The location problem for color subjectivism

According to color subjectivism, colors are mental properties, processes, or events of visual experiences of color. I first lay out an argument for subjectivism founded on claims from visual science and show that it also relies on a philosophical assumption. I then argue that subjectivism is untenable because this view cannot provide a plausible account of color perception. I describe three versions of subjectivism, each of which combines subjectivism with a theory of perception, namely sense datum theory, adverbialism, and the virtual color proposal, and argue that each version faces serious objections. Considering these three theories of perception to be exhaustive of those available to the subjectivist, I conclude that subjectivism is untenable and that the scientifically motivated argument for this view is unsound. I then offer the diagnosis that the philosophical assumption on which this argument relies is mistaken.     

Between Subjects: Commentary on Paper by Robert P. Drozek

This commentary on Drozek's paper outlines its key points under 10 headings, looking at various aspects of the intrapsychic and intersubjective elements involved in understanding motivation. There is discussion of issues of autonomy and dignity based upon Kant's philosophy that underpin the paper's assumptions about unconditional valuing of the other as a universal element of intersubjective motivation. In the commentary attention is paid to the role of desire in motivation, as well as some of the psychoanalytical literature on motivation, including papers by Sandler, Loewald, and Winnicott, some aspects of which connect up with the paper's theses. At various points, some of the clinical relevance of the paper's proposals are brought to light, in particular how the patient may be in a position to use the analyst's interventions as a source of intersubjective motivation.     

A Note on (K)Nots: Response to Robert W. Kentridge''s Commentary

GY, an extensively studied human hemianope, is aware of salient visual events in his cortically blind field but does not call this "vision." To learn whether he has low-level conscious visual sensations or whether instead he has gained conscious knowledge about, or access to, visual information that does not produce a conscious phenomenal sensation, we attempted to image process a stimulus s presented to the impaired field so that when the transformed stimulus T(s) was presented to the normal hemifield it would cause a sensation similar to that caused by s in the impaired field. While degradation of contrast, spatio-temporal filtering, contrast reversal, and addition of smear and random blobs all failed to match the response to a flashed bar s(f), moving textures of low contrast were accepted to match the response to a moving contrast-defined bar, s(m). Orientation and motion direction discrimination of the perceptually matched stimuli [s(m) and T(s(m))] was closely similar. We suggest that the existence of a satisfactory match indicates that GY has phenomenal vision.     

Strategies and problem representations: Implications for models of changing cognitive structure. Commentary on “Learning new problem-solving strategies leads to changes in problem representation” by M.W. Alibali,K.M. Ockuly and A.D. Fischer

In an accompanying study, Alibali et al. [Alibali, M. W., Ockuly, K. M., Fischer, A. D. (2009) Learning new problem-solving strategies leads to changes in problem representation. Cognitive Development, 24, 89–101.] present an important experimental result: introducing a new strategy can affect conceptual aspects of children's problem representation. In this commentary, we briefly explore implications of this finding for theories of the development of mathematical cognition and of the development of cognitive structures, more generally. We argue that Alibali et al.’s results, taken in the context of previous findings, imply that children's actions during mathematical problem solving affect their subsequent understanding of the problem. We further suggest that results such as these may be best accommodated by reconceptualizing how cognitive structures achieve both stability and flexibility.     

The Achilles Heel of Psychoanalysis: Meditations on Motivation: Commentary on Paper by Robert P. Drozek

In discussing Robert P. Drozek's “Intersubjectivity Theory and the Dilemma of Intersubjective Motivation,” I consider the challenges inherent to general theories of motivation in contemporary psychoanalysis, challenges that are further complicated by our multiple theories of intersubjectivity. While I agree with Drozek that individuals can be motivated by aspects of others' subjective experience I would not raise this phenomenon to a general theory of motivation. I explain why I feel that motivation is a fraught topic in contemporary psychoanalysis, and I suggest reasons that relational authors have often addressed this topic only obliquely. I also take issue with Drozek's claim that, to date, psychoanalysis has no motivational theory that addresses both the intrapsychic and the intersubjective realms. In reviewing the ideas of several authors whose theories Drozek rejects because he believes their work reduces motivation to the intrapsychic, I find that these authors have addressed the intersubjective and intrapsychic aspects of motivation far more adequately and complexly than Drozek has recognized. Thus while I admire the energy and logic—even at times the eloquence—with which Drozek presents his ideas, I question whether psychoanalysis needs a new motivational theory at this point in time.     

