The effect of relations in paired-associate learning

Previous studies have shown that the cued recall of paired associates is greater when one member of a pair has been apprehended as lying on the other member, as compared with the two having been apprehended as independent objects. The effect occurs when the objects have been perceived, imagined, or described in the relevant relationship. The additional thoughts hypothesis postulates that participants have more spontaneous "additional thoughts" when apprehending a pair in the relational condition. These may provide additional retrieval routes, thereby explaining the effect. In four experiments, the hypothesis was tested under conditions in which a clear unambiguous definition could be specified for an additional thought. The results showed that the greater recall in an "on" condition, as compared with an independent condition, occurs at least in part because more additional thoughts occur in the "on" condition. There was no evidence for any other contribution to the effect. It is argued that the findings question whether relations between objects play a fundamental role in the structure of memory.     

Imagining and naming rotated natural objects

The present experiment examined whether subjects can form and store imagined objects in various orientations. Subjects in a training phase named line drawings of natural objects shown at six orientations, named objects shown upright, or imagined upright objects at six orientations. Time to imagine an upright object at another orientation increased the farther the designated orientation was from the upright, with faster image formation times at 180° than at 120°. Similar systematic patterns of effects of orientation on identification time were found for rotated objects. During the test phase, all subjects named the previously experienced objects as well as new objects, at six orientations. The orientation effect for old objects seen previously in a variety of orientations was much reduced relative to the orientation effect for new objects. In contrast, substantial effects of orientation on naming time were observed for old objects for subjects who had previously seen the objects upright only or upright but imagined at different orientations. The results suggest that the attenuation of initially large effects of orientation with practice cannot be due to imagining and forming representations of objects at a number of orientations.     

Sensory-perceptual qualities of images

Four experiments demonstrated that such sensory-perceptual features of objects as weight, color, and numerosity affect imaginal performance involving images of those objects. For example, imaginary transport times of objects increased with both the hypothetical weight of the imagined object and the distance traversed. The transport functions were steeper when a map of the terrain was imagined than when it was perceived, suggesting that imaginal performance of heft did not parallel more perceptually guided performance. Corresponding to the view that images activate noncanonical information from long-term memory, mental transport times were longer for maps of familiar terrains than for those of presumably unelaborated unfamiliar terrains. Further, the effects of imaginary color discriminations depended on the familiarity of the object being imagined. Images of customarily colored familiar objects were generated faster when projected onto a surface of the same color than when projected onto a surface of another color, whereas images constructed from unfamiliar targets were recognized more accurately when the target's color differed substantially from that of the ground than when it differed by a smaller amount. The results were predicted by a model that assumed that images may incorporate ancillary characteristics in addition to canonical information.     

Facilitated pointing to remembered objects in front: Evidence for egocentric retrieval or for spatial priming?

Recent spatial memory theories propose that long-term spatial memories are retrieved egocentrically. One source of evidence comes from imagined perspective taking, in which participants learn an object layout, later imagine standing at one object and facing a second (orienting) object, and then point to a third (target) object from the imagined perspective. Pointing is faster for target objects in the anterior than in the posterior half of imaginal space. This “front facilitation” is consistent with asymmetric sensory and biomechanical body properties (favoring the anterior half of body space), supporting claims of egocentric retrieval. However, front facilitation might actually result from spatial priming: Proximity differences might cause orienting objects to prime target objects more in the anterior than in the posterior half of imagined space. Using a modified perspectivetaking task that unconfounded front facilitation and spatial priming, two experiments identified separate influences of front facilitation and spatial priming when participants imagined perspectives within the surrounding environment or a remote environment.     

The benefits and costs of repeated memory tests for young and older adults

Repeated and prolonged searches of memory can lead to an increase in how much is recalled, but they can also lead to memory errors. These 3 experiments addressed the costs and benefits of repeated and prolonged memory tests for both young and older adults. Participants saw and imagined pictures of objects, some of which were physically or conceptually similar, and then took a series of repeated or prolonged recall tests. Both young and older adults recalled more on later tests than on earlier ones, though the increase was less marked for older adults. In addition, despite recalling less than did young adults, older adults made more similarity-based source misattributions (i.e., claiming an imagined item was seen if it was physically or conceptually similar to a seen item). Similar patterns of fewer benefits and more costs for older adults were seen on both free and forced recall tests and on timed and self-paced tests. Findings are interpreted in terms of age-related differences in binding processes.     

