Information search in the testing of quantified hypotheses: how "all," "most," "some," "few," and "none" hypotheses are tested

A series of experiments examined how the search for information in the testing of hypotheses is affected by quantifiers that specify the frequency of the test relation. The experiments showed that a positive search is used more in the testing of propositions in which some instances are predicted to have the test relation than in the testing of propositions in which most or few instances are predicted to have the test relation. In addition, the studies demonstrated that a negative or disconfirmatory search is more likely to characterize tests of absolute hypotheses than tests of hypotheses of the majority or minority form. Finally, the findings indicated that a negative search also is more common in tests of hypotheses predicting the absence rather than the presence of a phenomenon. Thus, as expected, participants generally engaged in a diagnostic search rather than the confirmatory search for information that has been so ubiquitous in previous research.     

沃尔夫斯多夫:"苏格拉底对定义的寻求"

从考察柏拉图早期关于定义的对话中苏格拉底寻求定义的方式可知,苏格拉底对定义的评价是通过考察定义与他所承诺的"F-条件"("F"指在对话中苏格拉底与对话者所探讨的各概念变元)的同一性条件的一致性来达到的.在此过程中,他力图确定定义的真值,其方法是通过考察定义与他所相信为真的"F-条件"的一致性.如果一定义与这些条件不一致,那么就可认为这个定义是错的.而苏格拉底对"F-条件"的相信则建立在"自明"、"共同状态"、"经验"或根据这三者所作的"演绎"的基础上.不过,他没有说明他承诺"F-条件"的认识论根据是什么,这在某种程度上可以看做是他对伦理学的认识论问题的回避.他也承认他寻求定义的方式是有局限的.     

The role of information about "convention," "design," and "goal" in representing artificial kinds

In this chapter, we have considered the nature and development of our capacities for the representation of artificial kinds. We have presented a range of evidence collected using varying methods and from our own laboratories and those of others that speaks to the question of the kinds of information that might be central to knowledge of artifacts and their functions in human semantic memory. One key argument here has been that despite the fact that information about shared convention has been argued to play an important role in understanding of the "proper" uses of artifacts, just as it does in the case of the use of linguistic symbols within language communities, there are important differences between the two cases, and indeed across development, decisions about categories and functions dissociate. We have argued here that the nonarbitrary relationship between the material kind and mechanical structure of artifacts and the functions that can be supported undercuts the force of information about convention as important to determining proper artifact function. Shared convention appears less important for determining this facet of our semantic memory for artifacts than it does in supporting the proper relationship between linguistic symbols and the categories of artifact to which they refer.     

Enactivism,other minds,and mental disorders

Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are (at least partially) externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called “direct social perception” (DSP): the idea that we can sometimes perceive features of other minds directly in the character of their embodiment and environmental interactions. I argue that if DSP is true, we can probably also perceive certain features of mental disorders as well. I draw upon the developmental psychologist Daniel Stern’s notion of “forms of vitality”—largely overlooked in these debates—to develop this idea, and I use autism as a case study. I argue further that an enactive approach to DSP can clarify some ways we play a regulative role in shaping the temporal and phenomenal character of the disorder in question, and it may therefore have practical significance for both the clinical and therapeutic encounter.

     

The "I," the "we," and the "when": a meta-analysis of motivational primacy in self-definition

What is the primary motivational basis of self-definition? The authors meta-analytically assessed 3 hypotheses: (a) The individual self is motivationally primary, (b) the collective self is motivationally primary, and (c) neither self is inherently primary; instead, motivational primacy depends on which self becomes accessible through contextual features. Results identified the individual self as the primary motivational basis of self-definition. People react more strongly to threat and enhancement of the individual than the collective self. Additionally, people more readily deny threatening information and more readily accept enhancing information when it pertains to the individual rather than the collective self, regardless of contextual influences. The individual self is the psychological home base, a stable system that can react flexibly to contextual influences.     

Frequency pattern of alpha waves in the early stages of cerebrovascular circulation disorders]

In this study 201 EEG curves are interpreted belonging to patients suffering from incipient disturbances of the cerebral circulation. The patients were divided into 3 groups according to age (group I, 30-40 years; group II, 40-50 years; group III, 50 years and over). In group I there prevailed a rate of 11-12 alpha waves per sec., and a slower rate was hardly ever found; in group III the frequency pattern was quite different. This decreased frequency of the waves could be confirmed by statistics. We believe a direct link can be assumed to exist between a decrease in frequency and the beginning of disturbed cerebral circulation.     

General processes, rather than "goals," explain imitation errors

The goal-directed theory of imitation (GOADI) states that copying of action outcomes (e.g., turning a light switch) takes priority over imitation of the means by which those outcomes are achieved (e.g., choice of effector or grip). The object < effector < grip error pattern in the pen-and-cups task provides strong support for GOADI. Experiment 1 replicated this effect using video stimuli. Experiment 2 showed that shifting the color cue from objects to effectors makes imitation of effector selection more accurate than imitation of object and grip selection. Experiment 3 replicated this result when participants were required to describe actions. Experiment 4 indicated that, when participants are imitating and describing actions, enhancing grip discriminability makes grip selection the most accurately executed component of the task. Consistent with theories that hypothesize that imitation relies on task-general mechanisms (e.g., the associative sequence learning model, ideomotor theory), these findings suggest that imitation is no more or less goal directed than other tasks involving action observation.     

