Elaboration and numerical anchoring: Breadth,depth, and the role of (non‐)thoughtful processes in anchoring theories

Noted Judgment and Decision Making (JDM) researchers differ in their opinions of whether and how an attitudes and persuasion (A&;P) view of anchoring might add to the existing anchoring literature. Epley and Gilovich (2010) and Russo (2010) supported the breadth of variables that an attitudinal view of brings to bear on anchoring phenomena and the potential operation of different psychological processes across different contexts. They also suggest extensions to other types of anchors (along with Frederick et al. 2010), to alternative paradigms, and to other classes of moderators, such as goals. Authors of all three commentaries wondered if the evidence we presented speaks to traditional issues related to processes underlying anchoring. Frederick et al. (2010) also took a different approach in suggesting that anchoring is always due to non-thoughtful processes despite the fact that thoughtful processes can also influence judgments. This approach diverges from prominent reviews of the anchoring literature and implies that the presence of any simple, associative mechanism makes the overall process that involves that mechanism “non-thoughtful.” We discuss how this approach differs from our own, and we discuss the implications of the other observations in each commentary.     

Anchoring effects on performance judgments

Three studies were conducted investigating the effects of irrelevant anchors on performance judgments. Both a lab and field study demonstrated that an alternative anchoring manipulation that did not involve an explicit comparative question had effects on performance judgments similar to a traditional anchoring manipulation. The final study examined whether the anchoring effects were more likely when the anchor was highly applicable to the final judgment. The results indicated that both highly applicable and low applicable anchors produced an anchoring effect, but the highly applicable anchors had a larger effect on performance judgments. Evidence was also found for asymmetrical anchoring effects. In two of the three studies, high anchors increased performance judgments relative to the control group, whereas low anchors were not significantly different from the control group.     

The anchoring effect in metamemory monitoring

Judgments about future memory performance (metamemory judgments) are known to be susceptible to illusions and bias. Here we asked whether metamemory judgments are affected, like many other forms of judgment, by numerical anchors. Experiment 1 confirmed previous research showing an effect of informative anchors (e.g., past peer performance) on metamemory monitoring. In four further experiments, we then explored the effects of uninformative anchors. All of the experiments obtained significant anchoring effects on metamemory monitoring; in contrast, the anchors had no effect on recall itself. We also explored the anchoring effect on metamemory control (restudy choices) in Experiment 4. The results suggested that anchors can affect metamemory monitoring, which in turn affects metamemory control. The present research reveals that informative and, more importantly, uninformative numbers that have no influence on recall itself can bias metamemory judgments. On the basis of the current theoretical understanding of the anchoring effect and metamemory monitoring, these results offer insight into the processes that trigger metacognitive biases.     

Elaborating a simpler theory of anchoring

Within the classic anchoring paradigm, in which respondents are forced to consider provided numbers as possible responses to a target judgment, Wegener et al. (2008) proposed that cognitive load affects the psychological mechanism by which these anchors influence judgments. We propose, instead, that level of cognitive resources does not fundamentally affect how anchoring works, but only whether respondents can access other considerations that bear on the target judgment. Though we share the authors' view that environmental circumstances can influence the relative contribution of associative and deliberative inputs in judgments, we contend that cognitive load primarily affects the types of information that respondents consider, not the manner by which a focal element is processed.     

Taking the High (or Low) Road: A Quantifier Priming Perspective on Basic Anchoring Effects

ABSTRACT

Current explanations of basic anchoring effects, defined as the influence of an arbitrary number standard on an uncertain judgment, confound numerical values with vague quantifiers. I show that the consideration of numerical anchors may bias subsequent judgments primarily through the priming of quantifiers, rather than the numbers themselves. Study 1 varied the target of a numerical comparison judgment in a between-participants design, while holding the numerical anchor value constant. This design yielded an anchoring effect consistent with a quantifier priming hypothesis. Study 2 included a direct manipulation of vague quantifiers in the traditional anchoring paradigm. Finally, Study 3 examined the notion that specific associations between quantifiers, reflecting values on separate judgmental dimensions (i.e., the price and height of a target) can affect the direction of anchoring effects. Discussion focuses on the nature of vague quantifier priming in numerically anchored judgments.     