Reality monitoring of physically similar and conceptually related objects

Three studies showed that information used in determining a target memory’s source may be derived not only from the target event itself, but also from other nontarget events or memories. Subjects were more likely to claim that an imagined object was perceived when it physically resembled or was conceptually related to another specific item that was actually perceived, relative to when there was no physical resemblance or semantic relation. Furthermore, error rates for imagined items increased with the number of perceived items that they resembled. However, subjects’ orienting task at encoding (perceptually biased or perceptually plus conceptually biased) did not systematically affect error rates. The results indicate that reality monitoring decisions about a target object are influenced by similar physical and conceptual information that was derived from other objects.     

Visual impressions of generative transmission

ABSTRACT

Previous research has shown that stimuli in which a moving object (A) contacts a stationary one (B) and stops, and object B then moves off in the same direction, give rise to a causal impression: object A is perceived as producing the motion of object B. This impression is weakened or does not occur if there is a delay between A contacting B and B moving, or if there is a spatial gap between B and the location at which A stops. It is shown that a strong causal impression can occur despite the presence of both gap and delay if there are cues to generative transmission of causal influence from A to B. The cues investigated were successive colour change of a series of objects filling the gap between A and B. Reported causal impressions were stronger with the colour change stimuli than with stimuli in which the objects were present but did not change colour, and stronger if the colour change proceeded from A to B than if it proceeded in the opposite direction. Reported causal impressions increased in strength as the number of objects involved in the colour change increased, consistent with the hypothesis that the colour change is a cue to a process of transmission, and inconsistent with the hypothesis that it is perceived or inferred as involving a chain of causal relations. Other kinds of changes to object properties—a small upward motion, shrinkage without moving, and disappearance—yielded similar results. It appears that any rapid sequential change in object properties in the direction of causal influence can function to give rise to the visual impression of generative transmission. The possible role of apparent motion is discussed.     

Visual impressions of forces between objects: Entraining,enforced disintegration,and shattering

When a moving object (A) contacts a stationary one (B) and Object B then moves, visual impressions of force occur along with a visual impression of causality. It is shown that findings about force impressions that occur with launching effect stimuli generalize to other forms of phenomenal causality, namely entraining, enforced disintegration, and shattering stimuli. In particular, evidence is reported for generality of the force asymmetry, in which the amount of perceived force exerted by Object A is greater than the amount of perceived resistance put up by Object B. Effects of manipulations of kinematic variables also resembled those found in previous experiments. Some unpredicted findings occurred. It is argued that these reflect a change in perceptual interpretation when both objects are in motion prior to contact, due to both objects being perceived as in autonomous motion. The results are consistent with a theoretical account in which force impressions occur by a process of matching kinematic information in visual stimuli to stored representations of actions on objects, which supply information about forces.     

The permanence of mental objects: testing magical thinking on perceived and imaginary realities

This study tested participants' preparedness to acknowledge that an object could change as a result of magical intervention. Six- and 9-year-old children and adults treated perceived and imagined objects as being equally permanent. Adults treated a fantastic object as significantly less permanent than either perceived or imagined objects. Results were similar when a different type of mental-physical causality--a participant's own wish--was examined. Adults were also tested on the permanence of personally significant imagined objects (participants' images of their future lives). Although almost all participants claimed that they did not believe in magic, in test trials they were not prepared to rule out the possibility that their future lives could be affected by a magical curse.     

What object attributes determine canonical views?

We investigated preferred or canonical views for familiar and three-dimensional nonsense objects using computer-graphics psychophysics. We assessed the canonical views for objects by allowing participants to actively rotate realistically shaded three-dimensional models in real-time. Objects were viewed on a Silicon Graphics workstation and manipulated in virtual space with a three-degree-of-freedom input device. In the first experiment, participants adjusted each object to the viewpoint from which they would take a photograph if they planned to use the object to illustrate a brochure. In the second experiment, participants mentally imaged each object on the basis of the name and then adjusted the object to the viewpoint from which they imagined it. In both experiments, there was a large degree of consistency across participants in terms of the preferred view for a given object. Our results provide new insights on the geometrical, experiential, and functional attributes that determine canonical views under ecological conditions.     

