Skills-demands compatibility as a determinant of flow experience in an inductive reasoning task

The skills-demands fit hypothesis of flow theory was examined. Based on the earlier finding that high demands in a game situation do not reduce the experience of flow, a cognitive task paradigm was used. The effect of skills-demands compatibility on the experience of flow but not of other, similar psychological states (i.e., concentration, negative and positive activation) was also investigated. Participants were 89 undergraduate students who worked on a number of inductive reasoning tasks in four successive trials with or without skills-demands compatibility. The results clearly supported the skills-demands fit hypothesis; concentration and activation were affected only by the tasks' difficulty. Inductive reasoning tasks are a useful tool for the experimental analysis of flow, and skills-demands compatibility is a significant and powerful condition of flow, but not of other, similar psychological states.     

Speed of reasoning and its relation to reasoning ability

The study investigates empirical properties of reasoning speed which is conceived as the fluency of solving reasoning problems. Responses and response times in reasoning tasks are modeled jointly to clarify the covariance structure of reasoning speed and reasoning ability. To determine underlying abilities, the predictive validities of two cognitive covariates, namely perceptual and executive attention, are investigated. A sample of N = 230 test takers completed a reasoning test, Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM), and attention tests indicating perceptual and executive attention. For modeling responses the two-parameter normal ogive model, and for modeling response times the two-parameter lognormal model was applied. Results suggest that reasoning speed is a unidimensional construct representing significant individual differences, and that reasoning speed and ability are negatively correlated but clearly distinguishable constructs. Perceptual and executive attention showed differential effects on reasoning speed and reasoning ability, i.e., reasoning speed is explained by executive attention only, while reasoning ability is explained by both covariates. Implications for the assessment of reasoning are discussed.     

Group differences in intelligence and speed of information-processing

Three samples of different levels of mental ability, but each of average or above- average intelligence, were administered a battery of reaction time test which measure the speed with which persons can execute various elementary cognitive processes. Discriminant analyses revealed significant differences between the groups in reaction times and intraindividual standard deviations, and univariate analyses indicated that higher ability groups tended to obtain significantly faster mean reaction times and to show significantly less intraindividual variability than lower ability groups. Groups which differed the most in mental ability differed to the greatest extent on the more complex reaction time tests but this pattern was reversed for groups which were relatively close in mean IQ. Generally, the results support the hypothesis that speed- of-processing is an important factor unferlying intelligence, but a number of puzzling findings indicate the need for continued research in this area.     

Creativity and inductive reasoning: The relationship between divergent thinking and performance on wason's 2-4-6 task

This study was an investigation of the relationship between potential creativity—as measured by fluency scores on the Alternate Uses Test—and performance on Wason's 2-4-6 task. As hypothesized, participants who were successful in discovering the rule had significantly higher fluency scores. Successful participants also generated higher frequencies of confirmatory and disconfirmatory hypotheses, but a multiple regression analysis using the stepwise method revealed that the frequency of generating disconfirmatory hypotheses and fluency scores were the only two significant factors in task outcome. The results also supported earlier studies where disconfirmation was shown to play a more important role in the later stages of hypothesis testing. This was especially true of successful participants, who employed a higher frequency of disconfirmatory hypotheses after receiving feedback on the first announcement. These results imply that successful participants benefited from the provision of feedback on the first announcement by switching to a more successful strategy in the hypothesis-testing sequence.     

Linguistic and psychometric factors in propositional reasoning

An experiment is reported which demonstrates the effects of linguistic and psychometric factors on adults' performance on a propositional reasoning task. The three linguistic factors were the semantic content in which the logical rule was embedded, the linguistic form of the logical rule, and the polarity of the major premise of the logical arguments. The two psychometric factors were the mode of response and the order of presentation of the different types of content. The results showed that the linguistic factors had a pronounced effect on adults' propositional reasoning abilities, whereas the influence of the psychometric factors was negligible. These findings are discussed in relation to operational and interpretational factors in reasoning.     

