Genetic-Evidence That the Lewy Body Variant Is Indeed a Phenotypic Variant of Alzheimers-Disease

Lewy Body Variant (LBV) patients present as Alzheimers disease (AD) clinically; about two-thirds also have mild extrapyramidal features. At autopsy, neocortical and brain stem Lewy bodies are present in addition to changes diagnostic of AD. We have found that the Apolipoprotein E4 allele is a major genetic risk factor for LBV as it is for ′pure AD," in contrast to subjects with diffuse Lewy body disease or Parkinsons disease. This genetic evidence supports the concept that LBV-the second most common neurodegenerative form of dementia-is a phenotypic variant of AD.     

Agent communication pragmatics: the cognitive coherence approach

Different approaches have investigated the syntax and semantics of agent communication languages. However, these approaches have not indicated how agents should dynamically use communications. Instead of filling this pragmatics gap, most approaches have mainly focused on the ‘structure’ of dialogues even though developers are more interested in agents’ capabilities of having ‘useful’ automated conversations with respect to their goals rather than in their abilities to structure dialogues. This led us to work on a theory of the use of conversations between agents. In this paper, we propose a pragmatics theory which extends and adapts the cognitive dissonance theory (a major theory of social psychology) to multi-agent systems by unifying it with the theory of coherence in thought and action that issues from computational philosophy of mind. Precisely, we show how this theory allows us to provide generic conceptual tools for the automation of both agent communicational behavior and attitude change processes. This new motivational model is formulated in terms of constraints and elements of cognition and allows us to define cognitive incoherences and dialogue utility measures. We show how these measures could be used to solve common problems and answer some critical questions concerning agent communication frameworks use. Finally, our exploration in applying the cognitive coherence pragmatics theory as a new communication layer over classical BDI agents is presented. It relies on our dialogue games based agent communication language (DIAGAL) and our dialogue games simulator toolbox (DGS). The resulting framework provides the necessary theoretical and practical elements for implementing our theory. In doing so, it brings in a general scheme for automatizing agents’ communicational behavior as it is exemplified in this article.     

Relevance of education and intelligence for the political development of nations: Democracy, rule of law and political liberty

Political theory has described a positive linkage between education, cognitive ability and democracy. This assumption is confirmed by positive correlations between education, cognitive ability, and positively valued political conditions (N = 183 − 130). Longitudinal studies at the country level (N = 94 − 16) allow the analysis of causal relationships. It is shown that in the second half of the 20th century, education and intelligence had a strong positive impact on democracy, rule of law and political liberty independent from wealth (GDP) and chosen country sample. One possible mediator of these relationships is the attainment of higher stages of moral judgment fostered by cognitive ability, which is necessary for the function of democratic rules in society. The other mediators for citizens as well as for leaders could be the increased competence and willingness to process and seek information necessary for political decisions due to greater cognitive ability. There are also weaker and less stable reverse effects of the rule of law and political freedom on cognitive ability.     

Minds at rest? Social cognition as the default mode of cognizing and its putative relationship to the "default system" of the brain

The “default system” of the brain has been described as a set of regions which are ‘activated’ during rest and ‘deactivated’ during cognitively effortful tasks. To investigate the reliability of task-related deactivations, we performed a meta-analysis across 12 fMRI studies. Our results replicate previous findings by implicating medial frontal and parietal brain regions as part of the “default system”.However, the cognitive correlates of these deactivations remain unclear. In light of the importance of social cognitive abilities for human beings and their propensity to engage in such activities, we relate our results to findings from neuroimaging studies of social cognition. This demonstrates a remarkable overlap between the brain regions typically involved in social cognitive processes and the “default system”.We, henceforth, suggest that the physiological ‘baseline’ of the brain is intimately linked to a psychological ‘baseline’: human beings have a predisposition for social cognition as the default mode of cognizing which is implemented in the robust pattern of intrinsic brain activity known as the “default system”.     

Insight without cortex: lessons from the avian brain

Insight is a cognitive feature that is usually regarded as being generated by the neocortex and being present only in humans and possibly some closely related primates. In this essay we show that especially corvids display behavioral skills within the domains of object permanence, episodic memory, theory of mind, and tool use/causal reasoning that are insightful. These similarities between humans and corvids at the behavioral level are probably the result of a convergent evolution. Similarly, the telencephalic structures involved in higher cognitive functions in both species show a high degree of similarity, although the forebrain of birds has no cortex-like lamination. The neural substrate for insight-related cognitive functions in mammals and birds is thus not necessarily based on a laminated cortical structure but can be generated by differently organized forebrains. Hence, neither is insight restricted to mammals, as predicted from a “scala naturae”, nor is the laminated cortex a prerequisite for the highest cognitive functions.     

