Against “Transracialism”: Revisiting the Debate

This article critically reflects on some of the themes and assumptions at stake in the “transracialism” controversy, and connects them to important works in critical race theory: namely Rey Chow's notion of “coercive mimeticism” and Sara Ahmed's critique of white liberal multiculturalism. It argues that the analytic account of “race” that Tuvel draws upon in her article—Sally Haslanger's—is politically problematic, both on its own terms and in light of broader reflections on racialized and gendered power relations. In particular, I critique Haslanger's assumption that all racial identities exist on the same conceptual plane: that a single variable definition of “race” can be applied to any particular racialized group—including white and nonwhite racial identities. This erases racialized power relations, especially where, in liberal “multicultural” nations, whiteness constitutes the implied standard against which an appearance of “racial difference” is conjured. Finally, I extend my argument to the issue of treating “race” and gender analogously. Rejecting this move, I propose an alternative way of conceptualizing these as analytically distinct, yet constitutively interdependent, phenomena. In order to situate the debate historically, I consider an example of “racial transgression” from twentieth‐century China.     

Recognition,ideology, and the case of “invisible suffering”

The purpose of this paper is to expose, and provide a possible solution to, an internal inconsistency in Axel Honneth's critical theory of recognition. 1 Honneth requires a way of making his claim that misrecognition causes subjective suffering, with the potential to cognitively disclose injustice, consistent with his account of ideological recognition as a form of misrecognition that engenders compliance with an oppressive social order. Only by reconciling these claims—that is, by showing how ideological recognition can engender an acceptance of domination whilst at the same time causing subjective suffering—can Honneth's theory of recognition retain the kind of critical capacities he desires. As a means of achieving this reconciliation, I propose the notion of “invisible suffering.” In the case of ideological recognition, I suggest that the suffering caused by misrecognition has its disclosive power blocked by the faux‐affirmation that the ideology discursively accords, and this renders the experience of suffering, qua painful indicator of social injustice, invisible to the subject. Drawing on insights from medical sociology, I show how the need to supplement Honneth's theory of recognition with the idea of invisible suffering is revelatory of the kind of critical theoretical stance demanded by his ontological commitments.     

“THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY HAVE HAD ENOUGH OF EXPERTS”: IN DEFENSE OF THE “ELITES” OF THE SCIENCE‐AND‐RELIGION DEBATE

This article takes a critical stance on John H. Evans's 2018 book, Morals Not Knowledge: Recasting the Contemporary U.S. Conflict between Religion and Science. Highlighting the significance of the book for the science‐and‐religion debate, particularly the book's emphasis on moral questions over knowledge claims revealed in social‐scientific studies of the American public, I also suggest that the distinction between the “elites” of the academic science‐and‐religion field and the religious “public” is insufficiently drawn. I argue that various nuances should be taken into account concerning the portrayal of “elites,” nuances which potentially change the way that “conflict” between science and religion is envisaged, as well as the function of the field. Similarly, I examine the ways in which the book construes science and religion as distinct knowledge systems, and I suggest that, from a theological perspective—relevant for much academic activity in science and religion—there is value in seeing science and religion in terms of a single knowledge system. This perspective may not address the public's interest in moral questions directly—important as they are—but nevertheless it fulfils the academic function of advancing the frontiers of human knowledge and self‐understanding.     

“I am NN”: A Reconstruction of Anscombe's “The First Person”

This paper develops a way of understanding G. E. M. Anscombe's essay “The First Person” at the heart of which are the following two ideas: first, that the point of her essay is to show that it is not possible for anyone to understand what they express with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of thinking of an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of; and second, that the argument through which her essay seeks to show this is itself first personal in character. Understanding Anscombe's essay in this light has the merit of showing much of what it says to be correct. But it sets us the task of saying what it is that we understand ourselves to express with “I” if not an Art des Gegebenseins, and in particular what it is that we understand ourselves to express with sentences with “I” as subject that might seem to express identity judgments, such as “I am NN”, and “I am this body”.     

