Anticipating the inevitable: When leader and member attribution styles clash

This article supported the hypothesis that leaders’ and members’ attribution styles have interactive effects on members’ perceptions of the quality of their leader–member relations. Across two samples, results revealed an interactive effect such that members’ perceptions of poor leader–member relations were most accentuated when they were biased toward external and unstable attributions (i.e. optimistic attributions) for their negative outcomes, while their leaders were biased toward attributing negative outcomes to the internal and stable characteristics of the members (i.e. pessimistic attribution styles). In Study 2, results indicated that the members’ perceptions of distributive and procedural justice mediated the interactive effects of leader pessimism and member optimism on relationship quality.     

When mutations meet motivations: Attitude biases in counterfactual thought

The present research examines whether existing attitudes can spontaneously bias the content and direction of generated counterfactual thoughts, and whether these thoughts influence subsequent attitude-relevant judgments. Two experimental studies demonstrate that attitudes can bias the content of counterfactual thoughts, and that these biased thoughts in turn predict polarized attitudes. These effects were obtained regardless of whether explicit instructions for counterfactual generation were given. Furthermore, both studies demonstrate that these effects are mediated by judgments of future likelihood. Implications of these results for theories of counterfactual thinking and persuasion are discussed.     

Similarity of trait construal and consensus in interpersonal perception

This study examined the roles of similarity of trait construal and length of acquaintanceship in interpersonal consensus. Pairs of roommates were asked to rate a mutual acquaintance on six ambiguous traits and to describe their behavioral definitions of those traits. They were then asked to rate the acquaintance again, once on the basis of their own definition of the trait and then on the basis of their roommate’s definition of the trait. Consensus was greater when roommates based their judgments on the same, shared trait definitions than when they based their judgments on their own unshared trait definitions. Furthermore, those roommates who reported similar trait construals exhibited significantly higher consensus in their initial unrestricted judgments of the mutual acquaintance than did those whose trait construals were dissimilar. Length of acquaintance appeared unrelated to similarity of trait construal and consensus. Discussion focuses on trait construal, interpersonal agreement, and social judgment.     

When reasons matter: Quality of support affects reactions to increasing and consistent agreement

Evidence indicates that moving from a minority to a majority position has little impact on group identification. The present study investigated how reactions of former minorities and stable minorities to the group as a whole and their own faction were moderated by the quality of support they received for their position (genuine vs. superficial vs. unexplained). Former minorities identified more strongly with the group when others converted to their position for genuine than for superficial (or unexplained) reasons. The group identification of stable minorities did not vary as a function of the quality of support. Both former minorities and stable minorities identified more with their own faction when they received genuine than superficial (or unexplained) support. These findings clarify the important role of quality of support in group and faction identification. Moreover, they show that former minorities do identify with the group when they receive support they can trust.     

When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model

When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. The high-logic, low belief-bias group's relatively unbiased responses came at the cost of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of observed effects.     

When the risks are low: the impact of absolute and comparative information on disturbance and understanding in US and UK samples

When Klein, W. M. gave participants absolute and comparative risk information (crossed experimentally) they were more disturbed by being above than below average, but not by being at higher rather than lower risk. The current experiment tests whether Klein's findings extend to situations involving lower risk figures more typical of genuine health risks, assesses participants’ understanding of the information, and directly compares responses of US and UK samples. Participants were presented with hypothetical information about comparative and absolute risks of deep vein thrombosis. There was a main effect of absolute risk information on disturbance and precaution intentions in the US sample, but no effects of comparative information on these measures in either sample. Understanding was poor among participants receiving both pieces of risk information. Future studies should include measures of understanding to establish whether people are failing to understand what they are told or failing to respond systematically to what they understand. Practically, the findings caution against providing comparative risk information when communicating low risk figures.     