Direct perception in the intersubjective context

This paper, in opposition to the standard theories of social cognition found in psychology and cognitive science, defends the idea that direct perception plays an important role in social cognition. The two dominant theories, theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), both posit something more than a perceptual element as necessary for our ability to understand others, i.e., to “mindread” or “mentalize.” In contrast, certain phenomenological approaches depend heavily on the concept of perception and the idea that we have a direct perceptual grasp of the other person’s intentions, feelings, etc. This paper explains precisely what the notion of direct perception means, offers evidence from developmental studies, and proposes a non-simulationist interpretation of the neuroscience of mirror systems.     

Implicit cognitive development in cultural tools and children: lessons from Maya Mexico

Zinacantec Maya weaving tools and apprenticeship practices contain an implicit theory of cognitive development that corresponds to Piaget and Inhelder’s explicit theory of cognitive development [The Child’s Conception of Space, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956]. A set of preoperational and concrete operational spatial problems from the weaving domain provided empirical support for the ethnotheory of cognitive development implicit in Zinacantec weaving tools and their developmental sequencing. A structurally similar set of preoperational and concrete operational spatial problems were adapted from Piaget and Inhelder’s Swiss research. Both sets of problems were presented to children aged 4–13 in Nabenchauk, a Zinacantec hamlet in Chiapas, Mexico, and in Los Angeles, CA, USA. While the sequence of operational development was the same across both domains and both cultures, Zinacantec children were more precocious with the weaving problems, whereas U.S. children were more precocious with the spatial problems adapted from Piaget and Inhelder. After a brief instructional procedure, children in both Nabenchauk and Los Angeles improved on the weaving problems only, within the maturational constraints typical of concrete operational development. Nonetheless, the brief learning experience could not reverse the advantage of long-term cultural familiarity with backstrap-loom weaving. Our conclusions are threefold: (1) An implicit ethnotheory of cognitive development, built into the sequencing of cultural tools, can be as developmentally valid as an explicit formal theory. (2) Culture-general Piagetian stages are harnessed in culture-specific situations. (3) Maturational readiness interacts with both long-term cultural experience and short-term learning experience to actualize concrete operations in a specific context. Cross-context generalization of Piagetian stages is far from automatic; it requires cultural learning.     

A dual system for producing self-repairs in spontaneous speech: Evidence from experimentally elicited corrections

This paper presents a cognitive theory on the production and shaping of self-repairs during speaking. In an extensive experimental study, a new technique is tried out: artificial elicitation of self-repairs. The data clearly indicate that two mechanisms for computing the shape of self-repairs should be distinguished. One is based on the repair strategy called reformulation, the second one on lemma substitution. W. Levelt's (1983, Cognition, 14, 41–104) well-formedness rule, which connects self-repairs to coordinate structures, is shown to apply only to reformulations. In case of lemma substitution, a totally different set of rules is at work. The linguistic unit of central importance in reformulations is the major syntactic constituent; in lemma substitutions it is a prosodie unit, the phonological phrase. A parametrization of the model yielded a very satisfactory fit between observed and reconstructed scores. © 1987 Academic Press, Inc.     

DNA markers associated with general and specific cognitive abilities

Multivariate quantitative genetic research suggests a hierarchical model of cognitive abilities where genetic effects are largely general, cutting across most cognitive abilities. Some genetic effects, however, are specific to certain cognitive abilities. These results lead to a hypothesis for molecular genetic research: Although most genes associated with one cognitive ability will be related to other cognitive abilities, some genes will be specific to a particular cognitive ability. The current research explored this hypothesis in an analysis of data in specific cognitive abilities from 86 children from 6 to 12 years of age from a larger allelic association study of general cognitive ability. Eight DNA markers were entered simultaneously in separate multiple regression analyses predicting each of four specific cognitive ability factors (Verbal, Spatial, Perceptual Speed, Memory), as well as WISC-R subtest scores. Four marjers (CTGB33, EST00083, HLA, and SOD2) showed similar effects across the cognitive ability scales, suggesting that they are related to general cognitive ability (g). These associations became negligible when the effects of ‘g’ (WISC-R IQ) were removed. Three markers (ADH5, DM, and NGFB) continued to be significantly associated with specific cognitive ability scales after the effects of ‘g’ were removed. Although preliminary, these molecular genetic results support the hierarchical model predicted by quantitative genetic research.     