Effects of age and the relationship between response time measures and psychometric intelligence in younger adults

The major goal of the present study was to investigate the potential influence of age on the relationship among performance measures derived from a Hick reaction time task and general intelligence (psychometric g). Participants were 130 male and 130 female younger adults (mean age: 24.6 years) covering a wide range of individual levels of intelligence. Results from structural-equation modelling analyses clearly indicate that there is no evidence for the notion of a general speed factor underlying psychometric g. A much more sufficient model is provided by the assumption that median reaction time (RTmd) and intraindividual variability of reaction time (RTSD), though highly correlated, reflect two distinct sources of variance for psychometric g. While age was negatively associated with RTmd, no such relationship could be established for RTSD.     

Theory-based Bayesian models of inductive learning and reasoning

Inductive inference allows humans to make powerful generalizations from sparse data when learning about word meanings, unobserved properties, causal relationships, and many other aspects of the world. Traditional accounts of induction emphasize either the power of statistical learning, or the importance of strong constraints from structured domain knowledge, intuitive theories or schemas. We argue that both components are necessary to explain the nature, use and acquisition of human knowledge, and we introduce a theory-based Bayesian framework for modeling inductive learning and reasoning as statistical inferences over structured knowledge representations.     

Infants' reasoning about opaque and transparent occluders in an individuation task

Two experiments document that conceptual knowledge influences 3-year-olds' extension of novel words. In Experiment 1, when objects were described as having conceptual properties typical of artifacts, children extended novel labels for these objects on the basis of shape alone. When the very same objects were described as having conceptual properties typical of animate kinds, children extended novel labels for these objects on the basis of both shape and texture. Moreover, providing a salient perceptual cue (Experiment 2) did not interfere with children's reliance on conceptual information in extending novel words: when an object with eyes was labeled with a novel word in the context of a story describing the object as an artifact, children extended the label on the basis of shape alone (i.e. as though the object were an artifact). These results, which challenge directly the position that 'dumb attentional mechanisms' can account for word learning, stand as evidence for the central role of conceptual information in mapping words to meaning.     

Infants' reasoning about opaque and transparent occluders in an individuation task

There has been some debate about whether infants 10 months and younger can use featural information to individuate objects. The present research tested the hypothesis that negative results obtained with younger infants reflect limitations in information processing capacities rather than the inability to individuate objects based on featural differences. Infants aged 9.5 months saw one object (i.e. a ball) or two objects (i.e. a box and a ball) emerge successively to opposite sides of an opaque occluder. Infants then saw a single ball either behind a transparent occluder or without an occluder. Only the infants who saw the ball behind the transparent occluder correctly judged that the one-ball display was inconsistent with the box-ball sequence. These results suggest that: (a) infants categorize events involving opaque and transparent occluders as the same kind of physical situation (i.e. occlusion) and (b) support the notion that infants are more likely to give evidence of object individuation when they need to reason about one kind of event (i.e. occlusion) than when they must retrieve and compare categorically distinct events (i.e. occlusion and no-occlusion).     

Causal relations and feature similarity in children's inductive reasoning

Four experiments examined the development of property induction on the basis of causal relations. In the first 2 studies, 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults were presented with triads in which a target instance was equally similar to 2 inductive bases but shared a causal antecedent feature with 1 of them. All 3 age groups used causal relations as a basis for property induction, although the proportion of causal inferences increased with age. Subsequent experiments pitted causal relations against featural similarity in induction. It was found that adults and 8-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, preferred shared causal relations over strong featural similarity as a basis for induction. The implications for models of inductive reasoning and development are discussed.     

An investigation of the relationship between trait emotional intelligence and emotional task performance

This study examined the relationships between trait emotional intelligence (EI) and tasks involving the recognition of facial expressions of emotion. Two facial expression recognition tasks using the inspection time (IT) paradigm assessed speed of emotional information processing. An unspeeded emotion recognition task was also included, and a symbol IT task was used to assess speed of processing of non-emotional information. It was found that scores on all three emotion-related tasks were strongly intercorrelated, as were scores on the three IT tasks. The two emotional IT scores remained significantly correlated when symbol IT performance was partialled out. This finding, together with the associations between the speeded (IT) and unspeeded face tasks suggests that the association between the emotional IT tasks is not entirely accounted for by general processing speed, and that a general emotion-processing ability also contributes to performance on these tasks. An EI subscale assessing Appraisal of Emotions was significantly correlated with performance on the emotional IT tasks, suggesting that self-reports of emotional perception ability do relate to performance measures.     