分析思维降低情感预测影响偏差

人们在决策前需要对决策可能带来的结果进行预测。人们往往会高估未来事件对情感的影响,这被称为影响偏差。本研究从双系统理论出发,考察了分析思维是否会降低情感预测影响偏差。实验1(采用图片启动)和实验2(采用语言流畅性任务)考察了分析思维对影响偏差的影响,并分析了情感预测程度的中介作用。实验3在现场中以真实的决策(生育二孩)为例,考察了分析思维启动对情感预测的影响。结果发现:分析思维会降低情感预测强度,进而降低影响偏差。     

Gender makes the difference: The moderating role of leader gender on the relationship between leadership styles and subordinate performance

Using a predominantly male research and development (R&D) sample and a predominantly female customer service personnel sample, we investigated how authoritarian and benevolent leadership styles interact with leader gender to influence subordinate performance (i.e., task performance, citizenship behavior, and creativity). Our research extends role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002) by adopting  and  attribution principles to offer a more comprehensive framework for explaining how leader gender affects the impact of leadership styles on subordinate performance. Our results suggest that the negative relationship between authoritarian leadership and subordinate performance is stronger for female than for male leaders and that the positive relationship between benevolent leadership and subordinate performance is stronger for male than for female leaders. Accordingly, in addition to leaders’ engaging in gender-role congruent behaviors, a useful strategy is to adopt behaviors that are perceived as a positive deviation from their gender role.     

The common morality in communitarian thought: reflective consensus in public policy

I explore the possible meanings that the notion of the common morality can have in a contemporary communitarian approach to ethics and public policy. The common morality can be defined as the conditions for shared pursuit of the good or as the values, deliberations, traditions, and common construction of the narrative of a people. The former sense sees the common morality as the universal and invariant structures of morality while the second sense is much more contingent in nature. Nevertheless, the communitarian sees both aspects as integral in devising solutions to public policy problems. I outline how both meanings follow from communitarian philosophical anthropology and illustrate how they work together when addressing a question such as that of providing universal health insurance in the United States. The common morality forms the basis of building an implicit consensus that is available to and reaffirmed by the shared reflections of the citizenry.     

Adjusting for the correspondence bias: Effects of causal uncertainty, cognitive busyness, and causal strength of situational information

This research examined the conditions under which people who have more chronic doubt about their ability to make sense of social behavior (i.e., are causally uncertain; [Weary and Edwards, 1994] and [Weary and Edwards, 1996]) are more likely to adjust their dispositional inferences for a target’s behaviors. Using a cognitive busyness manipulation within the attitude attribution paradigm, we found in Study 1 that higher causal uncertainty predicted increased correction of dispositional inferences, but only when participants had sufficient attentional resources to devote to the task. In Study 2, we found that higher-causal uncertainty predicted greater inferential correction, but only when the additional information provided a more compelling alternative explanation for the observed behavior. Results of this research are discussed in terms of their relevance to the Causal Uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1994) and dispositional inference models.     

Measuring Theodicy: Individual Differences in the Perception of Divine Intervention

The attribution of control to God may have particularly interesting psychological properties. Theodicy refers to the perception of God controlling history—even the minutiae of daily events. The current study examines the psychometric properties of a new instrument, the Theodicy Scale. Results support the reliability of the brief scale when administered to college students, and some evidence is provided suggesting construct validation. Theodicy appears to represent a unitary construct and scores vary independent of social desirability bias. The absence of a relationship between Theodicy scores and simulated medical advice raises questions to be addressed in future research.     

Linking Superiority Bias in the Interpersonal and Intergroup Domains

Abstract

The author conducted 2 studies to explore the link between superiority bias in the interpersonal and intergroup domains. Australian university students evaluated the extent to which various personality traits were more or less applicable to themselves than to other Australian university students in general. They then evaluated the extent to which the same traits were more or less applicable to Australians than to people from other countries in general. As expected, the more participants evaluated themselves as superior to other university students, the more they evaluated Australians as a whole as superior to people from other countries. This link between interpersonal and intergroup superiority biases explained 22.1% of variance in Study 1 and 33.6% of variance in Study 2. The author interprets the results of the 2 studies as support for fundamental principles of social identity theory: (a) that self-concept consists of not only one's personal self but also the social groups to which one belongs and (b) that people are motivated to view both levels of self in a relatively positive fashion.     

Skill‐based versus effort‐based task difficulty: A task‐analysis approach to the role of specific emotions in motivating difficult actions

We make a distinction between primarily effort-based and skilled-based tasks and examine the correspondence between emotion and task. We reverse attribution theory results wherein failure to expend effort engenders regret and accomplishing tasks with skill engenders pride, and propose these emotions as antecedents to effort-based and skill-based behaviors. Specifically, pride (regret) produces higher self-efficacy, behavioral intentions and sign-ups when the task (CPR training) is portrayed as skill-intensive (effort-intensive) compared to effort-intensive (skill-intensive) or easy. Our research highlights the value of integrating an attributional analysis of tasks into an appraisal theory of emotions and suggests mechanisms that might underlie this relationship.     