Hierarchical structure in perceptual representation

A theoretical framework for perceptual representation is presented which proposes that information is coded in hierarchical networks of nonverbal propositions. The hierarchical structure of the representations implies selective organization: Some subsets of a figure will be encoded as integral, structural units of that figure, while others will not. A context-sensitive metric for the “goodness” of a part within a figure is developed, corresponding to the probability that the subset will be encoded as a structural unit. Converging evidence supporting this position is presented from four different tasks using simple, straight-line figures. The tasks studied are (a) dividing figures into “natural” parts, (b) rating the “goodness” of parts within figures, (c) timed verification of parts within figures, and (d) timed mental synthesis of spatially separated parts into unitary figures. The results are discussed in terms of the proposed theory of representation, the processes that operate on those representations, and the general implications of the data for perceptual theories.     

Knowledge and the regularity theory of information

Fred Dretske's Knowledge and the Flow of Information is an extended attempt to develop a philosophically useful theory of information. Dretske adapts central ideas from Shannon and Weaver's mathematical theory of communication, and applies them to some traditional problems in epistemology. In doing so, he succeeds in building for philosophers a much-needed bridge to important work in cognitive science. The payoff for epistemologists is that Dretske promises a way out of a long-standing impasse — the Gettier problem. He offers an alternative model of knowledge as information-based belief, which purports to avoid the problems justificatory accounts face. This essay looks closely at Dretske's theory. I argue that while the information-theoretic framework is attractive, it does not provide an adequate account of knowledge. And there seems to be no way of tightening the theory without introducing some version of a theory of justification — the very notion Dretske's theory was designed to avoid.     

Mathematical models of foreign policy decision-making: Compensatory vs. noncompensatory

There are presently two leading foreign policy decision-making paradigms in vogue. The first is based on the classical or rational model originally posited by von Neumann and Morgenstern to explain microeconomic decisions. The second is based on the cybernetic perspective whose groundwork was laid by Herbert Simon in his early research on bounded rationality. In this paper we introduce a third perspective — thepoliheuristic theory of decision-making — as an alternative to the rational actor and cybernetic paradigms in international relations. This theory is drawn in large part from research on heuristics done in experimental cognitive psychology. According to the poliheuristic theory, policy makers use poly (many) heuristics while focusing on a very narrow range of options and dimensions when making decisions. Among them, the political dimension is noncompensatory. The paper also delineates the mathematical formulations of the three decision-making models.The authors thank Raymond Dacey for his helpful comments.     

The case for a dual-process theory of transitive reasoning

Ever since its popularisation by Piaget around 60 years ago, transitive reasoning (deductively-inferring A > C from premises A > B and B > C) has been of psychological interest both as a mental phenomenon and as a tool in areas of psychological discourse. However, the focus of interest in it has shifted periodically first from child development, to learning disability, to non-humans and currently to cognitive and clinical neuroscience. Crucially, such shifts have always been plagued by one core question – the question of which of two competing paradigms (extensive-training paradigm versus non-training paradigm) is valid for assessing transitive reasoning as originally conceived in Piagetian research. The continued avoidance of this question potentially undermines several important findings recently reported: Such as about exactly what is involved in deducing transitive inferences, which brain regions are critical for reaching transitive inference, and what links exist between weakened deductive transitivity and mental illnesses like schizophrenia. Here, we offer the view that both of the competing paradigms are indexing transitivity, but each one tends to tap a different aspect of it. Then, we summarise studies from child and adult cognitive psychology, disabilities research, and from cognitive neuroscience. These, together with studies of non-human reasoning, seem to afford a theory of transitive reasoning that has two major components; one deductive but the other associative. It is proposed that only a dual-process theory of transitivity (having analytic versus intuitive routes approximate to deductive versus associative processing respectively) can account both for the variety of findings and the apparently-disparate paradigms. However, fuzzy-trace theory (“Gist” processes and representations), if not already embodying such a dual-process theory, will need to be incorporated into any complete theory.     

Personal epistemology and theory of mind: deciphering young children's beliefs about knowledge and knowing

The beliefs that individuals hold about knowledge and knowing have been the focus of a growing body of work on “personal epistemology.” There has been general agreement among researchers about a developmental trajectory of epistemological understanding that takes place in adolescence and adulthood. Rarely has this research included children, however, and we know little about the origins of epistemological awareness or its early development. A separate group of researchers have investigated children's “theory of mind,” or the ability to understand others’ beliefs, actions, and desires, with primary attention to the onset of this cognitive achievement between the ages of 3 and 5. This article reviews the theoretical foundation for a proposed relation between these constructs, and reports on an exploratory investigation with 3–5 year olds, in which epistemological level was significantly related to theory of mind ability. Results are discussed in relation to a general timeline depicting the development of children's beliefs about knowledge and knowing, a process that involves an ongoing tension between objective and subjective perspectives. We propose that the trajectory of epistemological development be expanded to include an initial period of egocentric subjectivity that characterizes epistemological thinking prior to the achievement of theory of mind.     