ERP characteristics of sentential inductive reasoning in time and frequency domains

Earlier studies have examined the issues of brain spatial localization in human sentential inductive reasoning using PET/fMRI. However, the temporal characteristics of such reasoning remain unclear. In our present study, we have used ERP (Event-related Potential) to further study human inductive reasoning involving sentential tasks. For congruent induction tasks, in which premises and conclusions are related, participants need to synthesize semantic information from the premises, conclusions, as well as background knowledge, while for incongruent induction tasks (baseline), in which premises and conclusions are unrelated, participants can respond “no” immediately. Behavioral data have been obtained that is consistent with expectations. ERPs imply that participants may integrate semantic information within the time window of 350–650 ms. Statistical analysis in the frequency domain has revealed a significant increase in the power of the gamma band (30–50 Hz) for congruent induction tasks in contrast to incongruent induction tasks.     

Differential involvement of left prefrontal cortex in inductive and deductive reasoning

While inductive and deductive reasoning are considered distinct logical and psychological processes, little is known about their respective neural basis. To address this issue we scanned 16 subjects with fMRI, using an event-related design, while they engaged in inductive and deductive reasoning tasks. Both types of reasoning were characterized by activation of left lateral prefrontal and bilateral dorsal frontal, parietal, and occipital cortices. Neural responses unique to each type of reasoning determined from the Reasoning Type (deduction and induction) by Task (reasoning and baseline) interaction indicated greater involvement of left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44) in deduction than induction, while left dorsolateral (BA 8/9) prefrontal gyrus showed greater activity during induction than deduction. This pattern suggests a dissociation within prefrontal cortex for deductive and inductive reasoning.     

Using the antisaccade task to investigate the relationship between the development of inhibition and the development of intelligence

A number of authors have proposed models of cognitive development that explain improvements in intelligence over the course of childhood via changes in the efficiency of inhibitory processes ( Anderson, 2001 ; Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1990 ; Dempster, 1991 , 1992 ; Dempster & Corkill, 1999a ; Harnishfeger, 1995 ; Harnishfeger & Bjorklund, 1993 ). A review of the literature reveals little empirical support for the thesis. This is largely due to a failure to distinguish between age‐related and non‐age‐related changes in both inhibitory ability and intelligence. Empirical evidence is presented from a developmental study employing the antisaccade task to provide support for the role of inhibitory processes in the development of intelligence. Additionally, a case is made for a functional difference underlying antisaccade errors that are subsequently corrected and those that remain uncorrected.     

Interpretation and matching bias in a reasoning task

Subjects were required to construct verifying and falsifying cases of conditional rules in which the presence and absence of negative components was varied. Their responses gave some indication of consistent interpretation of the rules, generally conforming to Wason's (1966) idea of a “defective” truth table. Much of their behaviour, however, seemed to be determined by a task variable in the form of a tendency to construct instances which matched, rather than altered, the values named in the rules.     

Majority and minority influence in inductive reasoning: A preliminary study

Ninety-three students were exposed to majority and minority influence in an inductive reasoning task. The former induced convergent thinking processes, though its effects were not reducible to mere compliance. The latter activated more divergent constructive processes, supporting the predictions of Conversion Theory.     

Electrical potentials of the cerebral cortex and psychometric intelligence

Contradictory findings concerning relationships between intelligence-test scores and different EEG evoked-potential (EP) measures have been reported. The positive findings suggest that intelligence is correlated with the number and amplitude of components in the EP waveform. Since there is evidence that both of these parameters are influenced by stimulus intensity, we examined the extent to which an EP/intelligence relationship may depend on stimulus intensity. In a sample of 22 Ss a relationship between EP amplitude and intelligence was found and the magnitude of this correlation was related systematically to stimulus intensity. The maximum correlation (r = 0.69) with scores on the Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices was obtained at an intermediate level of intensity. These findings may account for some of the inconsistencies in the literature. Moreover, they suggest an explanation for higher general intelligence in terms of greater central activation of neural processes in response to normal levels of stimulation.