“Practical Divine Influence”: Socioeconomic Status and Belief in the Prosperity Gospel

The “prosperity gospel” is an understudied feature of the religious landscape of the United States. Little is known about the social patterning of prosperity gospel beliefs. We focus on two core dimensions of socioeconomic status (SES)—education and income—as potential influences. Our analyses of data from the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life's 2006 Survey of Pentecostals produce three findings. First, education and income have negative and mostly independent associations with prosperity gospel beliefs. Second, SES‐based patterns remain after accounting for other attributes of the religious role. Third, while most education‐based differences are contingent upon the attributes of the religious role, these contingencies are not replicated for income‐based differences. These observations reinforce the long‐standing claim that SES plays a pivotal—and complex—role in the social patterning of religious beliefs.     

The “Meta” Level of Integrity: Integrity in the Context of Structural Injustice

This essay argues for a new, “meta,” level of integrity that is created by the context of structural injustice. The essay will draw from Margaret Walker to bring out a defining social value of integrity, namely, its ability to facilitate reliable response to harms caused by “moral luck.” The essay will then argue that, when bad luck is caused by complex social‐structural function, traditional advice for maintaining one's integrity fails to provide adequate guidance; following such advice facilitates unjust social‐structural function, and so unreliability in response to harm. The essay will address this problem by arguing that in the context of structural injustice, a “meta‐level” meaning of integrity emerges. This new meta‐level of integrity, unlike the more traditional first‐level integrity, does not instruct an individual to disassociate herself from structural harms; instead, it instructs an individual to manage the way in which she participates in unjust social structures. Meta‐level integrity, unlike first‐level integrity, does not facilitate an end to structural harm, but it does promote a reliable presence of social‐justice movements within unjust structures.     

Ibsen's Nora and the Confucian Critique of the “Unencumbered Self”

Criticisms of the liberal‐individualist idea of the “unencumbered self” are not just a staple of communitarian thought. Some modern Confucian thinkers are now seeking to develop an ethically particular understanding of social roles in the family that is sensitive to gender‐justice issues, and that provides an alternative to liberal‐individualist conceptions of the “unencumbered self” in relation to family roles. The character of Nora in Henrik Ibsen's A Doll's House seemingly exemplifies such conceptions of the unencumbered self in her rejection of her housewife role for a more authentic selfhood. Drawing upon the capabilities approach to justice, and positive early Japanese bluestockings’ responses to Ibsen's play, I argue that Nora's character is better understood as exemplifying an ethically compelling disencumbered self in potentially cross‐cultural circumstances: a self criticizing and rejecting social roles that are found to be unjust according to universal, as opposed to particularist, “Confucian” ethical standards.     

“The Lost Foundation”: Kristeva's Semiotic Chora and Its Ambiguous Legacy

The aim of this essay is to reclaim Kristeva's concept of the semiotic chora by re‐inscribing it as an intervention in the context of two important postmodern debates. The first debate relates to the philosophical problem of “the beginning before the Beginning.” The second concerns the necessity and possibility of mediation between incommensurable entities: the “demonic” and the social, desire and the Law, material production and representation. I contend: (1) that the introduction of the chora in RPL is part of Kristeva's effort to restore the legacy of a materialist economy of the beginning, as this is glimpsed in Plato's Timaeus from which Kristeva borrows her controversial term; and (2) that the chora constitutes an attempt on Kristeva's part to explore a third space of ambiguous relationality in the context of which our transcendence to the “demonic” lies less “beyond us” than “in‐between.”     

The Relationship of the Racial Identity Attitudes of Black Men to Perceptions of “Parallel” Counseling Dyads

The perceptions that Black men (N = 52) have of “parallel” dyads involving a Black male client and a White male counselor were examined in a vicarious participation analogue design. As defined by Helms (1984b), parallel dyad involves a client and counselor who share similar racial identity attitudes (i.e., attitudes about themselves relative to Blacks and Whites as reference groups). Multiple regression analyses were used to investigate whether racial identity attitudes predicted participants' reactions to the session and their perceptions of the counselors' cross-cultural competence and credibility. The results of the study indicated that racial identity attitudes significantly predicted participants' immediate reactions to the counselor. We used Helms's (1984b) interaction model to discuss the results and their implications for counseling practice and research.     