锚定判断中的心理刻度效应：来自ERP的证据

当前主要有两种理论解释锚定效应的发生机制：锚定调整启发模型和选择通达模型。同样,锚值可能是自发产生的,也可能是外部提供的。本研究用两个ERP实验分别探讨了不同精细程度的心理刻度对自发锚定加工和外部锚定加工的影响。结果表明,只有在自发锚引起的锚定加工中才出现心理刻度效应：在目标呈现后250~800ms之间,精细心理刻度比粗糙心理刻度诱发一个更大的波形正走向,支持锚定调整启发模型。在外部锚引起的锚定加工中,没有出现心理刻度效应,却出现了一个与通达有关的N300成分,支持选择通达加工模型。总的结果支持了锚定加工的双重属性：锚定判断是主动调整还是选择通达取决于不同的情境     

Are adjustments insufficient?

Many judgmental biases are thought to be the product of insufficient adjustment from an initial anchor value. Nearly all existing evidence of insufficient adjustment, however, comes from an experimental paradigm that evidence indicates does not involve adjustment at all. In this article, the authors first provide further evidence that some kinds of anchors (those that are self-generated and known to be incorrect but close to the correct answer) activate processes of adjustment, whereas others (uncertain anchors provided by an external source) do not. It is then shown that adjustment from self-generated anchors does indeed tend to be insufficient, both by comparing the estimates of participants starting from different anchor values and by comparing estimates with actual answers. Thus, evidence is provided of adjustment-based anchoring effects similar to the accessibility-based anchoring effects observed in the traditional anchoring paradigm, supporting theories of social judgment that rely on mechanisms of insufficient adjustment.     

Resisting persuasion by illegitimate means: a metacognitive perspective on minority influence

The present research tests a new metacognitive perspective on resistance in minority influence situations. It is proposed that when people initially resist persuasive messages from sources in the numerical minority, they can lose attitude certainty if they perceive that they have based their attitudes on the source's minority status and also believe this is an illegitimate basis for resistance. In three studies, participants were presented with a message from a minority source. In Study 1, participants became less certain of their attitudes after resisting this message. In Study 2, this effect only emerged when participants were led to believe they had based their attitudes on the source's minority status and this was an illegitimate thing to do. In Study 3, this effect was shown to have implications for persuasion in response to a second message. The implications of these findings for classic minority influence effects are discussed.     

The Effects of Argument Quality and Involvement Type on Attitude Formation and Attitude Change: A Test of Dual‐Process and Social Judgment Predictions

Involvement has long been theoretically specified as a crucial factor determining the persuasive impact of messages. In social judgment theory, ego‐involvement makes people more resistant to persuasion, whereas in dual‐process models, high‐involvement people are susceptible to persuasion when argument quality is high. It is argued that these disparate predictions might be reconciled by either different involvement types (i.e., value relevant vs. outcome relevant) or different attitude modification processes (i.e., attitude change vs. attitude formation). An experiment (N = 684) varying topic, position advocated, outcome relevance, and argument quality tested these moderators. The data were consistent with existence of two different types of involvement, but none of the theoretical predictions were consistent with the data. Instead, a main effect for argument quality had the largest impact on attitude change. Regardless of value‐relevant involvement, outcome‐relevant involvement, and attitude modification process, participants were more persuaded by high‐ rather than low‐quality arguments, with boomerang effects observed for low‐quality arguments. These findings highlight the importance of sound message design in persuasion.     

Anchoring,Activation, and the Construction of Values

Anchoring is a pervasive judgment bias in which decision makers are systematically influenced by random and uninformative starting points. While anchors have been shown to affect a broad range of judgments including answers to knowledge questions, monetary evaluations, and social judgments, the underlying causes of anchoring have been explored only recently. We suggest that anchors affect judgments by increasing the availability and construction of features that the anchor and target hold in common and reducing the availability of features of the target that differ from the anchor. We test this notion of anchoring as activation in five experiments that examine the effects of several experimental manipulations on judgments of value and belief as well as on measures of cognitive processes. Our results indicate that prompting subjects to consider features of the item that are different from the anchor reduces anchoring, while increasing consideration of similar features has no effect. The anchoring-as-activation approach provides a mechanism for debiasing anchoring and also points to a common mechanism underlying anchoring and a number of other judgment phenomena.     