When Increased Group Identification Leads to Outgroup Liking and Cooperation: The Role of Trust

ABSTRACT

Two studies explored the influence of group identification and the functional relations between groups on outgroup liking. In a laboratory study, Study 1 (N = 112) found that outgroup liking was highest when group identification was high and relations between groups were cooperative, but outgroup liking was lowest when group identification was high and relations were competitive. In a field replication of Study 1, Study 2 (N = 181) similarly found more liking with high group identification and cooperative relations between groups. Additional analyses revealed that the Identification × Relations interactions found in Studies 1 and 2 were mediated by outgroup trust. We discuss how trust is an important factor for predicting outgroup bias for both high and low group identification.     

Losing sight of oneself in the above-average effect: When egocentrism, focalism, and group diffuseness collide

Four experiments examined the relative influence of three causal processes in the above-average effect (AAE) and related comparative biases: (a) egocentrism, (b) focalism, and (c) referent group diffuseness. By manipulating the inclusion or exclusion of the self from the referent group (Experiments 1-3) or target group (Experiment 4), the relative contributions of each influence were assessed. In direct comparisons, single peers were systematically judged more favorably relative to groups including the self, suggesting that egocentrism plays a lesser role than focalism or group diffuseness. Thus, in response to the question such as “How friendly is Nancy compared to the rest of us?” the answer tends to be “More friendly.”     

Crime and punishment: distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment

Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection of an agent to a harmful consequence. Also, selectively for judgments of punishment and blame, people who attempt but fail to cause harm more are judged more leniently if the harm occurs by independent means than if the harm does not occur at all. An account of these phenomena is proposed that distinguishes two processes of moral judgment: one which begins with harmful consequences and seeks a causally responsible agent, and the other which begins with an action and analyzes the mental states responsible for that action.     

Beliefs as inner causes: The (lack of) evidence

Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as patterns of living that contextualize behavior.     

When bad gets worse: Negative wording amplifies negative recall in persons with the borderline personality trait

The emotional valence of memory recall strongly influences the extreme, and often self‐destructive behavioral response. Overall, 4427 people from the community filled out our screening questionnaire, of which 674 (mean age: 32.9 years, 64.7% women) passed the threshold for the likely presence of borderline personality disorder (BPD). Participants watched one of 9 possible video clips differing in valence (positive, negative or neutral). Results indicate support (ß = .151, p < .05) for a negative cognitive tendency in the evaluations proportionate to the severity of BPD but only when the impression is assessed with negatively‐worded items. This effect is detectable regardless of other factors such as negative mood, extremity of the answers or general impression of the character. These effects are unaffected by acute trauma. To conclude, different factors influence the recall of emotional stimuli, depending on the valence of the stimuli and the valence of the rating scale in persons with strong borderline tendencies.     

Thinking and feeling in the People's Republic of China: testing the generality of the "laws of emotion"

Cognitive theories of emotion assert that emotional reactions to events depend on the manner in which events are interpreted and appraised. From this perspective, the same outcome can produce different emotions. For example, a score of 85% on a test can evoke positive feelings if it is considered a success or negative feelings if it is considered a failure. Among the various appraisal dimensions that have been identified, causal attributions are thought to play a particularly influential role in shaping emotional reactions to various events. For example, success can evoke pride if it is attributed to high ability, gratitude if it is attributed to help from others, relief if it is attributed to a stroke of good fortune, or guilt if it is attained fraudulently or at the expense of others. These cognitive-affective linkages are thought to be universal. In this paper, we report two studies that tested the cross-cultural generality of some of these assumptions. In Study 1, participants from the People's Republic of China were led to succeed or fail on an (alleged) test of their intelligence and creativity. Consistent with previous findings with Western samples, attributions to ability predicted participants' emotional reactions to their test performance, with high ability attributions linked to greater pride following success. In Study 2, we extended these findings with American and Chinese participants, using a different experimental manipulation of success and failure, and a measure of attributions to effort. For both cultural groups, attributions to ability (but not attributions to effort) predicted greater emotional reactions to success. We conclude that attribution-emotion linkages have cross-cultural validity, and that pride is maximized when success is attributed to high ability.