The “Strange Acts of God:”The Hermeneutics of Concealment and Revelation in Luther and Shakespeare

Abstract: Martin Luther called himself “God's court‐jester”. He saw history as one of the “masks of God,” and he understood God as hiding Godself often behind the mask of the Devil. Luther developed a paradoxical theology, a theology of the cross, that is surprisingly compatible in certain respects with the paradoxical artistic vision of Shakespeare, especially in Hamlet, King Lear and Measure for Measure. Crucial motifs of Luther's theology—the hidden God, indirect revelation, revelation by concealment, revelation under the opposite, the “strange acts of God,” God's “rearward parts”(posteriora), and suffering (Anfechtungen and melancholy)—resonate with certain latent, even if at times blasphemeous, theological motifs and themes in Shakespeare. They also resonate with the experience of the Lutheran church in Hungary both in its past under communism and today in post‐communist Hungary.     

The “Grand Medium”: An Edwardsean Modification of Thomas Aquinas on the Beatific Vision

Jonathan Edwards's understanding of the beatific vision, which draws on Neoplatonist metaphysics, marks a modification of views that became dominant in the Western Church through the rise of Aristotelian anthropology as articulated in the theology of Thomas Aquinas. Edwards's account treats the resurrection of the body as significant, even indispensable for the deifying vision of God. It is also an account that regards Christ—the “grand medium” of the visio dei—as the consummate theophanic appearance of God. And it is, finally, an account that takes seriously the infinite progress of the vision of God, beginning in this life, continuing in the intermediate state, and on into the eternity of the resurrection.     

Theorizing cumulative dehumanization: An embodied praxis of “becoming” and resisting state‐sanctioned violence

This paper introduces a new conceptual framework referred to as “cumulative dehumanization” to better understand the ways in which dehumanization penetrates individual and collective bodies and minds, cutting across policy and ideology and accumulating materially and affectively over time and space. Cumulative dehumanization illuminates a web of vertical and horizontal, synthetic, and dynamic processes that result in an ongoing racialized, state‐sanctioned dehumanization that is fundamentally cumulative—both temporally and spatially—with a profusion of consequences attached. Within the landscape of aggressive surveillance and policing, we illuminate how cumulative dehumanization can be conceptualized as (i) an active condition of becoming, experienced as an accumulation of dehumanizing moments, structurally imposed on racialized communities under siege; (ii) a wearing down of the racialized and affective body, creating circuits of dispossession for entire communities; (iii) a product and (re)producer of the material and ideological modes undergirding racial capitalism; and (iv) a force met with individual and collective resistance. Linking literature on racial capitalism and affect, to the embodied social psychological phenomenon of dehumanization, cumulative dehumanization serves as a useful conceptual tool to examine the historical legacy of, processes embedded within, and entirety of collective consequences including resistance as inextricably linked. In doing so, we reveal the indivisibility of cognitive, embodied, psychological, social, material, ideological, and political circuits.     

The “Enemies of God” in Luther's Final Sermons: Jews,Papists, and the Problem of Blindness to Scripture

Martin Luther's attack on the supposed “enemies of God” in his final sermons was part of the reformer's concerted effort to announce his last will and testament for evangelical Christianity. Chiefly, the article defines what made Jews and “papists” distinct from other enemies in Luther's view. Jews and papists both had possessed Scripture since ancient times; yet they remained unreceptive—for reasons Luther struggled to explain—to the Word therein.     

promoting employability in a “flat” world

T. L. Friedman (2005) described a “flat” world platform where competition and collaboration take place in real time among people all over the planet. Implications exist for people to assume responsibility for managing their own careers and ensuring their own security in a global economy. This article addresses those challenges from both the individual's and the career counselor's perspectives. It proposes the “intelligent career” framework—comprising 3 “ways of knowing” and interdependencies among them—as a helpful basis for effective career development. People can use the framework to navigate their careers in order to develop new skills, develop broader reputations, and in turn sustain employability.     