Love Will Do the Thing That's Right: Commentary on Paper by Stuart A. Pizer,Ph.D., A.B.P.P.

In this paper, hope is explored as a motivating force in analysis. To see the patient's and the analyst's hopes in terms of changes they expect the treatment to accomplish emphasizes the cognitive aspect of hope. While touching on these cognitive expectations, this paper focuses on the emotional, rather than the cognitive, function of hope in treatment. It addresses the question of how hope can inspire analytic participants to have the strength and stamina that analysis requires.     

Expressivist to the core: Metaaesthetic subjectivism is stable and robust

Two common observations about aesthetics are in tension: that people generally consider aesthetic judgments subjective, and that people generally behave like objectivists (arguing over judgments, making choices based on judgments of trusted critics, rejecting strong assertions of aesthetic equivalence). This tension would be resolved if the first observation turned out to be false—if people endorsed subjectivism weakly, flexibly, or rarely. We tested whether people can be pushed to endorse objectivism under certain circumstances. Across a large sample (N = 588), aesthetic subjectivism proved consistent and robust to experimental manipulations. Even judgments that reflected participants' own evaluations of artworks were considered just as subjective as judgments directly opposed to their personal evaluations. We conclude that the apparent tension can be explained by the philosophical position of expressivism and discuss expressivism's prospects as a framework for understanding aesthetic judgment.     

Precuing benefits for color and location in a visual search task

Selection in multiple-item displays has been shown to benefit immensely from advance knowledge of target location (e.g., Henderson, 1991), leading to the suggestion that location is completely dominant in visual selective attention (e.g., Tsal & Lavie, 1993). Recently, direct selection by color has been reported in displays in which location does not vary (Vierck & Miller, 2005). The present experiment investigated the possibility of independent selection by color in a task with multiple-item displays and location precues in order to see whether color is also used for selection even when target location does vary and supposedly dominant location precues can be used. Precues provided independent information about the location and color of a target, and each type of precue could be either valid or invalid. The precues were followed by brief displays of six letters in six different colors, and participants had to discriminate the case of a prespecified target letter (e.g., R vs. r). Performance was much better when location cues were valid than when they were invalid, confirming the large advantage associated with valid advance location information. Performance was also better with valid advance color information, however, both when location cues were valid and when they were invalid. But these color benefits were dependent on the closeness of the colored letter to the cued location. Our results thus suggest that selection by color in a multiple-item display, where location and color information are independent from each other and equalized, is mediated by location information.     

Non-monotonic relationships between emotional arousal and memory for color and location

Recent research points to the decreased diagnostic value of subjective retrieval experience for memory accuracy for emotional stimuli. While for neutral stimuli rich recollective experiences are associated with better context memory than merely familiar memories this association appears questionable for emotional stimuli. The present research tested the implicit assumption that the effect of emotional arousal on memory is monotonic, that is, steadily increasing (or decreasing) with increasing arousal. In two experiments emotional arousal was manipulated in three steps using emotional pictures and subjective retrieval experience as well as context memory were assessed. The results show an inverted U-shape relationship between arousal and recognition memory but for context memory and retrieval experience the relationship was more complex. For frame colour, context memory decreased linearly while for spatial location it followed the inverted U-shape function. The complex, non-monotonic relationships between arousal and memory are discussed as possible explanations for earlier divergent findings.