal’s recent paper attempts to reconcile the view that propositions about the future can be true or false now with the idea that the future cannot now be real. I attempt to show that Westphal’s proposal is either unoriginal or unsatisfying. It is unoriginal if it is just the well-known eternalist solution. It is unsatisfying if it is instead making use of a peculiar, tensed truthmaking principle.

On what it means to know someone: a matter of pragmatics

Two studies provide support for W. B. Swann's (1984) argument that perceivers achieve substantial pragmatic accuracy--accuracy that facilitates the achievement of relationship-specific interaction goals--in their social relationships. Study 1 assessed the extent to which group members reached consensus regarding the behavior of a member in familiar (as compared with unfamiliar) contexts and found that groups do indeed achieve this form of pragmatic accuracy. Study 2 assessed the degree of insight romantic partners had into the self-views of their partners on relationship-relevant (as compared with less relevant) traits and found that couples do indeed achieve this form of pragmatic accuracy. Furthermore, pragmatic accuracy was uniquely associated with relationship harmony. Implications for a functional approach to person perception are discussed.     

Make applied phenomenology what it needs to be: an interdisciplinary research program

Continental Philosophy Review - Once a marginal affair, applied phenomenology is now a vast and vibrant movement. With great success, however, comes great criticism, and critics have been harsh,...     

On On what there is

All sides in the recent debates over the Quine-Putnam Indispensability thesis presuppose Quine's criterion for determining what a discourse is ontologically committed to. I subject the criterion to scrutiny, especially in regard to the available competitor-criteria, asking what means of evaluation there are for comparing alternative criteria against each other. Finding none, the paper concludes that ontological questions, in a certain sense , are philosophically indeterminate.     

Adults see vision to be more informative than it is

Humans gain a wide range of knowledge through interacting with the environment. Each aspect of our perceptual experiences offers a unique source of information about the world—colours are seen, sounds heard and textures felt. Understanding how perceptual input provides a basis for knowledge is thus central to understanding one's own and others' epistemic states. Developmental research suggests that 5-year-olds have an immature understanding of knowledge sources and that they overestimate the knowledge to be gained from looking. Without evidence from adults, it is not clear whether the mature reasoning system outgrows this overestimation. The current study is the first to investigate whether an overestimation of the knowledge to be gained from vision occurs in adults. Novel response time paradigms were adapted from developmental studies. In two experiments, participants judged whether an object or feature could be identified by performing a specific action. Adult participants found it disproportionately easy to accept looking as a proposed action when it was informative, and difficult to reject looking when it was not informative. This suggests that adults, like children, overestimate the informativeness of vision. The origin of this overestimation and the implications that the current findings bear on the interpretation of children's overestimation are discussed.