Children lose confidence in their potential to “be scientists,” but not in their capacity to “do science”

Over the course of middle childhood, children's interest and beliefs about their own capacities for success in science often decline. This pernicious decline is especially evident among underrepresented groups, including girls, members of some racial and ethnic minorities, and children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. The present research (N = 306, ages 6–11) found that while children lose interest and feelings of efficacy about their potential to “be scientists” across middle childhood, they maintain more robust interest and efficacy about “doing science.” These patterns were confirmed in both longitudinal and cross‐sectional analyses; effects were stable or increased across time and age. Mediation analyses revealed that the positive effect of action framing is partially accounted for by children's views that the group of people who do science is more inclusive than the category of scientists. These findings suggest that using action‐focused language to encourage children in science is more inclusive and may lead to more science engagement across middle childhood than language that emphasizes scientists as an identity category. Implications for educational practices will be discussed.     

Derrida's “Antigonanette”: On the Quasi‐Transcendental

In this article, I rely both on Derrida's 1974 work Glas, as well as Derrida's 1971–72 lecture course, “La famille de Hegel,” to argue that the concept of the quasi‐transcendental is central to Derrida's reading of Hegel and to trace its implications beyond the Hegelian system. I follow Derrida's analysis of the role of Antigone—or, as the lecture course has it, “Antigonanette”—in Hegel's thought to argue that the quasi‐transcendental indicates a re(con)striction of empirical difference into the transcendental, which is thereby only ever provisionally transcendental. I then argue that the economy of difference indicated by the quasi‐transcendental is neither a general economy, nor is it in each case singular, but rather it ambivalently oscillates between these two. Finally, I treat the temporality of the quasi‐transcendental, arguing that the economy of difference indicated by the quasi‐transcendental is not prior to the re(con)striction of empirical difference, but is paradoxically produced by it by being retroactively constituted. I take up this analysis for the sake of describing what I contend is the quasi‐transcendental structure of constitutive exclusion, a way of understanding the conceptual structure of political bodies, and the political structure of concepts.     

THE SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER OF PHILIP HEFNER'S “CREATED CO‐CREATOR”

Philip Hefner's understanding of humans as “created co‐creators” has played a key role in the science and religion field, particularly as scholars consider the implications of emerging technologies for the human future. Hefner articulates his “created co‐creator” framework in the form of scientifically testable hypotheses supporting his core understanding of human nature, adopting the structure of Imre Lakatos's scientific research programme. This article provides a brief exposition of Hefner's model, examines his hypotheses in order to assess their scientific character, and evaluates them against the relevant findings of contemporary science. While Hefner's model is largely commensurate with contemporary science, he at times makes claims that cannot be scientifically falsified or corroborated. Hefner's accomplishments in demonstrating the scientific compatibility of many theological notions is admirable; however, his overall position would be strengthened with a more tacit acknowledgment of the limitations of scientific knowledge. His anthropology draws also from extrascientific commitments and is all the richer for it.     

“WHY BE MORAL?” The Cheng Brothers' Neo‐Confucian Answer

In this article, I present a neo‐Confucian answer, by Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, to the question, “Why should I be moral?” I argue that this answer is better than some representative answers in the Western philosophical tradition. According to the Chengs, one should be moral because it is a joy to perform moral actions. Sometimes one finds it a pain, instead of a joy, to perform moral actions only because one lacks the necessary genuine moral knowledge—knowledge that is accessible to every common person as long as one makes the effort to learn. One should make the effort to learn such knowledge—to seek joy in performing moral actions—because to be moral is a distinguishing mark of being human. This neo‐Confucian answer seems to be egoistic, as its conception of motivation for morality is based on self‐interest: to seek one's own joy. However, since it emphasizes that one's true self‐interest is to seek joy in things uniquely human, which is to be moral, self‐interest and morality become identical; the more a person seeks one's self‐interest, the more moral the person is, and vice versa.