Anchors aweigh: a demonstration of cross-modality anchoring and magnitude priming

Research has shown that judgments tend to assimilate to irrelevant "anchors." We extend anchoring effects to show that anchors can even operate across modalities by, apparently, priming a general sense of magnitude that is not moored to any unit or scale. An initial study showed that participants drawing long "anchor" lines made higher numerical estimates of target lengths than did those drawing shorter lines. We then replicated this finding, showing that a similar pattern was obtained even when the target estimates were not in the dimension of length. A third study showed that an anchor's length relative to its context, and not its absolute length, is the key to predicting the anchor's impact on judgments. A final study demonstrated that magnitude priming (priming a sense of largeness or smallness) is a plausible mechanism underlying the reported effects. We conclude that the boundary conditions of anchoring effects may be much looser than previously thought, with anchors operating across modalities and dimensions to bias judgment.     

锚定效应的研究范式、理论模型及应用启示

锚定效应是普遍存在的一种现象,它是指在不确定状态判断过程中,人们会以最初的信息作为参照点来调整对事件的估计,这往往会导致得出错误的判断。本文首先阐述了锚定效应的相关概念及经典研究范式,后者包括语意启动范式、数值启动范式、自发锚与外部锚启动范式等。然后对锚定效应的不充分调整启发模型、锚定调整模型、选择通达模型、双加工模型以及神经心理模型等进行了深入的探讨,并总结了锚定效应在经济管理等领域中的应用。最后指出了锚定效应的研究局限及未来的研究发展方向。     

Multiple anchoring of category rating scales

A psychophysical experiment compared the effects of two different kinds of anchoring upon category ratings of the sizes of squares: (1) single anchoring in which the same square was presented on every anchoring trial, and (2) multiple anchoring in which squares of different sizes were presented on anchoring trials. Subjects did not rate the anchors, only those squares presented on alternate trials as the series stimuli. The major finding was that the two kinds of anchoring have similar effects. As with the single anchor, the multiple anchor establishes a new endpoint for the scale of judgment. The previously demonstrated relationship of increasing and then decreasing contrast as a function of the remoteness of the single anchor (Sarris, 1967, 1976) was found also for multiple anchoring.     

We're Closer than I Thought: Social Network Heterogeneity,Morality, and Political Persuasion

Literature in the area of social networks indicates that increases in perceived social network attitudinal heterogeneity generate increased openness to attitude change. Recent evidence in the area of morality, however, shows that morally based attitudes are particularly resistant to persuasion and can result in the rejection of disagreeing others. Positing that considering morality would reduce network influence, an experiment varied moral cues presented along with a non‐network persuasive message while holding the actual content constant. Results demonstrate that morality and network composition interact to predict persuasion, such that when people are not cued to consider morality increased network heterogeneity predicts increased persuasion, but when identical messages are presented in a way that invokes morality the impact of network heterogeneity disappears or even reverses marginally. This interactive effect was replicated in two very different political issues: gay adoption and nationalized healthcare. Implications for persuasion by morally motivated sources independent of the effects of specific moral arguments are discussed.     

Subliminal anchoring: Judgmental consequences and underlying mechanisms

Judgmental anchoring—the assimilation of a numeric estimate towards a previously considered standard—is an exceptionally ubiquitous effect that influences human judgment in a variety of domains and paradigms. Three studies examined whether anchoring effects even occur, if anchor values are presented subliminally, outside of judges’ awareness. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate such subliminal anchoring effects: judges assimilated target estimates towards the subliminally presented anchor values. Study 3 further demonstrates that subliminal anchors produced a selective increase in the accessibility of anchor-consistent target knowledge. The implications of these findings for the ubiquity of judgmental anchoring, its different underlying mechanisms, and comparative information processing are discussed.     