Taking a hands-on approach: apparent grasping ability scales the perception of object size

We examined whether the apparent size of an object is scaled to the morphology of the relevant body part with which one intends to act on it. To be specific, we tested if the visually perceived size of graspable objects is scaled to the extent of apparent grasping ability for the individual. Previous research has shown that right-handed individuals perceive their right hand as larger and capable of grasping larger objects than their left. In the first 2 experiments, we found that objects looked smaller when placed in or judged relative to their right hand compared to their left. In the third experiment, we directly manipulated apparent hand size by magnifying the participants' hands. Participants perceived objects to be smaller when their hand was magnified than when their hand was unmagnified. We interpret these results as demonstrating that perceivers use the extent of their hands' grasping abilities as "perceptual rulers" to scale the apparent size of graspable objects. Furthermore, hand size manipulations did not affect the perceived size of objects too big to be grasped, which suggests that hand size is only used as a scaling mechanism when the object affords the relevant action, in this case, grasping.     

The role of historical intuitions in children's and adults' naming of artifacts

It is commonly assumed that artifacts are named solely on the basis of properties they currently possess; in particular, their appearance and function. The experiments presented here explore the alternative proposal that the history of an artifact plays some role in how it is named. In three experiments, children between the ages of 4 and 9 years and adults were presented with familiar artifacts whose appearance and function were then radically altered. Participants were tested as to whether they believed that the modified objects were still members of the artifact kind. Results indicate that object history becomes increasingly important over the course of development.     

Source misattributions may increase the accuracy of source judgments

Misattribution of remembered information from one source to another is commonly associated with false memories, but we demonstrate that it also may underlie memories that accord with past events. Participants imagined drawings of objects in four different locations. For each, a drawing of a similarly shaped object was seen in the same location, a different location, or not seen. When tested on memory for objects' origin (seen/imagined) and location, more false "seen" responses, but also more correct location responses, were given to imagined objects if a similar object had been seen, versus not seen, in the same location. We argue that misattribution of feature information (e.g., shape, location) from seen objects to similar imagined ones increased false memories of seeing objects but also increased correct location memories, provided the misattributed location matched the imagined objects' location. Thus, consistent with the source-monitoring framework, imperfect source-attribution processes underlie false and true memories.     

Processing of extrafoveal objects during multiple-object naming

In 3 experiments, the authors investigated the extent to which objects that are about to be named are processed prior to fixation. Participants named pairs or triplets of objects. One of the objects, initially seen extrafoveally (the interloper), was replaced by a different object (the target) during the saccade toward it. The interloper-target pairs were identical or unrelated objects or visually and conceptually unrelated objects with homophonous names (e.g., animal- baseball bat). The mean latencies and gaze durations for the targets were shorter in the identity and homophone conditions than in the unrelated condition. This was true when participants viewed a fixation mark until the interloper appeared and when they fixated on another object and prepared to name it while viewing the interloper. These results imply that objects that are about to be named may undergo far-reaching processing, including access to their names, prior to fixation.     

The role of attention in the shift from orientation-dependent to orientation-invariant identification of disoriented objects

In two experiments, the naming of rotated line drawings of natural objects was examined after a training phase in which the objects were either attended or ignored. In the training phase of Experiment 1, subjects were presented with objects in a number of orientations over five repeated blocks of trials. In the center of each object, seven letters (Xs and Ts, colored red or blue) were presented in rapid succession. Half the subjects named aloud the rotated object and ignored the changing letter display (object-attend). The other half ignored the object and counted the number of red Ts, and then used this number to perform a simple multiplication (object-ignore). In the test phase, all subjects named the rotated objects. The results showed that in the first block of trials in the training phase, mean naming time in the object-attend condition increased the further an object was rotated from the upright. This effect of orientation for attended objects was much reduced in the later presentations of the test phase. In contrast, there was no such benefit of prior presentation observed for the naming of objects that had previously been ignored. Instead, a substantial orientation effect was shown for the naming of previously ignored objects, which was similar to the orientation effect observed for attended objects named in the first block. Similar results were found in Experiment 2, in which object-attend subjects in training covertly named the objects and then performed a letter count and multiplication task. In both experiments, performance on the letter count and multiplication task varied with the angle of the ignored object. The results suggest that full attentional resources must be allocated in order for orientation-invariant representations to be formed and used in the identification of rotated objects.     

