Accent trumps race in guiding children's social preferences

A series of experiments investigated the effect of speakers' language, accent, and race on children's social preferences. When presented with photographs and voice recordings of novel children, 5-year-old children chose to be friends with native speakers of their native language rather than foreign-language or foreign-accented speakers. These preferences were not exclusively due to the intelligibility of the speech, as children found the accented speech to be comprehensible, and did not make social distinctions between foreign-accented and foreign-language speakers. Finally, children chose same-race children as friends when the target children were silent, but they chose other-race children with a native accent when accent was pitted against race. A control experiment provided evidence that children's privileging of accent over race was not due to the relative familiarity of each dimension. The results, discussed in an evolutionary framework, suggest that children preferentially evaluate others along dimensions that distinguished social groups in prehistoric human societies.     

Responding to social and symbolic extrafoveal cues: cue shape trumps biological relevance

Psychological Research - Social cues presented at visual fixation have been shown to strongly influence an observer’s attention and response selection. Here we ask whether the same holds for...     

The ethics of social science research

ABSTRACT Ethical thinking about social science research is dominated by a biomedical model whose salient features are the assumption that only potential harms to subjects of research are relevant in the ethical evaluation of that research, and in the emphasis on securing informed consent in order to establish ethical probity. A number of counter-examples are considered to the assumption, a number of defences against these counter-examples are examined, and an alternative model is proposed for the ethical evaluation of social science research: a model which can cope with the systemic harms (harms other than those to participants as participants) which have been identified. This model is based on John Rawls's idea of original position reasoning and treats social science research as an institutional feature of the basic structure of society.     

School desegregation and social science research

Research on the effects of school desegregation, once quite common in psychology and related fields, has declined considerably since the mid-1980s. Factors contributing to changes in the quantity and focus of such research since the Brown v. Board of Education (1954) decision are discussed, with an emphasis on those related to the decline of this research in the last 2 decades. These factors include the nation's retreat from the policy of school desegregation and the associated decline in research funding. Changing perspectives regarding desegregation, the outcomes of desegregation that merit study, and the desirable composition of research teams studying desegregation have also played a role. Demographic changes in our society and its schools that have made salient other research topics and the development of effective research paradigms for studying intergroup relations in the laboratory have also contributed to this decline. ((c) 2004 APA, all rights reserved)     

利他主义:从社会生物学到社会科学

对自然界和人类社会中广泛存在的利他行为,社会生物学在动物行为研究的基础上提出几种假说,并把它推进到人类行为领域,由此引发与其他学科,尤其是社会科学众多解释模式之间的争论。造成分歧的主要原因不仅是利他行为本身的复杂性和多样性,更主要的是不同学科范式之间,以及这些范式所秉承的研究传统和学科目标之间的差异。对利他行为合理的科学解释必须放弃由于学科分割而造成的门户之见,把客观现象的人为分裂重新整合起来。这种学科间的整合不同于以往意义上研究方法的交叉与互补,而是要在“生物——社会”层面建立一个关于人类行为的全新的理论架构。     

An historian's view of American social science

This paper explicates the argument of The Origins of American Science. Starting from my own historical premises and the origin of the social sciences in both historicism and science, I compare the divergent historical orientations of the sociologies of Robert Park and Max Weber. I argue that the inclination of American social science toward scientism and liberalism derives from the national ideology of American exceptionalism. Since this structural feature of American political culture was itself a part of history, I indicate how changes in historical consciousness and politics led American social scientists to reformulate exceptionalism and their disciplines. By the 1920s, their hope of establishing scientific control over, and maintaining the liberal direction of, the fast-changing national history was embodied in scientism. I close with some thoughts about the continuing power of scientism and exceptionalism since the 1920s and the possibility that an historical, Weberian model of social science could bridge the widening gap between scientistic and hermeneutic wings of the social science disciplines.     

The very idea of a social science

In The Idea of a Social Science Winch, argues that, sociology is more properly conceived as a branch of philosophy than of empirical science. Winch falls victim here to the Humean assimilation of the empirical to the generalizable. He notes that much of our talk about social practice is in terms of conventions, so that explanations of social action can be given without recourse to statistical or experimental findings. But such talk depends nonetheless on the accuracy and detail with which the situations in which actions occur are‐ recorded, and this is surely an empirical enterprise. It is the misleading conception of sociology as a discipline, characterized by common procedures, that leads Winch to espouse the assimilation of sociology to conceptual inquiry. We need to see instead that sociology embraces a group of questions and subjects so loosely connected that it would be mistaken to speak of, and idle to project, a procedure common to all of them.     

I. Formal theory in social science

Contemporary social science tends to suffer from too many misplaced attempts at mathematical or game‐theoretical formulation, and much effort is wasted in either propounding such formulations, or in showing their inanity. Jon Elster does not entirely escape this himself, but Logic and Society is truly remarkable in pointing the way to some possibly very relevant formalizations. These are particularly to be found in the chapter on ‘contradictions of society’. There Elster attempts to delineate the properties of certain self‐frustrating predicaments of action, and to relate them as well to Hegelian‐Marxist conceptions of contradiction. It may be, however, that the relevance of this analysis is restricted to societies whose form of life has become atomistic, and whose members thus function in an individual‐calculative way in many spheres of life. But even so, formalizations of the kind Elster provides would be useful in defining one kind of historically evolved society among others.     

On radical conceptual revolutions in social science

The paper considers arguments for and against correction and elimination of the basic conceptual categories as well as theories of social science. It is argued that some correction of at least some basic social notions is called for. A great part of the paper consists in a conceptual investigation of such notion of correction in terms of different notions of corrective explanation.