Cognitive epidemiology: With emphasis on untangling cognitive ability and socioeconomic status

This commentary touches on practical, public policy, and social science domains informed by cognitive epidemiology while pulling together common themes running through this important special issue. As is made clear in the contributions assembled here, and others (Deary, Whalley, & Starr, 2009; Gottfredson, 2004; Lubinski & Humphreys, 1992, 1997), social scientists and practitioners cannot afford to neglect cognitive ability when modeling epidemiological and health care phenomena. However, given the dominant concern about the confounding of general cognitive ability (GCA) and socioeconomic status (SES), and the extent to which SES is frequently seen as the primary cause of health disparities (while GCA is neglected as a possible influence in epidemiology and health psychology), some methodological applications for untangling the relative influences of GCA and SES are reviewed. In addition, cognitive epidemiology is placed in a broader context: Just as cognitive epidemiology facilitates an understanding of pathology (“at risk” populations, and ways to attenuate undesirable personal and social conditions), it may also enrich our understanding of optimal functioning (“at promise” populations, and ways to identify and nurture the human and social capital needed to develop innovations for saving lives, economies, and perhaps even our planet). Finally, while GCA is likely the most important dimension in the study of individual differences for modeling healthy behaviors and outcomes, other relatively independent dimensions of psychological diversity do add value (Krueger, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2000). For example, compliance has at least two psychological components: a “can do” competency component (ability) and a “will do” motivational component (conscientiousness). Ultimately, developing and modeling healthy behaviors, interpersonal environments, and medical maladies are best accomplished by teaming multiple dimensions of human individuality.     

Evading conceptual self-annihilation: Some implications of Albert Bandura's theory of the self-system for the status of psychology

There are two cognitive revolutions occuring in psychology. The first in the fields of perception, memory, language and thought uses information processing and computer models of cognition. The second in learning theory and behavioral therapy uses folk psychological concepts of cognition. To test the philosophical compatibility of these cognitive revolutions I examine the implications of Albert Bandura's theory of the self-system for the disputed question of the status of folk psychology. I argue that if the theory of the self-system is correct, then strong eliminative materialist claims about the falsity of folk psychology are disconfirmed, functionalist homunculi hypotheses need modification, and certain constraints are imposed on neurophysiological accounts of the self. Thus I conclude that the cognitive revolution in learning theory and behavior therapy is making its own distinctive contribution to the new philosophical psychology emerging from the cognitive revolution in psychology as a whole.     

Implications of research for the treatment of depressive disorders during childhood

Basic research into the prevalence, natural course, and phenomena of comorbidity of depressive disorders during childhood are reviewed and implications of this research for treating depressed youths are noted. Results of investigations into the biological aspects of depression are integrated into a multifactorial model of depressive disorders during childhood and the efficacy of pharmacological interventions is discussed. Cognitive theory is integrated with attachment theory to explain a possible avenue to the development of depressive disorders during childhood. Interpersonal therapy has emerged as a potentially effective intervention for depressed youths. Basic tenets of this treatment model are compared and contrasted to a cognitive-behavioral treatment model, and a hybrid treatment referred to as “cognitive therapy within the interpersonal context” is proposed.     

Intertheoretical Identity And Ontological Reductions

I argue that there are good reasons to assume that Quine’s theory of reference and ontology is incompatible with reductive statements – such as ‘Heat is molecular motion’ or ‘Rabbits are conglomerations of cells’. Apparently, reductive statements imply certain intertheoretical identities, yet Quine’s theory of reference and ontology seems incompatible with intertheoretical identities. I argued that treating, for the sake of reconciliation, reductive statements along the lines of Quine’s theory of an ontological reduction (which does not imply intertheoretical identity) fails. Then I discussed two alternative strategies on behalf of Quine to handle reductive statements: the Holistic Strategy (which appeals to Quine’s notion of an all-encompassing background theory) and the Individuative Strategy (which draws on Quine’s notion of an apparatus of individuation). I argue that the Individuative Strategy promises to succeed. However, the Individuative Strategy obliges to revising Quine’s theory of an ontological reduction – a revision that, as I argue, can and should be implemented.     

A Theoretical Framework for Understanding Help-Seeking Processes Among Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence

This paper suggests a conceptual framework for understanding the processes of help-seeking among survivors of intimate partner violence (IPV). A cognitive theory from general literature on help-seeking in “stigmatizing” situations suggests three relevant processes or stages of seeking help in the IPV context: defining the problem, deciding to seek help, and selecting a source of support. Individual, interpersonal, and sociocultural factors that influence decision-making at each of these stages are discussed and illustrated with case examples.