Dividing attention between color and shape revisited: redundant targets coactivate only when parts of the same perceptual object

When a single perceptual object provides two different reasons for a particular decision (by containing two qualitatively different targets), detailed analyses of the response-time distributions have shown that the two different reasons are jointly responsible for the final decision. The question is whether this coactivation occurs because the two targets contained by the object were from separate dimensions (e.g., color and shape) or were parts of the same perceptual object. Early work argued in favor of dimensions, implying that the types of information being processed is critical, as opposed to their sources; more recent work has argued in favor of objects. Experiment 1 in the present paper corrected for a potential bias in the design of some recent studies and found additional evidence in favor of objects. Two additional experiments directly manipulated whether redundant targets would be perceived as parts of one or two perceptual objects (while holding all else constant) and produced the strongest evidence to date that coactivation requires that the redundant targets be parts of one object. This reverses the original conclusion and suggests that the sources of information are critical, as opposed to the types. Two specific versions of the object-based model are discussed.     

Physical imagery: kinematic versus dynamic models.

Physical imagery occurs when people imagine one object causing a change to a second object. To make inferences through physical imagery, people must represent information that coordinates the interactions among the imagined objects. The current research contrasts two proposals for how this coordinating information is realized in physical imagery. In the traditional kinematic formulation, imagery transformations are coordinated by geometric information in analog spatial representations. In the dynamic formulation, transformations may also be regulated by analog representations of force and resistance. Four experiments support the dynamic formulation. They show, for example, that without making changes to the spatial properties of a problem, dynamic perceptual information (e.g., torque) and beliefs about physical properties (e. g., viscosity) affect the inferences that people draw through imagery. The studies suggest that physical imagery is not so much an analog of visual perception as it is an analog of physical action. A simple model that represents force as a rate helps explain why inferences can emerge through imagined actions even though people may not know the answer explicitly. It also explains how and when perception, beliefs, and learning can influence physical imagery.     

Why are names of people associated with so many phonological retrieval failures?

Two experiments are reported that revisit the issue of why people’s names are more difficult to recall than common names such as the names of objects. In Experiment 1, retrieval of the names of a set of object pictures was compared with recall of a set of names of famous faces. The object and face sets were matched for preexperimental familiarity. The results showed significantly more tip-of-the tongue (TOT) states and significantly poorer name recall for faces than for objects. Although the overall numbers of incorrect answers for the two sets of items did not differ, the incorrect answers in the face condition were mostly “don’t know” responses, whereas incorrect answers for objects were mostly alternative names. In Experiment 2, written definitions were used instead of pictures, and target items were selected so as to keep the number of alternatives to a minimum. Under these circumstances, there were no differences in either the number of items correctly named or the number of TOTs for common and people’s names. These findings are consistent with the views of Brédart (Memory, 1, 351–366, 1993), who argued that there are fewer documented TOTs for common names because a semantically related alternative often comes to mind when a participant is experiencing, or is about to experience, a retrieval failure.     

Improvements in Object Exploration Skills May Facilitate the Development of Object Segregation in Early Infancy

Three experiments investigated (a) the development of infants' use of features to find a boundary between 2 adjacent objects and (b) the possible connection between this ability and the development of object exploration skills. In Experiments 1 and 2, it was shown that 3 1/2-month-old infants are beginning to use object features to determine the composition of a display, interpreting a display composed of different-looking parts as 2 separate objects and a display of similar-looking parts as a single object. In Experiment 3, exploration and segregation abilities were assessed in the same infants. The results of this study were that the more actively exploring infants perceived the display used in Experiment 1 as 2 separate objects, whereas the less actively exploring infants did not. One hypothesis consistent with these findings is that infants may learn how object features can be used to find object boundaries as a result of new observations made possible by their more active exploration skills.