Recent contributions to the theory of defense mechanisms: a comparative view

Some of the most recent contributions to the theory of defense mechanisms are critically reviewed including theories of complex motivational properties of the ego (Schafer, 1968; Kris, 1984), a functional theory of defense (Brenner, 1982), an object-representational theory of defense (Kernberg, 1976), a "two-person" theory of defense (Modell, 1984) and a self-psychologically based theory of defense (Kohut, 1984). These recently proposed theories of defense mechanisms utilize differing levels of analytic observation and theoretical discourse. One of the major differences among theorists involves the variety of referents of defense mechanisms (i.e., what is being defended against) including impulse, drive derivative, object loss, or environmental failure. Another fundamental difference involves the variety of ways theorists regard the relation between internal homeostasis and the external world. Questions are raised about the recent tendency in psychoanalytic theory to develop or invoke different theories of defense to explain a broad range of clinical phenomena.     

Further contributions to the mathematical theory of human relations

In continuation of a previous paper, some consequences of the fundamental equations established there are studied. For some simple hypothetical cases it is shown how some of the parameters which enter in the equations governing the structure of the social group can be determined by means of those equations from actually observable data. Furthermore some general properties of the variation with respect to time of the fundamental distribution function, which enters in the equations, are derived.     

Protopopov's ideas on habit formation and their relation to the Pavlovian theory of higher nervous activity

In 1929 Viktor P. Protopopov began to replicate E. L. Thorndike's animal experiments on habit acquisition. To determine the conditions necessary for habit formation, Protopopov used the natural experiment method, in which dogs encountered environments that prevented them from reaching a stimulus-bait. Not all dogs acquired the behavior necessary for obtaining the bait. Explaining the results within the framework of the Pavlovian theory of higher nervous activity, Protopopov concluded that habits were acquired when an active animal provoked by a bait-stimulus encountered an environmental barrier. The dogs tried a series of phylogenetic behaviors until the stimulus-bait was reached. The latter movements were retained, forming an ontogenetic habit. The dogs also learned not to produce the unsuccessful movements. In accord with the Pavlovian theory, individual differences in habit formation were related to temperament types. A critique of the Thorndikian Law of Effect is provided in terms of the Pavlovian theory of higher nervous activity.     

Domain-general contributions to social reasoning: theory of mind and deontic reasoning re-explored

Using older adults and dual-task interference, we examined performance on two social reasoning tasks: theory of mind (ToM) tasks and versions of the deontic selection task involving social contracts and hazardous conditions. In line with performance accounts of social reasoning, evidence from both aging and the dual-task method suggested that domain-general resources contribute to performance of these tasks. Specifically, older adults were impaired relative to younger adults on all types of social reasoning tasks tested; performance varied as a function of the demands these tasks placed on domain-general resources. Moreover, in younger adults, simultaneous performance of a working memory task interfered with younger adults' performance on both types of social reasoning tasks; here too, the magnitude of the interference effect varied with the processing demands of each task. Limits placed on social reasoning by executive functions contribute a great deal to performance, even in old age and in healthy younger adults under conditions of divided attention. The role of potentially non-modular and modular contributions to social reasoning is discussed.     

Cognitive contributions to theory of mind ability in children with a traumatic head injury

The objective of the current study is to examine the contribution of intellectual abilities, executive functions (EF), and facial emotion recognition to difficulties in Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities in children with a traumatic head injury. Israeli children with a traumatic head injury were compared with their non-injured counterparts. Each group included 18 children (12 males) ages 7–13. Measurements included reading the mind in the eyes, facial emotion recognition, reasoning the other’s characteristics based on motive and outcome, Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices, similarities and digit span (Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Revised 95 subscales), verbal fluency, and the Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Functions. Non-injured children performed significantly better on ToM, abstract reasoning, and EF measures compared with children with a traumatic head injury. However, differences in ToM abilities between the groups were no longer significant after controlling for abstract reasoning, working memory, verbal fluency, or facial emotion recognition. Impaired ToM recognition and reasoning abilities after a head injury may result from other cognitive impairments. In children with mild and moderate head injury, poorer performance on ToM tasks may reflect poorer abstract reasoning, a general tendency to concretize stimuli, working memory and verbal fluency deficits, and difficulties in facial emotion recognition, rather than deficits in the ability to understand the other’s thoughts and emotions. ToM impairments may be secondary to a range of cognitive deficits in determining social outcomes in this population.     

Lenin's relationship to the ideas of physicists

History and the philosophy of science have played a very important role in dialectical materialism; their results have been destined to support the correctness of the ideas of Marxist philosophers, especially in their application in historical materialism.From this point of view, the circumstances of the origin of the works of the Marxist classics cannot be neglected: Engels wrote hisDialectics in Nature in the period of classical physics, and Lenin published hisMaterialism and Empirio-Criticism at the beginning of the 20th century when our modern physics first began: shortly before the publication of Lenin's book, Röntgen and Becquerel discovered new kinds of radiation, Balmer published his ideas concerning the regularity of the hydrogen spectrum, Plank wrote his first articles about the elementary quantum and Einstein published his three famous articles (1905).During this period, physicists themselves did not understand their results, so important for the further development of physics. In this atmosphere of uncertainty, Lenin — a lawyer and politician — undertook his attempt to criticise the ideas of physicists.We trace one misinterpretation by Lenin of these ideas from books by Mach and Helmholtz.     

The influence of Weismann's germ-plasm theory on the distinction between learned and innate behavior

Since the early twentieth century it has been common in both psychology and behavioral biology to draw a sharp distinction between learned and innate behavior, or elements of behavior. The persistence of this dichotomy may be attributed in part to the fundamental importance of the separation of inherited and acquired characters within neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, one of the essential foundations for the modern study of behavior. A cornerstone of early neo-Darwinian thought was August Weismann's theory of the germ plasm, which proposed a segregation between germinal and somatic cells during development, thus ruling out the possibility that acquired characters could be inherited. This denial of Lamarckian hereditary mechanisms became one of the hallmarks of neo-Darwinism, as opposed to classical Darwinism. Within the neo-Darwinian framework it thus became important, as Weismann himself pointed out, to distinguish sharply between inherited and acquired characters. Although the dichotomy has frequently been criticized it remains tenacious, surfacing in different guises as older versions of it became terminologically unacceptable. The analysis offered here suggests that this tenacity may partly be explained by the implications of Weismann's germ-plasm theory, and its modern incarnation in the central dogma of molecular genetics, and by the central thematic position of those ideas in the neo-Darwinian foundations of modern behavioral biology.