Prevention, solution-focused therapy, and the illusion of mental disorders

Therapy theorists' criticism of the lack of specific mechanisms in the prevention of mental disorders is examined from the perspective of solution-focused therapy (SFT), which argues that solutions can be unrelated to problems, and that it is not even necessary to know what a problem is in order to solve it. It is suggested that the shift of attention from problems to solutions in SFT offers a conceptual framework within which the criticism is not relevant, and from which theorists of therapy and prevention can share a common outlook. This outlook involves a focus on encouraging productive, useful, positive behavior, with a corresponding deemphasis on an skepticism about current conceptualizations of mental disorders.     

Gordon Allport, character, and the "culture of personality," 1897-1937

This article examines the cultural context of early American personality psychology through a consideration of the early career of Gordon Allport. Between 1921 and 1937, Allport was among the leading figures in the movement to establish personality as a research category in American psychology. Far from being a strictly scientific concern, Allport's project was deeply embedded in the cultural politics of the age. Of particular importance was the gradual erosion of the language of character and the self-sacrificing, morally grounded self that it supported. Allport's "psychology of personality" helped fuel this trend while simultaneously attempting to resist it. His experience illustrates the elasticity and moral ambiguity of the newly emerging category of personality.     

Regulatory disorders in early childhood: Correlates in child behavior,parent–child relationship,and parental mental health

According to the guidelines published by the German Society of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Psychosomatics and Psychotherapy (2007), regulatory disorders of early childhood are characterized by a symptom triad, including (a) behavioral symptoms such as excessive crying, sleeping, or feeding problems; (b) a disturbed parent–child relationship; and (c) parental psychopathology. On the basis of a clinic–referred sample of 162 children, we examined whether children with and without regulatory symptoms differed in the quality of parent–child relationship and parental mental health, and how often the criteria of the symptom triad were fulfilled in the group of children with regulatory symptoms. In addition, emotional and behavior problems were compared in children with and without regulatory symptoms. Children with regulatory symptoms and children with other psychiatric symptoms did not differ with respect to child–parent relationship quality. However, parents of children with regulatory symptoms scored higher on the Symptom Checklist 90 Items‐Revised (G.H. Franke, 2002 ) than did the other parents. On the Child Behavior Checklist (T.M. Achenbach & L.A. Rescorla, 2000), children with regulatory symptoms tended to show more somatic problems, but they showed significantly less withdrawn behavior than did the other children. Of the 67 children with regulatory symptoms, only 11 (16.4%) fulfilled all three criteria of a regulatory disorder.     

Personality traits in late adolescence predict mental disorders in early adulthood: a prospective-epidemiological study

Prospective relations between personality traits and mental disorders were assessed in a longitudinal study of a representative birth cohort of young men and women from Dunedin, New Zealand. Personality traits were assessed via self-report questionnaire at age 18, and mental disorders were assessed via diagnostic interview at both ages 18 and 21. High "negative emotionality" (a propensity to experience aversive affective states) at age 18 was linked with affective, anxiety, substance dependence, and antisocial personality disorders at age 21 when corresponding mental disorders at age 18 were controlled. Low "constraint" (difficulty inhibiting the expression of affect and impulse) at age 18 was linked with substance dependence and antisocial personality disorders at age 21 when corresponding mental disorders at age 18 were controlled. The findings are discussed in terms of their implications for the development and treatment of mental disorders in young adulthood.     

"Factor analyses of the family assessment device," by Ridenour, Daley, & Reich

Ridenour, Daley, and Reich conducted a series of factor analyses using the correlational matrix of the subscale scores of the Family Assessment Device (FAD), published in Family Process, December, 1999. They conclude that "the FAD subscales be reorganized from their current seven-subscale format" (p. 507). We propose that this suggestion for reorganization is premature and based on the inappropriate application of an "internal consistency" model of scale construction to the FAD. We further suggest that the most important criteria regarding an assessment instrument are those of reliability, validity, and clinical utility. In the absence of this kind of data regarding alternative organizations of the FAD, we believe that the original subscales remain the best choice.     

Visual sensing IS seeing: why "mindsight," in hindsight, is blind

Faced with the surprising failure to notice large changes to visual scenes (change blindness), many researchers have sought evidence for alternative, nonattentional routes to change detection. A recent article in Psychological Science (Rensink, 2004) proposed a new, nonsensory "mindsight" mechanism to explain the finding that some subjects on some trials reported sensing the presence of a recurring change before they could explicitly identify it and without having a localizable visual experience of change. This mechanism would constitute a previously unknown mode of seeing that, as Rensink suggested, might be akin to a sixth sense. Its existence would have radical implications for the mechanisms underlying conscious visual experience. Provocative claims merit rigorous scrutiny. We rebut the existence of a mindsight mechanism by supporting a more mundane explanation: Some subjects take time to verify their initial conscious detection of changes.     

The role of functionality in the mental representations of engineering students: some differences in the early stages of expertise

As engineers gain experience and become experts in their domain, the structure and content of their knowledge changes. Two studies are presented that examine differences in knowledge representation among freshman and senior engineering students. The first study examines recall of mechanical devices and chunking of components, and the second examines whether seniors represent devices in a more abstract functional manner than do freshmen. The most prominent differences between these 2 groups involve their representation of the functioning of groups of electromechanical components and how these groups of components interact to produce device behavior. Seniors are better able to construct coherent representations of devices by focusing on the function of sets of components in the device. The findings from these studies highlight some ways in which the structure and content of mental representations of design knowledge differ during the early stages of expertise acquisition.