Elaboration and numerical anchoring: Implications of attitude theories for consumer judgment and decision making

Researchers across many domains have examined the impact of externally presented numerical anchors on perceiver judgments. In the traditional paradigm, “anchored” judgments are typically explained as a result of elaborate thinking (i.e., confirmatory hypothesis testing that selectively activates anchor-consistent information in memory). Consistent with a long tradition in attitude change, we suggest that the same judgments can result from relatively thoughtful or non-thoughtful processes, with more thoughtful processes resulting in judgments that have more lasting impact. We review recent anchoring research consistent with this elaboration-based perspective and discuss implications for past anchoring results and theory in judgment and decision making.     

Elaboration and consequences of anchored estimates: An attitudinal perspective on numerical anchoring

In the standard numerical anchoring paradigm, the influence of externally provided anchors on judgment is typically explained as a result of elaborate thinking (i.e., confirmatory hypothesis testing that selectively activates anchor-consistent information in memory). In contrast, theories of attitude change suggest that the same judgments can result from relatively thoughtful or non-thoughtful processes, with more thoughtful processes resulting in judgments that last longer over time and better resist future attempts at change. Guided by an attitudinal approach to anchoring, four studies manipulated participants’ level of cognitive load to produce relatively high versus low levels of thinking. These studies show that, although anchoring can occur under both high and low thought conditions, anchoring based on a higher level of thinking involves greater use of judgment-relevant background knowledge, persists longer over time, is more resistant to subsequent attempts at social influence, and is less likely to result from direct numeric priming.     

A new look at the consequences of attitude certainty: the amplification hypothesis

It is well established that increasing attitude certainty makes attitudes more resistant to attack and more predictive of behavior. This finding has been interpreted as indicating that attitude certainty crystallizes attitudes, making them more durable and impactful. The current research challenges this crystallization hypothesis and proposes an amplification hypothesis, which suggests that instead of invariably strengthening an attitude, attitude certainty amplifies the dominant effect of the attitude on thought, judgment, and behavior. In 3 experiments, the authors test these competing hypotheses by comparing the effects of attitude certainty manipulations on univalent versus ambivalent attitudes. Across experiments, it is demonstrated that increasing attitude certainty strengthens attitudes (e.g., increases their resistance to persuasion) when attitudes are univalent but weakens attitudes (e.g., decreases their resistance to persuasion) when attitudes are ambivalent. These results are consistent with the amplification hypothesis.     

The effects of message recipients' power before and after persuasion: a self-validation analysis

In the present research, the authors examined the effect of a message recipient's power on attitude change and introduced a new mechanism by which power can affect social judgment. In line with prior research that suggested a link between power and approach tendencies, the authors hypothesized that having power increases confidence relative to being powerless. After demonstrating this link in Experiment 1, in 4 additional studies, they examined the role of power in persuasion as a function of when power is infused into the persuasion process. On the basis of the idea that power validates whatever mental content is accessible, they hypothesized that power would have different effects on persuasion depending on when power was induced. Specifically, the authors predicted that making people feel powerful prior to a message would validate their existing views and thus reduce the perceived need to attend to subsequent information. However, it was hypothesized that inducing power after a message has been processed would validate one's recently generated thoughts and thus influence the extent to which people rely upon their thoughts in determining their attitudes.     

The pursuit of self-interest: self-interest bias in attitude judgment and persuasion

Self-interest affected the direction of attitudes in 4 studies exploring attitude judgment and persuasion. Experiment 1 showed that both self-interest and symbolic concerns predicted attitudes. The biasing role of self-interest in producing the well-known persuasion effects of personal relevance and argument strength was examined by disentangling the competing effects of personal costs and benefits. Experiment 2 used a standard personal relevance manipulation in the absence of supportive arguments and showed that perceptions of personal costs associated with the advocated policy partially mediated its negative effects on attitudes. Experiments 3 and 4 independently manipulated the onset of personal costs associated with an issue and the onset of issue-related benefits conveyed by supportive arguments. Postmessage attitudes were an additive function of personal costs and argument-specified benefits, and perceived costs and benefits biased information processing in a self-interested manner. A revised conception of personal relevance and argument strength is discussed.